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Abstract: 
 
This thesis challenges two key assumptions made in the current Islamic banking 
literature. Firstly, this thesis challenges and empirically invalidates the assumption that 
all Islamic banks are indistinguishable from their conventional counterparts and are thus 
equally unIslamic. To do so, this thesis uses the profit and loss sharing (PLS) criteria, 
which is central to the philosophy of Islamic banking and is the key principle 
differentiating Islamic from conventional banking, in theory and practice. By 
investigating variation in PLS levels between Islamic banks and comparing with 
conventional banks with and without Islamic windows, this thesis illustrates that the 
Islamic banking industry does not comprise a homogeneous group of banks that are all 
indistinguishable from their conventional counterparts. Rather, a typology of Islamic 
banks exists, comprising of three distinct groups of banks, each one following a 
different business model. While one group can genuinely be considered 
indistinguishable from conventional banks, another group shows clear evidence of 
pursuing PLS-oriented strategies in formulating its asset portfolio, differentiating itself 
from the purely debt-based intermediation model adopted by conventional banks. As 
such, empirical evidence shows that some Islamic banks are, in practice, operating 
closer to the PLS principle and can thus be considered more Islamic than others. Further 
investigation illustrates that the institutional environment matters for the provision of 
ideal PLS Islamic financing instruments.  
Secondly, this thesis overcomes two methodological issues to compare the corporate 
social performance (CSP) of Islamic and conventional banks. In doing so, this thesis 
challenges the second identified assumption from the literature, that religion-specific 
category of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is particular to Islamic banking, and 
invalidates it on conceptual, theoretical and empirical basis. A novel CSP Index based 
on the evidence-based disclosure criteria, comprising of 6 dimensions and 25 social 
performance indicators is constructed and complemented with three Social Performance 
Quantitative Indicators (SPQIs) to compare the CSP of Islamic and conventional banks. 
From this comparison, this thesis concludes that, contrary to the industry’s claims and 
expectations held of it, Islamic banking does not offer an ethical alternative to 
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conventional banking. Differences in the level and composition of CSP between the two 
industries are more subtle and require a nuanced approach to be studied.  
 
Key words: Islamic Banking, Profit-and-Loss Sharing (PLS), Transaction Cost 
Analysis, Cluster Analysis, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP), Content Analysis, Legitimacy Theory, Stakeholder Theory, 
Institutional Theory, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction    
1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Why Study Islamic Banking? 
Islamic banking has developed from a niche to a prominent feature of the international 
financial sector since its inception in the 1970s. The industry has flourished over the 
last four decades, becoming one of the fastest growing segments of the global banking 
market. With a compound annual growth rate of 38.5% (2004-2011) (IFSB, 2013), 
Islamic banking assets worldwide crossed the $1 trillion mark in 2011 (Reuters, 2012). 
The industry has truly become an international financial phenomenon, with more than 
600 Islamic financial institutions spread across 70-plus countries (ADB and IFSB, 
2015). The industry has become “systematically important” in some and “too big to 
ignore” in other markets (Hasan and Dridi, 2010, p.33). The Gulf Co-operation Council 
(GCC) nevertheless, remains the centre of the Islamic financial industry. The region 
houses the biggest and the largest collection of Islamic banks worldwide. 14 of the top 
20 Islamic banks comprising 55% of the global Islamic banking assets are located in the 
GCC. In Saudi Arabia, Islamic banking now represents over 50% of total banking 
assets (Ernst & Young, 2012). Given its pivotal role in the Islamic banking industry, 
this thesis focuses on the GCC region. 
1.2 Research Questions 
Two aspects of Islamic banking need to be considered for a holistic understanding of 
this phenomenon. First, is the financial aspect, which in theory is premised on the 
principle of profit-and-loss sharing (PLS). Second, is the social aspect of Islamic 
banking, which in theory translates into the promotion of social and developmental 
goals (Warde, 2000). This thesis considers both aspects of Islamic banking. In doing so, 
it questions two key assumptions that have been identified from the current literature, 
one relating to each aspect of Islamic banking. These are introduced below, leading to 
the research questions this thesis aims to answer. 
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1.2.1 The Financial Aspect of Islamic Banking 
The emergence of Islamic banking in the 1970s started a global debate, raising 
questions such as: How different is Islamic banking from conventional banking? Does it 
offer a genuine alternative? And is it even ‘Islamic’? Almost half a century later, these 
questions still hold enormous significance for research, the global banking industry and 
policy-making, as they question the legitimacy of a multibillion-dollar industry that is 
rapidly increasing its presence worldwide. Given their importance, these questions have 
already received considerable academic interest. Repeatedly, however, the same 
conclusions have been drawn in the literature i.e. Islamic banking is “not very different 
from conventional banking” (Chong and Liu, 2009, p.125); Islamic banks “do not 
operate much differently from conventional banks” (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000, p. 
118); Islamic banks follow a business model that appears to “not be too different” from 
their conventional counterparts’ (Beck et al., 2013, p.445); there are “merely superficial 
differences” between Islamic and conventional banks (Zaman and Movassaghi, 2002, 
p.2429) and that Islamic banking offers “merely a semantic difference” from 
conventional banking (Kuran, 2004, p.10), as it relies on “shari’a arbitrage”, the 
difference in language, contractual forms and transaction structures, (El-Gamal, 2006, 
p.20) to create a “de jure distinction” from conventional banking without offering a de 
facto alternative to the interest-bearing loan contract (Khan, 2010, p.806). Thus, the 
entire Islamic banking industry has been dismissed as simply “indistinguishable from 
conventional banking” (Khan, 2010, p. 805).  
Although the literature appears to have reached a definitive conclusion, this thesis will 
provide new insights that challenge our current understanding of Islamic banking and 
illustrate using empirical evidence how these earlier conclusions are not fully valid. In 
doing so, this thesis challenges the implicit assumption that the abovementioned 
conclusions rely upon. By dismissing the entire industry, the current literature implicitly 
assumes that Islamic banking industry comprises of a homogenous group of banks that 
are all indistinguishable from their conventional counterparts and thus equally un-
Islamic. Does the Islamic banking comprise of a homogenous group of banks or are 
there subgroups, some differentiable from conventional banks while others are not? To 
answer this, one must first understand the criteria upon which the conclusions thus far 
have been drawn which at their core relate to the concept of profit-and-loss-sharing 
(PLS), the significance of which is explained below. 
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Background  
Islamic banking exists to provide alternative forms of financial services that are 
consistent with the sharia1. The prohibition of riba, commonly translated as a ban on 
interest, is considered to be the central tenet of the Islamic financial system (Iqbal and 
Tsubota, 2006). Providing interest-free financial services has therefore become the sine 
qua non of Islamic banking. The alternative to interest-based lending that the theory of 
Islamic banking propagates is profit-and-loss-sharing (PLS), i.e. an equity-based form 
of financial intermediation. The entire theoretical model of Islamic banking is based on 
the principle of PLS. PLS exists in contractual agreements where two or more parties’ 
pool resources for investment purposes and share the resulting profits and losses at pre-
specified ratios (Dar et al., 1999). The contracts of musharakah (equity partnership) and 
mudarabah (silent partnership) premised on this PLS principle are considered “the real 
and ideal instruments of Islamic financing” (Usmani, 2004, p.12).  
Despite its centrality to Islamic banking, in practice Islamic banks rely predominantly 
on non-PLS instruments. These are criticised precisely for being a “cumbersome form 
of interest” (Kuran, 1995, p.162), as they rely on “otherwise unnecessary SPVs 
[special-purpose vehicles] or the addition of superfluous financial transactions” to gain 
religious legitimacy through establishing structural differences from conventional 
interest-bearing counterparts (El-Gamal, 2006, p.21). Such ‘sharia-compliant’ 
alternatives are argued to be forms of legal tricks, where contractual techniques 
permitted under sharia, are employed in such a way to overcome rulings on that which 
is prohibited (El-Diwany, 2010 p. 122). Two of the most prominent financing methods, 
murabahah (cost-plus-credit-sale) and ijarah (lease), which on average exceed more 
than 80% of Islamic banks’ asset portfolio (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2002), are criticised 
heavily as legal ruses, designed to circumvent the prohibition of riba and replicate 
interest-based debt finance contracts (Kuran, 1995, 2004; Zaman and Movassaghi, 
2002; El-Gamal 2006; Zaman 2008; Khan 2010, El-Diwany, 2010). Due to their 
reliance on such non-PLS instruments which conform to the letter but not the spirit of 
the sharia, Islamic banks are widely criticised to be operating no different from their 
1 Sharia is considered to be God-given set of instructions (divine guidance) on how to live one’s life and 
thus encompasses all aspects of a Muslim's life including beliefs, laws and morals. It stems from the holy 
book of Islam (the Quran) and the example of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad (peace be upon him), see 
chapter 2 for details.  
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conventional counterparts whilst supporting only a de jure Islamic identity (Khan, 
2010). 
Thus, the lack of PLS financing (musharakah and mudarabah contracts) is at the core of 
the criticism of Islamic banking. While the extant Islamic banking literature has 
criticised Islamic banks for relying on the controversial non-PLS instruments, the extent 
of variation in PLS financing levels across different Islamic banks and the potential 
reasons for such differences have largely been neglected thus far. Are some banks 
operating closer to the principle of PLS than others? If so, why? This question has not 
been considered in the literature as yet and is the subject of investigation in this thesis.  
By answering this question, the above-mentioned assumption of homogeneity in 
Islamic banks can be tested. As banks adopt more PLS, they not only “become more 
Islamic” (Azmat et al., 2015, p.254) but also different to conventional banks which 
operate on debt-based lending. Thus, by investigating variation in PLS levels between 
individual banks, one can assess if the Islamic banking industry comprise of 
homogeneous group of banks that have negligible levels of PLS and therefore are all 
indistinguishable from their conventional counterparts. To be able to address this 
however, it is first important to understand why the Islamic banking industry diverged 
from its PLS oriented theory towards non-PLS alternatives. Therefore the following two 
questions will be addressed sequentially in the first part (chapter 3 and 4) of this thesis. 
1. How and why has the Islamic banking industry diverged from its PLS-oriented 
theory towards non-PLS oriented practices?  
2. Are some Islamic banks operating closer to the principle of PLS than others, and 
therefore can be considered more Islamic? If so, what factors enable some banks 
to provide more PLS financing than others? 
1.2.2 The Social Aspect of Islamic Banking 
The 2008 financial crisis has reignited the debate about ethics in banking and finance 
(Wilson, 2009). An increasing focus is now being paid to the alternative, ethical forms 
of banking and comparisons are being drawn between the ethical and conventional 
banking models (see Paulet et al., 2015 for a recent comparison). Islamic banking bears 
an ‘ethical identity’, due to its philosophical roots in religion (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2007; Aribi and Arun, 2015). In the four-year period following the onset of the financial 
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crisis, Islamic banking assets grew at an average rate of 17% per annum, 2-3 times 
faster than the rate of their  conventional counterparts (Ernst & Young, 2014; BBC 
News, 2014). Naturally, the industry attracted a lot of attention and there is much 
interest in comparative studies of Islamic and conventional banking. A significant part 
of the extant literature however has focused on comparing banking models, financial 
and operational performance including efficiency and productivity, default rates and 
risk as well as the impact of the financial crisis on the profitability, asset growth, 
stability and resilience of Islamic and conventional banks (see e.g. Abdul-Majid et al., 
2010; Hasan and Dridi, 2010; Srairi, 2010; Beck et al., 2013; Bourkhis and Nabi, 2013; 
Mobarek and Kalonov, 2013; Johnes et al., 2014; Baele et al., 2014; Saeed and Izzeldin, 
20 16). None thus far, to the best of my knowledge, have conducted a systematic 
comparison of Islamic and conventional banks corporate social performance (CSP) in 
the period immediately after the financial crisis. 
Comparison of Islamic and conventional banks’ social performance is not only timely 
in light of the renewed search for ethical alternatives, but also an opportunity to test the 
claims made by and expectations held of Islamic banks. Society at large and especially 
customers and investors choosing Islamic banking for secular ethical and particularly 
religious reasons expect Islamic banks to incorporate social objectives into their 
policies and uphold Islamic ethical values, to fulfil not only an economic and religious 
but also a social role (Maali et al., 2006; Belal et al., 2015). This is because Islamic 
banks claim to provide banking services in accordance with the sharia, the objective of 
which is to ‘promote the welfare of people’ and establish social justice (Chapra, 1992; 
Aribi and Gao, 2010; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Aribi and Arun, 2015). According to 
Islamic principles, all commercial activities are subject to the moral objectives of 
sharia. Islamic banks are therefore required to not only abide by the prohibitions of riba 
which regulate the nature of Islamically-permitted financial arrangements but also 
embed the Islamic ethical values within their operations (Usmani, 2004).To operate in 
line with sharia values, Islamic banks are expected to have broader social goals 
therefore profit maximisation should not be the sole objective of these financial 
institutions and offering social value should form an essential part of the industry’s 
value proposition (Ali et al., 2013; Warde, 2000, 2010; Belal et al., 2015).  
Accordingly, social objectives have been declared  an essential, inseparable  feature of 
Islamic banking, and Corporate  Social Responsibility (CSR) a requirement for Islamic 
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banks to follow the principles of Islam in their entirety (Maali et al., 2006; Dusuki, 
2008; Warde, 2010; Farook et al., 2011). Given the importance attached to social goals 
it is no surprise that Islamic banks are “expected to be more socially responsible than 
their conventional counterparts” (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007, p.101). 
Such expectations have been long recognised by Islamic banks who acknowledge that 
adherence to sharia has social and ethical implications for their activities (Maali et al., 
2006; Kamla and Rammal, 2013). Islamic banks have been keen to claim themselves as 
providers of an ethical alternative for all, leveraging their religious identity to 
distinguish themselves from conventional banks on ethical and social grounds, and 
marketing their services as not only a religiously-compliant alternative for Muslims but 
also a “desirable” one for non-Muslims wishing to invest and save their money 
ethically (Kuran, 2004; Visser, 2009; Kamla and Rammal, 2013 p. 924). Such 
marketing claims are somewhat unsurprising  given the industry’s continued growth 
rests on its ability to attract a client base beyond the Muslim niche and its selling points 
in a global secular market lie in highlighting the universally-acknowledged ethical 
values of the Islamic philosophy, the consensus between Islamic principles and 
international standards regarding socially responsible business practices1 and the social 
value the industry offers (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Williams and Zinkin, 2010; Warde, 
2000, 2010). Given this context, it is interesting to note that neither the claims made by 
Islamic banks nor the expectations held of them have been tested so far. Do the present-
day Islamic banks really offer an ethical alternative to their conventional counterparts 
by demonstrating superior social performance? This question is as yet unanswered. 
The need to ask such a question arises due to a healthy scepticism about the claims 
made by Islamic banks. One must acknowledge that Islamic banks do not always show 
evidence of operating in accordance with the underlying sharia principles or the ideals 
propagated in theoretical models. As ethical recommendations in sharia are not legal 
requirements, there exists the possibility that Islamic banks following purely the letter 
of the law may be less inclined towards social initiatives which are costly to undertake.   
Notably, even if Islamic banks attach greater importance to social goals than their 
conventional counterparts, without a thorough comparison it is not possible to conclude 
ex ante that Islamic banks social performance would be superior to their conventional 
counterparts especially in the post crisis period. The pressure faced by the international 
banking industry to demonstrate a socially responsible business profile, addressing their 
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obligations towards society, has substantially increased since the financial crisis (Jizi et 
al., 2013). In the current environment, the banking industry is not only facing a loss of 
credibility but also heightened customer dissatisfaction and a general loss of trust by 
society (Bravo et al., 2012). The need to improve public image and maintain operational 
legitimacy is therefore of utmost importance. As CSR is recognised to be one of the 
direct routes to establishing an ethical corporate identity (Balmer et al., 2007; Bravo et 
al., 2012), heavy emphasis has been placed on CSR in the banking industry in recent 
years (Pérez and Rodríguez del Bosque, 2012). Detailed disclosures have been made in 
banks annual reports in an attempt to demonstrate their commitment to social and 
ethical concerns and alignment of corporate behaviour with societal expectations 
(Bravo et al., 2012). Under such circumstances, a thorough comparison is required to 
determine in what ways Islamic and conventional banks social performance differs, if at 
all.  
Finally it must also be recognised that such a comparison is important not only for 
Islamic banking stakeholders but also the international community. The importance and 
influence of Islamic banking worldwide  is likely to rise in the future as Islamic banking 
assets are estimated to  grow at an average rate of 19.7% per year to 2018, moving from 
an “esoteric” to a “global” asset class (The Economist, 2014). Issues related to and 
claims made by Islamic banks are therefore no longer relevant only for Muslims. 
Nevertheless, even as the industry moves beyond a niche market, much of Islamic 
banking is concentrated in developing and emerging economies, where the banking 
sector plays a key role in enabling socio-economic development. Issues of social 
justice, women empowerment, global development, poverty eradication especially 
through inclusive financing and environmental sustainability are major concerns 
worldwide (Kamla and Rammal, 2013). The UN Millennium Development Goals2 are a 
key example of the importance attached to such issues and the commitment made by the 
international community to overcome these. The role of banks regarding their 
developmental, social and environmental contributions is receiving considerable 
attention as these social issues become hot topics in the development and globalisation 
literature (Belal et al., 2015). Thus, it is vital that a banking industry which claims to 
provide an ethical financial alternative (Visser, 2009) is evaluated and compared against 
2 See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml for details 
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the status quo, for if there is such a banking alternative which exists, is financially 
viable and growing then it should receive a welcome call by not just those turning to it 
for religious reasons but also those committed to the betterment of society. 
Recognising the importance of such a comparison, it is apt to ask why it has not been 
conducted thus far. The absence of a comparative study in the extant literature which 
addresses the above question can be appreciated in light of the challenges that it 
presents. A meaningful comparison between Islamic and conventional banks requires 
that a single research instrument is used to assess and compare the two industries’ social 
performance. The current Islamic banking literature however assumes that CSR 
premised on the values of sharia implies a category which is ‘particular’ to Islamic 
banks, comprising of social activities required specifically from Islamic banks to 
demonstrate their sharia compliance and fulfilment of sharia’s moral obligations (Belal 
et al., 2015). Given the presence of such a ‘particular’ CSR category, which is 
essentially considered incomparable, how can Islamic and conventional banks’ social 
performance be compared?  Notably, even if a valid comparison could be drawn, the 
challenge of measuring corporate social performance still remains. Corporate social 
performance (CSP) is a concept closely related to CSR (Orlitzky et al., 2011) as it refers 
to the ‘the outcomes and actions resulting from a firms’ socially responsible behaviour’ 
(Wood, 1991; Van der Laan et al., 2008). In the conventional CSR literature, ethical 
ratings issued by rating agencies such as KLD3 are often used as a measure of an 
organisation’s CSP. For Islamic banks however, such third-party ethical ratings do not 
yet exist. Instead research on CSR in Islamic banking literature is largely normative and 
analytical as oppose to empirical (Farook et al., 2011). Importantly, the limited number 
of empirical studies which exist focus on measuring and analysing the volume, presence 
and/or type of social disclosure (e.g. positive/negative disclosure) in Islamic banks’ 
annual reports, often against a predetermined benchmark disclosure index, to 
understand  Islamic banks reporting behaviour, as opposed to examining and comparing 
social performance (see e.g. Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Aribi and 
Gao, 2011; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Aribi and Arun, 2015; Belal et al., 2015). A 
3 Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) is a leading ethical rating agency. It rates 
companies’ social performance using a rating criteria based on the company’s strengths and concerns 
against seven qualitative screens, each one focusing on a particular social indicator. These seven areas 
include: community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights and 
product quality and safety. 
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research instrument which measures and compares Islamic and conventional banks’ 
CSP therefore needs to be constructed.  
Given this background, the following questions are posed in this thesis and will be 
addressed in the second part of the thesis (chapters 5 and 6). 
3. Can a single research instrument be used to compare the corporate social 
performance (CSP) of Islamic and conventional banks?  
4. How does the corporate social performance (CSP) of Islamic and conventional 
banks differ?  
1.3 Thesis Structure 
To answer the research questions posed above, this thesis is divided into two parts. Part 
1 comprises of Chapters 2, 3 and 4. These focus primarily on the financial aspect of 
Islamic banking. Chapter 2 provides foundational knowledge for the readers by briefly 
introducing the key Islamic concepts and terms that are relevant for the issues discussed 
in this work. Chapter 3 addresses the first research question posed in this thesis while 
chapter 4 addresses the second research question. Part 2 of the thesis comprises of 
Chapters 5 and 6 which focus on the social aspect of Islamic banking and address the 
third and fourth research questions respectively. A summary of each chapter is 
presented below. 
Chapter 2 introduces the key concepts including the three main prohibitions of Islamic 
law which are particularly relevant for the financial aspect of Islamic banking. First, the 
meaning and scope of the term ‘sharia’ is covered in detail. This is followed by an 
explanation of the prohibition of ‘riba’. The prohibitions of ‘gharar’ and ‘haram’ 
industries are covered more briefly. Practical implications of these prohibitions for 
Islamic banking are explicitly stated. By addressing and clarifying the most common 
misconceptions held about these terms and concepts, this chapter provides the 
foundational knowledge readers will require to engage with the discussions presented in 
chapters 3 and 4. 
Chapter 3 addresses the first research question posed in this thesis as it provides a 
detailed account of the development of Islamic banking and explains how and why the 
industry deviated from its PLS-oriented theory to non-PLS oriented practices. The 
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chapter begins by explaining why the European commercial bank could not develop as 
an indigenously-Islamic institution within the context of medieval Islamic societies and 
describes more briefly how the conventional banking was transported to the Muslim 
countries and the roots of the Islamic banking movement. This is followed by a 
description of the theoretical model of Islamic banking. An in-depth account of the 
three different phases Islamic banking underwent in its transition from theory and to 
reality is then presented. Controversies related to Islamic banking products as well as 
the sharia certification process are also discussed at length. Finally a four-part analysis 
explains why the divergence between theory and practice of Islamic banking was 
inevitable, by discussing: transaction costs, impact of the institutional environment, 
incompatibility between the theoretical model of Islamic banking and the roles of a 
commercial bank and finally the inconsistency between principles of commercial 
banking and Islamic finance. The chapter concludes that no present-day Islamic 
commercial bank can be fully consistent with Islamic principles and raises the question 
whether some banks could be considered more Islamic than others, setting the 
motivation for the question addressed in chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 focuses on addressing the second research question posed in this thesis and 
asks whether all Islamic banks can be considered equally Islamic. In doing so, it 
questions the implicit assumption made in the current literature which dismisses all 
Islamic banks as simply indistinguishable from conventional banks, assuming that PLS 
levels are negligible in all banks. This chapter investigates the variation in PLS levels 
between Islamic banks by using two measures of PLS. It also calculates PLS levels for 
conventional banks with and without Islamic windows and compares these with Islamic 
counterparts. The chapter is divided in three parts. The first part presents a cross-
sectional study, where PLS levels between Islamic banks and conventional banks with 
and without Islamic windows are compared using a single year’s data to focus on the 
variation that exists between banks as opposed to changes occurring over time. Results 
from this analysis show that Islamic banking industry does not comprise a 
homogeneous group of banks; rather there is considerable variation in PLS levels 
between individual banks. A typology of Islamic banks is identified on the PLS criteria; 
which illustrates that some banks are indeed following a more PLS oriented business 
model and thus can be considered more Islamic than others. The second part of the 
chapter extends this analysis by examining multiple years’ data (2009-2012) and uses 
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cluster analysis to validate the typology of banks identified. Results confirm the 
presence of three distinct groups within the Islamic banking industry and that group 
membership is predominantly stable. Finally, part 3 investigates why some Islamic 
banks can have higher PLS financing levels than others by estimating the relationship 
between PLS financing level and banks-specific characteristics identified from the 
literature, controlling for the differences in institutional environment across countries.  
Chapter 5 addresses the third research question raised in this thesis, i.e. whether a single 
research instrument can be used to assess and compare the CSP of Islamic and 
conventional banks. At its core, this question relates to two issues. First is the issue of 
incommensurability between Islamic and conventional banks’ CSR, which arises from 
the assumption that religion-specific CSR is a category particular to Islamic banks, as 
asserted in the current literature (Belal et al., 2015). Second, is the issue of 
measurement i.e. how can the CSP of Islamic banks be measured? By addressing both 
these issues sequentially, this chapter develops a multidimensional CSP Index, 
comprising of 25 social performance indicators (SPIs), which is then used to compare 
the CSP of Islamic and conventional banks in chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 addresses the fourth and final research question posed in this thesis as it 
investigates how the CSP of Islamic and conventional banks differ. To do so, the 
chapter first uses the CSP index constructed in chapter 5 to compare the level and 
composition of CSP between Islamic and conventional banks. Using the dichotomous 
scoring method widely used in the current literature, CSP scores are generated for banks 
and comparisons are drawn between individual banks and across the two industries. In 
drawing comparisons, the chapter asks two questions. First, do Islamic banks, on 
average, have higher CSP scores than conventional banks? Second, how does the 
composition of CSP differ between Islamic and conventional banks? E.g. are the 
most/least popular CSP dimensions and social performance indicators the same? For 
these questions, the difference over the 2009-2011 period is also examined to identify: 
firstly, if and how the level and composition of CSP has changed within both industries 
and secondly, how the changes compare across the two industries. To further extend the 
literature on Islamic and conventional banks’ CSP comparison, the chapter also 
complements the dichotomous CSP score method with quantitative measures of 
selected social performance indicators developed in chapter 5, for which monetary or 
impact data could be collected from banks’ annual reports. Termed as Social 
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Performance Quantitative Indicators (SPQIs), these assess the extent to which a bank 
engages in a particular CSR activity, allowing for greater differentiation between 
individual banks and a more comprehensive comparison between the Islamic and 
conventional banking industries.  
The next chapter will now provide an introduction to the key Islamic concepts, 
including the three main prohibitions of Islamic law, which are especially relevant for 
the financial aspect of Islamic banking discussed in this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Introducing Sharia, the Key Islamic Prohibitions 
and their Implications for Islamic Banking    
2.1 Introduction 
Islamic banking is attracting much interest from both the global financial industry and 
academia. Research papers on the topic of Islamic banking have increased considerably 
in the last decade. Arabic terms such as ‘sharia’ and ‘riba’ are no longer alien to the 
non-Islamic finance specialists. Indeed, the terms ‘sharia-compliant’ and ‘riba-free’ are 
often used synonymously to describe the Islamic banking industry. But what do these 
terms mean?  
Sharia is commonly translated as Islamic law and the prohibition of riba, which is the 
central tenet of the Islamic financial system, as a ban on interest (Iqbal and Tsubota, 
2006). Albeit the most common translations, these are not only inaccurate but also 
unfair oversimplifications which limit one’s ability to fully comprehend the notion of 
‘Islamic’ banking and the controversies and criticisms of the industry’s products and 
practices. Thus, despite a rise in research studies on the topic, there are still a number of 
common misconceptions held about key concepts underlying Islamic banking which 
deserve clarification. Without appreciating the depth of the underlying Islamic concepts 
and prohibitions, the more nuanced arguments and discussions on the complex issues 
concerning the Islamic banking industry may not be clear or even accessible to the 
reader. A meaningful discussion of Islamic banking therefore requires a move away 
from shallow one-or-two word translations of these terms.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an understanding of the central 
Islamic concepts, including the three main prohibitions of Islamic law, which are 
particularly relevant for the financial aspect of Islamic banking. To achieve this, section 
2.2 begins with a detailed discussion of the meaning and scope of sharia. Section 2.3 
explains the three prohibitions. Riba is discussed at length, given its central role in the 
theory of Islamic banking. More concise descriptions of the other two prohibitions are 
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also presented, thereby defining the terms ‘gharar’ and ‘haram’. The implications of 
these prohibitions for Islamic banks are also explicitly stated. Section 2.4 concludes the 
chapter. In meeting its purpose, this chapter addresses and clarifies the most common 
misconceptions held about the key concepts discussed and by doing so provides the 
reader with the foundational knowledge required for the issues discussed in this thesis, 
especially in chapters 3 and 4.  
2.2 The Sharia 
Sharia is often inaccurately translated as ‘Islamic law’. This translation is not only 
problematic for reasons discussed below, it is also not in line with the linguistic 
foundations of the word (Kamali, 2008). The Arabic word ‘sharia’4 literally means the 
“way to water”, which in the harsh Arabian Desert referred to the only certain path of 
survival (Janin and Kahlmeyer, 2007, p.1). In religious terms, sharia refers to “God’s 
appointed way”, the path which leads to salvation and felicity in this world and the 
hereafter (Kamali, 2008, p.2). Practically, sharia is “a way of living one’s life”, an all-
embracing way of thinking and being (Norcliffe, 1999, p.37; Ezzati, 2002). In the 
Islamic context, sharia is viewed as a God-given set of “instructions” which define the 
way Muslims are to live and practice their faith, the means through which they can 
conform to the will of God5 (Norcliffe, 1999, Ezzati, 2002, p.79).  
The sharia is based on two theological sources: the Quran and the Sunnah (Janin and 
Kahlmeyer, 2007; Kamali, 2008). Muslims believe the Quran (Holy Book of Islam) is 
the literal word of Allah (God), which was revealed to the divinely-guided final Prophet 
of God, Muhammad (peace be upon him, henceforth pbuh6). The Sunnah is the sayings 
and practices of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), which expand upon and explain the 
Quranic teachings7. Record of the Sunnah has been preserved through oral traditions, 
4 The precise English spelling (transliteration) of the Arabic word is ‘shari’ah’, but in the interest of 
simplicity, the commonly used, much simpler spellings are used in this work. 
5 The “literal definition of Islam is “peace [attained] through submission to the will of Allah [God]” 
(Zepp Jr., 2000, p.xxxv). The sharia is the means through which one can conform to the will of God and 
achieve the state of a Muslim i.e. “one who is at peace through submission to God” (Norcliffe, 1999, 
p.1). 
6 Pbuh is the acronym for ‘peace be upon him’. These words follow the mention of the Prophets of Islam 
as a gesture of respect. 
7 The Quran itself confirms the Sunnah as a source of prescriptive guidance for Muslims. For example it 
states “And We revealed to you (O Muhammad, pbuh) the message (the Quran) that you may make clear 
to the people what was sent down to them” (Quran 16:44) and “Indeed in the Messenger of Allah 
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known as the ahadith (sing. hadith)8. Unlike the Quran, the ahadith do not exist in a 
single book. Two of the six most authentic books of ahadith are Sahih al-Bukhari and 
Sahih Muslim, the authenticity of which is considered second only to the Quran (El-
Diwany, 2010).   
The Quran and the Sunnah contain guidance on all aspects of a Muslim’s life. There is 
no distinction made between acts commonly seen as religious and those considered 
secular. The economic, social and legal affairs of Muslims and their society are 
therefore as much part of the religion as praying. Thus, the sharia encompasses both the 
spiritual and the material life of Muslims, at an individual and collective level. It not 
only comprises the essential values, articles of faith and moral teachings which define 
the Islamic belief but also specifies the rules which underpin their socio-economic and 
legal systems to be in accordance with God’s will. Accordingly, Islam as a religious 
belief system and sharia as the way of implementing it, provide a comprehensive 
framework for organising society, its institutions as well as guidance for the behaviour 
and conduct of individuals operating within that institutional and social context. 
Muslims therefore cannot compartmentalise their lives into secular and religious 
dimensions and the sharia influences decision-making in all spheres of their private and 
public life including the design of their society’s financial systems (Presley and 
Sessions, 1994; Norcliffe, 1999; Rice, 1999; Lewis, 2001; Tinker, 2004; Kamla et al., 
2006; Ayub, 2007; Dusuki and Abdullah, 2007; Dusuki, 2008; Iqbal and Lewis, 2009; 
Shanmugam and Zahari, 2009; Aribi and Gao, 2010; Khan and Karim, 2010). 
Contrary to the above, sharia is often considered a legal-code rather than a framework 
of life (Norcliffe, 1999). This misunderstanding stems from a focus on the legal 
injunctions specified within the sharia. Law is indeed an integral part of the sharia. The 
(Muhammad, pbuh) you have a good example to follow” (Quran 33:21). Note that references from the 
Quran refer to the chapter number followed by the verse number e.g. Quran 33:21 refers to the 21st verse 
of the 33rd chapter. Following the example of Kamla et al. (2006), a number of different English 
translations of the Quran have been used to convey the best explanation of the original Arabic text. The 
main translations used include Sahih International and Muhsin Khan, available also at www.quran.com. 
8 The Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) has been preserved through the ahadith. The hadith (singular 
form) is a chain of dependable oral traditions relating to the actions and words of Prophet Muhammad 
(pbuh), with the record of the original narration going back to the Prophet’s companions (Warde, 2000; 
El-Diwany, 2010). The six most authentic books of hadith are: Sahih al-Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Sunan 
an-Nisa’i, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi, Sunan Abi Dawud and Sunan Ibn Majah. These books are named after the 
compilers who collected and verified the authenticity of thousands of ahadith relating to the actions and 
sayings of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) before adding to their collections. For a summary on the science 
of ahadith, see El-Diwany (2010). 
15 
 
                                                                                                                                               
` 
Quran itself contains approximately 350 verses with a legal significance covering topics 
as varied as the rules of commercial transactions, inheritance, marriage, dietary 
regulations and even the rights of the poor, amongst others (Kamali, 2008; Iqbal and 
Lewis, 2009). However, it is often overlooked that law is only a constituent part of the 
sharia which at its core is primarily concerned with the Islamic dogma, particularly the 
belief in one God, its unwavering stress on morality and their integration in one’s 
personal conduct (Kamali, 2008). The overly legalistic tendency to define sharia as law 
and Islam as a “law based religion” has therefore come at the expense of the moral 
teachings of Islam (Kamali, 2008, p.6), and has resulted in the failure to acknowledge 
sharia as a “system of morality” which is primarily concerned with maintaining high 
ethical standards (Janin and Kahlmeyer, 2007, p.31). 
Viewing sharia as purely a legal system has also created an arbitrary and inappropriate 
division between the spirit and the letter of sharia law. To understand the spirit of sharia 
requires a study of its underlying objectives. As Al-Ghazali9 (a prominent 11th century 
Muslim scholar) famously summarised, the objective of sharia is to promote human 
welfare, which lies in the safeguarding of five necessities; faith, life, intellect, 
wealth/private property and lineage/family institution (Kamla et al., 2006; Kamali, 
2008; Aribi and Gao, 2010; El Diwany, 2010; Aribi and Arun, 2015). To protect these, 
certain activities are prohibited in the sharia10. For example, to protect wealth/private 
property, sharia lays down comprehensive rules of law governing economic 
transactions including the prohibition of riba (see section 2.3.1). Sharia prohibitions are 
therefore underpinned by ethical concerns, the preservation of the essential moral 
values of Islam (Kamali, 2008) and are aimed at ensuring the wellbeing and happiness 
of human beings in this world and the hereafter (Ayub, 2007). Failure to focus on these 
objectives leads to incorrect interpretations of the sharia. This is particularly relevant 
for the discussion of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) since legal rules derived solely on the 
basis of the letter of the law can potentially violate the spirit of sharia law, thereby 
defeating the purpose for which they are established. As Al-Shatibi (the renowned 14th 
century legal scholar) explained, the letter of the sharia law is not the end itself but the 
means to achieving the benefit the law intends. Therefore, one who meets the letter but 
9 Al-Ghazali is a prominent and respected 11th century Muslim theologian, jurist and philosopher. 
10 For example, to preserve life, abortion and murder are prohibited in the sharia; to preserve the family 
institution, adultery and fornication are prohibited whilst to preserve the intellect, alcohol and other 
narcotics are prohibited (Ayub, 2007; Shakir, 2015). 
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not the substance (i.e. spirit) of the law does not follow the sharia (El-Gamal, 2006). 
Recognising this is particularly relevant for understanding the controversies 
surrounding Islamic banking products discussed in chapter 3, as is the distinction 
between sharia and fiqh. 
The equivalence drawn between sharia and fiqh is a notable misconception which needs 
to be addressed. Often used interchangeably, the terms sharia and fiqh are not identical 
(Kamali, 2008). For Muslims, both the Quran and Sunnah are an eternal form of 
guidance (Warde, 2000). Principles specified directly in these sources, including those 
governing commercial activities, are timeless and universal. Some principles, however, 
require further clarification in their applicability to contemporary situations, examples 
of which cannot be found in Islamic history, such as modern banking practices. This is 
where fiqh, the interpretation of sharia, plays an important role. Fiqh (literally “in-depth 
understanding”) refers to Islamic jurisprudence, the body of detailed legal codes 
developed by Islamic jurists to address new and specific issues not explicitly mentioned 
in the Quran and the Sunnah (Hassan and Lewis, 2007; Abdul-Rahman, 2010, p.68). 
The sources of fiqh, also known as the secondary sources of Islamic law, include ijma 
(the consensus of Muslim jurists) and qiyas (analogical deduction) based on ijtihad 
(independent reasoning by Islamic jurists to establish new legal rules) (Ayub, 2007; 
Hassan and Lewis, 2007; Visser, 2009; Abdul-Rahman, 2010). Legal opinions issued 
by Islamic jurists/scholars are known as fatwas (Janin and Kahlmeyer, 2007; Kamali, 
2008). 
Islamic law is therefore made up of two components: the sharia and the fiqh; distinction 
between which is important to note. As sharia contains divine law from the Quran and 
Sunnah, both of which are unalterable, the sharia itself does not change. Fiqh, on the 
other hand, is man-made law, the application of sharia to new and specific problems, 
needs and circumstances which arise within different societies at different times. Some 
aspects of the fiqh rulings therefore can and do change over time depending on society 
specific circumstances (Abdul-Rahman, 2010). Thus, legal rulings (fatwas) derived 
from fiqh i.e. the secondary sources of law are not indisputable as are the divine 
injunctions specified in the sharia (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). The former can also 
never override the sharia therefore anything prohibited or permitted in sharia cannot be 
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altered by the fatwas issued by jurists/scholars11. Together, the combination of sharia 
and fiqh give Islamic law both permanency and flexibility. While the core Islamic 
principles and values specified in the sharia remain constant, the scope for adaptation to 
changing socio-economic environments enables accommodating developments and 
advancement in the law as per society’s needs (Warde, 2000; Shanmugam and Zahari, 
2009). 
Naturally, there can be differences amongst jurists/scholars in interpreting the sharia 
based on their intellect, knowledge, experience and local circumstances. The resulting 
varying interpretation of sharia has given rise to different schools of fiqh12. 
Distinctions, even if minute, across the fiqh schools e.g. in interpreting the strictness of 
a sharia rule, can give rise to different fatwas on the same matter across countries, 
regions and even within countries, depending on which school of fiqh or scholar is 
followed (Warde, 2000; Shanmugam and Zahari, 2009; Abdul-Rahman, 2010). This has 
important implications for the Islamic banking industry due to the classification of 
sharia rules. 
The sharia is broadly divided into two categories. Ibadaat (the ritual acts of worship) 
concern the relationship between mankind and God while muamalat (civil transactions) 
concern the relationship between humans (Janin and Kahlmeyer, 2007). Banking is 
governed by the rules of fiqh-al-muamalat i.e. Islamic jurisprudence concerning all 
matters other than acts of worship (this covers economic, political and social issues). 
Unlike ibadaat, fiqh-al-muamalat follows the ‘Principle of Permissibility’ i.e. all 
activities are permissible unless specifically prohibited by the sharia (El-Diwany, 2010). 
Since evidence on modern banking practices cannot be found in Islamic history, 
scholars need to interpret the sharia prohibitions specified for commercial transactions 
and their implications for banking activities. The Islamic banking industry therefore 
relies predominantly on fatwas issued by scholars through recourse to secondary 
11 In deriving new legal rulings or allowing potential deviation from existing norms, Muslim jurists are 
guided by the principle of maslahah i.e. public interest/welfare which is in line with the objective of 
sharia. Furthermore, the principle of darura (necessity) and urf (custom/common practice) are also 
considered by jurists. Customary practices, as long as they do not violate the sharia are respected and in 
case of necessities, sharia rules including prohibitions are temporarily suspended to alleviate hardships 
(Warde, 2000; Ayub, 2007). 
12 The four main schools of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in orthodox Sunni Islam are Hanafi, Shafi’i, 
Maliki and Hanbali. The Shia Muslims have their own different schools of jurisprudence (Warde, 2000; 
Shanmugam and Zahari, 2009; Abdul-Rahman, 2010). 
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sources of Islamic law, particularly ijtihad, to determine the validity of the industry’s 
products and practices (Siddiqi, 2001). 
For banking, the most important sharia prohibitions are of riba and gharar (defined 
below), which specify the difference between all valid and invalid Islamic contracts and 
transactions (El-Gamal, 2006). Further to these is the prohibition of any involvement in 
haram (religiously prohibited) industries e.g. breweries (Chapra, 1992; Warde, 2000; 
Zaher and Hassan, 2001; Ayub, 2007; Visser, 2009; El-Diwany, 2010). Given their 
significance, these prohibitions and their implications are discussed below.  
2.3 Key Prohibitions and their Implications  
2.3.1 Riba 
The prohibition of riba13, commonly translated as a ban on interest or usury, is the most 
well-known principle of Islamic finance. Providing interest-free financial services is 
therefore considered to be the sine qua non of Islamic banking (Khan, 2010).  
Translating riba as simply interest, however, is not only inappropriate but also 
misleading. Not all forms of what economists call interest e.g. the mark-up charged in 
credit sales and leases are prohibited in Islam. Furthermore, some transactions with an 
effective zero-percent interest rate, e.g. the exchange of £100 today for £100 in a year’s 
time, are forbidden on the grounds of riba. More importantly, the riba prohibition 
applies not only to monetary but also non-monetary transactions i.e. the exchange of 
goods, as long as the goods exchanged belong to the same genus e.g. salt-for-salt14 (El-
Gamal, 2006; Ayub, 2007; Nyazee, 2009, 2016; Visser, 2009; El-Diwany, 2010). 
Drawing direct equivalence between riba and interest is therefore clearly erroneous. So 
what exactly is riba?   
13 Riba is explicitly prohibited in the Quran and the Sunnah. Verses related to riba in the Quran are: 
2:275-279; 3:130; 4:161 and 30:39 (for order of revelation, discussion and ahadith on riba, see Ayub, 
2007).  
14 The most well quoted hadith on the definition of riba is: “Abu Said al Khudri reported that the Holy 
Prophet (pbuh) said “Gold is to be paid for by gold, silver for silver, wheat by wheat, barley by barley, 
dates by dates, and salt by salt, like for like and equal for equal, payment made hand to hand. He, who 
makes an addition to it or asks for an addition, deals in riba. The receiver and the giver are equally 
guilty” Hadith reported in Sahih Muslim, No.4064 (El-Diwany, 2010, p.103).  
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The word riba literally means ‘increase’ or ‘excess’, and refers to an unlawful gain 
which arises from inequality of counter-values exchanged in a commutative transaction 
(for detailed discussion see Warde, 2000; El-Gamal, 2006; Ayub, 2007; Nyazee, 2009, 
2016; Visser, 2009; El-Diwany, 2010). This excess (riba) is “revealed in two ways: 
excess in quantity or amount and excess from the benefit of delay" (Nyazee, 2009, p.52; 
2016). One or both features therefore exist in a riba transaction; an increase in the 
amount of one counter-value over the other and/or a delay in settling one or both of the 
counter-values15 (El-Diwany, 2010). On a superficial level, the delay in repayment does 
not appear to create inequality in the values exchanged, however, £100 (or 1 ounce of 
gold) today is not worth the same as £100 (or 1 ounce of gold) in a year’s time. Islamic 
law therefore recognises the time value of money (and other commodities) and takes 
into account that the change in values over time can potentially create unjustified gain 
for either party (El-Gamal, 2006; for other examples see, Nyazee, 2009, 2016; El-
Diwany, 2010). 
The scholarly debate on riba has a long tradition and is still ongoing (see Warde, 2000 
and Visser, 2009) however, it is important to note the rationale underlying the riba 
prohibition. Simply, sharia prohibits the exchange of unequal amounts of the same good 
and delay in settling the counter-values because such transactions are seen as inflicting 
injustice upon one of the counterparties (El-Diwany, 2010). The ban on riba therefore is 
aimed at establishing justice and fairness and preventing exploitation in business 
transactions, by eliminating all forms of unjust and unfair exchanges, especially 
“inequity in exchange”16 and more specifically the expropriation of wealth in credit 
transactions (Presley and Sessions, 1994; Kuran, 2004; Siddiqi, 2004, 2006; Iqbal and 
Molyneux, 2005; El-Gamal, 2007, p.320-1; Salleh et al., 2011, 2014).  
15 There are two types of riba. The first feature noted above refers to riba-al-fadl (riba of increase) which 
prohibits the trading of two goods from the same kind in different quantities, whilst the second feature 
refers to riba-al-nasia (riba of delay) which prohibits time-delay to occur in settling the counter-values, 
and therefore requires that when the same good is exchanged, the counter-values are settled on spot (El-
Gamal, 2006; Nyazee, 2009, 2016; Visser, 2009; El-Diwany, 2010, p.99-108). 
16 According to Ibn Rushd (a famous Muslim jurist and philosopher, 1198 C.E.) the prohibition of riba is 
aimed at eliminating “excessive inequity … [which] in certain transactions is achieved through equality”. 
Two fungible goods of the same genus and quality need to be exchanged in equal amounts, and when 
quality difference exist or when the goods exchanged are of two different types then the ratio of goods 
traded should be determined by the ratio of their prices. The prohibition of riba therefore ensures justice 
by eliminating the option of disadvantageous trade for one party; and enhances efficiency by ensuring 
that the quantity of goods traded occur at ratios determined by the ratio of market prices (El-Gamal, 2006, 
p.52-3). 
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Implications of the Riba Prohibition 
Lending can only be for Charitable Purposes  
The prohibition of riba applies directly to money-for-money exchanges i.e. loans. The 
standard interest-bearing loan contains both riba conditions mentioned above, i.e. it 
contains both a surplus and a delay in the counter-values exchanged. Even an interest-
free loan fails the riba prohibition due to the delay in repayment. Importantly, this 
implies that “all loans, with or without interest are prohibited” under Islamic law 
(Nyazee, 2009, p.76). Thus, in a pure Islamic financial system, a ‘loan’ per se, with a 
fixed repayment period, cannot validly exist (Nyazee, 2009, 2016).  
The only valid loan under Islamic law is ‘qard hasan’; literally, “a goodly loan”, or 
sometimes called an interest-free benevolent loan (Nyazee, 2009, 2016; El-Diwany, 
2010, p, 178). Qard hasan, however, differs from the conventional interest-free loan on 
three grounds. First, qard hasan is altruistic in nature, where the lender advances money 
to help a financially needy person. Second, no benefit (monetary or non-monetary) is 
permitted for the lender. Finally, no fixed repayment date can be stated for qard hasan 
as the amount loaned is returned at the borrowers’ convenience. Notably, in qard hasan, 
the delay in repayment is not considered riba. This is because under Islamic law, qard 
hasan is a contract of charity and not a contract of exchange. These legal technicalities, 
i.e. the contract forms, do matter since riba only applies to the latter contract types. 
Drawn up as charitable contract, a loan is possible under Islamic law and the rule of 
riba doesn’t apply.  Essentially, in qard hasan, the usufruct of money is given in charity 
by the lender. Lending therefore is considered a charitable act in Islam and is not 
permitted for profit-making (Nyazee, 2009, 2016; El-Diwany, 2010). 
To appreciate this, it is important to acknowledge the concept of money in Islam. The 
sharia prohibits charging a rent for money because from an Islamic perspective money 
does not have any intrinsic utility; it does not represent a commodity and is seen only as 
a medium of exchange. Money is essentially a store of value which “represents the 
monetised claim of its owner to property rights”. These rights are transferred when 
money is loaned. As no surplus is generated through the mere act of lending, there isn’t 
any additional property over which the lender can have claims. Interest repayments are 
therefore seen as an encroachment on the existing property rights of the borrowers and 
are deemed unjust (Presley and Session, 1994, p.586; Usmani, 2004; Rehman, 2010). 
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Legitimate Return is earned through Effort and Risk-Sharing 
The sharia draws a distinction between money and capital. Money is potential capital, 
unable to produce a return on its own. Transformation into capital requires money to be 
supplemented with enterprise i.e. active productive effort, risk taking and the know-how 
of effectively combining other factors of production to generate additional wealth. On 
this incremental wealth (profits), both the borrower and the lender have a residual claim 
since both contribute to the generation of it. Any return on funds extended by the 
financier therefore needs to be “commensurate with work effort” (Presley and Session, 
1994; p.586).  
If a financier cannot take an active role in managing the funds, the commercial risk of 
the funded venture needs to be shared. This is because any guaranteed return which is 
independent of the venture’s outcome is considered riba since it equates to ‘money-
now-for-more-money-later’ which is prohibited (Zaher and Hassan, 2001; Iqbal and 
Tsubota, 2006; Ayub, 2007). The prohibition of riba therefore requires risk-sharing 
between the financier and the user of funds. This condition is met in equity financing 
where profits and losses are shared between the contracting parties17. Since profits are 
determined ex-post, they reflect the creation of additional value from the funded 
venture and are subject to real economic risks. These risks are shared by all parties in a 
profit-and-loss-sharing arrangement, resulting in more equitable returns during good 
and bad times (Zaher and Hassan, 2001). Such a financing approach is in line with both 
the objective of sharia and the riba prohibition which aim to establish equity and justice 
in society and business transactions (Chapra, 1992; Siddiqi, 2004, 2006; Iqbal and 
Molyneux, 2005; Ayub, 2007). Riba-free financing therefore equates to profit-and-loss-
sharing (PLS) which is achieved through equity partnerships. 
Implications for Islamic Banks 
Advancing a loan does not present a viable option for Islamic banks as the loan contract 
contains elements of riba. To earn a return legitimately, Islamic banks need to share the 
risk i.e. profits and losses of the business/project funded. This is achieved by entering 
17 In an interest-bearing loan arrangement, the lender receives a predetermined rate of return which is 
independent of the funded venture. The interest rate reflects the perceived risk associated with the 
borrower’s creditworthiness and not the funded venture. Even in a variable interest rate arrangement, the 
lender does not face or share the commercial risk of the venture as is required because the interest rate 
charged varies with the market rate and not the risk/outcome of the funded venture. Thus both fixed and 
variable interest rate loans are not consistent with the riba prohibition. 
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PLS arrangements (i.e. equity partnerships) with the funded parties. Under such 
arrangements Islamic banks’ return on investment is a pre-determined profit-share 
which is distinguishable from a fixed return18. Crucially, the relationship between the 
bank and the funded client becomes one of partnership and not the borrower-lender 
relationship common in conventional banking. 
2.3.2 Gharar 
Gharar is often translated as risk, speculation or uncertainty; however, translating 
gharar simply as uncertainty or risk can also be misleading as all commercial activities 
entail some degree of both. Islam does not prohibit risk. On the contrary, returns from 
commercial transactions are justified only when the associated risk is incurred.      
Gharar exists in transactions that are conditioned upon uncertain events and covers 
excessive risk taking and speculative behaviour e.g. gambling (maysir). In contracts, 
gharar refers to a lack of clarity and uncertainty relating to the contractual terms and its 
basic elements, e.g. the subject matter, its price, and the rights/obligations of either 
party. The concept of gharar also connotes deception, fraud and cheating as it relates 
specifically to the exploitation of others through uncertainty or incomplete 
information19. The prohibition of gharar, therefore, aims to eliminate commercial 
contracts and transactions which use asymmetric information as the basis for 
exploitation as well as those where either party earns a return purely on the basis of 
chance, e.g. through gambling which undermines the value of productive effort. This is 
because under sharia, any return earned needs to be not only economically but also 
morally justified (Warde, 2000; Ebrahim and Rahman, 2005; El-Gamal, 2006; Ayub, 
2007; Visser, 2009).  
Implications for Islamic Banks 
The prohibition of gharar leads to a ban on transactions and contracts containing 
excessive risk, speculation and uncertainty. Any financial product and transaction 
which lacks material finality, i.e. does not have a direct or indirect link to a real 
economic transaction, and is used to earn a return purely through speculation is also 
18 Islamic economists argue that because Islamic banks’ returns are tied to the performance of the funded 
venture under such a financing system, it creates incentives for Islamic banks to seek out the most 
productive and profitable projects, leading to a more efficient allocation of resources (Iqbal and 
Molyneux, 2005). 
19 Distinction between minor and major gharar based on cost-benefit analysis is important, since only the 
transactions suffering from major gharar are banned (El-Gamal, 2006).  
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prohibited. In relation to banking, the prohibition of gharar  translates into a ban on 
short sales, derivatives, futures, forward contracts, discounting of bills and any form of 
speculative transactions that are akin to gambling (Usmani, 2004; Ayub, 2007; El-
Hawary et al., 2007; Visser, 2009; Khan, 2010). 
2.3.3 Haram Activities 
Haram (religiously prohibited) activities refer to those that are either explicitly banned 
by the Quran and Sunnah, are judged to be inconsistent with the ethical values and 
objectives of the sharia or are identified as harmful for society. These include industries 
such as alcohol, pork-related products, gambling, pornography, tobacco, narcotics, 
companies involved in oppressive regimes (i.e. abusing human rights) and/or 
environmental degradation as well as industries failing to meet the riba and gharar 
prohibitions such as conventional banking and finance (Dusuki and Abdullah, 2 007).  
Implications for Islamic Banks 
Engagement in haram industries either through production, distribution, financing or 
investment does not present a lawful source of income, since one cannot profit from 
something immoral within the bounds of sharia (Rehman, 2010). Islamic banks 
therefore cannot legitimately invest in or finance haram industries. Instead, Islamic 
banks are required to run a sharia screening process to design their asset portfolios, 
similar to the approach commonly adopted by socially responsible investment and 
ethical funds (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). As the screening criterion is rooted in the 
principles of sharia, it represents a ‘moral filter’, which Islamic banks in their role as an 
intermediary are required to exercise to ensure that financial resources are allocated 
away from activities which are incompliant with sharia and harmful for society 
(Chapra, 1992; Rehman, 2010). 
2.4 Conclusion  
This chapter introduced the key concepts and prohibitions of Islamic law which are 
directly relevant for the financial aspect of Islamic banking. The meaning and scope of 
sharia and the prohibition of riba have been discussed at length due to their importance 
and relevance for the discussions presented in the upcoming chapters. More concise 
descriptions of the prohibition of gharar and haram industries were also presented and 
the implications of all three prohibitions for Islamic banks were explicitly stated.  
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In introducing the key concepts, particular care was taken to address common 
misconceptions. Thus, the reader can now appreciate why sharia is more than Islamic 
law, riba more than simply a ban on interest and gharar more than uncertainty and risk. 
Inaccurate and oversimplified translations such as these hinder the ability of the reader 
to fully comprehend the complex issues which affect the Islamic banking industry 
particularly the reasons for certain criticisms of its products and practices which are 
discussed in the next chapter. By addressing the most common misconceptions, it is 
hoped that this chapter has provided a sound foundation which will make discussions 
presented in next chapters more accessible to the reader. 
Chapter 3 will now describe the development of Islamic banking, with a focus on 
explaining how and why the industry diverged away from its PLS-oriented theoretical 
model. Discussions in the next chapter will illustrate how the interpretation of sharia as 
simply law and a focus on the letter not the spirit of sharia law led to the development 
of highly controversial products and practices. It will also show how riba has, since the 
beginning of modern Islamic banking, simply been translated as a ban on interest, but 
ironically, despite this misinterpretation, current Islamic banking products fail to even 
comply with this limited standard. The importance of recognising the difference 
between fiqh and sharia will also aid in understanding some critical issues discussed in 
the next chapter. Finally, the next chapter will also highlight how varying 
interpretations of sharia by different scholars affects the Islamic banking industry. 
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Chapter 3 
Understanding the Development of Islamic 
Banking: Divergence between Theory and 
Practice    
3.1 Introduction  
Islamic commercial banks are the subject of enquiry in this thesis. These institutions 
claim to provide banking services in accordance with the sharia. Abiding by the sharia 
prohibitions described in chapter 2 is therefore a necessity for these institutions’ 
religious legitimacy. Of the three prohibitions mentioned, riba has undoubtedly received 
the most attention in the Islamic banking literature and is considered to be the central 
tenet of Islamic finance (Iqbal and Tsubota, 2006). To avoid riba, Islamic economists 
have promoted financial intermediation on the principle of profit-and-loss-sharing 
(PLS), which is the basis for the theoretical model of Islamic banking. Contrary to this 
theoretical premise, Islamic banks in practice rely predominantly on non-PLS (debt-
based) financial instruments. These are, however, heavily criticised by many as 
completely un-Islamic arrangements, designed to circumvent the sharia prohibitions and 
replicate interest-bearing debt contracts by complying with the letter over the spirit of 
sharia law (Kuran, 1995, 2004; Zaman and Movassaghi, 2002; El-Gamal, 2006; Zaman, 
2008; Khan, 2010; Khan, 2010a). Despite this criticism, 80-90% of Islamic banks’ asset 
portfolio on average is in non-PLS form (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2002; Warde, 2010). 
Thus, there is significant divergence between the PLS-oriented theory and the non-PLS-
oriented practice of Islamic banking.  
How and why has the industry developed this way? The purpose of this chapter is to 
answer these questions. To achieve this, a detailed account of Islamic banking’s 
development, from its conception to present-day practices, is presented followed by a 
four-part analysis explaining why the divergence between theory and practice was 
inevitable. In doing so, this chapter will argue that no Islamic commercial bank can be 
fully compliant with the sharia because commercial banking, which by definition 
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operates on a fractional reserve basis and intermediates by converting risk-free deposits 
into credit, is inherently inconsistent with the principles of Islamic finance.  
To support this argument, section 3.2 begins by describing the financial institutions 
which operated in the medieval Islamic world and explains why a European-style 
commercial bank did not and could not have developed as an indigenously-Islamic 
institution. The circumstances which transported conventional commercial banking to 
the Muslim world and started the Islamisation movement, leading to modern Islamic 
banking are then briefly introduced. This is followed by a description of the theoretical 
model of Islamic banking in section 3.3.  
Section 3.4 provides an in-depth account of the three phases of Islamic banking’s 
development since its emergence as a conceptual idea in the mid-twentieth century. The 
key political, economic and social factors which shaped the industry are highlighted. 
Financial initiatives which emerged as precursors to Islamic banking during the first 
phase are described to illustrate how these institutions, which operated according to 
Islamic finance principles, did not follow the standard commercial banking model. In 
contrast to these, modern Islamic banks which began operations during the second 
phase were specifically designed to emulate conventional commercial banking. As will 
be explained, it was indeed the goal of replacing conventional commercial banks which 
led to modifications made to the theoretical model of Islamic banking and the 
development of controversial non-PLS financial products. The initial proposed 
modifications and the process of their approval is covered in some detail to highlight 
that replication of commercial banking practices was possible only by compromising on 
religious values. Although religiously questionable, non-PLS instruments enabled the 
industry to grow to its current scale internationally. Factors aiding the growth and 
internalisation of Islamic banking, including the efforts of selected countries which 
have become industry leaders, are covered in the final phase along with a discussion of 
the global, country-level and regional growth rates recorded by the industry. Other 
notable characteristics of the current industry are also discussed. Finally, the changing 
nature of Islamic banking literature over the years and how intentions underlying the 
Islamic banking movement morphed, to reach a stage where the form-over-substance 
approach to designing sharia-compliant products has become the accepted norm, will 
also be highlighted throughout section 3.4. 
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Controversies associated with Islamic banking practices specifically related to the most 
popular products are explained in section 3.5. Although the prohibition of riba was 
interpreted narrowly as simply a ban on interest during the industry’s development, this 
section will illustrate how current Islamic banking products fail to even comply with 
this limited standard. This section ends with a discussion of the controversies 
surrounding the sharia certification process with a brief evaluation of the steps taken by 
the industry to address these issues.  
Section 3.6 then provides the four-part analysis explaining the divergence between 
theory and practice. The first two subsections focus on why non-PLS financing 
instruments have been favoured. The sources of higher transaction costs associated with 
PLS financing are explained and the impact of the institutional environment within 
which Islamic banks operate is discussed. The final two subsections expand the scope 
of analysis and consider the divergence between theory and practice more broadly. In 
the first of these, it will be argued that the theoretical model of Islamic banking 
propagated in the literature is not a model of commercial banking. Divergence from this 
model was therefore inevitable as Islamic banks aimed to replicate and replace their 
conventional counterpart. The final subsection, by bringing together key points from 
earlier discussions, will argue that the commercial banking institution is inherently 
inconsistent with sharia principles. Therefore Islamic commercial banks would have 
necessarily deviated from the Islamic principles and any theoretical model based on 
such principles. The more consistent alternative and recent proposed reforms for the 
industry are also discussed in this subsection, leading to policy recommendations. 
Finally section 3.7 concludes the chapter. Please note, that the thorough descriptions 
presented in this chapter serve a dual purpose. In addition to supporting the chapter’s 
aim and central argument, these also provide the background for issues discussed later 
in the thesis, primarily in chapter 4. 
3.2 Historical Context 
From its advent in seventh century Arabia, Islam spread outward in all directions 
throughout the Middle East to Asia, Africa as well as Europe. From the seventh to the 
fourteenth centuries, while Europe faced its Dark Ages, the Islamic civilisation 
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experienced its Golden Age20, characterised by rising economic strength, advancement 
in knowledge, technology, and culture. Significant contributions were made in the fields 
of science, mathematics, economics, law, philosophy and literature amongst others 
(Warde, 2000).  
On the financial front as well, the Islamic world was far ahead of the West, having 
developed a wide variety of credit institutions by the mid-eighth century. Historical 
records from the ninth to the eleventh century show evidence of complex quasi-banking 
activities in tenth century Iraq, an extensive ramified system of proto-banking in 
eleventh century Egypt and North Africa as well as widespread use of credit 
instruments which preceded their conventional counterpart. The latter included the 
suftaja (bill of exchange/letter of credit), as well as the ruq’as and sukuk (akin to 
modern-day cheques) 21. Many of the complex financial instruments commonly used 
and accepted as part of commercial life in the Islamic world were later adopted by the 
West (Udovitch, 1975). Famous examples include the sakk (singular of sukuk, referring 
to financial certificate) which is considered to be the root of the French/English word 
cheque (Warde, 2000; El-Gamal, 2006) and the mudarabah, a profit-and-loss sharing 
(PLS) financing arrangement developed to support the financial needs of merchants 
along major trade routes, which later became known as the ‘commenda’ in Europe 
(Harris, 2009). Although extensively used and discussed in religious and legal 
documents in the first two centuries of Islam, the mudarabah reached Europe centuries 
later with the oldest records found in Northern Italy in the late 11th and 12th centuries 
(Harris, 2009, see also references within). Other financial practices and similar credit 
techniques to those developed during the earliest medieval period in the Islamic world 
also began to appear in the West several centuries later, some as late as the 13th century. 
Thus, the widespread use of complex financial instruments in the early Islamic world is 
attested to be at least three to four centuries earlier than anything comparable appearing 
in medieval Europe (Udovitch, 1975). 
20 The Golden Age of Islam is approximated to be between the seventh to the tenth centuries in the 
Middle East and eleventh to the fourteenth centuries in Spain and the North African region (Warde, 
2000). 
21 The ruqa’s (literally notes) were used in short distance and local trade as orders for payments, delivery 
and as promissory notes. These complemented sakks (literally a “written documentation of financial 
liability”) and were used as instructions for transfer or deposit of funds and for payments of a variety of 
bills. Both operated as close equivalents of modern-day cheques (Udovitch, 1975; Shanmugam and 
Zahari, 2009; El-Gamal, 2006, p.195, see also references within).  
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Despite this four century head start, the Islamic world did not develop independent 
banking institutions, of the kind present today. Indeed the developments in the Islamic 
world preceded the emergence of standalone institutions devoted to banking, the 
foundations of which were laid in 12th century Europe and then firmly established by 
14th century Italian commercial banking houses. From the 14th to the 16th centuries, this 
European banking model, which operated by converting deposits into credit, became 
more elaborate and has ever since followed an upward trend  in complexity, size and 
influence, proceeding  to the present day complex banking and financial institutions 
(Udovitch, 1975; Warde, 2000). 
Such an institution however did not and could not have developed in the Islamic world. 
As Udovitch (1975) explains this was due to a number of factors, including the socio-
economic structure of Islamic economies and rules governing financial transactions. In 
the Islamic world, financial services were provided through two institutions: money-
changers and merchant bankers, although some of their functions overlapped. The 
former were a reliable source of international coinage and their evaluation, facilitating 
the interchangeability of gold and silver coins, used then as currency. In commercial 
centres such as Alexandria, money-changers occupied their own special bazaars, akin to 
Wall Street, which served as the nerve centres of financial exchange. Profits were 
primarily earned in form of a fixed transaction fee for each exchange.  
Merchant bankers were involved in a variety of proto-banking activities, from issuing 
bills of exchange (suftajas), accepting deposits (although no interest was paid on these) 
to acting as a clearinghouse for payments through extensively using ruqa’s and sukuk  
as well as money-changing for those with significant involvement in international trade. 
Despite their extensive banking operations, no individual was exclusively a banker. 
Instead, all banking activities undertaken by merchant-bankers were an extension of 
their commercial endeavours, related directly or indirectly to the trade in commodities 
(Udovitch, 1975). This was an important factor in the development of financial 
institutions in the Islamic world. In line with the gharar prohibition, all financial 
transactions were linked to a real economic activity through either trade of goods, 
production or investment in commercial ventures. Thus, there was no need for a 
standalone financial institution as financial activities were never autonomous but rather 
always conducted as a subset of commerce (Warde, 2000). 
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Credit provided to support the financial needs of merchants, domestic households, 
agriculture and industry primarily came in the form of credit and prepayment sale 
contracts as well as profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) arrangements. Credit sales were not 
only an indispensable source of credit supporting long-distance international trade but 
also an important source of profit, fully consistent with Islamic law. The sale of an item 
on credit for a higher than spot price is permitted under Islamic law, as the difference in 
price is considered a legitimate compensation to the creditor for the absence of capital, 
the risks involved and the benefit the buyer is able to receive through the use of the 
goods before full payment is made (Udovtich, 1975; Usmani, 2004; Visser, 2009). This 
encouraged widespread use of credit sales which explains why the prohibition of riba 
was observed to a considerable extent at the time, without retarding commercial 
activities. In keeping with the riba prohibition, investment in trade and industry was 
based on PLS arrangements, particularly the mudarabah and its variants, which were 
used as flexible alternatives to the interest-bearing loan contract. Usurious transactions 
were not the norm and the use of traditional Islamic loan contract i.e. qard hasan 
(interest-free benevolent loan) was insignificant in commerce (Udovtich, 1975). 
The relationship between deposit and credit was also very different in the Islamic 
world. The European bank developed as an intermediary which converted deposits into 
credit. In the Islamic world, this form of financial intermediation i.e. the conversion of 
deposits into return-generating loans was not possible as there was a disconnection 
between deposit and credit functions. In the Islamic world, deposits were held in form 
of trust. The contract of wadiah (safekeeping) was used which neither involved 
payment of any fee or compensation either to the depository or the depositor, nor 
permitted the depository to use the deposited funds. The function of this contract was 
restricted to safeguarding of money/goods deposited. This ensured that 
credit/investment and deposit activities were kept separate and within narrow confines. 
This was in sharp contrast to the European experience where the depository could not 
only use the deposited funds for its own commercial endeavours, generating credit, but 
also paid a premium to the depositors for this privilege. The latter, which developed 
into a deposit banking system continuing to this day, could clearly not be established in 
the Islamic world (Udovitch, 1975; Warde, 2000).  
In addition to the legal framework and financial structure, the social context was also an 
important factor. Credit, banking and commercial institutions in the Islamic world were 
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primarily reliant on a close-knit network of personal and communal relationships. 
Granting of credit was primarily based on the status and reputation of the parties 
concerned and was embedded in intricate albeit informally-structured but nonetheless 
an effective network of personal-social relationships. Merchant banking activities 
outside of such a network were rare (Udovitch, 1975; Warde, 2000). As Udovitch 
argues, these exact social-personal relations, which ensured successful and effective 
functioning of merchant banking and credit activities during the medieval period, were 
also the factors which confined their elaboration, development and growth into 
independent organisational forms. The complexities, unpredictability and slowness of 
communication between distant geographical locations limited the scale of economic 
activities at the time to numerous intimate circles, the integration of which into a much 
larger independent structure was precluded by the reliance on strong social networks. 
Thus, the socio-economic structure of the medieval Islamic civilisation did not lay 
down the foundations to construct economic institutions which could exist 
independently of the intricate social network on which economic life was based 
(Udovitch, 1975).  With no individual specialising in banking, a disconnection between 
deposit and credit functions, and financial relationships predominantly embedded in 
personal and communal ties, the European style independent deposit banking system 
could not and did not develop in the medieval Islamic world. 
Although not indigenously developed, the European banking model did firmly establish 
itself in the Islamic world. This was possible due to changes in world economic powers. 
As Europe exited the Dark Ages, it underwent a huge transformation through the stages 
of the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, Industrial Revolution, and 
Imperialism. In contrast, the Islamic world began to experience a break from it 
celebrated past as well as developments in the West, resulting in prolonged period of 
stagnation followed by decline between the fifteenth and the twentieth centuries 
(Warde, 2000). By the nineteenth century, a huge gap between the West and the 
Muslim world had developed which was followed by most of the Muslim world falling 
under colonial rule (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005).  
The economic, political and cultural impact of Western ascendency has been of 
significant importance in shaping the Muslim world. By the late nineteenth century, 
Western models of economics, law, politics and education were imposed on most 
Muslim countries which underwent, along with Westernisation, a thorough process of 
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secularisation. The role of religious scholars was significantly reduced while that of 
publically elected representatives was enhanced. This period was also critical for the 
financial sector, as the traditional Islamic financial institutions were replaced by 
western counterparts. The European interest-based model of commercial banking, 
which was first transported to most of the Muslim world through trade, became firmly 
established through colonisation. Muslim countries’ banking sectors thereafter began 
operating on the conventional interest-based banking model (Warde, 2000; Maali and 
Napier, 2010).  
The mid twentieth century brought about another notable change. With the fall of the 
British Empire in colonial India and the creation of Pakistan, a separate independent 
state for South-Asian Muslims, a movement to revive Islamic norms in the economic 
domain ignited. Contributions from South-Asian scholars, especially the writing of 
Maulana Mawdudi (1903-1979), which gave rise to the term ‘Islamic Economics’ 
became of significant influence22. Following Mawdudi’s seminal work, an abundance 
of literature was produced on Islamic economics, with the largest contributions made by 
Pakistani scholars23. Driven by the establishment of a separate sovereign state based on 
religious identity, Pakistan became the pioneer of the Islamisation24 movement (Wilson, 
1983; Kuran, 1996; Warde, 2000). 
The Islamic economics doctrine which appeared in the postcolonial era, as Kuran 
(1995, 1996, 2004) has extensively argued, was driven largely by “cultural rather than 
economic concerns” (Kuran, 1996, p.438). Aimed at re-establishing the importance of 
religion in the economic domain, it emerged as an instrument to create, protect and 
strengthen the religious identity of South Asian Muslims which at the time was 
considered threatened by western influence. It therefore lacked scientific rigour and was 
primarily normative. Few contributions in the literature proposed solutions for modern-
day economic problems. Instead the focus was firmly placed on establishing an 
‘Islamic’ approach towards economics (Kuran, 1996). Two features became dominant 
22 Influential figures in the Arab world include Sayyid Qutb and Baqir Al-Sadr (El-Gamal, 2006). 
23 Despite Saudi Arabia being the birthplace of Islam and the Arab Peninsula being the centre of the 
earliest Islamic civilisation, the only serious debate about applying Islamic principles to economics in 
modern times took place in Pakistan and not the Middle East. Unsurprisingly so, as Pakistan is the 
world's only country which was founded explicitly for the purpose of providing Muslims a state to govern 
themselves in accordance with Islamic principles (Wilson, 1983; Kuran, 1996; Warde, 2000). 
24 Islamisation refers to the process of desecularising the state including the legal, political and economic 
systems to bring these in line with the Islamic principles (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2010). 
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in the literature. First, the prohibition of riba, translated within narrow confines as a ban 
on interest, which took centre stage and second, the emphasis on social justice in Islam, 
which translated into socio-economic development being one of the primary goals of an 
Islamic financial system (Chapra, 1985). 
With the ban on interest taken as the central precept, the challenge was to Islamicize the 
existing interest-based banking system. However, without examples of modern-style 
banking institutions in the Sunnah (Prophetic tradition) and Islamic history, religious 
scholars trying to create an indigenous, ‘authentic’ brand of Islamic economics, and 
particularly banking, struggled to reconcile legal sources with demands of the modern 
world. Scholarly efforts within the realm of fiqh (jurisprudence) expanded. An 
unprecedented level of ijtihad25 (juristic inference) was undertaken to devise a financial 
system which would be consistent with both religious principles and the modern 
economy (Warde, 2000). Scholars relied on qiyas (analogical reasoning) through 
reference to legal precedents26. Documents of classical fiqh were searched for 
contractual arrangements which could be used either directly or in modified form as 
alternatives to modern-day conventional financial products (El-Gamal, 2006). The 
classical texts provided abundant examples of trade and investment contracts; the 
former comprising of a variety of sale contracts including mark-up and credit sale, 
leasing as well as other trade-based contracts and the latter consisting of PLS 
arrangements including the mudarabah and its variants (including musharakah). 
Majority of scholars promoted the idea that interest was to be replaced by PLS 
mechanisms, creating alternative bank–business and depositor–bank relationships based 
on equity partnerships rather than the usual borrower-lender relationship in 
conventional banking (Warde, 2000; Ayub,  2007).  
With no indigenous Islamic precedent, Islamic economists at the time took the existing 
conventional commercial banks as the blueprint for an ‘Islamic’ version of the banking 
institution, leaving the structure of the bank in terms of its role and nature of 
25 Recall from chapter 2, ijtihad refers to independent reasoning undertaken by Islamic jurists to establish 
new legal rules. It is used to address contemporary issues for which an explicit directive from the Quran 
and the sunnah cannot be found (Ayub, 2007).  
26 In premodern times, jurists/religious scholars used a variety of different legal tools to derive new laws 
including istislah (benefit analysis) and istihsan (public interest). In modern times, however, scholars 
have primarily focused on the rule ‘ijtihad through qiyas’ i.e. drawing juristic inferences solely on the 
basis of analogical reasoning through reference to legal precedents (El-Gamal, 2006). 
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assets/liabilities intact. Although unintentional, this as will be shown below, became 
one of the fundamental contributors in the divergence between the theoretical model 
and the practice of Islamic banks (see sections 3.4.2 and 3.6). To appreciate the 
discrepancies between theory and the practice of Islamic banking it is important first to 
understand the theoretical model of Islamic banking and the developmental phases the 
industry underwent. These are presented in the following two sections.  
3.3 Islamic Banking in Theory  
The earliest literature on modern Islamic banking dates back to the 1940s, with 
theoretical models appearing in the mid-1950s and further conceptual developments 
made throughout the 1960s to 1980s. Theoretical models of Islamic banking were 
devised with the aspiration to eliminate interest and replace it with PLS mechanisms on 
both the asset and the liability side of a bank’s operations (for a summary of these 
models see Iqbal et al., 1998; Ahmed, 2002; Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005).  
The traditional Islamic contracts of mudarabah (silent partnership) and musharakah 
(equity partnership) premised on PLS terms were particularly highlighted27. Commonly 
known under the label of ‘PLS financing’, these contracts were and still are considered 
to be “the real and ideal instruments of Islamic financing” (Usmani, 2004, p.12). At its 
simplest, Islamic banking was envisioned as operating on a two-tier mudarabah basis 
i.e. raise funds from depositors and supply capital to customers on a mudarabah (PLS) 
basis. Thus, the bank would enter two agent-principal relationships; acting as the agent 
for the depositors on the liability side and as the principal (capital provider) for 
businesses on the asset side (Uzair, 1955; Al-Arabi, 1966; Siddiqi, 1968, 1983a, 2006; 
Chapra, 1982, 1985, 2007; Iqbal et al., 1998; Warde, 2000; Zaher and Hasan, 2001; 
Ahmed, 2002; Usmani, 2004; Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005; Obaidullah, 2005; El-Gamal, 
27 There is evidence to suggest that mudarabah and musharakah predate Islam (Udovitch, 1970). Islamic 
traditions also provide references of mudarabah being used by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), more than 15 
years before his prophethood, as he travelled to Syria for trade, being the travelling partner of Khadija 
(his-wife-to-be) who was the capital provider (Hasan, 1989; Kahf and Khan, 1992). However, as Harris 
(2009) notes, the mudarabah was developed fully by the Arabs to support the long-term caravan trade 
routes linking south Arabia and the Mediterranean and thus is recognised as an “indigenously developed 
Arab–Islamic institution”, which leaves little debate over its Muslim origins. Whilst the origins of these 
financing modes is beyond the scope of this study, it is recognised that the long history of their use in 
Islamic tradition, and their use being attributed to the Prophet (pbuh) himself, are important factors 
establishing their superiority over other modes of financing within the Islamic economics literature. 
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2006; Ayub, 2007; Iqbal and Lewis, 2009). The two-tier mudarabah model is illustrated 
in figure 3.1 and described below.  
Figure 3.1: The Two-tier Mudarabah Model 
 
3.3.1 Asset side  
Profit-and-Loss-Sharing (PLS) Financing 
According to the two-tier mudarabah model, the primary financial instrument used by 
an Islamic bank to provide financing to its clients is the mudarabah contract. In addition 
to this, Islamic banks would also use musharakah financing.  
Mudarabah is often translated as silent partnership or trust financing. In this contract an 
Islamic bank acts as the capital provider (principal), financing an enterprise or a 
particular project as a sleeping equity partner and therefore does not take part in the 
management of funds (the bank holds no control rights in this contract). The financed 
client/entrepreneur (agent) brings his/her expertise and entrepreneurial skill to the 
partnership and manages the funded venture. Profits arising from the venture are shared 
according to an agreed ratio, whilst losses are borne solely by the capital provider (the 
bank), unless caused by the entrepreneur’s negligence. The financial loss falls only on 
the capital provider because according to sharia, one cannot lose what one has not 
contributed. In case of a loss, the capital provider loses his investment and as there is no 
return generated, the entrepreneur losses his/her effort and time. Musharakah is an 
equity financing contract where Islamic banks finance an enterprise or a particular 
project as an equity partner, sharing the profits and losses of the venture. Profits can be 
shared at any pre-specified ratio, but losses are shared in proportion to the capital 
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invested by each party. This contract gives each partner including the Islamic bank the 
right to participate in management of the invested funds, although this right need not be 
exercised28 (Warde, 2000; Khalil et al., 2002; Kuran, 2004; Usmani, 2004; Ayub, 2007; 
Shanmugam and Zahari, 2009; Visser, 2009; El-Diwany, 2010; Khan, 2010). 
3.3.2 Liability side 
Profit-and-Loss-Sharing (PLS) Deposits  
According to the theoretical two-tier mudarabah model, Islamic banks accept deposits 
on the basis of a mudarabah contract (silent partnership), where depositors are the 
providers of funds (principal) on whose behalf the Islamic bank (agent) invests. These 
PLS deposits are placed in investment accounts, named as such because these resemble 
investment funds operating on a risk-sharing basis (Visser, 2009). Accordingly, Islamic 
banks can neither guarantee the nominal value of these deposits nor pay a guaranteed, 
fixed return to the depositors as this constitutes riba. Profits are shared between the 
bank and the depositors according to a pre-determined ratio, whilst losses are borne by 
the depositors. PLS deposits are therefore similar to equity capital and carry loss 
absorbing capacity, making the depositors (the investment account holders) quasi-
shareholders of the Islamic bank (Khan, 1986; Lewis, 2001).  
Given the nature of PLS deposits, Islamic banks are envisioned as a “cross-breed of 
commercial and investment banks”, which share some characteristics of commercial 
banks in terms of ownership where depositors do not own the bank nor have voting 
rights; and investment intermediaries as investment account holders share the banks’ 
risk and are paid a percentage of the its profits (Chapra, 1985, p.154; Ahmed, 2002).   
3.4 Islamic Banking: From Theory to Practice 
The transition of Islamic banking from theory to reality took a number of social, 
political and economic developments in the Muslim world (Warde, 2000). The 
evolutionary process is broadly divided into three periods: 1940s – 1970, 1970s – 1990 
and 1990s – present. These developmental phases are described below. 
28 A counterpart to these arrangements do not exist in standard conventional commercial banks but does 
so in universal banks which also hold equity stake in financed firms. In conventional finance, merchant 
banking and venture capital is the equivalent of PLS arrangements (Warde, 2000; Iqbal and Lewis, 2009). 
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3.4.1 Phase 1: 1940s – 1970  
During the 1940s – 1970, the conceptual and political foundations for Islamic banking 
were laid down. The Islamisation movement which gained momentum in the post-
colonial era encouraged research into the concept of an Islamic financial system and 
theoretical models of Islamic banking were developed throughout the 1950s and 60s 
(Siddiqi, 2006; Billah, 2007). In the 1960s, pan-Islamism29, the defining political 
movement for Islamic banking began and gained substantial support by the end of the 
decade (Warde, 2000). 
The earliest literature on Islamic banking highlighted the conceptual struggle with 
several incoherent proposals and inconsistencies (Visser, 2013). The idea of partnership 
between the bank and its clients was constant but the exact conditions of this 
partnership were not. Qureshi (1946) for example mentioned loss sharing, but not profit 
sharing while Ahmad (1952) left the nature of partnership undefined. Uzair (1955) 
however, systematically invoked the mudarabah contract as the basis for interest-free 
banking and his work is widely considered as the first reference to the structure of two-
tier mudarabah model (El-Gamal, 2006). Al-Arabi (1966) advanced the idea of two-tier 
mudarabah, adding that an Islamic bank could not only invest depositors’ but also its 
shareholders’ funds in this manner. He emphasised the distribution of profit-and-loss 
sharing between parties to be in strict accordance with the sharia (i.e. the traditional 
mudarabah contract, described in section 3.3.1). Irshad (1964) however, suggested a 50-
50 profit-and-loss share between the parties, contradicting the sharia principles. Finally, 
a detailed outline was produced in 1968 by Siddiqi (1968, 1983a) which elaborated on 
the two-tier mudarabah model to include the use of both mudarabah and musharakah. 
Siddiqi argued that such a PLS banking system would become a viable alternative to 
conventional interest-based banking. The issue of consumption loans however was 
underplayed and not adequately addressed (Ariff, 2001). 
29 Pan-Islamism is the political movement which propagated unifying the world’s Muslim as a single 
nation, based on the idea of solidarity amongst the Islamic ‘ummah (community) bounded by common 
religious beliefs. It was sponsored by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in opposition to the pan-Arabism 
movement promoted by the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. The latter was a movement against 
western colonialism which promoted Arab and Third World solidarity as well as the ideas of nationalism, 
socialism and secularism. This position was at odds with Saudi Arabia which has always been a 
conservative monarchy with strong links to the West (Warde, 2000; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2010). 
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Independently of these developments, a number of private initiatives applying Islamic 
finance principles appeared in Pakistan, Egypt and Malaysia, although not all were 
successful (Warde, 2000; Rehman, 2010). Chronologically, the Pakistan initiative came 
first with a local interest-free credit network founded in the late 1950s. Set in a rural 
location, the institution was financially supported by a few pious landlords willing to 
deposit funds without a return to advance credit in form of qard hasan to other much 
poorer landowners for agricultural development. A fixed administrative fee was 
charged to cover the institutions’ operating expenses. The institution quickly grew 
popular with no shortage of borrowers. However, with a shortage of loanable funds and 
staff and lack of autonomy over lending decisions, it did not survive beyond the early 
1960s30 (Wilson, 1983; Warde, 2000).  
As the Pakistan initiative came to an end, a similar institution was founded in the rural 
area of the Nile Delta in Egypt. Founded by Dr Ahmed el-Naggar31 who was highly 
influenced by German mutual savings and loan associations, the Mit Ghamr Savings 
Bank began operations in 1963  The bank focused on addressing the financial needs of 
rural Egyptians underserved by the conventional banking system by offering interest-
free loans, on which a small administrative fee was charged. Unlike the Pakistan 
initiative, however, the depositors and borrowers in Mit Ghamr belonged to the same 
group. To receive an interest-free loan, borrowers had to place a minimum amount with 
the bank for at least a year, which ensured the bank did not face a shortage of loanable 
funds. Loans were given for a variety of economically productive activities32 and were 
primarily short-term (1 to 3 years). In line with Islamic teachings, which condemn 
hoarding, emphasis was placed on the circulation of funds and thus no grace period was 
permitted on repayments. The bank primarily earned a return by engaging in industry 
and trade directly or via partnerships and financing businesses on PLS basis (Wilson, 
1983, 1995; Warde, 2000; Tripp, 2006; Billah, 2007; Rehman, 2010).  
30 On the one hand, depositors viewed their payments in the bank as a one-time initiative which led to a 
shortage of loanable funds. On the other hand, depositors took significant interest in how the bank loaned 
out the funds, leaving the bank officials with very little autonomy over lending decisions. Recruitment 
problems with potential employees unwilling to work in an uncertain countryside initiative resulted in 
shortage of staff. Together, these problems led to a loss of enthusiasm and finally the closure of the 
institution. Outstanding loans were treated as bilateral arrangements between landlords which were 
mostly paid off during the early 1960s (Wilson, 1983).  
31 Ahmed al-Naggar later became the Secretary of the International Association of Islamic Banks (IAIB) 
(Warde, 2000). 
32 These included agricultural improvements including irrigation systems, the purchase of farm animals 
and machinery, sewing machines and even housebuilding (Wilson, 1983). 
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Mit Ghamr was a success. Unlike the conventional commercial banks, Mit Ghamr was 
highly regarded and trusted by the local rural population33. It effectively harnessed 
funds from farmers, small-scale traders and landowners who, as devout Muslims 
concerned about dealings in riba, had abstained from using the conventional banking 
sector (Wilson, 1995). At its peak, the bank operated via nine branches, had 250,000 
depositors with deposits amounting to almost 2 million Egyptian pounds (Warde, 
2000). The bank also contributed significantly towards socio-economic development 
particularly the reduction in rural indebtedness as it gave countryside borrowers an 
alternative to local moneylenders who charged excessively high interest rates (Wilson, 
1983). Despite its success, the bank came to a controversial end. Although not 
completely shut down, the bank was nationalised by the government, taken over by the 
Nasser Social Bank with its base moved to Cairo and its original countryside operations 
hampered34 (Wilson, 1995; Warde, 2000).  
Another prominent initiative, Tabung Haji (Pilgrims Fund Board), a Malaysian savings 
and investment institution, began operations in 1963. It was created to help Malaysian 
Muslims save and build their wealth for the annual Islamic pilgrimage to Makkah (the 
Hajj). With its purpose linked to an act of worship, all investments made by Tabung 
Haji were naturally required to be sharia compliant. The institution operated on the PLS 
model. Focused on the mass retail market, it pooled small savings, invested in a variety 
of projects and shared the profits with its customers. The underlying approach adopted 
was consistent with Islamic ethos, favouring savings and growth of wealth through 
investment in productive activities and discouraging debt, in contrast to the 
conventional banking system which promotes personal debt. With its strong roots in the 
community, a clear business structure and government support, Tabung Haji continues 
its operations to this day (Siddiqi, 2006; Rehman, 2010, Haniffa and Hudaib, 2010). 
33 The rural population was quite suspicious of all outsiders, particularly educated urbanites. Very few 
individuals had any experience of commercial banks which were seen as “alien institutions”. Mit Ghamr 
on the other hand, achieved significant personal support from the locals who considered it their own. The 
bank’s staff which comprised of  educated Muslim enthusiasts with previous banking experience, gained 
confidence of the conservative countryside community as they were seen to be devout Muslims 
worshipping alongside the locals and sharing similar moral values (Wilson, 1983, p. 76). 
34 The exact reasons for the bank's nationalisation are unclear. Some suggest the bank faced financial 
challenges and struggled to cover administrative expenses, increase salaries and therefore was unable to 
recruit additional staff. Others however argue that the bank was commercially viable but unpopular with 
the government, seen as a potential political threat and was also unpopular with the Central Bank of 
Egypt and state-owned banks who had concerns over how the bank was regulated. Given Mit Ghamr’s 
popularity, its closure would have led to widespread discontent and thus the Egyptian government 
decided, after much debate and delay, to nationalise it in 1972 (Wilson, 1983, 1995; Warde, 2000). 
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These institutions are important precursors to modern Islamic banks and although some 
attribute the roots of contemporary Islamic banking to these institutions and particularly 
Mit Ghamr (Billah, 2007); it is important to note that none of these institutions were 
actual formal banks. Commercial banking activities including transactional services and 
short-term placements were never considered a part of these institutions’ aims (Warde, 
2010; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2010). Instead, these were nonbanking financial institutions 
(NBFIs) which were established to address very specific needs of the local Muslim 
community in line with Islamic principles (Rehman, 2010). Independently-led and 
geographically distant, these initiatives did share a number of characteristics. First, 
despite their adherence to Islamic principles, none of these institutions made explicit 
reference to the religion to claim an Islamic identity. Second, as demand-driven 
initiatives, they focused on a genuine financial need. Finally, religiously inspired, these 
initiatives made significant contribution to socio-economic development. Accordingly, 
these are recognised as some of the earliest modern-day initiatives, which led by 
“sacred intentions”, embodied the true spirit of sharia and Islamic finance (Warde, 
2000; Rehman, 2010; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2010, p.87).  
3.4.2 Phase 2: 1970s – 1990  
The 1970s was the defining decade for Islamic banking. Conceptual ideas became 
reality as the first commercial Islamic bank was established in 1975. Two politico-
economic developments were crucial for this: pan-Islamism, which became an almost 
unstoppable force by the mid-1970s and the rise in oil prices, which quadrupled during 
1973-74. Together these provided both the political and the financial support required 
to move forward the Islamic banking agenda. From the pan-Islamism perspective, the 
establishment of an Islamic banking system was a symbol of restoring religious values 
in the secular economic domain35 (Warde, 2000; Billah, 2007; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2010). Until the 1970s, with no Islamic banking institutions, the Muslim world had 
become accustomed to operating on a conventional interest-based system. Although 
religiously objectionable, interest was accepted by society at large as an economic 
reality. Nevertheless, considerable sections of the populace including many 
businessmen abstained from dealing with conventional banks whilst many devout 
35 Arguably, for Saudi Arabia, a strong ally of the West, it was also the route to establishing itself as the 
custodian of the world’s Muslim population and the survival of its monarchic regime (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2010). 
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Muslims with banking accounts refused interest payments on their savings (Wilson, 
1995, 2009; Warde, 2000). The rise in oil prices however created an unprecedented 
need for banking services throughout the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)36, 
particularly for the business community. To prominent Arab businessmen, this provided 
a unique opportunity and the financial resources to establish religiously compliant 
banking institutions (Wilson, 1995; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2010).  
In 1975, Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB), the first of its kind, was created in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) by a group of reputable businessmen with strong social-political ties to 
the Royal family (Wilson, 1995; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2010). Before the end of the 
decade, similar banks appeared both within and outside of the GCC. These included 
Kuwait Finance House (KFH: 1977)37, Faisal Islamic Bank in Sudan and Egypt (1977), 
Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB: 1978) and Bahrain Islamic Bank (BIB: 1979). Development 
continued into the 1980s with Qatar Islamic Bank (QIB: 1982) and Bank Islam 
Malaysia Bhd (1983) being launched (Wilson, 1995, 2009; Warde, 2000; Billah, 2007). 
Islamisation however was not limited to individual banks. During this time, three 
countries, starting with Pakistan (1979) and shortly followed by Iran and Sudan (1983) 
pursued full Islamisation of their banking systems by explicitly banning interest 
(Warde, 2000). 
The pan-Islamism movement also led to the creation of a number of important 
transnational institutions starting with The Organization of the Islamic Conference38 
(OIC) which held its first meeting in 1970. At its 1974 summit, the OIC members voted 
to create an International Islamic Development Bank39 (IDB), which was to become the 
cornerstone of the global Islamic banking system, promoting trade and development in 
the Muslim world. In 1977, the OIC established the International Association of Islamic 
36 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) comprises of six Middle East countries which are: Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
37 The institution’s abbreviated label and the year it was established are presented in the parenthesis. 
38 The OIC was established with 30 founding members. It currently comprises of 57 member states, 56 of 
which are also a member of the United Nations. The 1972 charter of the OIC specifies its objective is to 
strengthen cooperation and solidarity amongst its member states. It promotes the idea of unifying the 
world’s Muslims into a single body and considers itself their representative voice (see, www.oic-oci.org 
for details).  
39 IDB was founded with 44 member countries with Saudi Arabia being the largest shareholder. It began 
operations in 1975. The aims of IDB included: provide funds to the member countries on PLS and fee-
based arrangements to promote and finance trade and development in the Muslim world, act as a 
clearinghouse for payments between Muslim countries, provide training and assistance in establishing 
additional Islamic institutions and to manage zakah (religious tax) funds (Warde, 2000). 
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Banks (IAIB), designed to be the advice and coordination mechanism for the newly 
established Islamic banks40. The Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA), the largest 
representative body of sharia scholars in the world with representation from all Muslim 
countries, which passes fatwas on various issues including Islamic banking, was created 
in 1981. All of these were based in Jeddah as Saudi Arabia continued to lead the pan-
Islamism movement (Warde, 2000; Wilson, 2009). 
Domestic politics however was extremely influential in the development of Islamic 
banking. Saudi Arabia, which was actively promoting Islamic banking in the 
international sphere, was extremely reluctant in issuing domestic Islamic banking 
licences. This was due in part to the fear of exposing and attracting attention to the 
interest-based conventional banking system, which was firmly established in the 
Kingdom despite an official prohibition of interest (Warde, 2000; Tripp, 2006; Wilson, 
2009). In 1985, the Islamic Fiqh Academy urged Muslim countries to assist the 
formation of Islamic banks and forbade the use of conventional banks for Muslims 
where the Islamic alternative was available. Although neither injunction produced 
immediate results, these did make it difficult for any Muslim government to explicitly 
oppose the development of Islamic banking (Warde, 2000). Al Rajhi Bank, the first 
Saudi Islamic bank and currently the largest in the world, was finally issued an Islamic 
banking license in 1987. With Al Rajhi launched, five of the six GCC states had 
established local Islamic banks. Oman however remained the exception. For political 
reasons, the country did not issue any Islamic banking licences until very recently41 
(Wilson, 2009). 
Islamic banks created during this period were very different from the NBFIs of the 
1950s and 60s. These were supply-driven enterprises, designed specifically to be a 
substitute for the conventional commercial bank. Their target clientele was also very 
different from the rural population. As a major oil producing region with a limited 
agricultural industry, microfinance-style credit unions were not relevant in the GCC, 
particularly as affluence had spread throughout the region with rising oil prices. The 
focus was therefore placed entirely on serving business clients and the middle-upper 
40 As part of its role, the IAIB published the Handbook of Islamic banking, which written by Islamic 
scholars was designed to be the practical guide for Islamic banks (Warde, 2000; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2010). 
41 Bank Nizwa, the first Islamic bank in Oman opened in 2013. 
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class citizens (Wilson, 2009). Furthermore, these institutions claimed an explicit 
Islamic identity promoting their operations on the basis of sharia-compliance. However, 
as these were managed by bankers with experience of conventional banking and very 
limited knowledge of fiqh, a credible mechanism providing assurances on sharia 
compliance was needed. This need was addressed by banks rather than the state, as each 
institution began building relationships with well-known sharia scholars, seeking 
approvals for their products and activities. For sharia scholars, this was an opportunity 
to regain influence in post-colonised societies. The mutual need gave rise to Sharia 
Supervisory Boards (SSBs, further details in section 3.5.3) and the culture of fatwa-
seeking in Islamic banking (Wilson, 2009; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2010).  
With no precedent however, neither sharia scholars nor the Islamic bankers and 
economists of the time had any firm ideas on how an Islamic commercial bank would 
operate in practice. These were uncharted waters for all parties involved and the stakes 
were high. If any of the initial ventures failed, it would cause significant damage to the 
Islamic banking movement. With high uncertainly there was considerable hesitation 
from the IDB, which did not undertake a single financial transaction for almost the first 
two years. It remained largely inactive trying to identify how to practically provide 
sharia-compliant financing without taking on unwarranted risk (Kahf, 2013; Visser, 
2013).  
Strong political and financial support led to a proliferation in research on Islamic 
banking and economics (Warde, 2000). As Wilson (1997, in Warde, 2000) notes, more 
has been written on Islamic economics during the 1970s-1990s than in the previous 
1400 years of Islamic history. During this time Islamic economists increased their 
efforts to strengthen the case for Islamic banking using empirical evidence, logic and 
scientific theory rather than relying on assertions from religious text. Further 
elaborations were also made to the Islamic banking model. Mohsin (1982) for example 
presented a framework for Islamic banks incorporating characteristics of commercial, 
development and merchant banking, designed for the capitalist environment. Al-Jarhi 
(1983) proposed that Islamic banks providing commercial banking services should 
separate between current account (demand deposits) and investment account deposits, 
with a 100% reserve requirement imposed on the former. While, Chapra (1985) in 
addition to propagating the PLS principle, emphasised the social aspect of Islamic 
banking suggesting that these institutions should serve public rather than individual 
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interests. He envisioned Islamic banks as a crossbreed of commercial, investment and 
merchant banks which would prioritise socio-economic development as opposed to 
profit maximisation. Using PLS principles, these banks would rely on project 
evaluation to extend funds rather than non-participatory methods which rely on strong 
collateral as in conventional banking. Although important, these efforts nevertheless 
were conceptual in nature and came much later than the developments made by industry 
professionals.  
Practitioners followed a more pragmatic approach as it became clear that the theoretical 
two-tier mudarabah model had left several issues unresolved, particularly from a 
practical perspective (Warde, 2000). Of the material produced, the most influential was 
by the late Dr Sami Hamoud, a Jordanian economist with 22 years of conventional 
banking experience. Hamoud’s background heavily influenced his view of how an 
Islamic bank should operate and the products it should provide. Hamoud’s vision was to 
create a bank which would operate on the European banking model and compete 
directly with its conventional counterpart by providing the same banking facilities, 
without violating the precepts of Islamic law (El-Gamal, 2006; Maali and Napier, 
2010). 
Hamoud rightly identified that mudarabah and musharakah (PLS) did not provide 
substitutes for the interest-bearing consumption loan offered by conventional banks. He 
therefore searched for a sharia-compliant alternative. His solution was a modified 
version of the traditional Islamic contract named murabahah. Traditional murabahah is 
a spot sale contract where goods are sold for cost-plus agreed mark-up price42. The 
modified murabahah proposed combined two sale contracts and a binding promise, and 
worked as follows: clients wishing to obtain finance for an asset specify to the bank 
their desired asset and supplier; bank then purchases the asset on behalf of its client for 
cash by entering a spot sale contract with the supplier and sells the asset to its client for 
cost-plus-mark-up price with deferred payment by entering a credit sale contract. Prior 
to entering this arrangement, the client commits to purchasing the asset from the bank. 
This structure replicated an interest-bearing loan transaction but was argued to be 
42 This was a contract designed to emphasise transparency in trade as the purchaser was made aware of 
the cost paid by the seller to the original supplier and could judge if the mark-up charged was inequitably 
high (Maali and Napier, 2010).  
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sharia-compliant as none of the individual components explicitly involved interest 
(Maali and Napier, 2010).  
Until Hamoud’s suggestion, this form of murabahah was unknown to the Islamic 
banking industry (Maali and Napier, 2010; Visser, 2013). Sharia scholars approved the 
arrangement on the basis of it being an asset-based transaction, where banks earn a 
return (mark-up) arising from the sale of actual goods, rather than profiteering through 
the extension of credit. Another supporting element was the precedent of credit sale 
contracts used abundantly in medieval Islamic societies to fulfil domestic and industrial 
credit needs. As mentioned earlier, sharia permits charging a higher than spot price in 
credit sale contracts and thus the mark-up was considered a valid form of profit 
(Udovtich, 1975; Usmani, 2004; Visser, 2009). Nevertheless, the lack of PLS and 
proximity to interest-bearing loan contract raised genuine concerns and thus sharia 
scholars permitted the structure only as an ‘exception’ to assist banks meet their client’s 
needs for occasions where PLS may not be suitable. The permission was aimed at 
supporting the transitional, introductory period of Islamic banking, allowing banks to 
build resources and experience to become viable institutions. It was expected that 
murabahah will be used temporarily until banks develop and move towards PLS-
consistent alternatives (Rehman, 2010; Warde, 2010).  
Following Hamoud’s recommendation, the first murabahah transaction was undertaken 
by IDB in August 1976 (Kahf, 2013; Visser, 2013). Certified as sharia compliant, 
murabahah quickly became popular and began to dominate Islamic banking. Newly-
established banks relied on murabahah right from their inception (Wilson, 2009). By the 
end of 1980s, murabahah accounted for almost 70% of Islamic financing, reaching 
around 90% in some Islamic banks (Maali and Napier, 2010).  
Hamoud also proposed modifications to the mudarabah contract applying to the liability 
side of the two-tier mudarabah model. Hamoud’s proposal was aimed at creating a close 
substitute of the conventional deposit system. His proposals relaxed several conditions 
of the original mudarabah contract. The most important one which attracted much 
debate was the issue of guaranteeing deposits held in investment accounts. Under the 
traditional mudarabah contract, the capital sum cannot be guaranteed. Hamoud however 
argued for an explicit guarantee of depositors’ funds. He also proposed Islamic banks 
create ‘investment risk provisions’ by setting aside 20% of the profits made per year 
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from investments using customer deposits to cover any losses which would otherwise 
be passed on to the depositors. He tried to put forth his case based on religious 
reasoning. The Fatwa Committee evaluating these proposals in Jordan did not accept 
the proposal of providing an explicit guarantee and argued the religious reasoning 
provided did not hold. To the Committee, the idea of transferring part of the profit from 
one year to another, which would benefit depositors who had not contributed to the 
original investment, was also problematic as the traditional mudarabah requires profit-
sharing only between the contractual parties. Nevertheless, persistence paid off and a 
compromise was made. Hamoud conceded to the Committees’ view on explicit 
guarantee whilst the Committee, by permitting investment risk provisions, ensured 
depositors would never have to face the situation of losing their deposits. In his role as 
JIB’s general manager, Hamoud considered investment account deposits as guaranteed 
and operated the bank on that basis43 (Maali and Napier, 2010). 
With such modifications made within the first few years of Islamic banking, the two-
tier mudarabah model never fully materialised. For those with aspirations of a genuine 
PLS alternative to the conventional banking system, the evolution of Islamic banking 
from theory to reality was extremely disappointing (Warde, 2000). Islamic economists 
criticised these developments as a complete deviation from the spirit of sharia and the 
vision of Islamic banking which endorsed risk-sharing between parties through PLS 
mechanisms (Siddiqi, 1983b).  
At the core of this deviation was a conflict in values which was evident in Hamoud’s 
proposals. His vision of the Islamic bank had to be both sharia compliant and replicate 
conventional banking practices. The latter however violated sharia principles, 
particularly the prohibition of riba. To appease sharia scholars reporting on Islamic 
banks’ compliance, Hamoud had offered financial structures such as the modified 
43 Hamoud’s proposals relied upon mixing opinions from the different schools of fiqh (recall from 
chapter 2, there are four main schools of fiqh in orthodox Sunni Islam; the Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki and 
Hanbali). Hamoud’s view was that adopting opinions from a single school did not provide the 
foundations for an internationally acceptable Islamic banking system. According to Hamoud, the 
modified murabahah was acceptable under Shafi’i school of fiqh whilst extracting provisions from the 
profits arising from investment account deposits was acceptable to the Maliki School. This approach was 
considered undesirable by most scholars on the Fatwa Committee in Jordan, who firstly did not agree 
with the mixing of schools and secondly were predominantly from the Hanafi School (Maali and Napier, 
2010). Subsequent debates have questioned whether Hamoud rightly interpreted the provisions made in 
the Shafi’i and Maliki School to support his proposals. Nyazee (2009), for example has argued that 
Hamoud misunderstood the original work by the great Islamic scholar al-Shafi’i and therefore his 
proposed modified murabahah is not valid even under Shafi’i school of fiqh (Visser, 2009). 
47 
 
                                                 
` 
murabahah which sequenced valid Islamic contracts in a formation that replicated 
prohibited conventional practices i.e. interest-based lending (Maali and Napier, 2010). 
In sharia terminology such arrangements are known as hiyal (sing: hila; ruse/legal 
trick), which refer to the use of lawful means, voluntarily and knowingly, to override 
sharia prohibitions and achieve unlawful objectives thereby defeating the spirit of sharia 
law (Warde, 2000; Rehman, 2010).  
The approval of the murabahah structure relied on a very specific approach to defining 
religious compliance (discussion on the meaning of sharia and difference between 
sharia and fiqh presented in chapter 2 are particularly relevant here). The term ‘sharia’ 
in sharia-compliance was reduced to ‘law’, rather than the more accurate ‘framework of 
life’. Consideration of the spirit (objectives) of sharia and its prohibitions were 
overlooked as focus was put on compliance with the letter of the law. The law itself was 
interpreted in a very confined and literal manner. Riba e.g. was defined simply as 
interest and since murabahah technically involved a ‘mark-up’ not interest, the 
transaction was deemed sharia compliant. Finally, emphasis was placed on the 
contractual form rather than the economic substance of the transaction. Since the 
individual contracts comprising the overall transaction complied with the ‘interpreted’ 
letter of sharia law, the structure was approved.  
The approval of modified murabahah and mudarabah deposit system however divided 
opinions. These approvals were based on fatwas and therefore came within the realm of 
fiqh where secondary sources of Islamic law such as ijtihad and qiyas are used by 
scholars to create legal rulings approving or disproving the validity of 
products/transactions under Islamic law. Fatwas however are disputable as these are 
man-made laws and this is where the disagreement over the validity of these products 
arose from. For many Islamic banking practitioners and sharia scholars, compliance 
with the letter of the law was an acceptable solution, however for others such 
compliance at the cost of the overall transaction defeating the spirit of the sharia law, by 
mimicking interest-based conventional finance, was completely unacceptable (Visser, 
2013). The latter opinion sided with notable scholars from Islamic history e.g. Al-
Shatibi  who clearly explained, as was highlighted in chapter 2, that the letter of sharia 
law is not the end in itself and therefore one who meets the letter but not the substance 
(spirit) of the law does not follow the sharia (El-Gamal, 2006). Thus, opposing views 
emerged on Islamic banking and its progress. Many considered Islamic banking a 
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success as the industry appeared to be a viable alternative to conventional banking. 
Others however were discontent with this success and growth coming at the cost of 
religious compromises and dilutions of values (Maali and Napier, 2010). 
The approval of murabahah, nevertheless, was a game-changer for the Islamic banking 
industry. It started the practice of Islamic banking products being developed on the 
basis of compliance with the letter rather than spirit of sharia and a focus on contractual 
form over the economic substance of transactions. Furthermore, it shifted focus from 
PLS contracts to modified versions of traditional trade-based contracts found in Islamic 
traditions, leading to development of non-PLS financial instruments. In the 1980s, 
sharia scholars approved an even more controversial financial instrument, called 
commodity murabahah, which involved short-term trading of commodities, allowing 
banks to replicate unsecured loans to serve their corporate clients (El-Gamal, 2006). 
By the end of this phase, secular goals took precedence over “the ardent sacred 
intentions” which had in part initiated the Islamic banking movement (Warde, 2000; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2010, p.89). Focus shifted from creating ‘sharia-compliant 
alternatives’ to ‘sharia-compliant replications’ of conventional finance as the industry 
aimed for growth. In this regard, a key development was the collapse of oil prices in 
1986. This led to a sharp reduction in the revenues of oil-rich GCC states with 
significant economic, social and political consequences across the Muslim world. As 
governments experienced financial difficulties, the bargaining position of Islamic 
bankers grew stronger and the industry expanded. GCC-based Islamic banks spread 
their operations and influence beyond domestic borders, entering markets such as 
Turkey44. The industry’s previous reliance on oil funds was no longer a dominant factor 
for its continued growth. Instead growth was achieved through replication of 
conventional products using structuring strategies which departed from the spirit of 
sharia (Warde, 2000; Rehman, 2010). 
44 Turkey for example despite its secular government of the time welcomed Islamic banking groups (such 
as Al-Baraka and Faisal Group) to establish Islamic banks (called special finance houses) in the country. 
To promote their launch, special privileges were granted including exemptions from the country's 
banking legislation (see Warde, 2000 for details). 
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3.4.3 Phase 3: 1990s – Present  
Growth and internationalisation have been the central themes of Islamic banking since 
the 1990s. As figure 3.2 illustrates, global Islamic banking assets have grown 
substantially, from less than $200 billion in the late 1990s to over $ 1.2 trillion in 2012. 
Figure 3.2: Growth in Global Islamic Banking Assets (1998-2012) 
 
Sources: Booz & Company45 (2008, 2011); IFSB (2013, 2014); PwC (2013); UKIFS (2013); KFH 
Research (2014) 
A number of politico-economic factors have been particularly influential for the 
industry’s growth. By the 1990s many of the Muslim countries were heavily indebted 
and dependent on external financial support. To obtain aid from institutions such as the 
World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF), or to join the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), governments of developing and emerging economies had to 
embrace the ideology of structural reforms. The ‘Washington Consensus’46 which 
represented the standard reform package promoted by the IMF and World Bank 
exported policy prescriptions such as: privatisation, deregulation, liberalisation of trade 
and financial markets and free flow of investment and capital, to countries across the 
45 Renamed as ‘Strategy&’ since 2014, subsidiary of the Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) Network. 
46 ‘Washington consensus’ is a term coined by John Williamson in 1989. It refers to a set of 10 specific 
economic policy prescriptions which comprise the ‘standard reform package’ promoted by U.S-based 
institutions including the IMF and World Bank for crisis wracked developing countries. Although not 
originally intended, the definition of Washington consensus has been broadened and is often considered 
synonymous with neo-liberalism (Williamson, 2004; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2010). 
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globe including the Muslim world. Although it reached the Muslim world much later 
than the West, neoliberal ideology has been universally adopted since the 1990s and 
thus reshaped Muslim economies (Warde, 2000). The GCC-based Islamic financial 
institutions (IFIs) have been a major beneficiary of neoliberal policies which have 
occurred in tandem with the internationalisation of capital. Since the 1990s, GCC-based 
IFIs took on an increasingly global perspective, expanding their operations through 
subsidiaries and representative offices throughout the Muslim and non-Muslim 
world47.These expansions have led to “a new form of Islamic capitalism” emanating 
from the GCC, affirming its status as the global centre of Islamic finance (Wilson, 
2009, p.3). 
Flexibility in international regulation has also aided this expansion. In the UK, for 
example the Financial Services Authority (FSA) made several concessions48 to 
accommodate Islamic banks, providing stimulus for growth of the industry in the UK 
and Europe (Ayub, 2007). Other changes have also been viewed positively. Abolition 
of the 1933 Glass Steagall Act (USA) in 1999, which separated commercial and 
investment banking activities, led to conventional financial institutions reinventing 
themselves as conglomerates combining traditional commercial banking, investment 
banking, securities trading and insurance activities under one group. The Islamic 
banking industry welcomed this increased diversity (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). For 
those propagating Islamic banks to be a crossbreed of investment and commercial banks 
(Mohsin, 1982; Chapra, 1985), this development was considered favourable for the 
eventual materialisation of their vision of Islamic banking. 
Another two factors, technology and the 2007– 08 financial crisis have aided Islamic 
banks’ global presence. During this phase, technological advances led to revolutionary 
changes in the international financial markets with a dramatic increase in innovation. 
Securitisation of loans and financial assets has become an especially notable feature of 
conventional finance and increasingly so of Islamic banking. Such advances have 
47 The largest Saudi Islamic bank, Al-Rajhi for example has established subsidiaries in Malaysia whilst 
DIB has rapidly expanded its branch network throughout Pakistan. KFH on the other hand has expanded 
throughout Singapore, Turkey and even as far as Australia (Wilson, 2009). 
48 This includes flexibility over the treatment of Islamic banks deposits, and stamp duty paid on Islamic 
mortgages. Islamic mortgages involve two sale contracts: purchase of the house by the bank from original 
owners and resale to its client. The FSA has allowed, despite there being two sale contracts, that stamp 
duty is to be paid only once (Ayub, 2007)   
51 
 
                                                 
` 
facilitated the creation of tailor-made Islamic financial products, which could be 
marketed not only to Muslim but also non-Muslims in highly interconnected financial 
markets. Islamic banks have therefore increased their efforts to innovate products which 
meet international financial standards and are credit-rated similar to their conventional 
counterparts. Currently, Islamic finance is no longer accessible only in Muslim 
countries. Instead, a large Islamic financial market has been established in the world’s 
global financial centres such as London (Wilson, 2009).  
The debate on ethics in finance since the 2007– 08 financial crisis has been particularly 
beneficial for Islamic banking. To increase their presence in the global secular market, 
Islamic banks have leveraged their religious identity, particularly the commonality 
between Islamic ethics and international standards on corporate social responsibility, to 
distinguish themselves from conventional banks on ethical and social grounds. Thus, in 
recent years Islamic banks have keenly marketed their services as not only a 
religiously-compliant alternative for Muslims but also an ethically desirable one for 
non-Muslims (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Williams and Zinkin, 2010; Visser, 2009; Kamla 
and Rammal, 2013). This has resulted in an expansion of Islamic banks client base 
beyond the Muslim niche, supporting the industry’s growth. 
Growth within the Muslim world has also been notable. In Muslim countries, the 
support for rapid Islamisation of economic and political domains has reinvigorated 
since 2001. For Muslim governments, supporting Islamic banking has been a politically 
low-risk and low-cost option to fulfil the demands of their societies. Thus, the industry 
in present times has benefited from ever greater political support (Warde, 2010; Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2010).  
Nine Muslim countries particularly have established themselves as the core Islamic 
finance markets. These comprise 5 of the 6 GCC nations, namely: Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE and 4 non-GCC nations which include: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Pakistan and Turkey. Combined, these countries constitute 95% of the global 
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Islamic banking assets excluding Iran and Sudan which officially recognise their entire 
banking system as ‘Islamic’49 (Ernst & Young, 2014).  
As figure 3.3 shows, growth of Islamic banking assets over the 2008 – 2012 period in 
these 9 core markets far outpaced their conventional counterparts. In Saudi Arabia 
Islamic banking assets grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 23%, more 
than twice that of conventional banking assets which grew at 11%. Similarly, in 
Kuwait, Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan Islamic banking assets have grown at more 
than twice the CAGR of their conventional counterparts; while in the UAE Islamic 
banking assets recorded a CAGR of 15%, three times larger than the CAGR for 
conventional banking. Strong growth in Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey has been 
particularly notable over this five-year period with Islamic banking assets recording a 
CAGR of 41%, 32% and 29% respectively compared to only 16%, 14% and 17% for 
conventional counterparts. Although growth rates have been similar in Qatar, Islamic 
banking assets still outperformed their conventional counterparts.  
Figure 3.3: Growth in Islamic and Conventional Banking Assets in 9 Core Markets (2008-2012) 
Source: KFH Research (2014) 
Several factors have contributed to the strong growth of Islamic banking in these core 
markets. Firstly, demand for Islamic banking products has been on the rise in these 
49 Although Pakistan initiated the Islamisation movement in the early1980s, by the third phase of Islamic 
banking’s development, the country has officially recognised a dual-banking system where both Islamic 
and conventional banks operate. 
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countries. Islamic banks have vigorously marketed their products, leveraging on 
religious compliance as their unique-selling point and drawing on the pro-Islamisation 
sentiment and political support, to compete directly with conventional counterparts in 
these dual-banking jurisdictions (Warde, 2010; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2010). As a result, 
there has been an increase in awareness and preference for sharia-compliant alternatives 
amongst these countries population (KFH Research, 2014; IFSB, 2014). Secondly, 
Islamic banks have expanded by providing sharia-compliant trade financing products to 
support these countries’ growing network of trade linkages. With economic growth, 
affluence in these countries has also increased leading to greater economic participation 
by the majority Muslim population. The 2007-2008 financial crisis and resulting 
liquidity crunch affecting Western banking institutions has also been a contributing 
factor, which enabled Islamic banks to emerge as an alternative for both Muslims and 
non-Muslims and thus expanding their clientele. Finally, along with ever-stronger 
political support, improved regulatory support for the industry has also sustained the 
growth momentum in these countries (KFH Research, 2014). 
A notable exception to the double-digit growth rate trend is Bahrain, where domestic 
political disturbance contributed to slow and even negative growth in the banking sector 
(IFSB, 2014). The source of this political unrest lay in ‘The Arab Spring’50, the series 
of protests that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread rapidly to other North 
African and Middle Eastern countries. Although sustained street demonstrations took 
place in Kuwait and Oman, Bahrain was the worst affected country in the GCC, where 
protests were fuelled by sectarian divide between the Sunni and the Shia Muslims. 
Protests led by the Shia dominant Bahraini opposition began in February 2011. Within a 
month the ruling monarchy declared a three-month state of emergency and imposed 
martial law. Protests continued as 2011 became a year of constant unrest, the worst 
faced by the country since the 1990s. Unsurprisingly, the economy suffered with a 
direct impact on the banking industry (BBC News, 2011; Reuters, 2011, 2012b). 
Despite the political unrest and economic slowdown, Islamic banking industry showed 
50 The Arab Revolution, popularised under the term ‘The Arab Spring’ by Western media, was a series of 
democratic uprisings which originated in Tunisia in December 2010 and rapidly spread to other North 
African and Middle Eastern countries including Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Bahrain, 
Kuwait and Oman amongst others. Reasons for the protests and their outcomes differed in each country. 
While the regimes were toppled in Tunisia and Egypt as a result of the protests, in Bahrain the protests 
did not threaten the monarchy but were rather fuelled by tensions between the Sunni and the Shia 
Muslims (BBC News, 2011; Reuters, 2011, 2012b). 
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resilience and still outperformed its conventional counterpart recording a positive 
CAGR of 1% compared to negative growth (-7%) in conventional banking assets.  
Amongst the 9 core markets, as figure 3.3 shows, Islamic banking assets have grown 
considerably faster in the non-GCC nations than their GCC counterparts, except for 
Malaysia. The level of Islamic banking penetration and the size of potential market are 
key reasons behind this. In all 5 GCC countries and Malaysia, Islamic banking 
constitutes 20% – 50% of the domestic market share. By comparison, Islamic banking 
constitutes 5.5% in Indonesia, 5.9% in Turkey and 9.5% in Pakistan. These are also the 
most populous Muslim countries in the world with Indonesia and Pakistan being the top 
two respectively. Given the significant potential for growth, these countries have 
attracted attention from both domestic and foreign Islamic banking institutions. Several 
well-established GCC-based Islamic banks have rapidly extended their subsidiary 
networks throughout these countries to capture part of these fast growing markets. As a 
result, Islamic banking assets are growing rapidly and given the aforementioned factors 
supporting the industry, growth in Islamic banking is expected to continue at these high 
rates in these countries as the industry’s market share continues to strengthen (Ernst & 
Young, 2014). 
When examined at the regional level as well, the strong growth in South and South East 
Asia is apparent. In the post financial crisis 2009-2012 period, global Islamic banking 
assets (excluding Iran) grew at a CAGR of 18%, as figure 3.4 shows. In comparison, 
Islamic banking assets grew by 25% in South East Asia (which includes Malaysia and 
Indonesia) and 22% in South Asia (which includes Pakistan). In contrast, the GCC 
recorded a CAGR of 15% over the same period, while the rest of the world (ROW, 
which includes Turkey) almost matched the global CAGR at 19%.  
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Figure 3.4: Growth in Islamic Banking Assets by Region (2009-2012) 
Notes: Islamic banking assets exclude Iran. Regions are as follows: GCC = Gulf Co-operation Council; 
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations (includes Malaysia and Indonesia); ROW = Rest of 
the World (includes Turkey); South Asia (includes Pakistan). Source: Ernst & Young (2014) 
Despite relatively slower growth, the GCC remains the most important region for 
Islamic banking. As figure 3.4 illustrates, the bulk of global Islamic banking assets 
(excluding Iran51) are concentrated in the GCC. As a region, the GCC accounts for 
more than two-thirds of the global Islamic banking assets. It also dominates other 
regions in terms of the domestic market share that Islamic banking holds. In the GCC, 
Islamic banking comprises 33% of the overall banking assets, while in South East Asia 
(ASEAN), South Asia and ROW Islamic banking constitutes 14%, 12% and 5% 
respectively. The GCC is also home to the biggest and the oldest Islamic banks as well 
as the largest collection of Islamic financial and regulatory institutions worldwide and 
thus remains at present the global centre of Islamic banking and finance (Ernst & 
Young, 2014). 
51 Global Islamic banking assets reported in figure 3.4 exclude Iran, which officially recognises its entire 
banking system as ‘Islamic’. As a country, Iran constitutes over 40% of global Islamic banking assets. As 
a predominantly Shia country, Iran follows slightly different rules due to differences in interpretation of 
Islamic law between Shia and Sunni scholars and thus is considered by industry analysts to have a unique 
domestic Islamic finance industry (Ernst & Young, 2014).  
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Barring country and regional differences, globally Islamic banking has grown strongly 
in this third phase of its development, although the industry’s growth has followed a 
completely different path than was originally envisioned. Islamic banking, being a 
product of the pan-Islamism movement, was expected to be a unified industry, 
organised and guided by the IAIB and IDB. It was expected that there would be a 
unique single model of Islamic banking and its regulatory framework which would be 
transported across the Muslim world. Developments since the 1990s however, shattered 
this illusion. As Islamic banking spread, it became an increasingly diverse and 
multipolar industry. Banks organised under the IAIB, which enjoyed a monopoly in the 
previous era, became only a constituent part of the much larger and diverse group of 
institutions, many of which did not belong to the IAIB. The influence of IAIB and IDB 
diminished as that of national considerations in promoting and regulating Islamic 
banking increased (Warde, 2000). 
In terms of regulation, Bahrain and Malaysia have played critical roles in modernising 
the Islamic banking industry by establishing standard-setting and industry coordination 
bodies. Amongst the earliest and most notable is the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions52 (AAOIFI: 1991)37 based in Bahrain, 
which develops and publishes industry-specific standards on accounting, auditing, 
governance, social responsibility, ethics and sharia governance. With the turn of the 
millennium, the number of such support institutions rose considerably to include 
amongst others: the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM: 2002), the 
International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA: 2002) and the Liquidity Management 
Centre (LMC: 2002), all based in Bahrain and the Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB: 2002) based in Malaysia (Hassan and Lewis, 2007). Given their location, it is 
clear that the geo-economics of Islamic banking has shifted from pioneers of the 
previous era which included Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, to Bahrain and Malaysia, 
which have become regional Islamic finance centres in their own right (Warde, 2000; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2010).  
52 AAOIFI is an international Islamic standard setting corporate body. It was established in 1991 to 
develop and publish accounting and auditing standards to be adopted by Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs) worldwide. These standards are adopted by several Middle Eastern countries, and authorities in 
several other countries have published guidelines based on these standards. The organisation aims to 
integrate the peculiarities of Islamic finance and provide specific guidance for IFIs in order to raise 
confidence of those using IFI’s financial statement and services (AAOIFI, 2010).  
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Malaysia has emerged as an interesting pole of Islamic finance in this period, with a 
considerably different politico-economic environment and religious traditions than the 
pioneers of Islamic banking. Albeit a Sunni Muslim country, Malaysia predominantly 
follows a different school of fiqh than the GCC and Pakistan. Malaysia’s approach to 
Islamic banking has also been considerably different, characterised by pragmatism and 
innovation. In Malaysia, Islamic finance has been an integral part of its government’s 
economic growth ambitions. Throughout the 1990s, the government encouraged 
creation of Islamic equivalents of state-of-the-art products used in conventional finance. 
However, in its pursuit to modernise Islamic finance, Malaysia has been criticised for 
cutting too many corners and its definition of religiously acceptable products as too lax. 
Mahathir Mohammed (Malaysia’s Prime Minister, 1981-2003) was known to show 
impatience with sharia scholars discussing the technicalities of religious compliance, 
accusing them of being too harsh and instead encouraged scholars to adopt innovative 
approaches, exploring previously untested sharia concepts (Warde, 2000).  
Through its highly pragmatic and what many consider a lax approach towards religious 
compliance, Malaysia has made significant contribution in modernising Islamic finance, 
particularly in pioneering the development of an ‘Islamic capital market’ which was to 
use specifically designed sharia-compliant bonds. The first sukuk (Islamic bond) was 
issued in Malaysia in 1990 (Warde, 2000). The sukuk market however was almost 
dormant for a decade, but this changed in 2001, when the first US-dollar denominated 
sukuk was issued by the Central Bank of Bahrain. The GCC has played a significant 
role in internationalising the sukuk market. Since 2011, record-levels of corporate and 
sovereign sukuk have been issued particularly in the GCC, which along with Malaysia 
has one of highest concentrations of sukuk issuances in the world. With globalisation of 
Islamic finance, even non-Muslim countries including the UK, USA, France and 
Germany and conventional financial institutions e.g. Goldman Sachs have issued sukuk. 
The global sukuk market is flourishing, with an estimated $130 billion worth of 
issuances in 2013 (IIFM, 2014). 
Notably, the expansion of Islamic banking has brought greater diversification and even 
fragmentation in the industry (Warde, 2010). Despite the nation’s efforts, and its 
position as a regional leader, Malaysia is not considered the international hub of Islamic 
finance particularly because of the difference in sharia traditions relative to the GCC. 
Many Malaysian certified Islamic products are not considered sharia-compliant in the 
58 
 
` 
more religiously-conservative GCC. Trading in debt, for example, is considered 
incompliant with sharia as it fails the riba prohibition. Islamic private debt securities 
(IPDS) however have been certified as sharia-compliant by Malaysian scholars 
following a more liberal interpretation of sharia. Scholars in the remaining Muslim 
world including the GCC continue to disagree53 (Warde, 2000; Khan, 2010).  
The distinct lines between Islamic and conventional banking have certainly blurred 
since the 1990s. The most notable aspect of this has been the emergence of Islamic 
windows54 i.e. dedicated branches and subsidiaries owned by conventional banks which 
offer Islamic commercial and/or investment banking services (Rehman, 2010). Several 
of the largest conventional financial institutions such as Citigroup, HSBC, Lloyds and 
Deutsche bank etc. own Islamic windows. As early as 1996, Citicorp had established an 
Islamic subsidiary in Bahrain. The role of local conventional banks however has been 
significant in expanding Islamic windows. Now almost every local conventional bank 
in the Muslim world particularly the GCC, offers some type of Islamic financial service 
(Warde, 2000).  
There is also increased convergence between Islamic and conventional banking 
products and practices. Not all practices adopted by Islamic banks however have 
negative connotations. For example, to avoid haram industries, Islamic banks use 
screening criteria similar to that used by socially responsible investment (SRI) funds 
(Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). Nevertheless, the practice of replicating conventional 
products through structuring strategies, which started in the previous era, has not only 
continued but intensified since the 1990s. Technological advancements and a greater 
alliance between Islamic bankers, sharia scholars and governments have facilitated 
innovation of extremely controversial products such as tawarruq (tripartite/quadripartite 
sale), a liquidity management tool designed to provide sharia-compliant cash financing, 
which was first undertaken by Saudi banks in 2000 (see section 3.5.1). Since then 
53 Sharia does not permit sale of debt at negotiated prices. Trading a debt obligation equates to a money-
for-money transaction and therefore needs to be at par value. Any increase or decrease is tantamount to 
riba. Majority of the contemporary sharia scholars hold this view. The Islamic Fiqh Academy (which 
represents scholars from all Muslim countries including Malaysia) has unanimously prohibited sale of 
debt. Malaysian scholars nevertheless continue to approve the sale of debt securities by referring to the 
Shafi’i school’s ruling permitting sale of debt. However what these scholars do not highlight is that the 
Shafi’i scholars only permitted such a transaction when the debt is sold at par value (Usmani, 2004). 
54 The Islamic Financial Services Board defines an Islamic window as a branch or unit in a conventional 
financial institution which is dedicated to providing sharia compliant financing, investments and fund 
management services (IFSB, 2007).  
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tawarruq has become extremely popular especially in the GCC (Dabu, 2007; Ahmad et 
al., 2017). Islamic banks now offer sharia-compliant equivalents of almost all 
conventional banking products and services.  
In growing their product range, secular goals including profit-maximisation and growth, 
have wiped out the sacred intentions which played at least some role until the previous 
era (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2010). Sharia arbitrage is now the standard process whereby:  
financial products prohibited under Islamic law are first identified, an Islamic analogue 
is then created using classic Islamic contracts keeping the original Arabic labels which, 
along with differences in contractual form, adds credibility to the Islamic identity of the 
products whilst achieving sufficient similarity between the Islamic structure and the 
conventional counterpart being replaced to ensure the product is consistent with the 
regulatory framework of the target markets (El-Gamal, 2006). This form-over-
substance approach to defining and designing sharia-compliant products, aiming to 
circumvent rather than comply in any meaningful way with sharia injunctions, is now 
the accepted norm of the industry (El-Gamal, 2006; Iqbal and Lewis, 2009). The debate 
on compliance with the letter vs. spirit of sharia has largely become an academic 
exercise as opposed to the industry’s concern.  
The nature of the Islamic banking literature produced during this period has also 
changed, reflecting the opposing opinions on the industry. Practitioner and industry-
supported literature focused on practicality, regulation, strategies to expand market 
shares and development of new Islamic products through financial engineering. This 
literature promotes Islamic banking as a success given its record high double-digit 
growth rates (Ernst & Young, 2012; IIFM, 2014). Academic literature however, 
particularly since the 1990s has been more critical of the developments in the industry. 
Prominent critics such as Kuran (2004), El-Gamal (2006) and Khan (2010) have 
dismissed the entire Islamic banking industry as nothing more than a branding exercise. 
Even the earliest advocates of Islamic banking and notable Islamic economists have 
criticised the industry for failing to fulfil the necessary conditions laid down by the 
sharia, concluding that Islamic banking today neither reflects the principles of Islamic 
finance nor has progressed in accordance with the original goals of aiding socio-
economic development (Siddiqi, 2006; Chapra, 2007). Criticism has also come from 
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modern-day sharia authorities. Sheikh Taqi Usmani55 (a renowned present-day sharia 
scholar and chairman of the Sharia Council of AAOIFI) has on several occasions raised 
concerns over Islamic banks’ breach of sharia principles in the use of murabahah and 
sukuk (Usmani, 2004, see section 3.5 for details). 
Naturally such criticism raises important questions: Why are Islamic banks’ 
products/practices controversial and given their criticism, how are these sharia-
certified? The next section addresses both questions. First, the most popular products 
used by Islamic banks and their criticisms are described. Second, issues regarding 
reliability of SSBs and sharia-certification process are presented with an evaluation of 
the steps taken by the industry to address them. 
3.5 Islamic Banking in Practice  
3.5.1 Controversies on the Asset Side  
In theory, the asset portfolio of Islamic banks comprises of PLS contracts. In practice 
however, Islamic banks use a variety of non-PLS financial instruments. The two most 
popular non-PLS financing modes are murabahah (cost-plus-credit-sale) and ijarah 
(leasing), which on average comprise more than 80% of Islamic banks’ asset portfolio 
and thus are considered the backbone of modern Islamic banking (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 
2002). Other relatively less common financing modes include salam (prepayment sale), 
istisna (sale order for manufactured asset), musawamah (sale with no mark-up 
disclosed), bai-al-muajjal56 (credit sale), and qard-hasan (interest-free benevolent 
loan)57. To provide cash financing facility to their customers or to manage their own 
liquidity needs, Islamic banks use commodity murabahah (short-term cost-plus-credit-
sale-of-commodities), tawarruq (tripartite/quadripartite sale) and/or bai-al-inah (buy-
back-sale).To meet the need for debt-like investment instruments, Islamic banks also 
55 Sheikh Taqi Usmani is one of the leading scholars in Islamic finance. He is the chairman of the 
International Sharia Standard Council of AAOIFI, the vice chairman of the Islamic Fiqh Academy and 
holds positions on several sharia boards of Islamic banks. 
56 Bai-al-muajjal is also known as bai-bithaman-ajil which simply refers to ‘sale with deferred payment’ 
i.e. a credit sale; sometimes also called mutajara (Obaidullah, 2005). 
57 Some Islamic banks provide qard hasan financing to their less well-off customers including small 
business owners, financially needy farmers and other poor clients. These loans do not generate a rate of 
return (as no interest can be charged and the borrower is required to repay only the capital amount 
borrowed). However, banks can (and in many cases do) charge a set commission fee for providing this 
service. This fee is independent of the amount and period the funds are loaned for (Shanmugam and 
Zahari, 2009; Visser, 2009).  
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hold sukuk (Islamic bonds). Ancillary contracts such as ju’alah (service fee), wakala 
(agency) and kafalah (guarantee) amongst others, form an integral part of the financial 
arrangements used by Islamic banks. A discussion of each of these contracts and their 
variants is not only beyond the scope of this thesis, it is also unnecessary as some key 
contracts are more widely used and keep reappearing in the discussion of other financial 
arrangements (Visser, 2013). A relatively comprehensive coverage of the controversies 
surrounding non-PLS instruments can therefore be achieved through a focused 
discussion of the most popular financial instruments. This is presented below. For 
details on the traditional Islamic contracts and their use as financial instruments, 
interested readers should consult: Obaidullah, (2005), El-Gamal (2006), Ayub (2007), 
Shanmugam and Zahari (2009), Visser (2009) and El-Diwany (2010). 
What are non-PLS financing modes and why do they exist? 
PLS financing contracts are more suited to business as opposed to consumer finance 
needs. If a customer wishes to purchase an asset (e.g. a car), Islamic banks cannot enter 
into a PLS contract nor extend a return-generating loan for this purpose. To 
accommodate such needs, contemporary sharia scholars have permitted variants of 
traditional trade-based Islamic contracts which have been modified to facilitate 
financing activities. These modified contracts create sales-based financing 
arrangements, which operate on a ‘mark-up’ and deferred payment principle. In these 
arrangements, Islamic banks purchase the desired asset on behalf of their client and 
resell/lease it, earning a return by adding a mark-up either to the cost of the asset or in 
form of a service/management fee (Warde, 2000; Ayub, 2007; Iqbal and Lewis, 2009; 
Visser, 2009). 
Contemporary sharia scholars have sharia-certified these financing arrangements on 
asset-based basis. As long as the sellers/lessor (Islamic bank) bears the ownership risk 
of the underlying asset, the profit earned is valid under the sharia. The mark-up charged 
in the credit sale/leasing arrangement is also considered a valid profit margin as a form 
of compensation for the risks involved and benefit the buyer is able to receive through 
the use of the goods before full payment is made (Usmani, 2004; Visser, 2009).  
These sales-based arrangements are usually labelled as ‘non-PLS’ or ‘debt-based’ 
financing modes because there is no risk-sharing between the bank and its customer. A 
predetermined and fixed rate of return on Islamic banks’ investment (the cost of asset 
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purchased) is built into the transaction using the mark-up. The amount and schedule of 
repayments is determined at the contract inception, and thus these arrangements create a 
regular stream of fixed payments for the bank which are repayable irrespective of the 
circumstances faced by the customer. Furthermore, as the bank retains ownership of the 
financed asset until repayments are complete, the control rights of the asset transfer to 
the bank in case of default (Warde, 2000; Ayub, 2007; Iqbal and Lewis, 2009; Visser, 
2009). Such transfer of control rights is the salient feature of debt contracts; PLS 
(equity) contracts offer no such control rights. Therefore, even beyond the fixed 
repayments, there is a formal equivalence between these sales-based (henceforth non-
PLS) modes and debt financing contracts which differentiate these from their PLS 
counterparts (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). 
Murabahah and Ijarah: Non-PLS (Debt-based) Financing 
Modified versions of traditional murabahah and ijarah are the most widely used non-
PLS financing modes in Islamic banking. These work as follows. Modified murabahah 
is a cost-plus-credit-sale contract, where an asset is sold at a cost-plus-mark-up price 
with deferred payment, usually scheduled as regular instalments made over a specified 
period of time. The traditional murabahah contract requires spot payment and therefore 
deferred payment is achieved by adding the traditional contract of bai-al-muajjal (credit 
sale) to the transaction. Modified murabahah (henceforth murabahah)58 is therefore a 
combination of two contracts in one (Visser, 2009). Murabahah is extensively used by 
Islamic banks and is an integral component of several other debt-based financial 
products (see discussion on commodity murabahah and tawarruq arrangements below). 
Modified ijarah has many variants, under which Islamic banks purchase and lease assets 
to receive a regular rental income. In traditional ijarah, the asset remains in the lessor’s 
ownership that bears the assets’ ownership risk, maintenance responsibilities and 
expenses, while the lessee bears only the operating costs59. The asset is also returned to 
58 In keeping with the Islamic banking literature and industry practice, the term ‘murabahah’ is used to 
refer to the modified murabahah contract (cost-plus-credit-sale), while the term ‘traditional murabahah’ 
refers to the original Islamic contract of  mark-up sale with spot payment. Note that sometimes in the 
literature and industry, the terms murabahah, bai-al-muajjal, bai-al-muajjal-murabahah and bai-bithaman-
ajil-murabaha are all used interchangeably to refer to the modified murabahah arrangement (Obaidullah, 
2005; Visser, 2009). 
59 In conventional operating leases, the asset’s risk, maintenance and related expenses are the lessee’s 
responsibility which is contrary to the traditional ijarah contract. Furthermore, unlike a conventional 
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the lessor at the end of lease period. As Islamic banks do not have any interest in the 
underlying asset, modified ijarah (henceforth ijarah) is commonly arranged similar to a 
conventional finance lease60 ending with the transfer of the asset’s legal title to the 
lessee. This is achieved through combining traditional ijarah with sale or gift contracts 
or through promises guaranteeing the transfer of ownership. The latter includes a 
promise to sell by the bank (call option on the leased asset) or a promise to purchase by 
the lessee (put option), which is followed by a formal sale contract at expiry of the lease 
period.  The rent (and sale price, if the asset is transferred through a sale contract) is 
calculated such that Islamic banks receives the principal invested in the asset plus a 
mark-up (Ayub, 2007; Shanmugam and Zahari, 2009; El-Diwany, 2010). 
Murabahah and ijarah are strongly criticised by many for being de facto interest-bearing 
instruments and therefore completely un-Islamic (Kuran, 1995, 2004; El-Gamal, 2006; 
Zaman and Movassaghi, 2002; Zaman 2008; Khan 2010). At best, these are considered 
‘weak’ forms of Islamic financing relative to superior PLS contracts (Siddiqi, 2002 in 
Khan, 2010). The latter view relies on the asset-backed argument for justifying these 
transactions for which the bank must assume the ownership risk of the asset sold/leased 
(Visser, 2009). Thus, for a valid murabahah, the asset must come into the banks’ 
ownership and a time lag must exist before the sale is made, so the risk of the asset is 
borne by the bank.  In case of ijarah, the ownership risk including the maintenance costs 
of the asset must be assumed by the bank and not the lessee (Usmani, 2004; Ayub, 
2007; El-Diwany 2010). In practice however, in a murabahah transaction the bank buys 
the specified asset only after it acquires a ‘legally enforceable promise’ from its client 
that he/she will purchase the asset from the bank (Shanmnugam and Zahari, 2009). The 
bank’s ownership is therefore symbolic; lasting only a few seconds and the risk 
exposure is virtually negligible. In ijarah financing, the ownership risk including 
maintenance and insurance costs are contracted away to the lessee. Not only is the 
ownership risk removed from these transactions but also the mark-up charged on 
murabahah and rent on ijarah assets is often benchmarked to the prevailing interest-rate 
and based on the length of repayment time, replicating the outcome of an interest 
operating lease, the asset in a traditional ijarah is leased for a specified term not the entire useful life of 
the asset (Ayub, 2007). 
60 The ownership risk and expenses of the leased asset transfer to the lessee under a conventional finance 
lease. Thus, conventional finance leases are not permitted under sharia, since the traditional ijarah 
requires the lessor to assume ownership risk of the asset (Ayub, 2007). 
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bearing loan. Thus, under such arrangements, the bank does not face ownership risk but 
rather credit risk associated with the borrower and interest rate risk similar to its 
conventional counterpart. Many academics therefore argue that non-PLS modes are 
simply ruses, where several interest-free valid contracts are combined to circumvent the 
prohibition of riba and replicate interest-based debt finance contracts (Kuran, 1995, 
2004; Zaman and Movassaghi, 2002; El-Gamal 2006; Zaman 2008; Khan 2010; El-
Diwany, 2010). Murabahah, for example, has been concluded to be a modern form of 
the medieval contractum trinius, which was used to overcome the prohibition of usury 
set by the Church (El-Gamal, 2006; El-Diwany, 2010; Khan, 2010). Given the 
additional transactions which have to be added to construct these arrangements, non-
PLS financing modes have been concluded as simply a “cumbersome form of interest” 
(Kuran, 1995, p.162). 
Questions have also been raised over the legal validity of non-PLS arrangements which 
combine two or more contracts in one transaction. Since interdependent contracts are 
not permitted in sharia, from a strict sharia (legalistic) perspective, experts have argued 
that the modified non-PLS financing contracts are invalid under Islamic law (Ayub, 
2007; Nyazee,  2009a; El-Diwany, 2010). Using the rules of Islamic jurisprudence, 
Nyazee (2009a) proves the invalidity of murabahah on three different grounds61 and 
criticises Islamic banks for failing to even meet the terms of Islamic law. 
Furthermore, several scholars have confirmed that the industry’s current practices are 
not even in line with the conditions on which the modified contracts were originally 
permitted (Iqbal and Lewis, 2009). Certified as an exception for transactions where PLS 
options cannot be used, non-PLS modes were not intended to be universal Islamic 
financing instruments. Therefore their use needs to be restricted only for asset 
acquisition purposes. In practice, however, there have been cases where murabahah has 
been used simply to fulfil a client’s need for funds rather than an asset. The widespread 
use of murabahah is indisputable which has given rise to the term ‘murabahah-
syndrome’ to describe the industry’s financing behaviour (Yousef, 2004). Even Islamic 
economists have concluded the use of non-PLS modes needs to be ‘cleaned’ since the 
61 Nyazee explains that there can be 1) no mark-up stated in a credit sale (bai-al-muajjal), 2) no delay in 
payment in a traditional murabahah contract i.e. goods are sold at a mark-up for a spot price and 3) a 
binding promise cannot be used to link a credit sale with a spot transaction. Therefore, the modified 
murabahah is invalid under Islamic law. For detailed explanation, see Nyazee (2009a).  
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industry’s current indiscriminate approach is not in line with Islamic principles (Iqbal et 
al., 1998; Siddiqi, 2006; Chapra, 2007).  
Criticism over misuse of these contracts has also been voiced by sharia authorities. As 
early as 1991, the Federal Sharia Court in Pakistan ruled the contract of murabahah as 
practiced by the Islamic banking industry was not in compliance with the principle of 
Islam (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). More recently, Sheikh Taqi Usmani, raised concerns 
over evidence of Islamic banks selling the underlying murabahah asset before it comes 
into their ownership (as multiple contracts are signed simultaneously) and has 
pronounced this practice in breach of the sharia principles, since according to Islamic 
law, one cannot sell that which he/she does not own (Usmani, 2004). As Usmani 
explains, without observing the strict conditions of the modified contracts, “the whole 
transaction turns into an interest-bearing loan since changing the label from interest to 
mark-up, profit or rent without fundamentally changing the nature of transactions does 
not suffice in establishing actual religious legitimacy” (Usmani, 2004, p.105). In such 
circumstances, these transactions cannot be deemed Islamic, and the return generated 
no longer lawful (ibid).  
Commodity Murabahah, Tawarruq and Bai-al-inah: Liquidity Management 
Tools 
In order to provide a cash financing facility to their customers or to manage their own 
liquidity needs (including interbank financing), Islamic banks use commodity 
murabahah (short-term cost-plus-credit-sale-of-commodities) and tawarruq 
(tripartite/quadripartite sale) or bai-al-inah (buy-back-sale).  
Commodity murabahah is used to replicate short-term treasury bills. This transaction 
uses a murabahah contract where the underlying asset is a commodity e.g. aluminium62. 
Commodity murabahah works as follows. Bank A buys a commodity at a spot price, 
and sells it to Bank B at a spot-price-plus-mark-up with deferred payment (due between 
one week to one year, but mostly on a three-month term). Bank B purchasing the 
62 Recall from chapter 2 the prohibition of riba requires that gold is exchanged for gold, silver for silver 
on the spot and in equal amounts. As these metals were used for currency, this condition ensured that an 
interest-bearing loan could not be created by trading these metals. In modern times, scholars have 
exempted many metal commodities such as aluminium and platinum from the rules applying to currency 
exchanges. Thus, these metals are often used in commodity murabahah, bai-al-inah and tawarruq 
transactions whereby trade cycles are used to replicate interest-based loans (El-Gamal, 2006). 
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commodity immediately sells it to another institution or a commodity dealer at the spot 
price. Through this transaction, Bank A earns a profit (mark-up) while Bank B receives 
the funds it needs immediately (Shanmugam and Zahari, 2009). 
Both bai-al-inah and tawarruq are primarily used as liquidity management tools to meet 
a bank’s own or its clients’ short-term cash financing needs, to provide financing for 
short-term working capital and in structuring credit cards (Obaidullah, 2005). Bai-al-
inah is a buy-back-sale transaction which involves two back-to-back sale contracts, one 
spot, and the other credit. In this arrangement, the customer sells an asset (usually a 
commodity) to the Islamic bank at an agreed price for cash. The bank immediately sells 
the asset back to the same customer on credit at an agreed higher price (comprising of 
the cash price plus mark-up). The customer receives cash and the bank makes a profit. 
This contract also occurs in the opposite direction where, the bank sells an asset (again 
a commodity) to its customer on credit and immediately buys it back for a lower cash 
price. The price differential represents the bank’s profit (Shanmugam and Zahari, 2009; 
El-Gamal, 2006). Classic fiqh literature has discussed bai-al-inah at length and it was 
viewed as an obvious ruse designed to circumvent the prohibition of riba and legitimise 
interest-based lending under the guise of trade (El-Gamal, 2006). Thus, bai-al-inah has 
been declared to be unanimously prohibited in Sharia (Usmani, 2004) and this ruling is 
internationally followed, except in Malaysia. The prohibition of bai-al-inah is based on 
two hadiths (prophetic traditions). Most scholars accept the authenticity of these hadith, 
but a minority do not. On the basis of the latter opinion, some Malaysians scholars have 
permitted the use of bai-al-inah and therefore it is used by Malaysian Islamic banks. 
This is however the minority position, as bai-al-inah is prohibited in the GCC and the 
rest of the Muslim world (El-Gamal, 2006; Shanmugam and Zahari, 2009).  
In the Gulf, tawarruq, a variant of bay-al-inah is used. The key difference between bai-
al-inah and tawarruq is that the latter includes three or more parties. In a tawarruq 
transaction, the bank buys a commodity with cash either directly or indirectly from a 
dealer and immediately sells it to its client for deferred payment. The client 
immediately sells the commodity for a spot payment and delivery to a third party, 
usually a commodity dealer, either the same as the original seller (if three-party 
transaction) or a different dealer with genuine need for the commodity (if four-party 
transaction). In the latter case, the bank uses a genuine commodity exchange to generate 
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cash financing for its client by adding two fictitious sales to the transaction. In the 
former case, the entire sale structure is artificially constructed to generate a cash 
financing scheme at interest, thereby raising credit with no identifiable link to 
customers’ need for an asset (Shanmugam and Zahari, 2009; Rehman, 2010). In 
practical terms, the difference between tawarruq and commodity murabahah is minimal, 
with the final spot sale in tawarruq being a formal part of the arrangement, which is 
often undertaken by the bank on behalf of its customer (El-Gamal, 2006).  
The permissibility of tawarruq is a contentious issue. Classical scholars recognised that 
a third or fourth party could be added as an intermediary to bai-al-ina, and thus by 
analogy tawarruq is also not permitted. Supporters of this view argue that what is 
permitted under sharia is not based on the contractual form or the number of 
transactions involved, for sharia does not ban a transaction only to permit it through 
greater degrees of separation involving higher transaction costs. Some scholars, 
however, permitted the arrangement given that it contains at least three parties. The 
latter view is used as the basis for tawarruq’s permissibility in the industry. Notably, 
selected scholars from only one of the four schools of fiqh permitted tawarruq, with the 
condition that its use is limited and unsystematic. The others have unequivocally 
condemned this arrangement (El-Gamal, 2006). 
Tawarruq has been permitted by AAOIFI given certain conditions. First, at least three 
parties must be involved in the transaction so it is not bai-al-inah. Second, the trade 
must be genuine i.e. physical ownership of the commodity traded should transfer from 
seller to buyer and the commodity must be sold at current market price, with a time gap 
between all sale contracts so that each party is exposed to price risk which is the basis 
for justifying the return. Finally, there should be no prearrangement between the parties 
particularly regarding the final sale which indicates a clear intention to override the riba 
prohibition. Similar to the position of classical scholars, AAOIFI does not permit the 
same agent to undertake the sale contract on behalf of both trading parties to ensure 
only legitimate sales take place. What is essentially permitted by AAOIFI is a very 
specific reformed version of tawarruq, known as an ‘unassisted/unorganised tawarruq’ 
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whereby a genuine trader may sell a product purchased on credit, for cash63 
(Obaidullah, 2005; El-Gamal, 2006; Khan, 2010a).  
Apart from three parties being involved, none of the other conditions are met by Islamic 
banks. Firstly, all sales are instantaneous. In practice, tawarruq, bai-al-inah and 
commodity murabahah transactions are all undertaken using multiple electronic trades 
from the bank’s premise, with no real commodity ever moving an inch. In many cases, 
the same stock of commodity is sold and resold many times within a single day, and 
therefore can be under multiple ownership claims. Justifying the return earned on the 
basis of ownership risk is therefore out of the question. Clearly there is no real 
economic activity underpinning these transactions. Trading of commodities through 
fictitious sales is simply used to lend and borrow at interest and thus these are a case of 
‘money-now-for-more-money-later’ arrangements, which explicitly fall under the riba 
prohibition (Khan, 2010a). Secondly, the sale price agreed between parties is not the 
market price of the commodity; rather it is the amount the client needs to borrow 
(Obaidullah, 2005). Finally, Islamic banks (either directly or indirectly through an 
appointed third party) act as the agent for both the customer and the dealer. Thus the 
final condition is also not met (El-Gamal, 2006; Khan, 2010a). 
The transaction used by Islamic banks is formally known as ‘organised tawarruq’, as 
the multiple sale structure is pre-organised by the bank. The Fiqh Academy of the 
Muslim World League banned organised tawarruq in 2003. In 2009, the Islamic Fiqh 
Academy also passed a ruling banning organised tawarruq (Shanmugam and Zahari, 
2009; Visser, 2009; El-Diwany, 2010; Khan, 2010a). Although not explicitly stated, 
AAOIFI has also effectively, albeit indirectly, banned organised tawarruq by specifying 
the above-mentioned conditions, which imply that tawarruq by definition cannot be 
organised (Khan, 2010a). In the case of Islamic banks, tawarruq is marketed as an 
instrument to meet clients’ cash needs and is therefore always conducted on an 
organised basis which fails to meet the strict guidelines that have been stipulated by 
AAOIFI (El-Diwany, 2010; Khan, 2010a). 
63 This allowance is provided for genuine traders who may sell inventory bought on credit on cash basis 
e.g. a fruit seller who buys stock on credit from the wholesaler in the morning and sells it for cash during 
the day, hoping to make a profit (Khan, 2010a). For detailed explanation of the joint stance taken on 
tawarruq by AAOIFI and the Islamic Fiqh Academy, see Khan (2010a). 
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In each of the three financial arrangements discussed, it is clear that neither the Islamic 
bank nor its customers are interested in the underlying commodity. Fictitious trading 
cycles involving credit sales are used simply to generate interest-based loans. These 
arrangements exploit sharia’s permission to charge higher than spot price in credit sales 
and the tradition of genuine credit sales which were used in medieval Islamic societies. 
These structures have therefore been identified as obvious ruses, designed with the 
intention to circumvent the prohibition of riba. With no genuine link to a real economic 
activity, these transactions lack materiality and therefore also fail the gharar prohibition. 
As a result, commodity murabahah, tawarruq and bai-al-inah are considered completely 
un-Islamic by many academics or at the very least highly controversial by majority of 
contemporary sharia scholars (Obaidullah, 2005; El-Gamal, 2006; Khan, 2010a).  
Sukuk: Debt Investments 
Islamic banks hold sukuk (Islamic bonds) as part of their investment portfolio to meet 
the demand for debt-like investment instruments. Sukuk are asset-backed securities 
which have a similar risk/return characteristic to conventional debt securities (Iqbal and 
Tsubota, 2006; Ayub, 2007). These are increasingly being used by both governments 
and corporations to raise finance (Chapra, 2007). The securitisation process64 involved 
in the issuance of sukuk is almost identical to the process used in conventional finance 
with the exception of sharia-compliant financial contracts being involved (Iqbal and 
Tsubota, 2006; Ayub, 2007). A special purpose vehicle (SPV) is set up by the originator 
under a mudarabah contract65 for the securitisation process. The SPV acquires the 
specific assets collateralising the sukuk and issues certificates representing financial 
claims on the assets lasting the term of the issue66. There are various types of sukuk; 
each named after the underlying sharia-nominate contract (Obaidullauh, 2005). The 
most common is the ijarah-sukuk which is the first Islamic fixed-income sukuk to have 
gained global acceptance. Ijarah-sukuk is considered the most efficient, sharia-
compliant alternative to conventional debt securities and has become extremely popular 
especially in the last decade given its tradability and liquidity (Obaidullah, 2005; El-
64 Securitisation is the process of pooling and repackaging illiquid and nonmarketable assets into tradable 
investment certificates. It is a process of raising funds secured on expected cash flows arising from a 
given set of assets. As Islamic financing is required to be asset-backed by definition, there have been 
plenty opportunities for sukuk issuances (Ayub, 2007). 
65 This is also known as a ‘special purpose mudarabah’. 
66 Sukuk are formally defined as financial certificates which represent a share in the ownership of 
tangible assets, their usufruct (earnings) or the assets of a specified investment or project (Ayub, 2007). 
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Gamal, 2006; Iqbal and Tsubota, 2006; Ayub, 2007; Shanmugam and Zahari, 2009). 
Ijarah-sukuk is therefore discussed below to illustrate a sukuk structure and related 
controversies67.  
Ijarah-sukuk is based on the concept of sale-and-lease-back and works as follows: 
Suppose the originator (a government or corporation) needs to raise funds amounting to 
£X. It creates an SPV which issues sukuk (certificates) worth £X to investors. The SPV 
uses the proceeds to buy a designated asset (usually property, land, machines etc.) from 
the originator and leases it back for a specified term at £X+Y, representing the principal 
and rental value. The originator pays rent on the leased asset in regular instalments, 
which the SPV distributes to the sukuk-holders on a periodic income-distribution basis 
in proportion to their sukuk holding, after deducting its fees/share. Sukuk-holders 
receive regular rental income which replicates bond coupons. At the end of the lease 
period, the originator buys the asset back. Ijarah sukuk offer both fixed and floating-rate 
payoffs. In the former case, the rent (cashflow) arising from this arrangement is fixed 
therefore it generates a predetermined rate of return on investment. In the latter case, the 
rent is based on a benchmark e.g. the LIBOR68 and revised periodically (Obaidullah, 
2005; Iqbal and Tsubota, 2006; Ayub, 2007; El-Gamal, 2006; Shanmugam and Zahari, 
2009). 
Ijarah-sukuk (and other variations of sukuk structures) are criticised for being no more 
than costly replications of conventional interest-based bonds which rely on structural 
differences to gain religious legitimacy (Ayub, 2007; El-Gamal, 2006; Zaman, 2008; 
El-Diwany, 2010). In the case of ijarah-sukuk, there are three primary issues. The first 
issue relates to the presence of the prohibited bai-al-ina (buy-back sale) in the ijarah-
sukuk structure. There are in fact two elements of bai-al-ina involved. First the 
originator sells the asset and its usufruct to the SPV. Second, the originator repurchases 
the usufruct through entering a lease contract and finally the originator repurchases the 
asset and its remaining usufruct at the lease-end. Thus, the controversies and rulings 
concerning bai-al-ina discussed earlier also apply to ijarah-sukuk rendering this 
arrangement impermissible under the sharia. Note that, in this arrangement, the asset 
price equates to the principal loan amount and the value of the usufruct (rent) represents 
67 For details on the different types of sukuk, see Obaidullauh (2005), Ayub, (2007) and Shanmugam and 
Zahari (2009). For industry report on sukuk markets see IIFM (2014). 
68 LIBOR is the London Interbank Offered Rate. 
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the interest charged on that loan. Thus, the ijarah-sukuk relies on the addition of an 
unnecessary SPV and several contractual agreements to replicate an interest-bearing 
debt contract (El-Gamal, 2006).  
The second issue relates to benchmarking of rental repayments. Each ijarah-sukuk has a 
different underlying asset and therefore at least theoretically each ijarah-sukuk should 
have a different rental rate depending on the market for the asset, its depreciation rate 
and the overall quality of the collateral. In practice, however, irrespective of the 
underlying asset, the rental rate charged is pegged to the interest rate charged on 
conventional bonds which have a similar credit rating. Thus, there is no direct 
relationship between the rental income generated and the underlying asset. The sukuk is 
therefore backed by nothing other than the credit-worthiness of the originator 
(government/corporation) as in conventional bonds, and offers mostly fixed or quasi-
fixed returns on investment contrary to the sharia principles (El-Gamal, 2006; Ayub 
2007). 
The final issue relates to ownership and sukuk-holders’ right to rental income. Sukuk 
are defined as certificates which represent proportionate ownership in the underlying 
leased asset. This ownership entitles sukuk-holders to a share in the rental income 
generated by the asset (Usmani, 2004). With ownership comes the responsibility of 
bearing the asset’s risk. With ijarah-sukuk, sukuk-holders are, in theory, exposed to the 
market risk of the underlying leased asset and the credit risk which relates to the 
originator’s inability to pay the agreed rent. To mitigate these risks in practice, ijarah-
sukuk include a clause whereby the originator undertakes a unilateral binding promise 
to buy the leased asset back if it defaults on the rental payments, with the price payable 
equating to the outstanding principal amount. This is known as a put option. As this put 
option is an integral part of the agreement, the sale of the underlying asset from the 
originator to the SPV is not a ‘true sale’ and thus the ijarah-sukuk is not actually an 
asset-backed security (CIMA, 2011), which is arguably the distinguishing feature of 
sukuk relative to its conventional  counterparts. Without genuine ownership risk, sukuk-
holders’ claim on the rental income is not valid under the sharia. In relation to this, 
there have been cases of sharia scholars retracting their approval of sukuk. Abdullah ibn 
Mani (a respected Saudi scholar) for example withdrew his approval of ijarah-sukuk 
issued by the Government of Bahrain, convinced that ownership of the underlying asset 
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was not completely transferred to the sukuk-holders as is required by sharia (El-Gamal, 
2006). 
Further concerns have also been raised by other sharia scholars. Sheikh Taqi Usmani, 
for example, declared in 2008 that up to 85% of the sukuk in existence at the time were 
not in accordance with sharia rules (Khan, 2010; Davies and Sleiman, 2012). Despite 
further guidance published by AAOIFI after this announcement, controversies on sukuk 
structures and their sharia compliance have continued (for examples see El-Diwany, 
2010; Khan, 2010). Thus, sukuk are concluded to be simply costly replications of 
conventional debt securities; a ruse which relies on structural differences to establish 
religious legitimacy whilst producing transactions involving riba which are specifically 
banned under the sharia (El-Gamal, 2006; El-Diwany, 2010; Khan 2010). 
3.5.2 Controversies on the Liability Side  
Investment Accounts 
In theory, an investment account is the principal deposit product offered by Islamic 
banks (Obaidullah, 2005). It represents the liability side of the two-tier mudarabah 
model, where deposits operate on a PLS (mudarabah) basis. In practice however, the 
PLS principle is never strictly followed. The nominal amount in these accounts is 
implicitly guaranteed, against the terms of the mudarabah contract (Zaher and Hassan, 
2001) .Even when Islamic banks make losses, these are not passed down to the 
investment account holders and the capital sum in their accounts is never written down 
(Warde, 2000; El-Hawary et al., 2007; Visser, 2009; Khan 2010). This is primarily due 
to competitive pressures such as withdrawal risk and displaced commercial risk69 as 
well as regulations which ensure mechanisms are in place to avoid capital loss for 
investment account holders (IAH) (Zaher and Hassan, 2001; El-Hawary et al., 2007; 
Schoon, 2010).  
Additionally, the expected rate of return on these investment account deposits is 
implicitly guaranteed and delinked from the bank’s actual profits (Zaher and Hassan, 
2001). Instead of sharing profits as they arise, Islamic banks use discretionary reserves 
69 Withdrawal risk is the risk of depositors withdrawing their funds due to lower rate of return being paid 
than competitor banks. Displaced commercial risk is the risk of divergence in the return on assets and 
expected returns to be paid on liabilities (El-Hawary et al., 2007). 
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such as Profit Equalisation Reserves (PER) and/or Investment Risk Reserve (IRR)70, to 
manage the profits distributed to the IAH. These reserves are essentially used to 
generate a smooth and stable return for the depositors (IAH), whilst protecting them 
from the risk of principal loss (Farook et al., 2012). Moreover, the return paid on 
investment account deposits mimics the interest rate paid on conventional banks’ 
deposits. Thus, with no real risk sharing, these accounts are similar to the interest 
receiving saving accounts offered by conventional banks (Kuran 1995; Chong and Liu, 
2009). 
Current and Savings Accounts 
In addition to investment accounts, Islamic banks also offer current and saving account 
facilities for depositors that seek to simply keep their funds at the bank. To comply with 
Islamic principles, these accounts should operate on a safekeeping/trust basis71 because 
the nominal value of these funds is guaranteed by the bank. As risk-free deposits, no 
return can be paid on these because that would constitute riba. More importantly, as 
deposits are held in trust, Islamic banks are not permitted to use these funds for their 
investment/financing purposes. Current and saving accounts in Islamic banks should 
therefore, in theory, be treated as full-reserve deposits with no return paid to the 
depositors. In reality however, Islamic banks reinvest these funds for financing 
purposes and therefore these account operate on a fractional reserve basis as in 
conventional banks, violating the conditions of the underlying Islamic contracts in use 
(Visser, 2009; El-Diwany, 2010).  
Often the contracts of qard hasan (interest-free benevolent loan) and wadiah 
(safekeeping) are used in practice. The use of these contracts however, is problematic 
from the sharia perspective. Qard hasan is an interest-free charitable loan contract, 
designed to be extended to assist the financially needy, where only the borrower can 
benefit. Recall from chapter 2, that with qard hasan any benefit above the capital sum 
70 PER is created to smooth profit distributions to investment account holders (IAH) and IRR is used to 
protect them from the risk of principal loss. The PER is created from deductions made to income earned 
on banks’ investments before profit is allocated to the bank and IAH. The IRR is established using 
appropriations from the IAH’s share of the profit after the bank’s shareholders’ share has been deducted. 
Although these reserves are recognised as part of IAH’s equity, the amounts within these reserves may 
not be distributed to them (Farook et al., 2012).  
71 The only form of deposit acceptable in classical Islamic traditions is that held on safekeeping (wadiah) 
basis (Warde, 2000). Recall from section 3.2, deposits in medieval Islamic societies operated on the 
safekeeping basis.  
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given to the lender whether monetary or non-monetary is riba. Considering deposits as 
qard hasan therefore implies any free banking services provided to the depositors would 
be considered riba, delegitimising such an arrangement. More importantly, Islamic 
banks do not actually fit the ‘financially needy’ category to which qard hasan can be 
extended. This contract is therefore delinked from its actual charitable nature simply to 
mimic current account services in conventional banks and is therefore controversial 
(Obaidullah, 2005; Schoon, 2010). 
Wadiah, on the other hand, is a classical safekeeping contract, where funds are held in 
trust with ownership and control remaining with the depositor. Under this contract, the 
bank cannot lawfully use these funds to extend credit or co-mingle with its own capital 
to use in its day-to-day operations (Schoon, 2010). Any deposits operating on this basis 
therefore need to be held on a 100% reserve basis (Visser, 2009). To overcome this 
constraint, Islamic bankers have redesigned the traditional wadiah contract as wadiah-
wad-dhamanah (safekeeping with guarantee), which permits banks to use these deposits 
as loanable funds (Obaidullah, 2005). According to the classical juristic argument, 
when funds under wadiah contract are used by the depositary (i.e. the bank), the 
contract is no longer one of safekeeping72 but that of a loan i.e. qard  (El-Gamal, 2006) 
and therefore rules and issues related to qard as discussed above apply. A brief 
discussion in El-Diwany (2010, p.253-4) concludes that sharia legality issues on current 
accounts remain unresolved. 
The use of wadiah contracts for savings accounts is also controversial as it requires a 
rather “liberal juristic application of Islamic financial principles” (Dar, 2007, p.85). In 
wadiah-based saving accounts, the capital sum is guaranteed and therefore a fixed 
return cannot be paid as that amounts to riba. Islamic banks therefore pay their 
depositors ‘gifts’ which are not contractually stipulated  in order to avoid the riba 
prohibition, but as these ‘gifts’ are recurring in nature, and paid on deposits at a certain 
rate without fail, these are “dangerously close to devouring riba” and therefore 
understandably criticised (Obaidullah, 2005, p.55).   
72 Use of such funds constitutes a violation of fiduciary duties placed upon the depositary under the 
traditional wadiah contract, and thus the depositary must guarantee the funds for the depositor (El-Gamal, 
2006).  
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3.5.3 Controversies Concerning the Reliability of Sharia Supervisory 
Boards and Sharia Certification  
The Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) is an important governance mechanism in Islamic 
banks, aimed at enhancing their religious credibility. The SSB is an independent body 
of sharia scholars that have expertise in Islamic commercial law. These scholars are 
employed and remunerated by the Islamic banks and their primary role entails giving 
fatwas on the sharia validity of the banks’ operations. In theory, the SSB act as religious 
auditors who are responsible for guiding, advising, reviewing and certifying at the end 
of each year that the banks’ products, contracts and transactions have conformed to the 
Islamic principles (Warde, 2010; AAOIFI, 2010). The SSB conducts sharia compliance 
checks both before and after the launch of a new product (AAOIFI, 2010). All new 
products therefore require a seal of approval from the SSB. The SSB’s opinion (fatwa) 
is theoretically binding such that refusal to approve a product implies that it cannot be 
used by the bank (Warde, 2010). 
Besides the SSB, Islamic banks also have an internal sharia auditing team. The internal 
sharia auditors have a similar role to internal financial auditors except that they evaluate 
the extent to which Islamic banks transactions and contractual terms comply with the 
guidelines and instructions of the SSB (AAOIFI, 2010). Thus, the sharia audit team 
plays a bridging role between the management and the SSB. Final sharia audit results 
for each year are published as part of the annual reports (for most Islamic banks) and at 
times include recommendations made by the SSB for future improvements73.  
A number of issues however, concerning the SSB and reliability of sharia certification 
have arisen. For example, there’s the issue of multiple board memberships and conflict 
of interest. Sharia scholars hold positions on numerous sharia boards, including those of 
competing banks. The top 10 of the 400-plus sharia scholars in the world hold 24-85 
board seats each, occupying nearly 40% of all the SSB seats available worldwide74 
73 For details on the role of the SSB, the SSB report and the internal sharia review, see guideline issued 
by AAOIFI particularly: ‘Governance Standard for Islamic Financial Institutions, (GSIFI) 1, 2, 3 and 5 
namely: Shari’ah Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition and Report; Shari’ah Review; Internal 
Shari’ah Review and Independence of Shari’ah Supervisory Board’ (AAOIFI, 2010). 
74 The exposure and influence of these scholars has far greater reach than the number of seats each 
individual holds. This is because the same scholars also provide their services to consulting companies 
such as Minhaj Advisory, which caters for the needs of other financial institutions including mutual 
funds, asset management and real estate companies. Estimations show that the institutional and cross 
links of the top 3 scholars alone makes up 21% of the entire industry. These top 3 scholars are Sheikh 
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(Ünal,  2010b). Furthermore, the same scholars hold positions not only on the boards of 
regulated banks but also in standard-setting regulatory bodies e.g. AAOIFI and central 
banks, effectively judging and regulating their own work. Such a system is 
unsurprisingly criticised for conflict of interest, which remains an unresolved issue in 
the industry (Davies and Sleiman, 2012). 
The high number of cross-memberships is commonly attributed to a severe shortage of 
qualified sharia scholars; however, it is not the availability but rather the ‘desirability’ 
of certain scholars which is driving this phenomenon. Although less experienced sharia 
scholars are mostly available, banks deliberately seek out well-known scholars for their 
reputation. Deals are made and products sold via the reputation of the scholars 
certifying them. The bigger the name, the greater the credibility it brings to the 
institution and its products. This naturally stretches the demand for certain scholars to 
be far greater than others, leading to multiple board memberships (Fitch, 2011; Davies 
and Sleiman, 2012).   
Multiple memberships however, put unrealistic demands on the scholars’ time, 
affecting their ability to provide the quality of service (consultation, audit and scrutiny) 
which is required. Sharia boards are therefore commonly perceived to be mere 
rubberstamps. Interviews have revealed that the role of SSB in many cases is rather 
superficial, that the sharia audit process is perfunctory and that SSBs do simply grant 
rubberstamp approvals to the decisions taken by the banks’ management (Warde, 
2010). 
There are also more serious concerns relating to the reliability and independence of the 
scholars’ opinion and banks’ sincerity in attaining sharia compliance. Doubts exist over 
the sharia scholars’ ability to fully understand the products they certify. Sharia scholars 
are certainly knowledgeable in Islamic law, however many are not well-versed in 
finance and therefore may fail to fully understand the economic purpose of the product 
they’re certifying. The SSB’s judgement can therefore be based on the structure as 
opposed to the substance of the financial product. Knowing this, product managers who 
are incentivised to seek rapid approvals, do not always disclose all the necessary 
information. At other times, major financial institutions simply market products as 
Nizam Mohammed Yacoubi, Dr Abu Guddah, and Dr Ali Elgari who prominently feature in GCC banks’ 
Sharia Supervisory Boards (Ünal, 2010a). 
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sharia-certified without actual approval. In a recent controversy, it was revealed that 
Goldman Sach’s base prospectus had publically named three scholars as advisors on the 
issuance of its $2bn sukuk, even though none of the named scholars had seen the 
prospectus, nor given their permission for the sukuk to be marketed as sharia-compliant 
(Davies and Sleiman, 2012). Such practices unsurprisingly create serious doubts over 
the legitimacy of products advertised as sharia-compliant.  
The possibility of rent seeking by scholars combined with the potential lack of integrity 
on banks’ part makes the sharia certification process even more unreliable. With only 
15-20 prominent scholars with ‘rock-star’ status, it is unsurprising that these scholars 
are well remunerated. In addition to their base pay ranging from $20,000-$50,000 a 
year, top scholars can earn $1000-$1500 per hour of consultation, annual bonuses of 
$10,000-$20,000 per board seat, and even six-figure sums (reportedly $150,000-
$500,000) for each fatwa issued to certify large transactions in international institutions 
(Foster, 2009; Khan, 2010; Fitch, 2011; Davies and Sleiman, 2012).  
These handsome remuneration packages however raise questions regarding the extent to 
which certain sharia scholars willingly offer “tailor-made fatwas” to sharia-certify 
dubious products and practices based “on the most tenuous religious grounds in 
exchange for money” (Warde, 2010, p.236). It has been suggested that, banks can get 
almost any financial product/transaction certified as sharia compliant by actively 
seeking and relying on the validations of accommodating scholars and tempting them 
with high payoffs (Khan, 2010). Interviews with industry insiders have revealed 
evidence of such practices, particularly in conventional financial institutions offering 
Islamic products. As Foster (2009) reports, conventional banks create the same type of 
financial product for the Islamic market as the conventional counterpart, and keep 
approaching different sharia scholars for a fatwa until one certifies it as sharia 
compliant. The product is then marketed as ‘Islamic’75. Evidence of such practices has 
given rise to the ongoing controversial debate on ‘fatwas for sale’ (Warde, 2010). 
75 The interview reported in Foster (2009) reads “as one investment banker based in Dubai, working for a 
major Western financial organisation explains: "We create the same type of products that we do for the 
conventional markets. We then phone up a Sharia scholar for a Fatwa [seal of approval, confirming the 
product is Shari'ah compliant]. "If he doesn't give it to us, we phone up another scholar, offer him a sum 
of money for his services and ask him for a Fatwa. We do this until we get Sharia compliance. Then we 
are free to distribute the product as Islamic." 
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In the ‘fatwa shopping’ process, variation in sharia interpretation plays a major role. As 
highlighted in chapter 2, sharia rules can be interpreted differently by different scholars, 
some being more lenient than others. The range of disagreements between scholars can 
lead to ‘fatwa wars’ which banks use to their benefit, by simply choosing the most 
lenient and ‘creative’ scholar willing to justify what suits the institution’s preferences 
(Warde, 2010; Foster, 2009).  
Varying sharia interpretations and each bank having its own sharia board also make it 
difficult to arrive at a consensus on sharia-certified products and practices. This has 
created fragmentation in the Islamic banking industry as there are no uniform rules of 
sharia certification which apply to the industry as a whole (Tripp, 2006; Warde, 2010). 
The lack of transparency in how sharia scholars reach their conclusions in the sharia 
certification process complicates matters further. Rarely do sharia boards disclose their 
methodology and even then details are not publically published (Davies and Sleiman, 
2012). Ultimately, the current controversial certification process not only has a financial 
but also a moral cost. Not only are the banks using their depositors, clients and 
shareholders’ funds (and the income generated from these) to make excessive payments 
to sharia scholars, but the religious validity of the products and service provided is also 
contentious and potentially incompliant with the religious values of their stakeholders 
(Warde, 2010).  
These issues are well recognised in the industry and several steps have been taken to 
overcome them, although the effectiveness of such measures is questionable. To 
address the problem of fragmentation and avoid reliance on fatwas from lone scholars, 
there have been attempts to create national and even international sharia boards. 
Malaysia, for example has established a national sharia board. However, since sharia 
scholars in Southeast Asia tend to be more lenient in interpreting the sharia than the 
orthodox views held in the Middle East, several rulings passed by Malaysian scholars 
are not considered valid in the Arab Gulf. Thus, the same sharia-certified products are 
valid in one market but not in others (Foster, 2009; Warde, 2010). To achieve 
harmonisation across markets and develop common standards, attempts to benefit from 
transnational boards have also materialised, with the Islamic Fiqh Academy considered 
to be the most prestigious international sharia body, passing fatwas on Islamic banking 
issues. However, as no individual institution is bound by the resolutions/fatwas passed, 
these aren’t followed internationally. Furthermore, as the Islamic Fiqh Academy is 
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largely associated with Saudi Arabia, other countries with varying fiqh traditions tend 
to look towards their own fiqh academies (Warde, 2010). Such institutions therefore 
have not been very effective in overcoming the fragmentation and establishing 
standardisation of sharia certification in the industry.   
Other initiatives have aimed specifically at increasing confidence in the sharia 
compliance of individual banks and their products, however these too cannot be 
considered successful. The Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA) for example, 
aims to provide a Sharia Quality Rating, as a reference for the quality of compliance by 
banks and products marketed as ‘Islamic’. These ratings are designed to be used by 
financiers and investors in a similar manner to credit ratings (IIRA, 2006)  . However, 
not only do banks need to volunteer to be assessed on an annual basis but the results of 
the review are also not published publicly without the bank’s consent (ibid). It is 
reasonable to assume that banks with a poor rating will not consent to their rating being 
published publicly to prevent any negative impact on their reputation and therefore poor 
ratings are unlikely to appear in the public domain76. Thus, a reliable and independent 
assessment of sharia compliance appears to be rather difficult to find from within the 
Islamic banking industry. 
Finally, in response to the criticism that sharia boards are mere rubberstamps, Malaysia 
has banned scholars from serving on more than one bank’s sharia board at a time. In the 
Arab Gulf, however, multiple board memberships are virtually unregulated. 
Governments and regulatory bodies including AAOIFI and central banks in the Gulf 
have hesitated in making stricter rules in the industry including the issue of limiting 
board positions. Attempts at increased regulation have also seen strong resistance from 
some scholars. Without intervention from regulatory bodies and governments, the steps 
towards a single board membership and stricter regulation are unlikely to occur (Khan, 
2010; Davies and Sleiman, 2012). Globally, the Islamic banking industry is years away 
from a standardised and transparent sharia certification process. Until then 
controversies on ‘fatwas-for-sale’, conflict of interest, rent seeking on part of both 
76 The IIRA website puts into question the success of the Sharia Quality Rating (SQR) initiative, as there 
is neither a list of banks rated nor their ratings. Evidence of only one Islamic bank (namely Jordan 
Islamic Bank) with a SQR could be found on the website http://www.iirating.com (Accessed 15.01.17). 
Furthermore, since its inception, the IIRA has developed a focus towards providing credit ratings through 
a risk assessment of Islamic financial institutions and their financial instruments as opposed to sharia 
compliance ratings.  
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banks and scholars continue to plague the industry and raise questions over the religious 
validity of the industry’s products and practices. 
3.6 Understanding the Divergence between Theory and Practice 
Islamic banking is riddled with controversies, as the previous section describes. The 
fundamental criticism of the industry however amounts to one key point: lack of PLS 
financing, which indicates its failure to develop in accordance with the central 
philosophy of risk-sharing (Warde, 2000). Given the emphasis on PLS financing in 
theoretical models, why has the industry turned away from it? This section provides an 
explanation by discussing first, the transaction costs associated with PLS financing and 
second, the impact of the institutional environment on these costs. The final two 
subsections consider the divergence between theory and practice more broadly. In the 
first of these, it is argued that the two-tier mudarabah model does not serve to fulfil the 
roles of a commercial bank and therefore divergence from the theoretical model was 
inevitable. In the final subsection, it is argued that the (European/conventional) 
commercial banking institution is inherently inconsistent with sharia principles and 
therefore any Islamic bank aiming to operate as a commercial bank would have 
deviated from Islamic principles. The more consistent alternative and recent proposed 
reforms for the industry are discussed, leading to recommendations for how Islamic 
banks can operate closer to sharia principles.   
3.6.1 Transaction Costs: Rationale for the Lack of PLS Financing in 
Islamic Banks 
The lack of PLS financing in Islamic banks can be appreciated through an 
understanding of the higher transaction costs involved in this mode of financing relative 
to the non-PLS modes which mimic the standard debt-contract. Building on Coase’s 
(1960) definition, Dahlman (1979) specifies three types of transaction costs which arise 
due to imperfect information. These are “search and information costs, bargaining and 
decision costs, [and] policing and enforcement costs” (p.148). Using Dahlman’s 
categorisation, the following discussion illustrates why PLS is considered to be the 
more expensive and therefore the less preferred choice for Islamic banks relative to 
non-PLS (debt) financing. 
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Consider first, the case of search and information costs. In order to provide PLS 
financing, Islamic banks must first seek out reliable investment partners with profitable 
projects. The ‘quality’ of the investment partner and the project to be financed however, 
cannot be fully verified ex-ante due to informational asymmetry (the 
entrepreneurs/managers seeking finance have better information about the risks of the 
project than Islamic banks). Islamic banks therefore face an adverse selection problem. 
The terms of PLS contracts exacerbate this issue. To maximise their gain, entrepreneurs 
seeking to finance projects with high expected profits are likely to opt for non-PLS 
financing, which leaves them as the residual claimant. Entrepreneurs seeking to finance 
projects with low expected profits, however, would be keen to finance on PLS terms to 
minimise their losses in case of failure (recall that losses are shared in a musharakah or 
borne  solely by Islamic banks in a mudarabah arrangement) (Iqbal and Lewis, 2009). 
In a world of imperfect information with potentially dishonest agents, entrepreneurs 
with low-quality projects (i.e. with high probability of failure) have an incentive to 
misrepresent the quality of their proposed project through unrealistic and inflated 
expected profits. Islamic banks therefore need to expend resources to verify the quality 
claims. This involves not only checking the past credit history of the potential 
investment partners, but also the process of project evaluation including a profitability 
and feasibility analysis (Johnes et al., 2014). Such investigations inevitably raise costs 
compared to non-PLS financing, where a credit history check of the borrowing party 
suffices77. Making the correct selection also requires that Islamic banks have sufficient 
information to judge between high and low quality investment partners and projects. 
However, given poor quality and quantity of informational flows, especially in 
developing countries where the majority of Islamic banks operate (El Hawary et al., 
2007; Khan, 2010), the risks and costs associated with adverse selection are likely to be 
high. Thus, to economise on search and information costs, Islamic banks facing acute 
adverse selection problems, especially when competing directly with conventional 
banks, are likely to prefer non-PLS over PLS financing (Iqbal and Lewis, 2009). 
77 Even if entrepreneurs with high quality projects are actively seeking PLS financing and Islamic banks 
are willing to provide such options, the presence of ‘dishonest’ entrepreneurs tends to drive ‘honest and 
potentially profitable’ entrepreneurs out the market. The cost of dishonesty therefore is not limited to 
search and information costs incurred by Islamic banks but also includes the loss incurred from driving 
genuine PLS financing out of existence (see Akerlof, 1970).  
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Next, consider the bargaining and decision costs which relate to the process of setting 
mutually agreeable contractual terms. PLS financing contracts are unstandardized. 
These client-specific contracts are designed to take into account the characteristics of 
the individual investment partners and the project under consideration. Accordingly, 
these contracts incur significant costs during the bargaining process as bank-client 
consultations are set up to determine contractual terms. Furthermore, to ensure 
compliance with sharia, all new contracts require approval from the banks’ SSB (Johnes 
et al., 2014). PLS contracts therefore also incur additional administration costs related 
to the sharia approval process. This makes PLS contracts costlier and more time-
consuming compared to the non-PLS alternatives for which pre-approved standardised 
contracts exist (ibid).  
Finally, policing and enforcement costs are incurred because Islamic banks cannot 
determine if entrepreneurs will violate the terms of the contract or misappropriate funds 
ex-post. If such information was available ex-ante, Islamic banks would select only 
trustworthy entrepreneurs or include stringent contractual terms to limit the scope of 
contract violation and misappropriation of funds (Dahlman, 1979). However, this is not 
possible due to informational asymmetry. The entrepreneur has more knowledge of his 
intentions, capabilities to manage the work and the likelihood of success or failure of 
the project, relative to the Islamic bank. Additionally, as PLS contracts are better suited 
to long term projects due to the time diversification effect of equity (Dar et al., 1999), 
inherent uncertainty regarding the future presents additional problems for writing 
complete contracts. At the outset, the contracting parties can neither anticipate all future 
contingencies nor identify suitable adaptations, and therefore are subject to bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1957, 1972). The best outcome achievable is an incomplete contract. 
Gaps in incomplete contracts, however, provide scope for opportunistic behaviour i.e. 
“self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1985) on part of the 
entrepreneur.  
Islamic banks providing PLS financing are therefore exposed to large counterparty risk, 
especially in the case of mudarabah (El-Hawary et al., 2007) where Islamic banks and 
entrepreneurs form a principal/agent relationship78. The separation between ownership 
78 The principal/agent framework can also be used to compare PLS and non-PLS financing. In a 
principal/agent relationship as in the case of mudarabah, agency problems arise specifically because 
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and control i.e. Islamic banks are the residual risk bearers whilst entrepreneurs are the 
decision- makers, gives rise to conflict of interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Three 
features of the mudarabah contract extenuate this problem. Firstly, extreme linearity i.e. 
returns for each party are a linear function of the profits generated from the financed 
project and therefore are fully dependent on the entrepreneurs (agents) effort and skill 
level. Since effort levels are unobservable, all benefits of shirking are enjoyed solely by 
the entrepreneurs. Secondly, discretionary power i.e. entrepreneurs have full control 
over investment decisions and may prioritise self-interest by misappropriating funds for 
personal use and/or make sub-optimal investment decisions. The incentive to do this is 
extremely high when an entrepreneur has secured funding for a low quality project 
since the full financial loss is borne by the bank. Finally, idiosyncratic uncertainty (risk) 
i.e. Islamic banks returns are contingent on the entrepreneurs’ claimed profits which 
may be misreported (Khalil et al., 2002). The entrepreneurs have an incentive to 
underreport profits not only from the desire to keep a bigger share but also due to 
discriminatory tax treatments since profits are taxed but interest is exempted as a cost 
item. The impact of the tax regime can be considerable, as evident from the case of 
mudarabah companies in Pakistan, which grew considerably before the withdrawal of 
their tax-exempt status in 1992 (Dar et al., 1999). In developing countries where tax 
avoidance/evasion is a much more serious problem, Islamic banks face the problem of 
receiving a share of profit, calculated using the entrepreneurs’ official financial 
accounts which are created for tax purposes. Without access to the entrepreneur’s true 
accounts, concerns over potential losses due to dishonesty make non-PLS contracts 
more desirable (Kuran, 1995; Visser, 2009).  
To minimise such agency problems, Islamic banks need to establish suitable incentives 
and expend resources to monitor the actions of entrepreneurs and enforce contract terms 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). While it is difficult to differentiate more from less 
contracts cannot be written or enforced costlessly (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The higher agency costs 
associated with PLS include monitoring costs incurred by the principal, bonding costs incurred by agent 
(entrepreneur) to signal compliance with contractual terms or to compensate the principal in case of 
contract violation, and residual loss, which refers to the welfare reduction faced by the principal as 
agent’s decision diverges from the decision which maximise the principal’s welfare (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In this work, transaction costs framework is used as opposed to limiting the discussion 
to agency costs because, Islamic banks, strictly speaking, are in a partnership under a musharakah 
contract, not a principal/agent relationship. Under musharakah, Islamic banks can hold a management 
role, and have an impact on the decision making process, therefore the separation of ownership and 
control does not exist as it does in the mudarabah case.  
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opportunistic entrepreneurs ex-ante (Williamson, 1979), it is also difficult to design 
contract terms that minimise opportunistic behaviour. The source of moral hazard 
therefore lies in the inability of contracting parties to write a complete contract which 
preserves incentives (Marshall, 1976) and aligns the interest of the entrepreneur with 
that of the Islamic bank. Allocating a share of the profit to the entrepreneur is one 
inherent incentive in PLS financing contracts. However, it may not be sufficient in the 
case of mudarabah as the entrepreneur does not face financial loss or when an 
entrepreneur knowingly finances a low quality project. Banks may therefore need to set 
up in-person and on site monitoring systems to verify declared profits from PLS 
projects which increases costs relative to non-PLS financing (Visser, 2009). 
Furthermore, in the case of a disputed mudarabah contract, negligence of the 
entrepreneur needs to be proven, most likely through a lengthy and costly legal process, 
so that the burden of full loss does not fall solely on the Islamic bank. PLS financing 
therefore presents significant moral hazard problems and requires intensive monitoring, 
which inevitably increases costs (Kuran, 1995; Khalil et al., 2002; Visser, 2009). 
To summarise, note that agency problems are particularly acute for PLS financing 
especially in the absence of control rights and state-contingent returns. Mitigating these 
problems increases costs. The presence of asymmetric information and costly state 
verification, makes non-PLS (debt) superior to PLS (equity) financing79 (Townsend, 
1979; Williamson, 1987) with the preference for the former increasing as agency 
problems become more severe (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). Thus, the over-reliance 
on non-PLS financing exhibited by Islamic banks is simply a rational response to the 
informational asymmetry problems and the higher transaction costs associated with PLS 
financing (Dar et al., 1999; Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Kuran, 1995, 2004; El-Gamal,         
2007; Visser, 2009; Khan, 2010). 
3.6.2 A Broader Perspective on Transaction Costs: Importance of the 
Institutional Environment 
Imperfect information and opportunism alone, although important, cannot be deemed 
sufficient to explain the lack of PLS financing in Islamic banks. Opportunism and 
79 Although costly-state verification is argued to make “complete risk-sharing [i.e. PLS financing] 
suboptimal” (Townsend 1979, p.267), it must be appreciated however, that Townsend’s model fails to 
explain the existence of outside equity (ibid) and that the optimality of debt disappears if dynamic 
considerations and/or ex-post renegotiations are introduced in the model (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). 
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bounded rationality are innate characteristics of human nature and affect all complex 
financial transactions. These are neither new problems nor limited to PLS financing. 
Furthermore, Islamic economists have argued in favour of PLS financing precisely 
because of its the long established history in Islamic traditions, as is evident from 
detailed accounts in classical Islamic jurisprudence and religious texts (Kuran, 2005; 
Harris, 2009). Mudarabah and its variants were indeed the prevalent modes of financing 
in early Islamic societies (as highlighted earlier in section 3.2) . These were used widely 
by merchants operating trading caravans throughout the Mediterranean region not only 
by Muslims in the Middle East but also Jews and Christians. Trading caravans 
constituted of two parties, the capital investor (principal) who provided goods to be 
sold, and the travelling party (agent), who travelled to other regions/countries for trade. 
Informational asymmetry and agency problems existed at the time as well, however 
these did not hinder the success and dominance of PLS modes (Udovitch, 1970 in 
Chapra, 2007). 
So what can explain the prevalence of PLS modes in early Islamic societies? As 
Williamson (1985) notes, it is extremely important to locate transaction costs within the 
larger social context in which they are embedded as culture, customs and norms have a 
bearing on the size of transaction costs and therefore need to be accounted for. 
Financing of the trading caravans on a PLS basis was embedded in the early Islamic 
society as the norm. As Harris (2009) explains, mudarabah80 did not exist simply as a 
single financing contract but referred to a complex institution, a nexus of contracts 
which determined several relationships including agency, investment, risk and profit 
allocation between parties as well as the “creation of a separate pool of assets” (p.610). 
This also applied to musharakah which was recognised as a variant of the general 
mudarabah contract, where the travelling party also contributed capital. Several other 
variants of mudarabah also existed which formed a “complex multilateral system” 
including, bilateral mudarabah, where the travelling partner in an initial mudarabah 
became the investing partner in the second; multilateral mudarabah where several 
capital providers invested in a single mudarabah to benefit from economies of scale, 
and even the case of a single investor spreading his investments across several 
80 Harris (2009) uses the term commenda which is the European variant for the mudarabah.  
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travelling trade partners to lower his risk through diversification (see Harris, 2009, 
p.610-11 and references within).  
Moreover, PLS financing did not operate in insolation. There existed a complex 
network of supportive institutions enabling PLS to work effectively. A strong 
independent legal system existed to enforce contract obligations, which provided 
efficient resolution of disputes through the mechanism of qadi (judge) offices supported 
by the religious scholars. The merchant code of conduct represented an additional 
independent third-party enforcement mechanism. Travelling partners were required to 
comply with the merchant code, violation of which was treated as a breach of the 
mudarabah arrangement. A strong network of learned jurists helped convert this general 
code of conduct into operating rules and regulation, specifying detailed rules for 
acceptable behaviour and judgements upon disputed cases. Furthermore, traders 
belonged to fraternities and guilds, which provided an informal credit rating system as 
well as an informal mechanism for contract enforcement. If any trader cheated, business 
relations with him were severed. Continual business provided scope for building up 
reputational capital, and encouraging more favourable terms of trade for the individual. 
A well-connected business community network created the environment where trust 
and cooperation was a recognised commercial practice (Udovitch, 1970 in Chapra, 
2007; Harris, 2009).  
High levels of trust and cooperation between the principal and agent reduces the need 
for monitoring, and therefore lowers transaction costs, while legal support reduces 
enforcement costs (Williamson, 1985). Additionally, as the rules and regulations 
surrounding the contracts were well-understood by society at large at the time, costs 
incurred in the contract creation (bargaining stage) were also reduced81. Thus, the 
existence of supportive institutions reduced transactions costs associated with adverse 
selection, contract creation, monitoring and enforcement of PLS arrangements.   
In contrast, Islamic banks suffered from a lack of such supportive institutions in the 
early decades and this issue largely continues to the present-day in most Muslim 
countries (see Iqbal et al., 1998 and Chapra, 2007 for discussion on the institutional 
81 A standard mudarabah template contract existed providing a number of default rules, as well as scope 
for adaptations to the individual needs of the contracting parties e.g. profit shares (Harris, 2009). 
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needs of Islamic banking). Institutions which meet the specific needs of Islamic banks 
such as sharia courts to resolve disputes or external credit rating agencies for banks’ 
investment partners were at the start of Islamic banking missing (Chapra, 2007). This is 
a direct consequence of historical events. Although the western colonial period lasted 
less than a century (Nasr,1999), it left a lasting legacy by transporting the institutional 
framework of conventional interest-based banking to Muslim countries. Thus, the 
central banking system and the regulatory environment were designed in accordance 
with conventional banking needs. This broader operating environment was not altered 
(and still is only partially altered) to accommodate the emergence of Islamic banks, 
which at least theoretically, were aimed at using PLS financing modes (Chapra, 2007).  
As El-Gamal (2006) notes, when Islamic banking emerged, its products had to be 
functionally the same as its conventional counterparts to ensure acceptance from 
regulators. For example, from a conventional supervisory perspective, banks are limited 
in the amount of risk they can accept on their financing and investment portfolio and 
that which they can pass onto their depositors (Kuran, 1995). Furthermore, by the time 
many of the industry-specific supportive institutions were developed in the early 2000s, 
the practice of form-over-substance had taken root along with the first mover advantage 
given to practitioners which shaped the methodology of developing sharia compliant 
financial products for future generations. For many, murabahah has been a well-known 
and accepted mode of Islamic finance for decades. This norm made it difficult for the 
entire industry to change course once supportive infrastructure institutions were 
established (El-Gamal, 2006). 
Moreover, in most developing and emerging economies where Islamic banks operate, 
the level of institutional development generally is not as advanced as in the developed 
western world. Rapid urbanisation in Muslim countries has occurred “against the 
backdrop of inefficient legal systems” (Kuran, 1995, p.168). Property rights are poorly 
defined and protected, the risk of expropriation or intervention from governments is 
high, corruption is a significant feature of the economy and political stability is often 
challenged creating an environment of mistrust (Dar et al., 1999; Yousef, 2004; Khan, 
2010). Weak legal systems not only make enforcement of contractual terms difficult but 
also expensive, raising the transaction costs associated with PLS financing.  
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As Harris (2009) notes, mudarabah was not a single contract that could be adopted in 
any environment, instead, to work it required a “supportive legal system” (p.616), 
which cannot be created by Islamic banks themselves. The government’s role in 
establishing supportive institutions is therefore paramount. Consequently, in recent 
years, several Muslim countries have moved towards adopting policies which 
encourage Islamic banking, including the elimination of discriminatory tax regimes 
which favour debt over equity (Kuran, 1995), and establishment of institutions to 
support the judicial system for Islamic finance, including Sharia courts, establishment 
of accounting and auditing standards (e.g. AAOIFI) to enable standardisation of 
reporting, as well as investment in education and training institutes for development of 
Islamic banking specific human capital (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005; Baba, 2007;       
Iqbal, 2007).  
Nevertheless, even where institutions specific to the needs of Islamic banking exist, 
their role in enabling PLS financing has largely been marginalised as one crucial point, 
the complementarity of institutions has been unexploited in most countries. 
Complementarity refers to the extent to which one institution “enhances the usefulness 
of another” (Kuran,  2009, p.601-2). Institutional complementarity is essential for 
reforms to have the desired impact (Kuran, 2009). Adoption or transplantation of a 
single institution in a country does not instantly equalise the enabling contribution that 
institution makes in another country where it is supported by a strong network of 
complementing institutions. For example, creation of the Federal Shariah Court in 
Pakistan has not been successful at imitating the impact of the qadi office in medieval 
Islamic civilisation for easing PLS transactions because of the weak legal system within 
which it is placed. The rulings of the Federal Shariah Court are not honoured nor 
supported by the government82 rendering its role ineffective in supporting the adoption 
of PLS by the Islamic banking industry (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005).  
82 Recall, that the Federal Shariah Court of Pakistan gave a judgement in 1991 that murabahah as 
practiced by Islamic banks is not in compliance with the tenets of sharia. The Court ordered the 
government to correct such un-Islamic practices. However, rather than upholding the judgement of the 
Shariah court, the government filed an appeal against this judgement in the Supreme Court, which also 
supported the judgement of the Shariah Court. To date, as evident from the practices of Islamic banks in 
Pakistan, the judgement of the Federal Shariah Court has not been implemented (Iqbal and Molyneux, 
2005). 
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Overall, the institutional environment in which Islamic banks emerged and operate was 
from the outset, designed for conventional commercial banking. This was not altered 
sufficiently or quickly enough to support PLS financing, which requires higher 
institutional support to minimise associated transaction costs. Islamic banks which 
adopt PLS financing in isolation from a supportive institutional framework stand to 
incur additional expenses relative to non-PLS (debt) financing and therefore 
understandably prefer the latter. 
3.6.3 Two-tier Mudarabah is Not a Model of Commercial Banking  
At a broader level, it must be appreciated that the divergence between theory and 
practice of Islamic banking was inevitable, quite simply because the two-tier 
mudarabah is not actually a model of commercial banking. With PLS assets and PLS 
liabilities, it is the polar opposite of the standard commercial bank which, by design, is 
an institution that intermediates on debt-basis. Debt liabilities (deposits, treated as loans 
to the bank) are converted into debt assets (credit i.e. interest-bearing loans). The two-
tier mudarabah however, offers an alternative model of financial intermediation based 
on equity and depicts the structure of venture capital, private equity and mutual funds, 
which exist as successful institutions alongside, but not in competition with commercial 
banks in the conventional financial system (El-Gamal, 2007).  
By emulating the multilateral mudarabah used by trading caravans in early Islamic 
societies, the two-tier mudarabah allows collection of savings to benefit from 
economies of scale on one side and investments across several businesses offering 
lower risk through diversification on the other. Trading caravans however, operated as 
an information-sharing ‘coalition of borrowers’ (see Leland and Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 
1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986) overcoming problems 
of informational asymmetry through a network of fraternity and guild memberships, 
which provided an informal credit rating system as well as a mechanism for contract 
enforcement (Udovitch, 1970; Chapra, 2007; Harris, 2009). These did not fulfil the 
roles of commercial banks. 
Commercial banks fulfil several important roles in the economy. By specialising as 
intermediaries, these banks minimise on transaction costs arising from asymmetric 
information which would otherwise be faced by individual investors in the market. 
Banks also act as a signalling medium by providing credit ratings for borrowers and 
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reflect the quality of their creditworthiness to others in the market through the premium 
charged on loans. This facilitates efficient allocation of capital. Furthermore, banks 
lower the costs of transactions (payments and withdrawal of cash), act as providers of 
liquidity for depositors, and transform savings with high liquidity demand into long 
term illiquid investments (see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Diamond, 1984; 
Ramakrishan and Thakor, 1984; Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Gangopadhyay and Singh, 
2000; see Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993 for a survey of banking theories).  
To abide by the two-tier mudarabah model, Islamic banks need to operate as investment 
intermediaries, which limit their scope in fulfilling the roles of commercial banks. On 
the liability side, the role of liquidity provider is especially challenging (Ahmed, 2002). 
Islamic banks cannot meet the liquidity demand of their depositors when deposits 
operating on a PLS basis are invested in long-term projects and therefore cannot be 
readily withdrawn83. Furthermore, neither the capital sum nor the return paid on these 
PLS deposits can be guaranteed as that amounts to riba. Essentially, the PLS deposits 
(held in investment accounts) are similar to equity capital and carry loss absorbing 
capacity. Investment account holders are therefore quasi-shareholders (Khan, 1986; 
Lewis, 2001). Such deposit facilities however do not match the risk preferences of all 
depositors (Kuran, 1995), especially those seeking safekeeping, liquidity and 
transaction e.g. payment services (current accounts), and therefore limits the type of 
depositors willing to place funds with Islamic banks operating on a two-tier mudarabah 
basis. On the asset side, PLS not only introduces a mismatch in the risk profile of a 
commercial bank’s asset/liability structure when depositors’ liquidity preferences are 
taken into consideration (Ahmed, 2002) but also presents higher transaction costs than 
the standard debt contract, as explained above.  
Note that, transaction costs are economised when transactions which differ in their 
attributes are assigned to governance structures84 in a discriminating way, thus the 
“organization form matters” (Williamson, 1985, p.18). In the context of Islamic 
banking, differences in attributes of PLS and debt financing need to be identified and 
matched to governance structures which minimise costs associated with these 
83 Deposits on mudarabah basis can only be withdrawn at a cost with prior notice (Ahmed, 2002).  
84 The firm is seen as a governance structure from the perspective of transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1985).   
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transactions. Of the three attributes identified by Williamson (1979)85, uncertainty and 
transaction-specific-investment (i.e. ease of verification) differs significantly between 
PLS and debt financing. Governance structures, such as the conventional commercial 
bank, which are designed to economise on transaction costs arising from debt-financing 
are not the same nor can simultaneously economise on costs arising from PLS 
arrangements86.Thus, alternative organisation forms are required for PLS-based 
intermediation. This key point seems to have been overlooked by Islamic economists 
who, during the twentieth century, attempted to Islamicize the financial system by 
imposing PLS mechanisms over the pre-existing conventional commercial banking 
model.  
Given the incompatibility, a choice had to be made between the two-tier mudarabah 
model using PLS and fulfilling the roles of a commercial bank. As explained earlier (in 
sections 3.3 and 3.4), the aim for modern Islamic banks, from the outset, was to be a 
substitute for conventional commercial banks. Fulfilling the abovementioned roles was 
therefore part of these institutions’ objectives. Of course, these couldn’t be achieved 
through PLS mechanisms and the industry moved towards replication of conventional 
banking products through sharia arbitrage. Thus, the pursuit to replace conventional 
commercial banks inevitably led to the divergence between the theoretical model and 
practice of Islamic banking. 
Essentially, the evolution of Islamic banks reflects the conclusions drawn by 
Williamson (1979) that “the efficient organization of economic activity entails 
matching governance structures with these [above-mentioned] transaction attributes in 
a discriminating way” (p. 261). The Islamic banking industry has acted according to 
this but in reverse. During the transition from theoretical models to practical reality, 
Islamic banks moved away from PLS towards non-PLS contracts to match the 
transaction type (debt financing) to a pre-selected governance structure (i.e. commercial 
bank), which was adopted from the conventional banking system as it pre-existed in 
Muslim societies and was supported by the broader operating environment in which 
85 The three transaction attributes identified by Williamson (1979) are uncertainty, frequency of 
recurrence and investment idiosyncrasy i.e. transaction-specific-investment, which in case of financial 
markets refers to the ease of verification. 
86 El-Gamal (2007, p.311) also notes that as most Islamic bankers are ex-conventional bankers, who are 
trained toward credit risk analysis, but not monitoring of customer behaviour, that the industry adopted 
debt instruments to capitalise on their skills. 
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they emerged. It is unsurprisingly then that the financial instruments which Islamic 
banks have turned to are similar to the standard-debt-contract. 
3.6.4 No Islamic Commercial Bank can be Fully Consistent with the 
Sharia  
Why was an incompatible model proposed for Islamic commercial banking? There are 
potentially two reasons. The first relates to Kuran’s observation that the Islamic 
economics doctrine arising in postcolonial era lacked scientific rigour (Kuran, 1996). 
Perhaps, the incompatibility between the two-tier mudarabah model and the roles of a 
commercial bank was not scrutinised sufficiently and thus Islamic economists of the 
time naively believed imposing PLS mechanisms to replace interest would not only 
Islamicize the commercial banking institution but also provide a viable alternative to 
the conventional counterpart. Certainly, as the two-tier mudarabah does not adequately 
address issues of current account deposits and consumption loans, the argument that 
there were gaps in understanding the role of commercial banks seems plausible.  
The second, more critical argument, this thesis propagates is that any proposed model 
would have been incompatible, simply because the (European/conventional) 
commercial banking institution is inherently inconsistent with sharia principles. As 
financial intermediaries, Islamic banks need to fulfil two key roles in the economy; 
intermediate between investors (savers/lenders) and capital seekers (borrowers) and 
provide transactional and depository services (liquidity). To be in accordance with the 
sharia, the first role needs to be on PLS basis and the second on a safekeeping (100% 
reserve) basis. Clearly, both these roles cannot be simultaneously fulfilled using the 
commercial banking structure which by definition, operates on a fractional reserve basis 
where funds collected as risk-free deposits are converted into credit. Therefore, Islamic 
banks which were developed in the 1970s specifically to emulate conventional 
commercial banks would have necessarily deviated from the Islamic financial principles 
and therefore any model based on such principles. As Islamic banks continue to operate 
according to the same structure, it is clear that no present-day Islamic commercial bank 
can be fully compliant with the sharia.   
How can Islamically-acceptable banking services be provided? Close study of the 
sharia principles particularly risk-sharing (PLS financing) and safekeeping (deposits as 
trust), call for the separation of investment (intermediation) and commercial 
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(transactional) banking operations. The two-tier mudarabah model provides a PLS-
based solution for the intermediation problem. To provide transactional and deposit 
banking services however, Islamic banks need to operate as ‘narrow’ banks, which 
accept deposits only for transactional purposes and maintain 100% reserve, earning a 
return through offering a range of fee-based services (Nienhaus, 2013). This view 
contradicts the vision of Islamic banks as a crossbreed of investment and commercial 
banks promoted by some Islamic economists (Mohsin, 1982; Chapra, 1985). 
Nevertheless, this idea has support in both history and literature.  
Historically, financial services were provided through two separate institutions in the 
Islamic world. As explained earlier, the European-style commercial bank could not 
develop in medieval Islamic societies partially because of the Islamic financial 
principles. There was a clear disconnection between deposit and credit functions, as the 
former were held on safekeeping basis while investments occurred solely on PLS basis 
(Udovitch, 1975). The famous precursors to Islamic banking, known for embodying the 
true spirit of sharia also support the separation idea. NBFIs which operated as mutual 
credit unions on interest-free basis (e.g. Mit Ghamr) or as saving and investment 
vehicle operating on PLS basis (Tabung Haji), did not provide commercial banking 
services (Warde, 2010; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2010).  
Some of the earliest Islamic banking literature called for separation between current and 
investment account deposits, with a 100% reserve requirement imposed on the former 
(Al-Jarhi, 1983). Others more recently have also suggested that PLS financing, (mutual 
fund model) should be used for investments and kept separate from deposit banking 
activities (Zaman and Movassaghi, 2002; El-Gamal, 2007). Mutuality in credit unions is 
also propagated as it complies not only with religious principles including riba but also 
secular regulations, specifically designed for such institutions (El-Gamal, 2007). 
Application of these proposals will take the Islamic financial industry closer to its 
predecessors which arguably did not suffer from the industry’s current controversies. 
To eliminate controversial practices, Nienhaus (2013) argues that separating investment 
and commercial banking operations and adopting narrow banking principles should be 
taken as a reform policy for the industry. He argues that through this reform, three 
problems of Islamic banking can be resolved. First, current accounts will no longer 
operate on fractional reserve basis and be consistent with the safekeeping principle 
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under narrow banking. Second, with investment operations separated under a PLS-
intermediation model, investment account holders (IAH) will no longer suffer from a 
‘deposit illusion’ and thus operate on genuine PLS terms. Finally, under a PLS-
intermediation model, the dominance of controversial non-PLS modes will end. 
Furthermore, he argues that such a separated system will reduce risk of maturity 
mismatches, make Islamic (narrow) banks safer, and enhance transparency allowing 
IAH to make informed choices over their preferred risk/return investment packages, 
whilst diminishing the need for deposit insurance and capital requirements. Indeed, 
there has been much support to suggest that a narrow banking system leads to 
systematically stable banking sector by eliminating the threat of bank runs and offers 
greater macro-financial stability (see e.g. Chiarella et al., 2012). The culture difference 
between investment banking (risk-taking) and commercial banking (risk-averse) also 
makes the argument for separation. Mixing the two cultures has clearly not been 
successful as the 2007–08 financial crisis illustrated (Abdul-Rahman, 2014). A survey 
of the extensive literature which evaluates the merits of separation and particularly 
narrow banking is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is interesting to note however, that 
these suggestions are neither new concepts nor proposals aimed specifically at Islamic 
banking. 
There is a long history of narrow banking reform proposals in the conventional 
economics literature, with notable contributions made in the 1930s. The ‘Chicago Plan’ 
(1933) advanced by a group of leading US economists87, proposed separation of the 
credit and monetary function of the banking system, requiring 100% reserves for 
deposits. Irving Fisher, a supporter of the plan, is widely known for his work on the 
concept of ‘100% Money’ (see e.g. Fisher, 1935). Furthermore, commercial and 
investment banking operations were separated by the 1933 Glass Steagall Act. These 
emerged as a response to the 1929 Great Depression in the US and unsurprisingly 
regained interest in the post 2007–08 financial crisis debate on banking reform. As with 
87 The Chicago Plan is a collection of banking reforms which were proposed in the aftermath of the 1929 
Great Depression in the USA. The idea underpinning the Chicago plan was first formulated by Frederick 
Soddy in 1926. It was picked up by Frank Knight, professor at the University of Chicago, who authored 
the first version of the Plan in March 1933. The Plan received considerable support from his colleagues 
including Paul Douglas and especially Henry Simons, who authored the second version in November 
1933. As it was proposed and supported by University of Chicago professors, the reform proposals 
became known as the ‘Chicago Plan’. Although many different versions of the Chicago plan were 
circulated during the 1930s, all were unanimous on 100% deposit reserves (for detailed discussion see, 
Benes and Kumhof, 2012). 
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the 1930s experience however, the proposals for narrow banking although 
acknowledged, did not materialise.  
The Turner Review (2009) undertaken by the FSA in the aftermath of the 2007–08 
financial crisis in the UK, for example, acknowledged the debate on narrow vs. 
investment banking and concluded that a complete and formal legal distinction is not 
feasible. It supported greater constraint on banks’ risk-taking activities rather than a 
complete disintegration. The central recommendation made by the Vickers Commission 
(2011), which has been translated into law through the 2013 Financial Services 
(Banking Reform) Act88, also calls for changes within the existing system by 
introducing a ring-fence to protect UK banks deposit-taking and retail businesses in 
separate, financially independent legal entities from the riskier investment banking 
activities (ICB, 2011). Similarly, the Volcker Rule, part of the 2010 Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the US, has called for restrictions on 
banks’ investment activities by limiting speculative trading, eliminating short-term 
proprietary trading, and banks’ involvement in private equity and hedge funds. Inspired 
by the Glass Steagall Act, the Volcker Rule is the modern attempt to effectively 
separate the commercial and investment functions of the bank without a full 
disintegration. The delay in implementation89 of the Volcker Rule which has already 
been criticised for being watered down from its original tougher stance with added 
exemptions, possible loopholes, further proposed changes and continued pressure from 
industry lobbyists pushing to roll back the Rule itself, however speaks volume about 
attitudes to stricter regulation in the banking industry (BBC News, 2014; Reuters, 2016, 
2017). The conventional banking industry has illustrated clearly, that despite facing one 
of the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression, the ‘too big to fail’ banks are 
also too strong to impose greater regulation on. The banking industry is extremely 
88 Ring-fencing was the core recommendation made by the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), 
also known as the Vickers Commission (named after the commission chair Sir John Vickers) in the post 
financial crisis review in the UK. It requires UK banks to separate their deposit and lending functions 
from their investment banking functions. The final Vickers report was published in September 2011 and 
its ring-fencing recommendation has been introduced in law through the 2013 Financial Services 
(Banking Reform) Act. This will become effective from 1 January 2019. For details, see ICB (2011) and 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/33/contents/enacted.   
89 The Volcker Rule was initially proposed to take effect in 2012. The Rule however was only approved 
in 2013, went into effect in April 2014 with compliance required by July 2015 until the Federal Reserve 
extended the compliance deadline to July 2017 for some parts, only to receive a further five-year 
extension application by major banks, extending the potential compliance period to 2022 (BBC News, 
2014; Reuters, 2016). 
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resistant to reforms and thus a move towards complete separation and particularly 
narrow banking is unrealistic. 
Are the proposed reforms likely to happen in Islamic banking? The simple answer is, 
No. Structural changes of this significance require not only strong political will but also 
cooperation from the industry, neither of which are likely. For Muslim governments, 
supporting Islamic banking has been a low-risk, low-cost, publically popular policy to 
pacify the resurgence of religious sentiment in their societies. Any attempt to halt the 
industry’s progress is likely to be politically unpopular. The Islamic banking industry, 
similar to its conventional counterpart, is also highly resistant to reforms as the case for 
greater SSB regulation discussed earlier shows. The industry has from the outset given 
preference to secular goals over religious values. Therefore, support for such major 
changes, which can possibly cause reputational damage by exposing to the masses the 
industry’s lack of religious legitimacy, is highly improbable. The industry has also 
made significant efforts in recent years to converge with conventional finance and 
integrate in global markets and therefore is likely to follow the regulatory precedents 
set. There are also huge costs involved in the proposed reforms. Amongst others, one of 
the most obvious in a narrow banking system is the loss of current account deposits as a 
source of cheap funding. Current accounts in Islamic banks earn no return and therefore 
all profits earned from their use currently accrue to Islamic banks. Losing this privilege 
under a narrow banking system is hardly appealing. Finally, given the interconnected 
nature of financial markets, Muslim countries are unlikely to follow narrow banking 
principles in a global fractional reserve banking system. Therefore, while the proposal 
to fully separate investment and commercial banking operations is rather idealistic and 
unlikely to happen anytime soon, the adoption of narrow banking principles is out of 
the question.  
Compliance with the sharia principle of safekeeping for deposits is unachievable in the 
current banking environment, therefore the only tenable option for Islamic banks to 
improve religious adherence is to focus on the PLS principle. By following the ring-
fencing regime and setting up a pure-PLS window within the existing Islamic bank’s 
structure, PLS financing can be made a viable option. Through this, the two-tier 
mudarabah model can materialise without the issue of mismatched risk and maturity 
profiles currently faced under the commercial bank’s asset/liability structure. To be 
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strengthened, this policy proposal requires empirical support and therefore further 
investigation into PLS financing behaviour of current Islamic banks needs to be 
undertaken. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Contemporary Islamic banking emerged as the outcome of post-colonial socio-political 
and economic developments which took place in Muslims countries during the mid-
twentieth century. After the initial conceptual struggles, the two tier-mudarabah 
structure, which propagated intermediation on PLS basis, emerged as the theoretical 
model for Islamic banking. Pan-Islamism and the 1970s oil boom provided the political 
and financial impetus transforming Islamic banking from a conceptual idea to reality.  
Development of the industry however took a path considerably different from that 
envisioned by Islamic economists. As soon as the first Islamic banks were established, 
modifications were made to the theoretical model and non-PLS instruments were 
introduced. The development and sharia certification of murabahah was a defining 
moment for the industry. It not only allowed Islamic banks to compete with 
conventional counterparts by mimicking the interest-bearing loan contract, but also 
started the culture of developing Islamic banking products on the basis of compliance 
with the letter rather than the spirit of sharia law. The instant popularity of murabahah 
led to development of other non-PLS financial instruments which have ever since 
dominated the industry. 
Non-PLS instruments are however severely criticised as legal ruses i.e. structuring 
strategies which are designed specifically to circumvent rather than comply, in any 
meaningful way, with the sharia injunctions. In addition to murabahah, the highly 
popular but equally controversial Islamic banking instruments including ijarah, 
commodity murabahah, tawarruq and sukuk have all been analysed and shown to be no 
more than de facto interest-bearing instruments, which rely on differences in contractual 
forms and Arabic labels to establish an Islamic identity (Kuran, 1995, 2004; Zaman and 
Movassaghi, 2002; El-Gamal, 2006; Zaman, 2008; El-Diwany, 2010; Khan, 2010; 
Khan, 2010a). Despite the criticism, the form-over-substance approach to defining and 
designing sharia-compliant products has become the accepted norm of the industry (El-
Gamal, 2006; Iqbal and Lewis, 2009).   
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Why did the industry take such a developmental path? As this chapter explained, the 
divergence between PLS-oriented theory and non-PLS-oriented practices of Islamic 
banking has both practical and more fundamental roots. From a practical perspective, 
the lack of PLS financing is understandably a rational response to the higher transaction 
costs associated with this mode of financing relative to the non-PLS (debt) alternative. 
Furthermore, the institutional environment in which Islamic banks emerged and 
continue to operate, was from the outset, designed for conventional commercial 
banking and thus is geared towards supporting debt over PLS (equity) financing. As 
discussed earlier, PLS financing requires the existence of supportive institutions which 
reduce transactions costs associated with adverse selection, contract creation, 
monitoring and enforcement of PLS arrangements. In the absence of such a supportive 
institutional framework, by adopting PLS financing, Islamic banks stand to incur 
additional expenses and therefore naturally prefer the non-PLS alternative.  
At a more fundamental level, however, the divergence between theory and practice of 
Islamic banking was inevitable, quite simply because the two-tier mudarabah is not a 
model of commercial banking. Contrary to the debt-assets/debt-liabilities structure of a 
commercial bank, the two-tier mudarabah propagates PLS-assets/PLS-liabilities. It 
therefore depicts the structure of venture capital, private equity and mutual funds; 
institutions which exist alongside, but not in competition with commercial banks.  
Even more crucial is the inherent inconsistency between the principles of commercial 
banking and those of Islamic finance. As shown in this chapter, the foundation on 
which commercial banking operates, fractional reserve and intermediation by 
converting risk-free deposits into credit, are the polar opposites of the principles 
underpinning Islamic finance, which requires 100% reserve for risk-free deposits and 
intermediation on PLS basis. Thus, no Islamic bank operating on a commercial banking 
basis can simultaneously comply fully with the sharia. Indeed as argued above, sharia 
principles, specifically risk-sharing and safekeeping, call for the separation between 
investment (intermediation) and commercial (transactional) banking operations. 
Historical evidence supports this view, as financial institutions which developed in 
medieval Islamic societies operated with a clear disconnection between the deposit and 
credit function. Even the famous precursors to Islamic banking which were known to 
have embodied the spirit of sharia were non-banking financial institutions. Mit Ghamr 
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operated as a mutual credit union and Tabung Haji as an investment and savings 
vehicle, neither operated as commercial banks. Nevertheless, the case for separation, 
although can be proven on principle-basis, is unlikely to materialise. Adoption of 
narrow banking principles is highly unrealistic to even be considered any time soon and 
given the precedent set by the conventional banking industry, a full separation of 
investment and commercial banking operations is also rather unlikely.  
As suggested earlier, the only policy proposal which can be realistically offered to the 
industry is the establishment of pure-PLS windows within the existing Islamic banks’ 
structure. Using the ring-fencing regime, this window operation can be legally and 
financially separate from the rest of the bank’s operations. As the two-tier mudarabah 
model materialises in this shape, without the issue of mismatched risk and maturity 
profiles currently faced under the commercial bank’s asset/liability structure, the 
provision of PLS financing can increase, bringing Islamic banking activities somewhat 
closer to the sharia principles. Future research should therefore consider investigating 
whether this proposal is empirically supported. 
Finally, this chapter’s conclusion, that no present-day Islamic commercial bank can be 
fully compliant with the sharia, leads to an interesting question. If no Islamic bank can 
be fully Islamic, can some be considered more Islamic than others? As mentioned 
above, by operating as commercial banks, all Islamic banks work on a fractional reserve 
basis and therefore fail to comply with the 100% deposit (safekeeping) principle. The 
case of the PLS principle however is different. Although low, PLS is not completely 
absent in the Islamic banking industry. Differences in PLS levels may therefore enable 
differentiation between banks which are operating closer to the sharia principles, than 
those relying solely or predominantly on non-PLS alternatives. If such a difference 
exists within the industry, it will invalidate a key assumption made in the current 
literature. Due to the overwhelming dominance of non-PLS instruments, critics have 
dismissed the entire Islamic banking industry as nothing more than a branding exercise, 
an industry that is simply “indistinguishable” from its conventional counterpart (Kuran, 
2004; El-Gamal, 2006; Khan, 2010, p.817). Such a conclusion however implicitly 
assumes that the Islamic banking industry comprises a homogenous group of banks, all 
with negligibly low levels of PLS, making them equally un-Islamic. This may not hold 
true. The next chapter investigates this interesting prospect. 
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Chapter 4 
Distinguishing between the Indistinguishable: 
Are All Islamic Banks Equally Islamic?  
4.1 Introduction 
Profit-and-Loss-Sharing (PLS) is the raison d’être of Islamic banking (Chapra, 2007). 
The lack of PLS financing has therefore understandably raised serious cause for 
concern and criticism of the industry. Due to the overwhelming dominance of non-PLS 
instruments, critics have dismissed the entire Islamic banking industry as nothing more 
than a branding exercise, an industry that is simply “indistinguishable” from its 
conventional counterpart (see e.g. Kuran, 1993, 2004; El-Gamal, 2006; Khan, 2010). 
Such a conclusion however implicitly assumes that all Islamic banks have negligible 
levels of PLS and thus are equally un-Islamic. The extent of variation in PLS levels 
across different Islamic banks and the potential reasons for such differences however 
have not been investigated in the literature thus far. Are some Islamic banks operating 
closer to the PLS principle than others? If so, what factors enable some banks to 
undertake greater levels of PLS financing despite the higher transaction costs involved? 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer these questions.  
To achieve this aim, this chapter uses two measures of PLS to assess and compare PLS 
levels between Islamic banks, conventional banks with and without Islamic windows. 
The first one measures the percentage of PLS financing in a bank’s financing portfolio 
and thus focuses on the types of financing contracts (PLS or debt) employed by banks. 
The second measure examines the percentage of PLS assets in banks’ total financing 
and investment portfolio and thus examines the types of major earning assets (i.e. PLS 
or debt) that banks predominantly employ. Although the use of two PLS measures has 
eluded prior literature, as this chapter will explain, this approach provides a holistic 
comparison of Islamic and conventional banks. The first measure allows one to 
investigate if Islamic banks provide a genuine PLS alternative to the interest-bearing 
loan and thus evaluate if the criticism that Islamic banks are indistinguishable from 
their conventional counterparts validly applies to all Islamic banks. The second measure 
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takes into account a banks’ involvement in both PLS financing and investment assets 
and therefore offers an all-encompassing approach to investigating if some banks are 
operating closer to the PLS principle than others.  
By using these two measures, this chapter examines if Islamic banking industry does 
indeed comprise a homogeneous group of banks that are indistinguishable from their 
conventional counterparts. First a cross-sectional comparison is undertaken between 
banks, using PLS levels for the latest year in the sample (2012). Cluster analysis is then 
applied to the pooled PLS dataset, covering the 2009-2012 period to validate results 
from the cross-sectional analysis. Finally, the random effects estimator, using Mundlak 
(1978)’s approach is used to investigate factors explaining why some banks undertake 
greater levels of PLS financing than others. 
Previous studies on Islamic banking have considered several reasons for the lack of 
PLS financing by Islamic banks. Informational asymmetry problems are most often 
cited as the key reasons (Dar et al., 1999; Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Kuran, 1995, 
2004; El-Gamal, 2007; Visser, 2009; Khan, 2010). In the presence of informational 
asymmetry and costly state verification, debt is superior to equity financing (Townsend,       
1979; Williamson, 1987);  with preference for the former increasing as agency 
problems become more severe (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). Opportunistic behaviour 
i.e. “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1985) and bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1957,  1972) however, are innate characteristics of human nature 
that affect all complex financial transactions especially those conducted over time. If 
considerable variation in PLS financing levels does exist across banks, what factors can 
explain it? This question is examined in the final part of this chapter. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents an in-depth 
analysis of a generalised Islamic bank’s balance sheet which demonstrates the single 
asset type that differentiates Islamic banks from their conventional counterparts in 
practice. Section 4.3 presents the data and method, discussing the two PLS measures 
used in this study followed by results of cross-sectional comparison between Islamic 
and conventional banks’ PLS levels presented in section 4.4. This section concludes by 
identifying a typology of Islamic banks, suggesting that three distinct groups of Islamic 
banks exist. Section 4.5 expands this analysis by applying cluster analysis to pooled 
PLS data for 2009-2012 period to validate the typology identified in section 4.4 and 
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investigate if group membership is stable over time. Section 4.6 then examines the 
potential determinants of PLS financing and finally section 4.7concludes the chapter, 
with a discussion of its limitations and implications for further research. 
4.2 What Distinguishes Islamic from Conventional Banks in 
Practice? A Balance Sheet Analysis  
4.2.1 Assets  
Line 1: Cash and Balances with Central Banks: This includes statutory reserves, current 
accounts and deposits placed on commodity murabahah and/or tawarruq basis. Funds 
placed as statutory reserves and in current accounts earn no return and form only a 
small part of this asset category. Deposits placed on commodity murabahah or tawarruq 
earn a return. Commodity murabahah involves short-term notional commodity 
exchanges which replicate the returns on short-term treasury bills. Tawarruq involves a 
multiple party spot-purchase and credit-then-spot-sale arrangement which is designed to 
meet short-term cash financing needs and therefore is used for liquidity management. In 
both cases, fictitious sales conceal interest-bearing transactions (Obaidullah, 2005; El 
Gamal, 2006; Shanmugam and Zahari, 2009; Khan, 2010a; Rehman, 2010).  
Line 2: Due from Banks & Financial Institutions: This includes short-term deposits 
placed with other banks and/or financial institutions that are invested on commodity 
murabahah and/or tawarruq basis. These replicate interest-bearing conventional 
counterparts (ibid). Some banks also hold current accounts in other banks. Funds placed 
in current accounts earn no return and form only a small part of this asset category. 
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Figure 4.1: Generalised Balance Sheet of Islamic and Conventional Banks 
 
  
Conventional Bank 
Assets
1
Cash and Balances with Central Banks                    
(Deposits on commodity murabahah and/or tawarruq 
basis)
Cash and Balances with Central Banks
2
Due from Banks & Financial Institutions                  
(Deposits on commodity murabahah and/or tawarruq 
basis)
Due from Banks & Financial Institutions
 3 Islamic Financing: (includes)
- Non-PLS (Debt) Financing 
(Murabahah, ijarah etc.)
PLS Financing
(Musharakah & Mudarabah)
 4 Investments in: Investments in:
4a -   Debt Securities (including sukuk) -   Debt Securities 
4b -   Equity Securities -   Equity Securities 
4c -   Associates and Joint Ventures -   Associates and Joint Ventures
4d -   Properties -   Properties
5 Property and Equipment Property and Equipment
6 Other assets Other assets
  Liabilities and Equity
7
Due to Banks & Financial Institutions                          
(Deposits on commodity murabahah and/or tawarruq 
basis)
Due to Banks & Financial Institutions
8 Customer Deposits: (includes)
8a - Current Accounts                                                                   
(On qard hasan or wadiah-wad-dhamanah basis)
8b -  Investment Accounts 
 9 Borrowings (sukuk financing) Borrowings 
10 Other liabilities Other liabilities
Equity: (includes) Equity: (includes)
- Share capital - Share capital
- Reserves - Reserves
- Retained Earnings - Retained Earnings
  Liabilities and Equity
Customer Deposits
11
Islamic Bank
Assets
Loans and advances3a
3b
Colour Key:
Controversial Islamic banking assets and liabilities : fail to comply with PLS, ownership risk or full reserve requirement. 
Ideal Islamic financing and investment assets: comply with PLS or ownership risk requirement.
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Line 3: Islamic Financing: This includes the non-PLS (debt) and PLS (equity) financing 
contracts. These are defined below. 
Line 3a: Non-PLS (Debt) Financing: The primary non-PLS financing modes used by 
Islamic banks are murabahah and ijarah. Murabahah is a cost-plus-credit-sale contract 
where an asset is sold at a cost-plus-mark-up price with deferred payment, usually 
scheduled as regular instalments, made over a specified period of time. Ijarah is a lease 
contract where Islamic banks purchase and lease assets to receive a regular rental 
income for a specified term, at the end of which the asset’s legal title transfers to the 
lessee. Other less frequently used contracts include salam (prepayment sale) and istisna 
(sale order for manufactured asset). Extremely similar to murabahah, but less 
commonly used arrangements also include musawamah (sale with no mark-up 
disclosed), and bai-al-muajjal (credit sale). Although structured as sale/lease contracts, 
these financing modes replicate the conventional interest-bearing loan (Kuran, 1995, 
2004; Zaman and Movassaghi, 2002; El-Gamal 2006; Zaman 2008; El-Diwany, 2010; 
Khan 2010).  
Line 3b: PLS financing: This comprises of musharakah (equity partnership) and 
mudarabah (silent partnership) contracts. These are considered the “ideal instruments of 
Islamic financing” as they are based on PLS terms and thus meet not only the letter but 
also the spirit of sharia (Usmani, 2004, p.12). Under these contracts, Islamic banks 
finance an enterprise or a particular project as an equity partner. Profits arising from 
these arrangements are shared according to a predetermined ratio whilst losses under 
musharakah are shared according to the capital contribution ratio and under mudarabah 
fall solely on the capital provider (i.e. Islamic bank) unless caused by the financed 
firm’s negligence (Warde, 2000; Usmani, 2004; Ayub, 2007; Shanmugam and Zahari, 
2009; Visser, 2009; El-Diwany, 2010). A counterpart of this does not exist in 
conventional commercial banks90. 
Line 4: Investments: These include debt and equity investments as detailed below. The 
investment portfolio of Islamic and conventional banks comprises of similar assets and 
is materially indistinguishable. 
90 An equivalent can be identified in conventional universal banks which also hold an equity stake in 
firms they finance. The exact nature of their contractual terms however differs from Islamic PLS 
financing contracts e.g. a counterpart to the mudarabah arrangement, where losses fall solely on the bank 
(capital provider), does not exist even in universal banks (Warde, 2000; Iqbal and Lewis, 2009). 
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Line 4a: Debt securities: This comprises of sukuk (Islamic bonds) and other fixed-
return debt securities which are not explicitly declared as sharia-compliant. The latter 
are essentially interest-bearing conventional debt securities that Islamic banks hold to 
achieve a diversified investment portfolio. Sukuk, designed as asset-backed securities, 
are structurally different but in substance the same as conventional interest-bearing 
bonds. These have a similar risk/return characteristic as their conventional counterparts, 
to the extent that even the rate of return on sukuk is benchmarked to the interest rate 
paid on conventional bonds with similar credit ratings (Iqbal and Tsubota, 2006; El-
Gamal, 2006; Ayub, 2007; Zaman, 2008; El-Diwany, 2010; Khan, 2010). The debt 
securities portfolio of Islamic and conventional banks is materially the same, especially 
as many conventional banks in the GCC also hold sukuk issued by governments.  
Line 4b, c, and d: Investments in: equity securities, associates, joint ventures and 
properties: The first three financial assets listed in this category operate on a PLS basis, 
as the bank shares the risk of the businesses invested in and faces the possibility of 
making a real profit or loss. The final one, properties, refers to investments in real estate 
which forms a relatively small part of this asset category. Banks invest in properties for 
capital gain purposes. These investment properties are therefore held for a considerable 
amount of time exposing banks to the risks associated with ownership, including the 
risk of property prices appreciating and depreciating. Recall from chapter 3, when 
banks bear the ownership risk of the tradeable asset, the return earned through its trade 
is valid under the sharia (Usmani, 2004). This part of the banks’ overall investment 
portfolio is therefore in line with the sharia principles as the first three assets operate on 
a PLS basis and the final one meets the ownership risk requirement. Conventional 
banks also hold these types of investment assets, as figure 4.1 highlights.  
Line 5: Property and Equipment: These are the premises and equipment used by banks 
to provide banking services to their customers. These are not a distinguishing feature of 
Islamic banks.   
Line 6: Other assets: These include miscellaneous assets which differ by bank. These 
are not a distinguishing feature of Islamic banks.  
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4.2.2 Liabilities and Equity  
In addition to equity capital, the liability side of an Islamic bank’s balance sheet is 
materially indistinguishable from that of a conventional commercial bank. 
Line 7: Due to Banks & Financial Institutions: These short-term deposits, placed by 
other banks and/or financial institutions, are invested on commodity murabahah and/or 
tawarruq basis, and replicate their interest-bearing conventional counterparts. Some 
banks also place funds in current accounts, which earn no return and form only a small 
part of this liability category. These are analogous to the deposits discussed in line 2.  
Line 8: Customer Deposits: This includes current accounts and investment accounts. 
Details are provided below. 
Line 8a: Current accounts: Qard hasan (interest-free-loan) or wadiah-wad-dhamanah 
(safekeeping with guarantee) contracts are used to provide current account services 
which operate as in conventional banks, on a fractional reserve basis with no return paid 
to the depositors and are under an explicit deposit guarantee (Visser, 2009).  
Line 8b: Investment accounts: These deposits earn a return, which theoretically is on a 
PLS basis. In practice, the PLS principle is never strictly followed. There is an implicit 
deposit guarantee as the capital sum in these accounts is never written down even when 
the banks make a loss (Warde, 2000; Zaher and Hassan, 2001; El-Hawary et al., 2007; 
Visser, 2009; Khan 2010). Banks also use discretionary reserves such as Profit 
Equalisation Reserves (PER) and/or Investment Risk Reserve (IRR) to generate a 
smooth and stable return for the investment account holders (IAH). The expected rate of 
return on these deposits is therefore implicitly guaranteed and delinked from the banks’ 
actual profits (Zaher and Hassan, 2001; Farook et al., 2012). Moreover, the return paid 
mimics the interest rate paid on conventional banks’ deposits. With no real PLS 
arrangement, investment accounts are similar to the interest-receiving saving accounts 
offered by conventional banks91 (Kuran 1995; Chong and Liu, 2009). 
91 Two types of investment accounts exist in Islamic banks: restricted investment accounts where 
depositors can place restrictions on the range of assets the bank can invest their funds in (these may be 
tied to specific projects), and unrestricted investment accounts where the bank manages funds with full 
discretion. Accounting treatments differ with regards to reporting of investment accounts, with some 
banks reporting restricted investment accounts as off-balance-sheet activity. The rationale behind this 
treatment is that the bank does not own these funds; it acts as the depositors’ agent in managing the funds 
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Line 9: Borrowings: Some banks raise funds through issuing sukuk, which as discussed 
earlier on the asset side (line 4a), replicate conventional interest-bearing bonds.  
Line 10: Other liabilities: These include miscellaneous liabilities which differ by bank. 
These are not a distinguishing feature of Islamic banks. 
 Line 11: Equity: This comprises of share capital, reserves and retained earnings of the 
bank. Equity capital comprises of similar components in both Islamic and conventional 
banks, albeit in different proportions. These are not a distinguishing feature of Islamic 
banks. 
4.3.3 The Distinguishing ‘Islamic’ Feature 
Three important points emerge from the balance sheet analysis above. First, note that in 
practice, PLS exists only on the asset side of an Islamic bank’s balance sheet. With no 
genuine PLS-based deposits, the liability side of an Islamic bank’s balance sheet is 
materially indistinguishable from that of its conventional counterpart. Second, PLS 
assets exist in both the financing and investment portfolio of an Islamic bank. Thus, 
PLS arrangements are not limited to musharakah and mudarabah contracts; rather they 
also exist in several investment assets, which as highlighted in figure 4.1 are also 
present in conventional banks. Finally, given the above points, it is clear that PLS 
financing is the only asset type which meaningfully distinguishes the balance sheet 
structure of an Islamic bank from its conventional counterpart. In practical terms then, 
PLS financing signifies the unique ‘Islamic’ attribute of a bank.  
Following from this analysis, the next section will describe the data and how the 
measures of PLS used in this study are defined. 
in predetermined investment activities where the losses are accrued solely to the investment account 
holders. However, banks reporting in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) treat investment accounts as deposits and report these under liabilities (Schoon, 2010).While it 
cannot be confirmed due to insufficient details in banks’ annual report if off-balance-sheet investment 
account operate on actual PLS basis, differences in accounting treatments do confirm that on-balance-
sheet investment accounts operate on a fixed return basis.  
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4.3 Method: Measuring Profit-and-Loss-Sharing (PLS) 
4.3.1 Data 
The sample studied here comprises of 61 banks from the Gulf Co-operation Council 
(GCC). It includes 23 full-fledged Islamic and 38 conventional banks, of which 18 own 
Islamic windows92. To begin the sample selection process, the complete list of all 
institutions licensed to operate as a bank was collected from each of the six GCC 
country’s central bank website93 at the start of January 2014. Any investment-only or 
special-purpose banks were then excluded. The sample therefore is limited to 
commercial banks.  
Data is collected from consolidated annual reports which include the parent bank and 
all its subsidiaries. All Islamic windows are therefore treated as part of the parent 
conventional bank rather than as separate Islamic banks94. This confines the Islamic 
bank category to full-fledged Islamic banks only. Banks which are owned by a non-
banking parent/holding company have been included in the sample and are analysed at 
the bank (not the holding company) level, as these are expected to have greater control 
over their banking activity and strategic decision making compared to an existing 
bank’s subsidiary. The final sample also does not include any foreign banks. This is 
primarily because of data limitations as separate financial statements reporting on these 
banks’ GCC operations are not available. Most foreign banks produce consolidated 
financial reports (i.e. at the parent bank level) which do not explicitly provide enough 
information to permit the calculation of PLS levels as required for this work95.  
92 Of the 38 conventional banks in the sample, 24 have Islamic windows. However, as data on PLS 
financing (musharakah and mudarabah) is not explicitly available in the annual reports of 6 banks, these 
have been included in the conventional bank category as their Islamic windows could not be included in 
the sample analysed.  
93 Starting from the Central Bank’s list ensures that all banks operating in the GCC are considered for 
inclusion in the study and that the final sample is representative of the bank population in each country. 
94 Treating Islamic windows as separate Islamic banks is not always possible especially as some Islamic 
window operations can simply be a branch rather than a stand-alone subsidiary. Given this, it is 
reasonable to assume that the decision-making authority regarding policies on sharia compliance 
including the provision of PLS financing is likely to be determined at the bank’s parent level rather than 
the window level, which further justifies limiting the Islamic bank category to full-fledged Islamic banks. 
95 Exclusion of foreign banks has led to a substantial reduction in the number of analysable banks. 
However, without sufficient data on the Islamic banking operations (in particular, the share of PLS 
financing) financial ratios required for this study could not be calculated. 
109 
 
                                                 
` 
Finally, data is collected for the four-year period following the financial crisis, namely 
2009 – 201296. A breakdown of the sample banks per country and type is provided in 
Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Number of Banks per Country and Type 
 
General descriptive statistics for the sample banks and results of the univariate 
comparisons between Islamic and conventional banks are provided in Table 4.2. As 
indicated by the total assets value, which is commonly taken as a proxy for bank size, 
conventional banks, on average, are twice as large as Islamic banks with a mean total 
asset value of $23.09 billion compared to $11.72 billion for Islamic banks. This 
difference in size is highly statistically significant as the p-value for the two-sided t-test 
reported at the bottom of the table illustrates. Further breakdown of conventional banks 
illustrates that this result is driven by the difference in size between Islamic banks and 
conventional banks with Islamic windows, as the latter have a mean total assets value 
which is almost three times as large as Islamic banks. Conventional banks without 
Islamic windows however are, on average, similar size to Islamic counterparts. The 
largest bank in the entire sample is also from the conventional banks with Islamic 
windows category, as the maximum value shows. Together, this suggests that the larger 
conventional banks tend to offer Islamic banking services through window operations.   
For all categories of banks, i.e. Islamic, conventional with and without Islamic 
windows, the mean total assets value is higher than the median indicating that the 
96 2012 was the latest year available at the time of data collection 
Country
Islamic Conventional Total With Islamic 
Windows
Without Islamic 
Windows
Bahrain 5 5 10 2 3
Kuwait 4 5 9 0 5
Oman 0 6 6 0 6
Qatar 4 2 6 2 0
Saudi Arabia 4 7 11 6 1
UAE 6 13 19 8 5
Total 23 38 61 18a 20
a In total there are 24 conventional banks with Islamic windows however, as data on PLS financing (musharakah and 
mudarabah) is not explicitly available in the annual reports for 6 banks, those Islamic windows could not be included in 
the sample analysed
Breakdown of Conventional BanksNumber of Banks
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distribution is skewed to the right. This is due to the size of the largest banks in the 
sample which are almost 3-15 times larger than the median banks in their respective 
category. The variation in bank size is notable as the total assets value for the full 
sample ranges from less than $0.5 billion to over $95 billion. Variation in size is 
nevertheless smaller in the Islamic banking industry which has a standard deviation of 
14 compared to 22.85 in the conventional banking industry.  
Further details provided by the financing and investment ratios show that on average 
almost 60% of banks’ total assets are in the financing (i.e. loans) portfolio with a further 
15% in the investments portfolio. Interestingly, the average investment ratios are 
identical in Islamic and conventional banks, and while there is some variation between 
conventional banks with and without Islamic windows, this difference is not statistically 
significant. In contrast, there is a highly significant difference in the average financing 
ratio for Islamic and conventional banks, both with and without Islamic windows, as the 
average financing ratio in Islamic banks is lower, 55.7% compared to 61.7% in 
conventional banks. This finding is consistent with prior literature, see e.g. Beck et al. 
(2013), which finds that Islamic banks on average tend to be less involved in the 
traditional banking activities which are highly reliant on intermediation through 
interest-generating loans97 and instead tend to have a higher share of fee-income than 
their conventional counterparts.  
Similar to the financing ratio, standard deviation for the financing-to-deposit ratio is 
greater amongst Islamic banks (21.2%) compared to conventional banks (16.3%), 
revealing that there is greater variability in the Islamic banking industry relative to its 
conventional counterpart. The financing-to-deposit ratio is also lower in Islamic banks, 
with an average of 88.3% compared to 92.8% in conventional banks, although this 
difference is only marginally significant at the 10% level of significance and is 
insignificant when Islamic and conventional banks without Islamic windows are 
compared. Nevertheless, this comparison does indicate that the average Islamic bank 
intermediates less of the deposits it receives than its conventional counterpart.  
97 For Islamic banks this includes sharia-compliant alternatives i.e. the non-PLS financing modes 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test of Difference between Islamic and 
Conventional Banks 
 
Mean Median Min Max St. Dev
Total Assets ($ billion)
All Banks 18.89 10.29 0.43 96.96 20.75
Islamic Banks 11.72 6.68 0.43 68.60 14.00
Conventional Banks 23.09 14.53 1.39 96.96 22.85
with Islamic Windows 34.93 29.77 1.93 96.96 21.84
without Islamic Windows 12.71 5.82 1.39 88.57 18.28
Financing Ratioa
All Banks 0.595 0.619 0.064 0.827 0.128
Islamic Banks 0.557 0.589 0.064 0.827 0.142
Conventional Banks 0.617 0.650 0.206 0.791 0.114
with Islamic Windows 0.616 0.625 0.422 0.771 0.084
without Islamic Windows 0.618 0.668 0.206 0.791 0.136
Investments Ratio
All Banks 0.153 0.145 0.017 0.431 0.091
Islamic Banks 0.153 0.145 0.017 0.307 0.079
Conventional Banks 0.153 0.145 0.023 0.431 0.096
with Islamic Windows 0.166 0.163 0.049 0.378 0.076
without Islamic Windows 0.142 0.097 0.023 0.431 0.110
Financing-to-Deposits Ratioa
All Banks 0.912 0.918 0.387 1.875 0.182
Islamic Banks 0.883 0.873 0.387 1.875 0.212
Conventional Banks 0.928 0.957 0.405 1.402 0.163
with Islamic Windows 0.932 0.926 0.572 1.402 0.144
without Islamic Windows 0.924 0.983 0.405 1.251 0.179
Deposit Ratio
All Banks 0.659 0.697 0.018 0.833 0.144
Islamic Banks 0.630 0.678 0.018 0.833 0.189
Conventional Banks 0.674 0.699 0.199 0.818 0.110
with Islamic Windows 0.668 0.694 0.382 0.793 0.088
without Islamic Windows 0.680 0.702 0.199 0.818 0.126
Capital Ratio
All Banks 0.163 0.143 0.076 0.902 0.092
Islamic Banks 0.203 0.159 0.076 0.902 0.138
Conventional Banks 0.140 0.137 0.081 0.238 0.031
with Islamic Windows 0.141 0.137 0.095 0.238 0.029
without Islamic Windows 0.140 0.136 0.081 0.227 0.034
cont.
Balance Sheet Structure: Selected Indicators
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Test of Difference between Islamic and 
Conventional Banks 
 
Looking now at the liability side of the balance sheet, as the deposit ratio indicates, 
customer deposits are the main source of funding for both Islamic and conventional 
banks, although the latter rely on this funding source to a greater extent than Islamic 
banks (67.4% versus 63% respectively). Breakdown of conventional banks further 
shows that conventional banks without Islamic windows have a slightly higher reliance 
on this funding source on average than conventional banks with Islamic windows, 
although the difference between the two is not statistically significant. The difference in 
the average deposit ratio between Islamic and conventional banks is also only 
significant at the 10% level of significance. In contrast, the difference in the capital 
ratios between Islamic and conventional banks, both with and without Islamic windows, 
is highly statistically significant. Islamic banks have a higher capital ratio, averaging 
20.3% compared to conventional banks with an average of 14%. This finding is 
consistent with prior studies which find that Islamic banks tend to be better capitalised 
than their conventional counterparts and that this has been an important factor in 
Islamic banks’ resilience during the financial crisis period (see e.g. Hasan and Dridi, 
2010; Beck et al., 2013).  
Overall, the comparison between Islamic and conventional banks’ balance sheet 
structures suggests that Islamic banks tend to be smaller than conventional banks, have 
Difference in Means (p-values) IB v ACB IB v CBIW IB v CB CB v CBIW
Total Assets 0.000 0.000 0.694 0.000
Financing Ratioa 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.903
Investments Ratio 0.992 0.300 0.461 0.113
Financing-to-Deposits Ratioa 0.096 0.088 0.182 0.742
Deposit Ratio 0.052 0.102 0.049 0.520
Capital Ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.768
aThese are commonly referred to as 'loans ratio' and 'loan-to-deposit ratio' in conventional banking literature. In keeping with 
Islamic banking literature and industry analyst reports (e.g. the IFSB IFSI Stability report), the terms 'financing ratio' and 
'financing-to-deposit ratio' are used here.
Univariate Test of Difference in Balance Sheet Characteristics between Islamic and Conventional Banks
Total Assets are in US $ billion, deflated using 2010 as the base year. Financing Ratio is calculated as Total Financing / Total 
Assets. Investments Ratio is calculated as Total Investments / Total Assets. Financing-to-Deposits Ratio is calculated as Total 
Financing / Total Customer Deposits. Deposit Ratio is calculated as Total Customer Deposits / Total Assets. Capital Ratio is 
calculated as Total Equity Capital / Total Assets. Values stated in the rows entitled 'Conventional Banks' are descriptive 
statistics for all conventional banks in the sample which include banks with and without Islamic windows. Further sub-sample 
breakdown, differentiating between banks with and without Islamic windows are presented in rows below. The acronyms IB 
refers to Islamic banks; ACB refers to all conventional banks; CBIW refers to conventional banks with Islamic windows and 
CB refers to conventional banks without Islamic windows. T-test for equality of means is calculated assuming unequal sample 
variances, two-sided p values are reported.
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lower financing, deposit and financing-to-deposit ratios and therefore are less involved 
in the traditional banking intermediation activities, which relies on generating income 
through loans and funding via customer deposits. They do however, on average, hold 
almost identical proportion of their total assets in the form of investments. Finally, there 
is a significant difference in the capital ratios between the two industries as Islamic 
banks tend to be better capitalised than their conventional counterparts. The next 
subsection will now discuss the PLS measures that will be used in this chapter to 
evaluate and compare Islamic and conventional banks. 
4.3.2 Why Use Two Measures of Profit-and-Loss-Sharing (PLS)? 
Profit-and-Loss-Sharing (PLS) has been long recognised as the core principle of Islamic 
banking. Banks offering more PLS contracts are “considered more ‘Islamic’” than those 
relying on non-PLS (debt-based) alternatives (Azmat et al., 2015, p.269). Yet to the best 
of my knowledge, no study has focused on comparing PLS levels between individual 
banks thus far to identify if some are operating closer to the PLS principle than others 
and whether the criticism that Islamic banks are indistinguishable from conventional 
counterparts is validly applicable to all Islamic banks. To overcome this gap, PLS levels 
between banks need to be compared. To achieve this, a measure of PLS is required.  
As the prior Islamic banking literature illustrates, two alternative approaches can be 
used to measure the extent to which a bank operates on the principle of PLS. These 
approaches differ on the basis of how one defines what constitutes a PLS asset98. 
According to the first approach, PLS assets comprise only the contracts of musharakah 
and mudarabah which, as noted in chapter 3, have a long history in Islamic legal text 
going back to the time of early Islamic societies and have traditionally been the focal 
point of theoretical literature on Islamic banking. In evaluating the extent to which a 
bank operates on the PLS principle, studies following this approach focus solely on the 
financing contracts offered by an Islamic bank and measure what percentage of a 
banks’ financing portfolio comprises of these PLS financing contracts. The PLS level of 
a bank is therefore measured as: the ratio of musharakah and mudarabah to total 
financing (see e.g. Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Chong and Liu, 2009). Prior Islamic 
98 As the balance sheet analysis above illustrated, there are no genuine PLS-based arrangements on the 
liability side of Islamic banks’ balance sheet. Prior literature has therefore focused solely on the asset side 
of the balance sheet in evaluating how far Islamic banks adopt the PLS principle. 
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banking literature has almost exclusively adopted this approach in measuring banks’ 
PLS levels. A notable exception is Khan (2010), which has adopted a second alternative 
approach to measuring banks’ PLS levels by defining the category of PLS assets more 
broadly. In its definition of PLS assets, Khan (2010) includes not only the traditional 
PLS financing contracts of musharakah and mudarabah but also other ‘equity-based’ 
investment assets  e.g. equity securities and investment in associates which, although do 
not have a direct reference in historical Islamic legal text but do nevertheless, operate 
on a risk and reward sharing basis. Khan (2010) therefore follows a broader remit in 
evaluating the extent to which an Islamic bank follows the PLS principle as he 
examines both the financing and investment portfolios of a bank to measure what 
percentage of these combined portfolios comprise of PLS assets. The PLS level of a 
bank is thus measured as: the ratio of musharakah, mudarabah and other equity-based 
investments to total financing and investment assets99 (see Khan, 2010). 
While the literature presents two possible approaches to measuring PLS, both have their 
strengths offering useful but notably different insights. By focusing solely on the 
financing portfolio, the first approach allows one to examine whether Islamic banks 
provide a genuine PLS alternative to the interest-bearing loan. More importantly, for the 
purpose of this study, using this approach to measure and compare PLS levels between 
banks allows one to evaluate if the criticism stated in the current literature, that the 
Islamic banking industry is simply “indistinguishable” from its conventional 
counterpart (Kuran, 2004; El-Gamal, 2006; Khan, 2010, p.817), is validly applicable to 
all Islamic banks. This is because, as the balance sheet analysis in section 4.2 
illustrated, it is only the PLS financing contracts of musharakah and mudarabah which 
meaningfully differentiate Islamic from conventional banks in practice. Therefore, for 
an Islamic bank to provide no musharakah or mudarabah financing implies that it is 
operating solely on the basis of non-PLS financing modes which are equivalent to the 
standard interest-bearing loan contract (Kuran, 1995, 2004; Zaman and Movassaghi, 
2002; El-Gamal 2006; Zaman 2008; El-Diwany, 2010; Khan 2010), making the bank 
99 As noted in the main text, Khan (2010) defines PLS assets more broadly than other Islamic banking 
studies to include in addition to musharakah and mudarabah, ‘other (equity-based) investment assets’ that 
also present the possibility of making a real profit or loss for the bank. Thus assets such as “investments 
in associates” and equity-based “available for sale investments” are included in the PLS level calculated 
for each bank. The definition of PLS measure used in Khan (2010) is not explicitly given in the paper but 
has been confirmed through personal correspondence with the author. I am extremely grateful to 
Professor Feisal Khan for providing this very useful insight. 
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practically indistinguishable from its conventional counterpart. By adopting the first 
approach to define a measure of PLS, one can therefore identify which Islamic banks 
have zero PLS financing, and are indistinguishable from their conventional 
counterparts, and which are genuinely different. Moreover, this approach also allows 
one to make a further distinction between individual banks as it shows if some banks 
have higher PLS financing levels than others and thus opens up the avenue for further 
research into why differences across banks in adopting the PLS financing contracts may 
exist, despite the higher transaction costs associated with this mode of financing. 
The alternative, second approach adopted by Khan (2010) however offers two different 
benefits. Firstly, it appreciates banks’ participation in any form of PLS financial 
arrangement, acknowledging that to be consistent with the PLS principle Islamic banks 
are not limited to musharakah and mudarabah contracts. It therefore offers a broader 
definition of PLS assets which importantly includes certain financial assets that are 
widely used in conventional finance e.g. investments in equity securities. By adopting 
such a broader definition of PLS assets, Khan’s approach enables one to measure what 
percentage of a bank’s combined financing and investment portfolio i.e. its major 
earning assets are in PLS form and therefore investigate if some Islamic banks are 
operating closer to the PLS principle more broadly (specifically in generating majority 
of their income). Secondly and more importantly, by building on Khan’s approach one 
can construct a measure of PLS even for conventional banks without Islamic windows 
which, do not use musharakah and mudarabah contracts but, do have equity-based 
investment assets. This enables one to compare PLS levels directly between Islamic and 
conventional banks to identify, firstly, if Islamic banks in line with the sharia principles 
genuinely follow a more PLS-oriented business model than their conventional 
counterparts in practice and, secondly, the possibility that some conventional banks 
may have higher PLS levels than self-proclaimed Islamic banks. Prior literature thus far 
has not investigated this, as the PLS levels for conventional banks have not been 
measured. Khan (2010) has also not pursued this option as his analysis is limited to 7 
Islamic banks.  
There are of course limitations to both approaches. As the first approach focuses only 
on the financing portfolio, it does not take into account that banks may be involved in 
PLS investment arrangements. It also does not allow one to compare PLS levels 
between Islamic and conventional banks which do not own Islamic windows (i.e. for 
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which PLS financing levels are always zero). Using Khan’s approach to measure PLS 
overcomes these problems. However, Khan’s approach has its own limitation as it does 
not explicitly reflect whether a bank provides the ‘ideal’ PLS financing contracts of 
musharakah and mudarabah100, which as noted in chapter 3 are widely recognised as the 
raison d’être of Islamic banking (Chapra, 2007) and are the only feature which 
practically distinguish Islamic banks’ balance sheet structure from their conventional 
counterpart. Thus, Khan’s approach alone does not allow one to evaluate if the criticism 
of Islamic banks being indistinguishable from their conventional counterparts is validly 
applicable to all Islamic banks.  
Given these different strengths and limitations, which of the two approaches should one 
use? In making this decision, it is important to note that while both approaches attempt 
to evaluate the adoption of PLS principle in banks, these do not measure the same thing. 
The definition of PLS assets and the asset portfolio under review (i.e. the numerator and 
denominator used in the calculations) differ between both approaches, and thus the 
resultant PLS levels are not directly comparable. These two approaches in fact offer 
complementary measures which are best suited to investigate two different but related 
questions as indicated above. As the first approach measures the presence and level of 
PLS financing in banks, it is better suited to answer the questions: do Islamic banks 
provide a genuine PLS alternative to the interest-bearing loan and (thus evaluate) does 
the criticism that Islamic banks are indistinguishable from their conventional 
counterparts validly applies to all Islamic banks? Khans’ approach however is better 
suited to answer the question: are some banks operating closer to the PLS principle than 
others, as it takes an all-encompassing view to defining PLS assets by accounting for a 
banks’ involvement in both PLS financing and investment assets. Both these questions 
are of interest to this thesis. Moreover, there are benefits of using multiple measures of 
PLS even though this practice is absent in the current literature. Firstly, the two 
measures overcome each other’s limitations as discussed earlier to offer additional 
insights compared to using only one. Secondly and more importantly, combining results 
100 To appreciate this, a closer examination of Khan’s results is required. Take for example, the PLS 
shares of Kuwait Finance House (KFH) reported at 22.7% (2004) and 20.1% (2005) in Khan (2010). 
Superficial reading of these results may lead one to assume that KFH provides PLS financing options to 
its customers. However, my own analysis of KFH’s 2004/2005 annual reports revealed that KFH neither 
undertakes musharakah nor mudarabah financing; the PLS shares reported in Khan (2010) are solely 
driven by the presence of ‘other equity investment’ assets. 
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from these two measures allows one to identify if banks adopt different strategies in 
following the PLS principle, e.g. do some Islamic banks follow the PLS principle by 
only holding PLS investment assets and avoiding PLS financing contracts, which incur 
additional transaction costs, while others hold both PLS financing and investment 
assets? By using both PLS measures, this type of question can be investigated and a 
holistic assessment of banks’ adoption of the PLS principle can be undertaken. This 
chapter therefore builds on both the approaches offered in the literature to define two 
separate measures of PLS, as detailed below.  
Defining the Share of PLS in Banks’ Financing Portfolio 
The first measure of PLS used in this work is defined as the ratio of musharakah and 
mudarabah to total financing101. This measure is denoted by PLS-F and follows the first 
approach to measuring PLS, which is widely used in the Islamic banking literature (see 
e.g. Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Chong and Liu, 2009). 
A variant of the PLS-F is also defined in order to compare Islamic banks and 
conventional banks with Islamic windows. This is because as the data description 
presented earlier highlighted, the data used in this chapter has been collected from 
consolidated annual reports and thus the unit of analysis in this study is the parent bank. 
PLS-F calculation therefore uses the conventional parent banks’ financing portfolio as 
the denominator. To identify what proportion of the Islamic window’s financing 
comprises of PLS financing contracts, the variant PLS-IW is used which measures the 
ratio of PLS financing in the Islamic windows’ total financing portfolio. Both PLS-F 
and PLS-IW shares are presented in the following results section for the purposes of 
comparison with full-fledged Islamic banks. Box 4.1 summarises the PLS financing 
measures used in this study.  
  
101 To collect data on PLS-F, notes to the consolidated financial statements for each bank have been read 
carefully. Diminishing musharakah used for home financing has not been included in the share of PLS-F, 
as this arrangement mimics a conventional mortgage (see Khan, 2010 and references within for further 
details).   
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Box 4.1: PLS-F and PLS-IW: Ratio of PLS Financing in Total Financing  
PLS ratio Calculated as:  
% PLS 
Financing 
(PLS-F) 
 
Ratio of PLS financing to total financing 
 
PLS financing  (line 3b)* 
Total financing (line 3)* 
 
- PLS financing consists of musharakah and mudarabah financing. 
 
% PLS 
Financing IW 
(PLS-IW) 
 
Ratio of PLS financing to Islamic Window’s (IW) total 
financing 
PLS financing 
Total IW financing 
 
- PLS financing is defined as above. 
- Total IW financing refers to total financing undertaken by the 
Islamic window, not the parent (conventional) bank. 
∗ These line references relate to the generalised balance sheet (figure 4.1) 
 
Defining the Share of PLS in Banks’ Major Earning Assets 
The second measure of PLS used in this study follows Khan (2010)’s alternative 
approach102 and extends its application to compare PLS levels between Islamic and 
conventional banks, a comparison which has eluded the literature thus far. This broader 
measure, termed PLS-MEA, as defined below in box 4.2, calculates the share of PLS 
assets in the financing and investment portfolio of a bank which represents its major 
earning assets (MEA). This measure not only accounts for the controversial non-PLS 
financing modes (e.g. murabahah) but also the controversial (debt-based) investment 
assets held by banks, such as sukuk, by excluding these from the category of PLS 
assets.  
  
102 The definition of PLS measure used in Khan (2010) is not explicitly given in the paper, therefore it 
cannot be established whether the measure used in this study is identical to Khan (2010). However, 
through personal correspondence with the author, it has been established that assets such as “investments 
in associates”/ “available for sale investments” are included in the PLS share.  
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Box 4.2: PLS-MEA: Ratio of PLS Assets in Major Earning Assets 
PLS ratio Calculated as:  
 
% PLS Major 
Earning Assets 
(PLS-MEA) 
 
Ratio of PLS assets to major earning assets (MEA) 
PLS assets (lines 3b, 4b,c,d)* 
Financing and investment portfolio (MEA) (lines 3+4)* 
  
- PLS assets include PLS financing and PLS investments. 
- PLS financing consists of musharakah and mudarabah financing 
- PLS investments consists of equity investments103; investments in 
associates, joint ventures and investment properties104. 
- Major earning assets are defined as sum of total financing and 
investment portfolio.  
∗ These line references relate to the generalised balance sheet (figure 4.1) 
 
4.3.3 Comparing PLS Levels between Banks: What Can We Expect?  
When comparing PLS-F levels between Islamic banks, it can be expected that the share 
of PLS financing may not be a substantial portion of any Islamic banks’ financing 
portfolio, given the sub-optimality of equity relative to debt financing in the presence of 
costly-state verification and agency problems (Townsend, 1979; Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981; Williamson, 1987; Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000) and evidence from industry 
practice (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2002). Predicting an outcome from the comparison of 
PLS-F levels between Islamic banks and windows however is more difficult, as Islamic 
windows have not been explicitly scrutinised for adherence to Islamic principles in the 
prior literature nor compared with full-fledged Islamic banks even though recent 
literature calls for such comparisons to be conducted (Beck et al., 2013). Such a 
comparison is important particularly as some sharia scholars including Sheikh Nizam 
Yaquby (a prominent contemporary sharia scholar) and academics have raised concerns 
about the ‘purity’ of Islamic windows, with questions over “serious sharia compliance 
failures” including the introduction of innovative products that do not abide strictly 
103 Notes to the financial statements are used to calculate the share of equity investments in the total 
investment portfolio. Where explicit breakdown of debt/equity investments is not reported in the financial 
statements, additional supporting notes including the treatment of debt/equity investments required by the 
relevant reporting standards is used to determine the category of investment. This has affected 2 Islamic 
and 4 conventional banks  
104 Investment properties are included as the risk of ownership (appreciation/depreciation of selling price) 
is taken by the bank.  
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with the sharia e.g. murabahah deposits; a weaker framework of sharia governance, and 
a general lack of commitment to the Islamic banking principle in the overall charter of 
the bank (Yaquby, n.d.; Farook, 2011a, p.26). By making a comparison between 
Islamic banks and conventional banks with Islamic windows on the central, PLS 
principle of Islamic financing, this chapter takes an initial step at addressing such 
concerns.   
Should one expect PLS financing levels to be higher or lower in Islamic windows? 
According to Kuran (2004, p.19), the Islamic banking “anti-interest campaign” has 
created an “exploitable opportunity” for conventional banks to enter a growing market 
with a somewhat captive customer base (given the requirement to abide by sharia for 
Muslims). If Islamic window operations are purely profit-motivated, Islamic windows 
may avoid PLS financing in favour of low-risk non-PLS alternatives which are 
equivalent to the conventional financial products, provide the benefit of requiring credit 
risk analysis as opposed to project appraisals and stringent monitoring. On the other 
hand, Islamic windows benefit from the resource pool, capital base, technical 
infrastructure, reputation, credibility and functional including legal support of the much 
larger parent conventional banks, which offers competitive advantage and the ability to 
reduce overall costs associated with PLS financing, compared to full-fledged Islamic 
banks (Rehman, 2010). Moreover, as argued by El Gamal (1997, 1998), an initial 
critical mass of debt financing ensures efficiency of PLS. Diversification across a 
variety of sharia-compliant, and/or conventional debt and PLS-financing contracts  
allows the parent conventional bank to reduce the risk of its overall financing portfolio 
(Markowitz, 1952, 1959). Thus, Islamic windows can benefit from the higher returns 
associated with equity financing (see, Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Boyd et al., 1998) at 
comparatively lower risk than full-fledged Islamic banks. Given the unique position of 
Islamic windows, these may have higher PLS financing levels than Islamic banks. It is a 
priori ambiguous which of the two possibilities is more likely. 
When comparing PLS-MEA levels between banks, prior Islamic banking literature 
suggests that PLS-MEA should be higher in Islamic banks than their conventional 
counterparts. This is because early Islamic banking  models and advocates envisioned 
Islamic banks as a “cross-breed of commercial and investment banks”, inclined 
towards long-term projects financed on risk-sharing (equity) basis (Mohsin, 1982; 
Chapra, 1 985, p.154; Ahmed, 2002). In line with such models, Islamic banks’ 
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investment portfolio should ideally comprise of equity investments especially as 
conventional debt securities including bonds which offer a fixed coupon rate are banned 
for failing to meet the riba prohibition (Usmani, 2004; Ayub, 2007; Visser 2009). 
Accordingly, one can expect Islamic banks to have higher PLS-MEA than conventional 
counterparts, especially as conventional banks without Islamic windows do not provide 
PLS financing. However, given the possibility of variation in PLS-F levels between 
Islamic banks, which may also hold debt securities including sukuk, it cannot be 
determined a priori if PLS-MEA will certainly be higher in Islamic banks than their 
conventional counterparts.  
4.4 Results  
To keep the focus on differences in PLS levels which exist between banks as opposed 
to reflecting any changes over time, this section compares PLS levels using a single 
year’s data, choosing 2012 which is the latest year in the sample. PLS levels for the 
entire sample period (2009 – 2012) are presented in section 4.5.  
4.4.1 Comparing PLS Levels in Islamic Banks and Windows  
Table 4.3 presents the PLS Financing (PLS-F) levels for the 23 (full-fledged) Islamic 
banks in column 1 and 18 conventional banks with Islamic windows in column 2 and 3. 
As the results show, Islamic banks on average hold only about 6% of their financing 
portfolio in PLS contracts with over 90% in non-PLS (debt) financing. This finding is 
in line with prior literature confirming that on average PLS financing constitutes only a 
small proportion of Islamic banks’ financing portfolio (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; 
Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2002; Warde, 2010). 
A focus on the average PLS-F level however misses the key point, as it ignores the 
amount of variation which exists in the Islamic banking industry. Within a single year, 
PLS-F ranges from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of over 35%, with a standard 
deviation of over 10%. Noticeably, PLS-F is zero in almost half, 11 of the 23 Islamic 
banks (henceforth written as 11/23). The financing portfolio of these banks comprise 
only of the non-PLS modes and for 7 Islamic banks consists only of murabahah and 
ijarah contracts. Based on the balance sheet analysis presented earlier, these Islamic 
banks are essentially ‘quasi-conventional’ banks, as there is no element distinguishing 
these in substance from their conventional counterparts. At the other end of the 
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spectrum are Islamic banks which hold more than 20% of their financing portfolio in 
PLS contracts. These constitute one-fifth of the sample. Compared to the zero PLS-F 
banks, these Islamic banks are clearly operating closer to the PLS principle and 
therefore are more in line with the true spirit of sharia.  
The significant heterogeneity in PLS-F levels clearly invalidates the implicit 
assumption made in current literature that the Islamic banking industry comprises a 
homogenous group of banks that are indistinguishable from their conventional 
counterparts and therefore are equally un-Islamic. As the results show, there are clear 
differences between individual Islamic banks, with some holding considerable 
percentage of their financing portfolio in PLS contracts. Empirical evidence therefore 
does not support the generalised criticism that Islamic banks do not provide a genuine 
PLS alternative to conventional financing and the conclusions drawn in  previous 
studies which dismiss the entire industry as nothing more than conventional banking by 
another name (e.g. Kuran, 1995, 2004; Zaman and Movassaghi, 2002; El-Gamal, 2006; 
Zaman 2008; Khan 2010).  
Examining PLS-F levels at the bank rather than the industry level with a focus on intra-
industry comparison, as in this study, provide important insights into the Islamic 
banking industry. These insights have not only gone unnoticed in prior literature but 
also deserve attention and further investigation to determine why some banks have 
considerably higher levels of PLS-F despite the higher transaction costs associated with 
this mode of financing. This is addressed in section 4.6. 
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Table 4.3: PLS-F Levels in Islamic Banks and Conventional Banks with Islamic Windows 
 
Banks PLS-F Banks PLS-IW Banks PLS-F
AB 0.00% ANB 0.00% ANB 0.00%
AHB 0.00% AUB 0.00% AUB 0.00%
ARB 0.00% FGB 0.00% FGB 0.00%
BAJa 0.00% RB 0.00% RB 0.00%
BWB 0.00% SHB 0.00% SHB 0.00%
BYB 0.00% SIVB 0.00% SIVB 0.00%
KFH 0.00% UABa 0.00% UABa 0.00%
KIB 0.00% NBAD 0.06% NBAD 0.002%
NIB 0.00% ABC 0.10% ABC 0.01%
SIB 0.00% ENBD 1.66% ENBD 0.15%
WB 0.00% QNBb 3.01% CBD 0.30%
MAR 0.29% CBD 4.58% DBa 0.36%
QIB 0.71% DBa 4.83% ADCB 0.38%
QIIB 0.91% BSF 5.77% QNBb 0.62%
ITB 1.94% SFG 6.81% MB 0.95%
ADIB 3.81% ADCB 7.18% UNB 1.28%
ABG 7.86% MB 7.57% BSF 3.08%
BAB 7.96% UNB 15.61% SFG 3.22%
DIB 19.29%
BISB 20.54%
KCB 23.06%
AJBa 24.67%
ASB 35.74%
Min. 0.00% Min. 0.00% Min. 0.00%
Max. 35.74% Max. 15.61% Max. 3.22%
Mean 6.38% Mean 3.18% Mean 0.58%
St. dev 10.49% St. dev 4.25% St. dev 1.01%
3.21% 5.81%
0.193 0.015
Islamic Window Level Parent Bank Level
Conventional Banks with Islamic Windows: Analysis atIslamic Banks
PLS Financing shares are given to 4 deimal places where the share is less than 0.01% to provide a more precise value.     
a 2011 data, b 2010 data, c T-test for equality of means is calculated assuming unequal sample variances, two-sided p 
values are reported. The test is also conducted by excluding the outliers, ASB and UNB (at IW level). Conclusions 
reached are unchanged as the p values are 0.194 (at IW level) and 0.023 (at bank group level).
Difference in meansc
p value p value
IB-IW (IW level) IB-IW (bank group level)
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As table 4.3 shows, PLS-F levels also vary in conventional banks with Islamic windows 
but this variation is not as pronounced as in full-fledged Islamic banks when analysed at 
the window level and is even more muted when analysed at the conventional parent 
bank level. PLS-IW ranges from 0% to a maximum of 16%, whilst PLS-F for Islamic 
windows ranges from 0% to a maximum of 3%. Comparison between PLS-IW and 
PLS-F levels (column 2 and 3), shows that Islamic banking constitutes only a small 
proportion of the conventional banks with PLS financing on average constituting less 
than 1% of the parent banks’ financing portfolio.  
These results confirm that by having Islamic window operations, conventional banks 
enjoy greater ability to hold a diversified portfolio at the parent bank level whilst also 
providing substantial PLS financing at the window level. Thus, there is some support 
for diversification argument via Islamic windows. For example, in UNB, PLS financing 
constitute 15.61% of the Islamic window’s financing portfolio which is higher than 18 
of the 23 Islamic banks, however, when calculated at the parent bank level, PLS 
constitutes just over 1% of UNB’s total financing portfolio. Risks associated with PLS 
financing are therefore substantially lower at the parent bank level, than they would be 
for a full-fledged Islamic bank with the same level of PLS-F. 
Nevertheless, there are mixed results on whether the Islamic window model implies 
higher or lower PLS levels. On the one hand, the difference in average PLS-F between 
Islamic banks and conventional banks with Islamic windows (columns 1 and 3) is 
statistically significant. Results show that 40% of Islamic windows operate as quasi 
conventional banks by providing no PLS financing. These Islamic window operations 
can be considered the practical manifestation of the “exploitable opportunity” the “anti-
interest campaign” has created for conventional banks (Kuran, 2004, p.19), whereby 
without changing their lending behaviour in any fundamental manner, conventional 
banks have adopted the quasi-conventional sharia-certified non-PLS-instruments as the 
means to enter the lucrative and growing Islamic banking market. On the other hand, 
there are also several cases where Islamic windows show evidence of operating closer 
to the spirit of Islamic banking by providing PLS financing options to their customers 
that several Islamic banks do not provide. In 7 Islamic windows, PLS-IW is higher than 
the PLS-F levels in 16 Islamic banks. Even when PLS-F levels are compared (column 1 
and 3), the two highest ranking Islamic windows (BSF and SFG) hold a higher share of 
PLS-F than 15 Islamic banks.  
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This finding has important policy implications. In February 2011, Qatar Central Bank 
passed a directive for all conventional banks to cease their Islamic banking operations 
by the end of the year. Although the motive behind this decision was not disclosed in a 
public statement, speculation suggests that this decision was made to protect the purity 
of Islamic banking operations, avoid comingling of Islamic and conventionally funds 
and to level the playing field for much smaller Islamic banks (Reuters, 2012a; Gulf 
Times, 2012). Results from this study suggest this policy has been detrimental for the 
promotion of PLS as the share of PLS-F in Qatari Islamic windows, QNB and DB is 
higher than 12 Islamic banks (and higher than 15 and 16 Islamic banks respectively if 
PLS-IW is compared). Thus, by implementing a ban on Islamic windows, not only has 
financing choice been limited in the Qatar Islamic banking industry, but more 
importantly, the level of PLS financing  i.e. the ‘real and ideal’ Islamic financing 
(Usmani, 2004) has also been reduced in the economy. Furthermore, competition in the 
Qatari banking industry has also decreased  as the number of institutions offering 
Islamic banking has been reduced from twelve to four (Reuters, 2012a). As Aggarwal 
and Yousef (2000) suggest higher competition reduces the bargaining power of banks, 
relative to borrowers (entrepreneurs), and therefore lowers their rent-seeking ability 
which in turn may increase demand for PLS financing. With fewer Islamic banks in the 
market, the incentive of PLS financing may have been hampered further.  
4.4.2 Comparing PLS Levels in Islamic and Conventional Banks  
Table 4.4 shows the results for the share of PLS in banks major earning assets (PLS-
MEA) in Islamic and conventional banks with and without Islamic windows (column 1, 
2 and 3 respectively). The average PLS-MEA for Islamic banks is 14%, which is nearly 
four times larger than the average PLS-MEA for conventional banks and this difference 
is highly statistically significant. Thus, Islamic banks105 do on average, place a greater 
emphasis on PLS forms of financing and investment assets than their conventional 
counterparts. Nevertheless, this result cannot refute the criticism that Islamic banks rely 
heavily on debt instruments, since on average, less than 15% of Islamic banks’ major 
earning assets (MEA) are in PLS form.  
105 Industry level results refer to full-fledged Islamic banks only, as Islamic windows are included as part 
of the parent conventional bank 
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A closer look at the results shows the significant variation between Islamic banks. PLS-
MEA ranges from less than 1% to over 53% in the single year. For 8 of the 23 banks 
(35% of the sample), PLS-MEA is higher than the average and for 3 of these banks, 
PLS-MEA comprises 40% or more, representing a considerable proportion of the 
banks’ MEA. For the highest ranking Islamic bank, ASB, PLS assets exceed more than 
50% of its financing and investment portfolio. Contrary to the criticism of Islamic 
banks, these results provide empirical evidence to suggest that some Islamic banks 
follow a different, more PLS-oriented banking model than conventional banks. 
On the other hand, there are also Islamic banks for which PLS-MEA is negligible (less 
than 2%). These banks exhibit an overall low risk-sharing approach to their operations. 
Moreover, comparison with conventional banks reveals that several Islamic banks are 
even less PLS-oriented than their conventional counterparts. For 5 Islamic banks PLS-
MEA is lower than the average PLS-MEA of conventional banks, with the highest 
ranking conventional bank with (without) Islamic window holding PLS-MEA share 
greater than 8 (15) Islamic banks.  
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Table 4.4: PLS-MEA Levels in Islamic and Conventional Banks 
 
 
 
Banks PLS-MEA Banks PLS-MEA Banks PLS-MEA
AHB 0.47% SHB 0.09% RAK 0.00%
NIB 0.69% UABa 0.19% FB 0.01%
ARB 0.73% ABC 0.89% NBF 0.22%
AB 1.85% ADCB 1.22% BD 0.65%
BAJa 2.06% ANB 1.53% NBO 1.04%
MAR 3.28% NBAD 1.71% OAB 1.33%
BWB 4.33% CBD 1.73% GB 1.75%
QIB 6.80% DBa 1.93% BS 1.77%
ADIB 7.34% ENBD 2.67% OIBa 1.89%
BAB 8.80% RB 2.80% BM 2.63%
ABG 9.05% BSF 3.17% IVB 2.67%
QIIB 9.06% UNB 3.60% NCB 2.74%
WB 9.50% SIVB 3.61% ABK 2.76%
KIB 9.50% AUB 4.12% NBB 3.45%
BYB 9.98% QNBb 4.44% BB 3.48%
SIB 15.03% MB 5.15% NBK 4.67%
KFH 18.63% SFG 6.74% BBK 6.49%
AJBa 23.50% FGB 7.14% CBI 6.85%
DIB 23.64% BOS 8.97%
ITB 24.71% CBK 11.54%
BISB 39.85%
KCB 44.51%
ASB 53.72%
Min. 0.47% Min. 0.091% Min. 0.00%
Max. 53.72% Max. 7.14% Max. 11.54%
Mean 14.22% Mean 2.93% Mean 3.24%
St. dev 14.71% St. dev 2.04% St. dev 3.08%
Difference in means
IB-CBIW 11.29% CBIW-CB -0.31% IB-CB 10.98%
p value 0.001 p value 0.711 p value 0.002
a 2011 data, b 2010;  T-test for equality of means is calculated assuming unequal sample variances, two-sided p values 
are reported.
Conventional Banks
With Islamic Windows Without Islamic Windows
Islamic Banks
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Taking PLS levels as an important indicator of banks’ Islamicness as in prior literature 
(Khan, 2010; Azmat et al., 2015), then these results show that with a broader definition 
of PLS, some conventional banks appear to be more ‘Islamic’ than the self-proclaimed 
Islamic banks106, as they are operating closer to the PLS principle strongly advocated to 
be the cornerstone of Islamic banking (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). The variation in 
PLS-MEA levels across Islamic banks again emphasises that it is important to take a 
nuanced approach towards evaluation of Islamic banks, as opposed to relying on 
industry averages. 
Looking at the results from table 4.3 and 4.4 together shows evidence to suggest that 
some Islamic banks substitute away from the costlier PLS financing contracts towards 
cheaper forms of PLS assets, such as equity securities which do not incur the sort of 
origination and monitoring costs of higher agency problems associated with PLS 
financing. Despite zero PLS-F, banks such as KFH (19%) and SIB (15%) hold above 
average PLS-MEA, higher than all conventional banks. PLS-MEA levels for these 
banks are completely driven by the non-financing forms of equity investments. High 
PLS-MEA levels in Islamic banks therefore are not always a result of PLS-F but similar 
to conventional banks can be determined only by other equity investment assets107. 
Most importantly, these results also suggest that there is considerable heterogeneity in 
the Islamic banking industry regarding the strategies adopted by individual Islamic 
banks to follow the PLS principle. Whilst some focus entirely on non-financing PLS 
investments, others hold substantial portions of their financing portfolio in PLS form as 
shown in table 4.3. 
Intra-industry variation in PLS-MEA also exists in the conventional banking industry 
and there is some difference in PLS-MEA levels between conventional banks with and 
without Islamic windows, the former’s ranging from 0% to 7% and the latter’s between 
0% to over 11%. However, this difference in averages is not statistically significant. 
106Such a conclusion must be treated with caution, as it implicitly assumes 1) risk-sharing as the sole 
determinant of Islamicness and 2) debt-based financing instruments and sukuk are equivalent to 
conventional debt contracts in line with the view expressed by notable academics in the Islamic banking 
literature (see for example, Kuran, 1995, 2004; El-Gamal 2006; Khan 2010). 
107 For five out of the eight banks with above average PLS-MEA, the level of PLS-F is also above 
average. However, KFH and SIB are notable exceptions which imply that high PLS-MEA is not a 
necessary condition for a bank to hold high PLS-F.   
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4.4.3 A Typology of Islamic Banks 
Combining the results from PLS-F and PLS-MEA108 analysis to identify which Islamic 
banks operate differently from their conventional counterparts leads to an interesting 
insight; it is the same group of Islamic banks. In fact, a pattern emerges when both the 
PLS-F and PLS-MEA results are studied simultaneously. This pattern, illustrated in 
figure 4.2, can be best described as a typology109 of Islamic banks.  
As figure 4.2 shows, there are three broad groups of banks identified. Only one bank, 
ITB (labelled Bank A in figure 4.2) is an exception to the generally recognised pattern 
with high PLS-MEA but low PLS-F. This is the implication of recent changes in the 
bank. ITB, previously a conventional investment bank, reorganised operations with its 
Islamic banking subsidiary (Shamil Bank) to operate as an Islamic retail bank in 2010. 
PLS financing contracts of the Islamic subsidiary bank transferred to the parent bank’s 
financing portfolio. The low level of PLS-F for ITB therefore reflects the difference in 
the scale of Islamic window and the much larger parent bank110. Thus, at present this 
bank does not fit in any of the three identified groups. The main characteristics of each 
group are summarised in table 4.5 and detailed below.  
 
Table 4.5: Typology of Islamic Banks (2012) 
 
108 Combining the results from both measures of PLS provides a comprehensive picture of how Islamic 
banks perform against each other and conventional banks with regards to the principle of PLS. 
109 I am grateful to Dr Carola Wolf for suggesting the use of this term to present these results. 
110 As financial statements for Shamil Bank are no longer available online, it is not possible to calculate 
what the PLS-F share would be if calculated at the window level (i.e. using Shamil Bank’s total financing 
as the denominator) 
Bank Group PLS-F PLS-MEA Group Label Share of Total Islamic Banking Assets
Group 1 0% <20% Quasi-conventional 57.30%
Group 2 0.01% -10% <10% Hybrid 32.30%
Group 3 ≥20% >20% PLS-Oriented 10.40%
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                             Figure 4.2: Typology of Islamic Banks (2012) 
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Group 1: Quasi conventional Islamic Banks:  PLS-F 0%; PLS-MEA <20% 
The quasi-conventional group includes Islamic banks which genuinely are 
indistinguishable from conventional banks and thus are validly criticised as such in 
prior literature. With zero PLS-F, these banks rely purely on non-PLS financing 
contracts, and only apply the PLS principle through holding conventionally recognised 
equity investment assets, which are also present in conventional banks. As noted earlier, 
some Islamic banks in this group hold even lower PLS-MEA than conventional 
counterparts. The two notable Islamic banks in this group are SIB and KFH with the 
highest, over 15% PLS-MEA however; these also do not provide a PLS (equity-based) 
alternative to conventional financing. The group contains 11 of the 23 (henceforth 
written as 11/23) Islamic banks, comprising of all 4 Kuwaiti banks, 3/4 Saudi, 3/6 UAE, 
and 1 Qatari bank and represents the majority of the GCC Islamic banking industry. As 
Table 4.4 illustrates, more than 50% of the Islamic banking assets from the analysed 
sample are placed in banks which fall under this category. Extending the analysis to 
include Islamic windows reveals that almost half, 7 of the 18 Islamic windows, also fall 
in this quasi-conventional group. Thus, these Islamic windows have only superficially 
changed their banking operations by adopting non-PLS financial instruments and in 
reality continue to operate as conventional banks and continue to rely exclusively on 
debt over PLS financing arrangements. This group, which consists of almost half of the 
full-fledged Islamic banks and Islamic windows, has therefore been labelled as quasi-
conventional banks, which have practically failed to provide a genuine PLS alternative 
to conventional banking. 
Group 2: Hybrid Islamic Banks: 0.01% <PLS-F <10%; PLS-MEA <10% 
Table 4.5 illustrates that a further 32.3% of Islamic banking assets are in group 2 banks. 
These hybrid Islamic banks, while distinct from purely conventional banks, are far from 
the ideal PLS-based model promoted by Islamic economists. PLS financing is provided 
by these banks but constitutes only a small proportion, less than 10% of the overall 
financing portfolio. PLS-MEA also constitutes less than 10% of the overall financing 
and investment portfolio. The PLS principle is followed to some extent but these banks 
predominantly rely on debt instruments. This group consists of 7/23 Islamic banks; 3 
Qatari, 2 Bahraini and 1 bank each from UAE and Saudi Arabia. Two banks, ABG and 
BAB labelled as Bank B/C in figure 4.2 have noticeably higher PLS-F than other banks 
in the group. However with less than 8% PLS-F, these banks essentially represent the 
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‘average’ Islamic bank which holds more than 90% of its financing portfolio in debt 
form. Again, extending the analysis to cover Islamic windows, shows that this group  
also includes 11/18 conventional banks with Islamic windows, which is difficult to 
show on the figure 4.2 diagram, as majority of the banks (8/11) have less than 1% PLS-
F. To remain consistent with the unit of analysis (i.e. banks analysed at the parent bank 
level), PLS-F rather than PLS-IW shares are presented in figure 4.2 for conventional 
banks with Islamic windows. This does not change the classification of the banks.  
Group 3: PLS- Oriented Islamic Banks:  PLS-F ≥20%; PLS-MEA >20% 
Group 3 comprises only 5 Islamic banks, 3 from Bahrain and 2 from the UAE, 
constituting approx. one fifth of the sample. These banks are unambiguously different 
from the others in the sample as they show evidence of actively pursuing PLS-oriented 
business model i.e. PLS focused strategies in terms of their financing arrangements and 
investment portfolio. With PLS-F and PLS-MEA greater than 20%111, these are 
operating as a “cross-breed of commercial and investment banks” as originally 
envisioned for the Islamic banking model (Chapra, 1985, p.154; Ahmed, 2002). ASB, 
labelled as Bank D in figure 4.2, may be considered an outlier with significantly higher 
PLS-F and PLS-MEA than the rest of the group. However, these groups are broadly 
defined and the inclusion or exclusion of ASB in group 3 does not change the key 
conclusion that there are some Islamic banks which are operating closer to the PLS 
principle by actively adopting PLS financial instruments over debt-based alternatives, 
which makes them more Islamic and undeniably distinguishable from their 
conventional counterparts.  
4.5 Validating the Typology of Islamic Banks using Cluster 
Analysis  
The above comparison of PLS levels between and across the Islamic and conventional 
banking industries has shown that the Islamic banking industry does not comprise a 
homogeneous group of banks, that are all indistinguishable from their conventional 
counterparts. Rather, three distinct groups have been identified. While banks within 
each group appear to follow a similar strategy, banks across the three groups seem to 
111 This also includes DIB, with PLS-F of 19.29% as the difference between this bank and others in group 
3 is smaller than banks in group 2. 
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follow different strategies regarding their adoption and implementation of the PLS 
principle e.g. relative to the other groups, quasi-conventional Islamic banks avoid PLS 
financing contracts altogether. This finding suggests that the typology of Islamic banks 
identified in the previous section may be reflecting the presence of ‘strategic groups’ 
within the Islamic banking industry, a possibility that has not been explored thus far 
(due to the assumption of homogeneity).  
The concept of strategic groups has been long studied in the strategic management 
literature since the term was first coined by Hunt (1972). Although there is no 
universally accepted formal definition, the term ‘strategic group’ commonly refers to a 
group of firms within a single industry which use similar strategies, i.e. make similar 
decisions in key areas and thus are more homogeneous in their decision making and 
actions than firms are across the industry more generally (Porter, 1980; Reger and Huff, 
1993; Fiegenbaum & Thomas 1995; Short et al., 2007; Mergaerts and Vennet 2016). 
Strategic group theory therefore rejects the assumption of intra-industry homogeneity 
and recognises that not only do differences exist between firms but crucially similarities 
also exist in the strategic choices made by groups of firms within an industry (Barney 
and Hoskisson, 1990). Firms in different strategic groups compete for the same 
customer base but in diverse ways as represented by the different business models they 
adopt112 (Harrigan, 1985). The concept of strategic groups therefore provides a useful 
means to categorise firms within an industry on the basis of their strategic 
choices/business models. Importantly, the exact composition of strategic groups differs 
depending on which strategic decision variables are selected as the basis for defining 
the groups (Hatten and Hatten, 1987).  
Findings from the previous section suggest that when the PLS principle is used 
(assessed using the two PLS measures defined in this study), three groups of banks can 
be identified in the Islamic banking industry, characterised by distinct: Quasi-
conventional, Hybrid and PLS-oriented business models. Although the presence of 
strategic groups has not been explicitly studied in the context of Islamic banking, there 
is a history of literature seeking to identify if strategic groups exist within the 
conventional banking sector. Amel and Rhoades (1988) for example, tested for the 
112 As Mergaerts and Vennet (2016) highlight, the concept of business models itself stems from the 
literature on strategic groups as the former reflect firm strategy including for example, the choice of 
products a firm offers (e.g. to provide PLS financing or not). 
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presence of strategic groups across 16 banking markets using data on banks’ balance 
sheet composition for three years. As the balance sheet composition reflects a bank’s 
strategic choices (the nature of its assets and liabilities), the use of balance sheet data 
for the identification of strategic groups and bank business models has been long 
established in the banking literature (see e.g. Amel and Rhoades 1988) and continues to 
be used by recent studies (Ayadi et al., 2011; Mergaerts and Vennet, 2016). Even in the 
Islamic banking literature, balance sheet data has been used to compare Islamic and 
conventional banks’ business models (Beck et al., 2013). By using the two PLS 
measures, this chapter follows prior literature in making use of banks’ balance sheet 
data to identify if different groups exist within the Islamic banking industry.  
Crucially, as the above analysis uses only a single year (2012) data, the question arises:  
does evidence still support the existence of different groups when data from multiple 
years is analysed, and, if so, does group membership change over time? These are 
important questions to address because finding an affirmative answer to the first 
question will confirm that the conclusion drawn from the 2012 analysis113 is not simply 
an artefact of a single year, rather it is reflective of the industry structure more 
broadly114. Moreover, finding stable group membership will confirm the significance of 
between-bank variation in the adoption and implementation of the PLS principle 
relative to within-bank variation. Some level of variation in PLS levels within banks is 
expected, since the composition of banks’ asset portfolio naturally changes over time 
following the course of business, however, finding that banks repeatedly fall in the 
same groups will indicate that a clear difference does exist in the strategic choices made 
by different groups of banks with respect to the PLS principle.  
113 i.e. Islamic banking industry does not comprise a homogeneous group of banks that are all 
indistinguishable from conventional banks as is suggested in the literature 
114 Recognising an industry’s structure accurately is important for an improved understanding of market 
competition and possible differences in performance between firms. However for the pupose of this study 
specifically, it is also important for identifying if the Islamic banking industry does indeed comprise 
heterogeneous group of banks where some choose to operate closer to the PLS principle and importantly, 
provide PLS financing option relative to others. It is noteworthy that a significant part of the strategic 
management literature has focused on investigating the impact of strategic group membership on firm 
performance (see e.g. Short et al., 2007; Mergaerts and Vennet, 2016 and references within), which 
although an interesting area of research, is beyond the focus on this thesis. This chapter will therefore not 
investigate the impact of group membership on bank performance, rather the focus of this section remains 
on confirming if different groups still exist in Islamic banking industry when PLS levels for more than a 
single year are analysed. 
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Thus, to evaluate if the Islamic banking industry does comprise of heterogeneous 
groups and whether group membership is stable, this section expands the analysis 
presented in section 4.4 by adding a further three years to the dataset. PLS-F and PLS-
MEA levels are therefore calculated for an additional three years in the post financial 
crisis period preceding 2012, leading to a revised sample of 2009 – 2012 115. As some 
banks began operations during the sample period while for others data required to 
calculate PLS levels was unavailable at the time of data collection, the final sample 
comprises of an unbalanced panel of 225 bank-year observations (81 full-fledged 
Islamic, 66 conventional banks with Islamic windows and 78 without windows). 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 respectively summarize the PLS-F and PLS-MEA data over the 
2009-2012 period116. As the summary statistics show, both the annual average PLS 
levels and the variation across banks is higher in the Islamic banking industry 
throughout the studied period. The average PLS-F for full-fledged Islamic banks over 
the four-year period ranges around the 6% mark, with a minimum of 0% to maximum 
of 36%, compared to an average of 1% for conventional banks with Islamic windows 
(henceforth CBIWs) where PLS-F ranges between 0 – 10%. The standard deviation is 
also noticeably higher in the former (7% to 10%) than the latter (1% to 2.7%). 
Similarly, the annual average PLS-MEA in Islamic banks ranges from 14% – 17.5% 
which is four-to-five times larger than the annual average PLS-MEA for conventional 
banks with and without Islamic windows. The standard deviation for Islamic banks is 
also more than five times greater than conventional banks’ as PLS-MEA varies from a 
minimum of 0% to a maximum of 57% in Islamic banks, relative to conventional banks 
(with Islamic windows) where it ranges from 0% to less than 12% (10%). Therefore, 
the four-year data shows that while on average Islamic banks show higher levels of 
PLS, there is also greater variability in the industry (i.e. between banks). 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 also show that PLS levels change within individual banks, although 
the magnitude and direction of these changes differs across banks. In banks such as 
KCB, both PLS-F and PLS-MEA have consistently increased over the four years 
whereas in banks such as ADIB, PLS levels have decreased. In other banks such as 
ABG, PLS levels show both positive and negative year-on-year changes over the 
115 The preceding three years are used as 2012 was the latest year at the time of data collection.  
116 To ensure that the unit of analysis remains consistent with the typology discussed earlier in section 
4.4.3, the PLS-F values for conventional banks with Islamic windows are provided in table 4.6. 
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sample period. As noted above, it is expected that PLS levels will change within banks 
as the composition of their asset portfolios changes over time, therefore the observed 
variation is not entirely surprising.  
Nevertheless, the magnitude of change in certain banks is more notable than others. In 
MAR for example, PLS-F has reduced from almost 15% to less than 0.5% over the 
four-year period whereas in ASB, PLS-F has increased from 3.8% to almost 36%. In 
depth study of MAR’s financial statements indicate that the fall in PLS-F level is a 
result of a decrease in both the amount of musharakah and mudarabah (PLS) financing 
and an increase in non-PLS financing contracts particularly murabahah as well as the 
introduction of other non-PLS alternatives such as istisna during 2011 (MAR, 2011, 
p.20117). The reduction in PLS financing could be due to a change in bank’s strategy 
(possibly due to a change in leadership/management)118, or simply because the 
musharakah and mudrabah partnership contracts completed their term as these are time 
bound. Alternatively, the ban on Islamic windows imposed by the Qatar Central bank 
may have had an impact on PLS-F levels. With the ban imposed, the number of 
institutions offering Islamic banking in Qatar reduced from twelve to four (Reuters, 
2012a). According to Aggarwal and Yousef (2000), higher competition reduces banks’ 
bargaining power relative to borrowers and therefore lowers their rent-seeking ability 
which in turn may increase demand for PLS financing. With fewer Islamic banks in the 
market, the incentive of PLS financing may have been hampered. QIB, another Qatari 
Islamic bank, also shows reduction in its PLS-F to almost 0% after 2011. Whether these 
banks substituted PLS for non-PLS financing due to reduced competition or simply 
increased non-PLS financing to capture customers no longer served by conventional 
banks’ Islamic windows needs further investigation to be answered. Therefore, to fully 
understand the impact of the ban on Islamic windows on PLS financing, a more indepth 
study focusing on the Qatar banking industry is required which is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.   
ASB’s annual reports on the other hand are more suggestive of the potential reason for 
the sharp increase in the banks’ PLS-F level. As indicated in the bank’s 2009 annual 
117 Refers to the banks’ financial statements  
118 During data collection, only the financial statements for MAR were available. Without the full annual 
report which provides information on bank’s management (e.g. names of directors), any change in 
management could not be confirmed. 
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report, ASB acquired Bahrain Saudi Bank (BSB), a conventional commercial bank, in 
2009. As of December 31st 2009, ASB’s consolidated financial statements therefore 
comprise the financial statements of ASB and its subsidiary BSB, resulting in a 
significant increase in the bank’s total assets. Since BSB is a conventional bank, its 
assets are not PLS-based. This inevitably increased the proportion of non-PLS assets in 
ASB’ balance sheet. Over the sample period, as explained in its annual reports, ASB 
has been converting BSB’ non-sharia compliant assets including its financing contracts 
to sharia-compliant alternatives. In its 2010 report for example, ASB states the bank has 
“been successful in converting a significant portion of conventional assets and 
liabilities of BSB to Shari’a compliant products” (ASB, 2010, p.22). Error! Bookmark 
not defined.This conversion process has continued into 2011 and 2012. While the 
acquisition of BSB has certainly had an impact on the balance sheet structure of ASB, it 
cannot be completely ruled out that the potential reason for the sharp increase in PLS-F 
may be due to a shift in bank’s strategy as well e.g. to operate as a more PLS-oriented 
bank. To reach a definitive conclusion, interviews with the bank’s management may 
help shed light on the reason for the observed changes in PLS level however such a 
mode of investigation is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Finally, it is notable that for both Islamic banks and CBIWs that have chosen to operate 
as quasi-conventional banks by offering no PLS financing, this position appears to be a 
stable (and potentially long-term) strategy. As table 4.6 shows, all Islamic banks with 
0% PLS-F consistently remain at this level throughout the four-year period with the 
exception of only one (BWB, which has reduced its PLS-F from 0.01% to 0% over the 
2011-12 period). Similarly, all CBIWs that have 0% PLS-F have remained at this level, 
with the exception of only two banks (CBD and ENBD, which have increased from 0% 
to 0.3% and 0.13% over the 2011-12 and 2010-11 period respectively). Therefore while 
PLS-F levels have changed in banks which provide PLS financing, there has been 
almost no change in the majority of the banks that offer no PLS financing. This is an 
important finding as it illustrates that remaining a quasi-conventional bank seems to be 
the dominant position for banks that have chosen this strategy. Nevertheless, given the 
exceptions, it is clear that banks can and do move in and out of the identified groups 
e.g. BWB has joined the quasi-conventional group while CBD and ENBD have exited 
from it by offering PLS financing. This suggests that group membership may not be 
completely fixed. Whether stable group membership is the dominant position for most 
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banks therefore needs to be further investigated. Moreover, given that PLS levels have 
changed in several banks, how many distinct groups of banks does the data support? To 
answer these questions, cluster analysis is used. Similar to previous banking studies 
(e.g. Ayadi et al., 2011 and Mergaerts and Vennet, 2016), cluster analysis was applied 
to the pooled (2009-2012) dataset to identify the presence and number of different 
groups and whether group membership changes over time. Further details on cluster 
analysis are given below. 
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Table 4.6: PLS-F Levels in Islamic Banks and Conventional Banks with Islamic Windows (2009-2012) 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2009 2010 2011 2012
AB 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% ABC 0.03% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
ABG 11.76% 15.32% 9.78% 7.86% ADCB 0.35% 0.12% 0.38%
ADIB 6.78% 5.76% 5.31% 3.81% ANB 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
AHB 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% AUB 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
AJB 24.67% 24.37% BSF 3.81% 4.70% 3.49% 3.08%
ARB 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% CBD 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.30%
ASB 3.87% 13.73% 25.59% 35.74% DB 1.29% 1.15% 0.36%
BAB 7.31% 9.44% 7.11% 7.96% ENBD 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.15%
BAJ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% FGB 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
BISB 22.40% 17.50% 22.67% 20.54% MB 3.22% 3.01% 3.11% 0.95%
BWB 0.01% 0.00% NBAD 0.013% 0.011% 0.002% 0.002%
BYB 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% QNB 0.73% 0.62%
DIB 32.01% 23.49% 18.83% 19.29% RB 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
ITB 1.62% 2.36% 1.94% SFG 8.22% 10.11% 9.11% 3.22%
KCB 12.85% 16.88% 20.09% 23.06% SHB 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
KFH 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% SIVB 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
KIB 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% UAB 0.00% 0.00%
MAR 14.99% 9.39% 0.20% 0.29% UNB 5.32% 4.24% 2.60% 1.28%
NIB 0.00% 0.00%
QIB 5.33% 3.54% 3.10% 0.71%
QIIB 0.07% 0.01% 0.45% 0.91%
SIB 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
WB 0.00%
Min. 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% Min. 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Max. 32.01% 23.49% 25.59% 35.74% Max. 8.22% 10.11% 9.11% 3.22%
Mean 6.90% 6.14% 6.37% 6.37% Mean 1.41% 1.34% 1.11% 0.63%
St. dev 9.31% 7.73% 9.34% 10.46% St. dev 2.46% 2.66% 2.38% 1.10%
PLS Financing shares are given to 4 decimal places where the share is less than 0.01% to provide a more precise value
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks with Islamic Windows
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Table 4.7: PLS-MEA Levels in Islamic and Conventional Banks with and without Islamic Windows (2009-2012) 
Banks 2009 2010 2011 2012 Banks 2009 2010 2011 2012 Banks 2009 2010 2011 2012
AB 0.00% 0.41% 1.55% 1.85% ABC 0.59% 0.53% 0.68% 0.89% ABK 2.48% 2.66% 2.65% 2.76%
ABG 14.85% 16.54% 11.27% 9.05% ADCB 4.55% 0.65% 1.22% BB 3.53% 2.81% 2.73% 3.48%
ADIB 11.88% 10.48% 9.40% 7.34% ANB 1.96% 1.96% 1.93% 1.53% BBK 6.34% 5.83% 5.70% 6.49%
AHB 0.96% 0.70% 0.47% AUB 4.88% 4.91% 4.58% 4.12% BD 0.98% 0.91% 0.69% 0.65%
AJB 23.50% 24.79% BSF 4.12% 5.12% 3.95% 3.17% BM 3.17% 3.56% 2.68% 2.63%
ARB 1.57% 1.53% 1.10% 0.73% CBD 1.43% 1.08% 1.70% 1.73% BOS 7.85% 7.39% 8.81% 8.97%
ASB 56.92% 49.13% 54.00% 53.72% DB 3.50% 3.09% 1.93% BS 0.60% 0.86% 1.45% 1.77%
BAB 8.68% 10.58% 8.64% 8.80% ENBD 3.69% 4.87% 3.52% 2.67% CBI 7.55% 6.19% 5.68% 6.85%
BAJ 3.19% 3.40% 2.06% 1.15% FGB 7.21% 7.74% 7.62% 7.14% CBK 7.14% 7.76% 11.39% 11.54%
BISB 35.64% 29.75% 41.80% 39.85% MB 6.17% 6.33% 7.33% 5.15% FB 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01%
BWB 4.02% 4.33% NBAD 0.80% 0.88% 0.86% 1.71% GB 3.42% 2.25% 1.99% 1.75%
BYB 14.71% 12.87% 12.21% 9.98% QNB 4.90% 4.44% IVB 3.56% 3.24% 2.46% 2.67%
DIB 36.40% 29.40% 23.24% 23.64% RB 2.49% 2.82% 2.82% 2.80% NBB 3.80% 4.30% 3.37% 3.45%
ITB 28.84% 27.53% 24.71% SFG 7.60% 9.64% 9.61% 6.74% NBF 0.45% 0.35% 0.22%
KCB 32.42% 40.15% 43.40% 44.51% SHB 0.12% 0.11% 0.17% 0.09% NBK 5.99% 7.04% 6.80% 4.67%
KFH 21.79% 21.08% 21.62% 18.63% SIVB 6.28% 4.26% 4.21% 3.61% NBO 1.10% 1.33% 0.96% 1.04%
KIB 5.03% 6.62% 10.44% 9.50% UAB 0.01% 0.005% NCB 4.75% 4.37% 3.37% 2.74%
MAR 15.61% 11.06% 3.48% 3.28% UNB 6.51% 6.58% 4.92% 3.60% OAB 1.77% 1.70% 1.61% 1.33%
NIB 0.15% 0.69% OIB 2.15% 2.28% 1.89%
QIB 17.89% 14.09% 12.36% 6.80% RAK 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
QIIB 8.17% 7.37% 9.03% 9.06%
SIB 12.81% 13.23% 14.11% 15.03%
WB 9.50%
Min. 0.00% 0.41% 0.15% 0.47% Min. 0.12% 0.01% 0.00% 0.09% Min. 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Max. 56.92% 49.13% 54.00% 53.72% Max. 7.60% 9.64% 9.61% 7.14% Max. 7.85% 7.76% 11.39% 11.54%
Mean 17.50% 16.18% 15.26% 14.24% Mean 3.89% 3.83% 3.32% 3.08% Mean 3.48% 3.25% 3.23% 3.31%
St. dev 15.08% 13.63% 15.06% 14.78% St. dev 2.47% 2.75% 2.82% 2.06% St. dev 2.53% 2.49% 3.03% 3.15%
Conventional Banks With Islamic Windows Conventional Banks Without Islamic WindowsIslamic Banks 
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4.5.1 Method: Cluster Analysis 
Cluster analysis is a statistical technique that assigns data objects/observations into 
distinct groups called clusters, with the aim of grouping together observations such that 
they are homogeneous within clusters and heterogeneous between clusters based on a 
set of pre-selected characteristics. By definition then, observations within a particular 
cluster are more similar to each other in terms of the selected characteristics than 
observations across clusters (Barney and Hoskisson, 1990; Ayadi et al., 2011). When 
characteristics reflecting firms’ strategic choices are used as the basis of cluster 
analysis, the resulting clusters qualify as strategic groups (Hatten, 1974; Hatten et al., 
1978). Cluster analysis has therefore been recognised as a “valuable” and “important 
tool” for identifying the presence of strategic groups/business models and has been 
widely used in the strategic management literature as well as in previous banking 
studies  (see e.g. Hatten, 1974; Hatten et al., 1978; Amel and Rhoades, 1988; 
Fiegenbaum & Thomas 1995; Ketchen and Shook, 1996, p.455; Short et al., 2007; 
Ayadi et al., 2011; Mergaerts and Vennet, 2016). 
As cluster analysis aims to group together observations on the basis of similarity 
(Everitt et al., 2011), the first step in generating clusters is to select the clustering 
variable(s) i.e. to determine which characteristic(s) will be examined to establish 
(dis)similarity between individual observations (Sarstedt and Mooi, 2014). Depending 
on the research question, prior studies have used different types and number of 
clustering variables, ranging from a single variable to more than half a dozen. Porter 
(1980) for example used firm size to group together firms while Ayadi et al., (2011) and 
Mergaerts and Vennet (2016) used a variety of balance sheet indicators to identify 
business models in European banking markets. As Ayadi et al. (2011) highlight, for the 
identification of strategic groups/business models, the chosen clustering variables must 
be those that are within the firm’s control. In this chapter, the two PLS measures are 
used as the clustering variables. These capture banks’ strategic orientation towards the 
adoption and implementation of the PLS principle and meet the above-mentioned 
criteria as banks have direct influence over the decision to provide PLS financing and 
the amount of their financing and investment portfolio they choose to hold in PLS form. 
Once the clustering variables have been selected, the next step is to choose the 
clustering procedure (which includes the method for measuring (dis)similarity and 
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partitioning clusters) and finally determine the appropriate number of clusters (Ayadi et 
al., 2011). There are several different types of clustering procedures. The most popular 
are 1) hierarchical and 2) non-hierarchical (partitioning) clustering, both of which adopt 
different approaches to generate clusters. 
In hierarchical (agglomerative) clustering, clusters are formed sequentially starting with 
the highest possible number of clusters. Each (bank-year) observation is therefore 
initially treated as a separate cluster. Similar observations are then merged to form new 
clusters. The most similar (of these new) clusters are then merged and the process is 
repeated, progressively aggregating the preceding clusters until all observations are 
eventually grouped, creating a tree-like structure (dendogram). (Dis)similarity is 
measured by calculating the distance between observations in the original variable(s) 
space, as similar observations have smaller distances between them. Formation of 
clusters is thus dependent on how distance is measured. Most commonly the (squared) 
Euclidean distance, illustrated in figure 4.3, is used (De Maesschalck et al., 2000; 
Everitt et al., 2011; Sarstedt and Mooi, 2014).  
Figure 4.3: Euclidean Distance 
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If collinearity exists between the clustering variables however, the alternative 
Mahalanobis distance is recommended (De Maesschalck et al., 2000; Sambandam, 
2003; Sarstedt and Mooi, 2014). The Mahalanobis distance119 is given by: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 =  �(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥)𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥−1(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥)𝑇𝑇   for i = 1 to n,  where X is (n x m) matrix, containing n 
observations and m variables and 𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥 is the variance-covariance matrix 
Once the distance measure is selected, one (or more) clustering algorithm(s) is chosen 
to partition the clusters. Each algorithm optimises a different criterion in partitioning 
clusters and thus can lead to different results. Previous research has found some 
procedures are better at identifying group structures in the data than others (see 
Milligan (1981) for an evaluation of different clustering procedures). Of the various 
hierarchical clustering algorithms, Ward’s (1963) minimum-variance method has been 
highly recommended especially in the presence of overlaps and has thus been widely 
applied in the strategic management literature as well as by banking-specific studies 
(Milligan, 1981; Barney and Hoskisson, 1990; Reger and Huff, 1993; Short et al., 2007; 
Ayadi et al., 2011; Sarstedt and Mooi, 2014; Mergaerts and Vennet, 2016). As with the 
other hierarchical methods, Ward’s method starts by treating each observation as a 
single cluster. However, in generating and partitioning the clusters, Ward’s method 
follows a slightly different approach to the other hierarchical algorithms. Instead of 
combining observations with the least distance, Wards’ method combines observations 
which increase the within-cluster variance by the least amount, to form the cluster 
solutions (Ayadi et al., 2011; Sarstedt and Mooi, 2014).  
To determine the appropriate number of clusters, a ‘stopping rule’ is required. By 
evaluating various stopping rules, Milligan & Cooper (1985) recommend the Calinski 
and Harabasz’s (1974) pseudo-F index as the best, most consistent stopping rule as it 
identified group structures correctly in over 90% of the cases in simulations (Ayadi et 
al., 2011). Accordingly, the Calinski and Harabasz’s index has been a popular choice 
used by previous studies to determine the number of clusters (see Ayadi et al., 2011 and 
Mergaerts and Vennet, 2016 for application to banking-specific research). The Calinski 
and Harabasz’s index is “the sample estimate of the ratio of between-cluster variance to 
within-cluster variation”, therefore the number of clusters which relate to the highest 
119 If there is no correlation between the variables, the Mahalanobis distance is the same as the Euclidean 
distance (Sambandam, 2003). 
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pseudo F index value is selected as the most appropriate and distinct clustering 
configuration (Ayadi et al., 2011, p.23). 
In contrast to hierarchical clustering, non-hierarchical procedures adopt a different 
approach to generate and partition the clusters. The non-hierarchical clustering 
procedure begins by randomly assigning observations to a pre-specified (k) number of 
clusters (Sarstedt and Mooi, 2014). Observations are then reassigned successively to 
other clusters to minimise the within-cluster variation which is measured using the 
(squared) distance from each individual observation to the geometric centre, the 
centroid (i.e. arithmetic mean) of the associated clusters. Cluster centroids are 
recomputed as new observations are added. Non-hierarchical clustering is therefore an 
iterative process, whereby multiple passes are made through the data as observations 
change group affiliations depending on the distance from the recomputed cluster 
centroids (Ketchen and Shook 1996). If reallocating an observation to another 
(different) cluster reduces the within-cluster variation, the observation is reallocated to 
the (new) cluster and the process is repeated until all observations are assigned to a 
cluster and no further changes to cluster affiliations take place i.e. clustering solution 
reaches convergence (Anderberg, 1973; Ketchen and Shook, 1996; Sarstedt and Mooi, 
2014). As with hierarchical clustering, various algorithms exist in non-hierarchial 
clustering as well, with k-means being the most widely applied (Sarstedt and Mooi, 
2014). 
Given the differences between the two clustering procedures, which one should one 
use? In making this decision, it is important to note the strengths and weaknesses of 
both procedures. One of the drawbacks of hierarchical clustering is that cluster 
affiliations do not change during the clustering process therefore each observation 
remains part of the initial cluster it has been assigned. In contrast, in non-hierarchical 
clustering, cluster affiliations can and do change during the clustering process as 
observations are reassigned to different clusters in locating the optimal clustering 
solution (Ketchen and Shook, 1996; Sarstedt and Mooi, 2014). This difference 
translates into a notable advantage offered by the non-hierarchical clustering over its 
hierarchical counterpart. This advantage relates to the impact of outliers. While both 
hierarchical and non-hierarchical clustering can be sensitive to the presence of outliers, 
non-hierarchical clustering is impacted less by outliers (Ketchen and Shook, 1996, 
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p.446). As non-hierarchical clustering is an iterative process, even if the initial clusters 
are distorted by the presence of outliers, this distortion is often corrected during 
successive iterations as observations change cluster affiliations and the cluster centroids 
are recomputed (Hair et al., 1992; Ketchen and Shook, 1996). Moreover, by allowing 
observations to change cluster affiliations as multiple passes are made through the 
dataset, non-hierarchical clustering optimises within-cluster homogeneity and between-
cluster heterogeneity for the final clustering solution. These advantages however come 
at a cost. As noted earlier, non-hierarchical clustering requires that the number of 
clusters is prespecified i.e. established a pirori (Milligan, 1980; Ketchen and Shook, 
1996). This is problematic as cluster analysis is mainly a descriptive and exploratory 
statistical technique (Ketchen and Shook, 1996; Everitt et al., 2011). To overcome this 
problem, many experts have advocated for ‘two-stage clustering’, which combines the 
principles of both procedures by running hierarchical clustering in the first stage to 
identify the number of clusters and their centroids and non-hierarchical clustering in the 
second stage which uses results from the first stage as the starting point. Previous 
research has shown that the two-stage clustering procedure increases the validity of the 
cluster solutions and has therefore been recommended and used as a method of 
triangulation to help increase the validity of results drawn from cluster analysis 
(Milligan, 1980; Punj and Stewart, 1983; Hair et al., 1992; Ketchen and Shook, 1996; 
Short et al., 2007; Sarstedt and Mooi, 2014). 
In line with these recommendations, this study adopts the two-stage clustering 
procedure, whereby Ward’s hierarchical clustering procedure is used in the first stage 
with the Calinski and Harabasz’s index used as the stopping rule to determine the 
appropriate number of clusters, followed by the k-means non-hierarchical clustering 
used in the second stage. Results from the first stage are used as the starting point for k-
means. To further ensure robustness of the cluster solutions, k-means is also run with 
random starting points. 
Before turning to the results, the one final consideration required for cluster analysis is 
to ensure that the resultant clusters offer a “meaningful strategic interpretation” i.e. that 
they represent important differences in the strategic choices/business models adopted by 
the different groups of firms (McGee and Thomas, 1986, p.148; Sarstedt and Mooi, 
2014). To ensure that clusters are meaningful and interpretable, it is recommended that 
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any a priori expectations and knowledge which may determine the nature of a group are 
taken into account prior to generating data-driven clusters. Practical considerations are 
therefore paramount and choices regarding the nature of groups need to be made even 
before embarking on the cluster analysis procedure (Sarstedt and Mooi, 2014). Prior 
studies e.g. Short et al. (2007) have therefore relied on using both deductive (i.e. where 
a priori expectations regarding nature of groups exists) and inductive (data-driven) 
approaches to conduct cluster analysis, relying on a priori (theoretical) framework and 
analysis to impose group solutions. A key benefit that the inducto-deductive approach 
offers is that it enables the constructed groups to be informed by not only statistical but 
also theoretical and practical considerations. This is highly valuable especially as the 
latter are considered of “utmost importance when deciding on the number of clusters” 
(Short et al., 2007; Sarstedt and Mooi, 2014, p.298). 
In this study, an important consideration which needs to be accounted for arises from 
the balance sheet analysis conducted in section 4.2. Using prior literature, the analysis 
illustrated that the balance sheet structure of an Islamic bank which does not offer PLS 
financing contracts is practically indistinguishable from its conventional counterpart. 
Such a bank essentially operates as a quasi-conventional bank, as it relies solely on 
debt-based financing contracts and follows the PLS principle solely through holding 
PLS (equity-based) investment assets which are also present in conventional banks. 
This decision to avoid PLS financing contracts altogether reflects the adoption of a very 
specific, important and fundamentally different strategic position compared to Islamic 
banks which offer PLS financing. Running cluster analysis without accounting for this 
major difference would lead to erroneous grouping as banks with 0% PLS-F and just 
above 0% PLS-F (e.g. 0.07%) will be included in the same cluster (since the distance 
between 0% and just over 0% is small). Such a clustering solution will fail to represent 
the fundamental difference in strategic choices made between banks that choose not to 
provide PLS financing and those that do (i.e. PLS-F>0%). To avoid this error, quasi-
conventional banks need to be recognised a priori as a separate strategic group, where 
membership of this group is defined by the absence of PLS financing. Accordingly, in 
the following analysis, the quasi-conventional group is constructed by definition to 
include banks with 0% PLS-F. For the remaining banks i.e. where PLS-F > 0%, groups 
are generated using cluster analysis and therefore the number of groups and their 
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membership is purely data-driven. Results from the cluster analysis are presented 
below. 
4.5.2 Results from Cluster Analysis 
This section presents and discusses the results from the two-stage cluster analysis 
procedure detailed above. As the first stage of the cluster analysis involved using 
Ward’s hierarchical approach, the Calinski and Harabasz’s pseudo-F Index was used to 
determine the appropriate number of clusters. Results presented in table 4.8 show that 
the index attained a single maximum value, indicating the 2 cluster solution as the most 
appropriate and distinct cluster configuration.  
Table 4.8: Pseudo-F index for Determining the Number of Clusters 
 
As these are the number of clusters present amongst banks where PLS-F > 0%, the 
results suggest that there are two further groups in the Islamic banking industry in 
addition to the quasi-conventional group which, recall from the above discussion, has 
been defined to include all banks where PLS-F = 0%. In total then, the inducto-
deductive approach indicates the presence of three groups. 
Following on from Ward’s clustering method, the second stage involved using the k-
means clustering procedure. As the 2-cluster solution yielded the highest pseudo-F 
Number of Clusters Calinski and Harabasz 
Pseudo-F index
2 201.55
3 135.32
4 105.48
5 97.67
6 84.47
7 76.86
8 90.74
9 109.06
10 140.81
11 128.75
12 131.75
13 137.71
14 129.75
15 123.83
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index value, k-means was specified to run with 2 clusters (i.e. k=2)120. Both the 
centroids determined by the Ward’s hierarchical clustering as well as randomly 
generated centroids were used as the starting points sequentially. Both approaches 
produced highly consistent results. Moreover, as both the Ward’s hierarchical and k-
mean non-hierarchical clustering procedures also produced consistent results i.e. banks 
were assigned to the same clusters in the final solutions,  These results are presented 
graphically in figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4: Cluster Analysis: PLS-F and PLS-MEA (2009-2012) 
 
Group 1 has been deductively defined based on the balance sheet analysis such that all banks where PLS-
F = 0% are a member of this group. Groups 2 and 3 are inductively defined using cluster analysis  
As figure 4.4 illustrates, in addition to the quasi-conventional group, there are two 
groups of banks identified. Group 3 banks show notably higher PLS levels however 
there is also greater dispersion amongst these compared to banks in group 2. The 
descriptive statistics for all three groups are given in table 4.9 below. For each group, 
the breakdown per bank type is also given to provide greater detail. For group 1, where 
120 To further validate the number of clusters generated, k-means was also run with different number of 
predefined clusters e.g. k= 3, 4, 5 etc. Calinski and Harabasz’s Index can also be used with k-means to 
check the pseudo-F value produced for each number of prespecified cluster solution (Sarstedt and Mooi, 
2014). The 2 cluster solution with k-means generated the highest pseudo-F value. 
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(by definition) PLS-F is 0%, the PLS-MEA value ranges from a minimum of 0% to a 
maximum of 21.79%. As the table shows, there is greater variation amongst Islamic 
banks than CBIWs (standard deviation of 7.29% v. 2.40%). The mean PLS-MEA for 
the entire group (including Islamic banks and CBIWs) is 5.46%. Islamic banks have a 
slightly higher mean PLS-MEA value (7.29%) compared to CBIWs (3.26%) however 
the difference between these is not statistically significant. For comparison, descriptive 
statistics for conventional banks without Islamic windows (henceforth CBs) is also 
provided (as these banks also do not engage in any PLS financing). Again, although the 
mean PLS-MEA in CBs is lower than Islamic banks and CBIWs, the difference in 
means is not statistically significant. In total there are 66 bank-year observations in this 
group, 36 Islamic and 30 conventional banks with Islamic windows. As was discussed 
earlier, by excluding PLS financing contracts from their financing portfolio, these banks 
operate as conventional banks which only provide debt-based financing options to their 
customers. Moreover, comparison of PLS-MEA levels shows that on average the 
proportion of these banks’ major earning assets which is in PLS form does not differ 
from conventional counterparts. This indicates that, irrespective of how the adoption of 
the PLS principle is measured (as PLS-F or PLS-MEA), there is a group of Islamic 
banks and CBIWs which is genuinely indistinguishable from their conventional 
counterparts. 
Comparing the average PLS-F and PLS-MEA levels across groups 1 and 2 offers an 
interesting insight. While the difference in mean PLS-F levels between the two groups 
is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance, the difference in mean PLS-
MEA between the groups is only statistically significant at the 10% level. Therefore, as 
these results indicate, the average PLS-MEA level alone cannot differentiate between 
these groups; rather it is the presence of PLS-F which differentiates banks in group 2 
from the quasi-conventional banks in group 1. This is an important finding, for if one 
accepts the choice to offer PLS financing as an important strategic decision then these 
two groups illustrate the presence of distinct strategic groups within the Islamic banking 
industry, where banks in each group have adopted fundamentally different banking 
business models. If, however, one looks only at the level of PLS-MEA, by measuring 
PLS broadly as in Khan (2010), banks in group 1 and 2 cannot be differentiated as 
separate strategic groups. Given the balance sheet analysis presented earlier which 
discussed the importance of PLS financing as the sole differentiating feature of Islamic  
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Table 4.9: Descriptive Statistics for Bank Groups from Cluster Analysis 
PLS-F (%) PLS-MEA (%) PLS-F (%) PLS-MEA (%) PLS-F (%) PLS-MEA (%)
Islamic Banks
Min 0.00 0.00 Min 0.01 3.28 Min 3.87 23.24
Max 0.00 21.79 Max 15.32 28.84 Max 35.74 56.92
Mean 0.00 7.29 Mean 5.11 11.81 Mean 20.98 37.90
St.Dev 0.00 7.05 St.Dev 4.53 6.48 St.Dev 7.07 11.03
(N= 36) (N= 28) (N= 18)
Conventional Banks with Islamic Windows
Min 0.00 0.00 Min 0.002 0.53 Min - -
Max 0.00 7.74 Max 10.11 9.64 Max - -
Mean 0.00 3.26 Mean 2.15 3.88 Mean - -
St.Dev 0.00 2.40 St.Dev 2.71 2.62 St.Dev - -
(N= 30) (N= 35) (N= 0)
All (Islamic and Conventional Banks with Islamic Windows)
Min 0.00 0.00 Min 0.002 0.53 Min 3.87 23.24
Max 0.00 21.79 Max 15.32 28.84 Max 35.74 56.92
Mean 0.00 5.46 Mean 3.46 7.40 Mean 20.98 37.90
St.Dev 0.00 5.79 St.Dev 3.89 6.16 St.Dev 7.07 11.03
(N= 66) (N= 63) (N= 18)
Conventional Banks without Islamic Windows
Min 0.00 0.00
Max 0.00 11.54
Mean 0.00 3.32
St.Dev 0.00 2.76
(N=78)
T-test results confirm that the difference in means between groups (1 and 2; 2 and 3; 1 and 3) is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. The 
exception is the difference in mean PLS-MEA between groups 1 and 2, where the differences  in means for the entire group is significant at the 10% level. 
Group 3Group 2 Group 1
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banks in practice and the long-standing literature supporting the importance of PLS 
financing as the core of Islamic banking, it is considered important in this thesis to 
make a distinction between banks that do and do not offer PLS financing121. Thus, in 
addition to the reasons discussed earlier, using two PLS measures, as in this study, also 
proves to be informative regarding the presence of strategic groups in the Islamic 
banking industry.  
Looking now at the composition of group 2, as table 4.9 shows, there are 63 bank-year 
observations in this group, 28 Islamic and 35 CBIWs. PLS-F ranges from a minimum of 
0.01% (0.002%) to a maximum of 15.32% (10.11%) in Islamic banks (CBIWs). Similar 
to group 1, the mean PLS-F value is higher in Islamic banks (5.11%) relative to CBIWs 
(2.15%), however the difference is not statistically significant. Overall, this group 
shows a mean PLS-F value of 3.46% with a standard deviation of 3.89%. PLS-MEA 
ranges from 3.28% to 28.84% in Islamic banks and 0.53% to 9.64% in CBIWs. As with 
PLS-F, the mean PLS-MEA is higher in Islamic banks (11.81%) compared to CBIWs 
(3.88%), the difference between these however is statistically significant. Thus, on 
average, Islamic banks in group 2 have higher PLS-MEA level than CBIWs, although 
as the standard deviation illustrates, there is also greater variation in the former (6.48%) 
than the latter (2.62%). Overall, with over 90% of their financing (and major earning) 
assets in non-PLS form, banks in this group represents the ‘average’ Islamic bank 
which engages in some level of PLS while in fact predominantly relying on non-PLS 
alternatives. 
Group 3 on the other hand depicts a distinctly different set of banks which engage in 
PLS considerably more than banks in the other two groups. The mean PLS-F and PLS-
MEA values for this group are over five times larger than group 2’s. Expectedly, the 
difference in means across the groups is highly statistically significant. The range of 
PLS levels also highlights the difference between the groups. The maximum PLS-F 
value for example is almost twice the maximum for Islamic banks in group 2 while the 
minimum PLS-MEA value for group 3 banks is almost the same as the maximum PLS-
MEA for Islamic banks in group 2. The one notable exception is the minimum value for 
121 Having defined the quasi-conventional group (deductively) enables this study to make this distinction 
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PLS-F (3.87%) which belongs to Al-Salam Bank (ASB, 2009)122. As this bank has an 
extremely high PLS-MEA level (56.92%), it is closer to the group 3’s centroid than 
group 2’s when both PLS-F and PLS-MEA are considered together and therefore it is 
allocated to group 3. Although this observation is an outlier (with relatively low PLS-F 
compared to others), the inclusion and exclusion of this bank does not lead to any 
significant change in results. While excluding ASB (2009) from group 3 changes the 
minimum PLS-F value to 12.85%, the mean (standard deviation) changes by 1% point 
to 21.98% (5.81%). The maximum PLS-MEA changes to 54% while the mean 
(standard deviation) changes to 36.78% (10.27%), which is also a change of 
approximately 1% point. The clustering solution, i.e. the number of clusters and group 
membership, also remain unchanged with/without inclusion of this observation. In 
relation to group membership, it is notable that this group does not comprise any 
CBIWs, rather there are only 18 Islamic bank-year observations in this group, making 
this the smallest of three group of banks. With notably high PLS levels, these banks 
nevertheless represent an important minority which show evidence of actively pursuing 
PLS-oriented strategies in formulating their financing and investment portfolios and 
thus are clearly operating closer to the principle of PLS than other banks in the industry.  
Given the characteristics of each group discussed above, parallels can be drawn 
between the cluster analysis results and the groups identified from the 2012 analysis 
(see discussion on typology presented in section 4.4). Figure 4.5 below illustrates this as 
it shows that, in addition to the quasi-conventional banks, the groups generated by 
cluster analysis are consistent, in principle, with the groups identified from the 2012 
analysis. There is a difference in the bounds defining the groups across the single and 
multi-year analysis. However, this is unsurprising as PLS levels vary in banks over time 
and the bounds (minimum/maximum) and the centroids (means) are defined such that 
these describe the cluster characteristics based on its constituents. As new observations 
are added, the recomputed centroids and bounds change to reflect the characteristics of 
cluster members. With additional data (e.g. further years), these are likely to change 
further. Nevertheless, despite the difference in the bounds and group means, the cluster 
analysis with three years additional data validate the main conclusions drawn from the 
2012 analysis. As the results show the Islamic banking industry does not comprise a 
122 As was discussed earlier in section 4.5 (in relation to table 4.6), the low PLS-F level reflects the 
changes in the bank which arose due to the acquisition of a conventional bank (BSB in 2009).  
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homogeneous group of banks that are all indistinguishable from conventional banks, 
contrary to the criticism presented in the literature. Furthermore, evidence from the 
multi-year sample still supports the presence of three distinct groups of banks in the  
Figure 4.5: Mapping Identified Groups onto Cluster Analysis Results 
 
Islamic banking industry123. Group 1, as defined earlier, comprise quasi-conventional 
banks which are materially indistinguishable from their conventional counterparts; 
group 2 represents the hybrid banks which engage in PLS financing but rely 
predominantly on non-PLS alternatives while group 3 comprise of PLS-oriented banks 
which show clear evidence of pursuing PLS-oriented strategies, with almost 40% of 
their major earnings assets (financing and investment assets) in PLS form and over 20% 
of their financing portfolio comprising of the ideal PLS contracts of musharakah and 
mudarabah. These three groups demonstrate that important differences exist between 
groups of banks within the Islamic banking industry regarding the strategic position 
they have adopted in relation to the implementation of the PLS principle. Thus, results 
123 The possibility that any further years’ data may show more or less than 3 distinct groups cannot be 
ruled out, however over the 2009-2012 period, cluster analysis with the inducto-deductive approach 
adopted in this study supports the three group solution. 
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from the cluster analysis with multiple years’ data validate the typology of Islamic 
banks identified and discussed earlier which, in light of earlier discussion, can also be 
interpreted to support the presence of strategic groups in the Islamic banking industry. 
Finally, as figure 4.5 shows, both ITB (2010-12) and ASB (2009) stand out as outliers. 
For both banks, earlier discussions presented in section 4.4 and 4.5 respectively explain 
that the merger and acquisition undertaken by these banks during the sample period 
inevitably had an impact on their balance sheet structures which explain the observable 
pattern in their PLS levels. To ensure that the results are robust, the two-stage clustering 
procedures were run with the inclusion and exclusion of these outliers, results however 
remained unchanged i.e. banks were allocated to the same clusters. Therefore, for 
completeness, these bank-observations are included in the analysis and figure 4.5.  
While the evidence discussed above supports the presence of three distinct groups, the 
question whether group membership is stable remains. To answer this, a closer look at 
each group’s constituent banks is required. Table 4.10 below presents the list of banks 
assigned to each group from the cluster analysis. Banks which remain within the same 
group throughout the sample period are listed by name only. For banks which move 
groups, the years for which they are a member of the relevant group are also presented. 
As table 4.10 shows, group membership is highly stable throughout the three groups. 
Less than 3% of the bank-year observations move groups over the studied period. These 
include BWB, which has moved from the hybrid to the quasi-conventional group over 
the 2011-12 period and CBD and ENBD which have moved in the opposite direction 
over the sample period. Importantly, there has been no change in the PLS-oriented 
group, which comprise of the same five banks that were identified as constituents of 
this group from the 2012 analysis. Results on group membership from cluster analysis 
and the 2012 analysis are therefore consistent. Moreover, while these results indicate 
that banks can change their strategic positioning on PLS sufficiently to move between 
groups, stability in group membership is the dominant feature of each group. Stable 
group membership therefore supports the conclusion that important differences do exist 
in the adoption and implementation of the PLS principle between banks.  
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Table 4.10: Cluster Analysis: Bank Group Membership 
 
4.6 Further Analysis: Investigating the Variation in PLS Financing 
between Banks 
Results from the preceding sections show that the adoption of PLS financing contracts 
varies between banks, with some banks having notably higher PLS-F levels than others. 
As PLS investment assets, such as equity securities, do not incur the additional 
transaction costs associated with PLS financing, the fundamental question arises: why 
do some banks have higher levels of PLS financing than others? The current Islamic 
banking literature has not addressed this question as variation in PLS financing levels 
between banks has not been studied. This section aims to overcome this gap in the 
literature by investigating this question.  
To achieve this, data on PLS-F for the four-year period (2009 – 2012) is used. All 
conventional banks without Islamic windows (i.e. which do not engage in any form of 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
(Quasi-Conventional Banks) (Hyrbid Banks) (PLS-Oriented Banks)
Islamic Banks
AB ABG AJB
AHB ADIB ASB
ARB BAB BISB
BAJ BWB (2011) DIB
BWB (2012) ITB KCB
BYB MAR
KFH QIB
KIB QIIB
NIB 
SIB
WB
Conventional Banks 
with Islamic Windows
ANB ABC
AUB ADCB
CBD (2009-11) BSF
ENBD (2009-10) CBD (2012)
FGB DB
RB ENBD (2011-12)
SHB MB
SIVB NBAD
UAB QNB
SFG
UNB
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Islamic banking services, PLS or non-PLS) are excluded from the sample. The current 
sample therefore comprises of 41 banks, 23 Islamic and 18 conventional banks with 
Islamic windows. As some banks began operations during the sample period while 
others have missing data on some variables of interest, an unbalanced panel of 147 bank 
observations forms the final dataset.   
4.6.1 Identifying the Potential Determinants of PLS Financing  
Although the literature has not explicitly addressed the question why some banks may 
have higher PLS financing levels than others, some guidance from the literature can be 
found concerning factors which may influence a bank’s ability and decision to provide 
PLS financing. These are discussed below. 
Bank-Specific Characteristics 
The first potential determinant is the age of a bank. Controversial non-PLS financing 
modes, e.g. murabahah, were originally permitted by sharia scholars as ‘exceptions’ to 
support the transitional, introductory period of Islamic banking. Such financing modes 
were argued to provide Islamic banks with an essential starting point to establish 
themselves as viable institutions against conventional banks operating on interest-based 
lending. It was expected that over time, reliance on non-PLS financing would be 
replaced by a move towards the ideal PLS contracts (Ahmad, 1993; Khan, 1995; 
Usmani, 2004; Rehman, 2010; Warde, 2010). Thus, according to this ‘(controversial) 
means to an (Islamic) end’ argument, older Islamic banks should have higher PLS-F.  
The second potential determinant is the size of a bank. PLS financing requires close 
monitoring of clients to reduce moral hazard. Banks may therefore need to set up in-
person and on-site monitoring systems to verify declared profits from PLS-funded 
projects (Visser, 2009). This can be particularly expensive and difficult to standardise 
as the scale of the operation grows. Lack of standardisation in such monitoring systems 
may put large banks at a disadvantage (ibid; Čihak and Hesse 2008). Thus, there may 
be diseconomies of scale in the ‘ideal’, PLS mode of Islamic financing. To benefit from 
economies of scale, larger banks may turn towards the more standardised non-PLS 
alternatives. Some evidence in support of this has been found in an international sample 
of Islamic banks, where Aggarwal and Yousef (2000) find that the financing portfolio 
of larger banks is skewed more towards murabahah (non-PLS) than smaller banks. 
Thus, according to this ‘size matters’ argument, larger banks should have lower PLS-F. 
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The third potential determinant is the liability structure of the bank, particularly the 
reliance on depositor funds as the main source of funding. Azmat et al. (2015) put forth 
a theoretical proposition that a higher reliance on depositor funds will be associated 
with lower PLS financing because of depositors risk aversion and withdrawal risk that 
Islamic banks face. Venture capitalists face far less susceptibility to such withdrawal 
risk as they raise the required funds primarily from institutional investors and with 
approximately seven years commitment (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Islamic banks 
however, are reliant on risk-averse depositors which have short-term liquidity needs 
(Ahmed, 2002). To encourage such depositors to invest in PLS investments (with 
uncertain returns and the potential loss of capital), Islamic banks will need to charge a 
higher risk premium to the firms which they engage through PLS. This increases the 
cost of capital for the borrowing firms and thus reduces demand for this particular 
arrangement, dissuading firms to enter PLS arrangement with Islamic banks (Azmat et 
al., 2015). According to this argument then, banks which have a higher reliance on 
depositor funds as their main source of funding are likely to have lower PLS-F levels. 
Finally differences may also exist between full-fledged Islamic banks and conventional 
banks with Islamic windows, especially in light of the argument presented by Kuran 
(2004), suggesting that Islamic banking offers an “exploitable opportunity” for 
conventional banks in the GCC to enter a lucrative market in their region. If the 
provision of Islamic banking services is profit-motivated, conventional banks with 
Islamic windows may avoid PLS financing in favour of low-risk non-PLS alternatives 
which are equivalent to the conventional financial products. The 2012 analysis also 
illustrated that there is a significant difference in the average PLS-F level between 
Islamic and conventional banks with Islamic windows, the latter being lower than the 
former’s. Similarly PLS-F levels may also differ for banks which were previously 
conventional banks but converted to full-fledged Islamic banking. On the one hand, if 
conversion was motivated by religious reasons124, these banks may pursue PLS 
financing more intensely as they have chosen to change their business model for 
religious compliance. On the other hand, if the choice to convert was strategically 
motivated, i.e. to enter the increasingly important Islamic banking market in the GCC 
region, then PLS-F levels are likely to be lower in converted banks, as these banks can 
124 Note: local conventional banks in the GCC are also owned and run by Muslims 
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adopt an ‘Islamic’ identity while keeping their operations fundamentally the same 
through the use of less costly non-PLS modes of financing. It is therefore important to 
control for differences in bank type when investigating PLS-F levels between banks. 
Institutional Environment  
Another important factor is the institutional environment in which a bank operates. The 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature discusses in detail the importance of 
institutions, both formal (e.g. property rights) and informal (e.g. customs), in shaping 
economic behaviour. Institutions represent man-made constraints that structure socio, 
economic and political interactions. Essentially these “provide the incentive structure of 
an economy” and as such have a direct impact on production and transacation costs 
associated with economic interactions (North, 1991, p.97; Williamson, 1985, see also 
Abdul-Rahman et al., 2014 for a summary and discussion in the context of Islamic 
banking). Chapter 3 discussed at length the importance of the institutional environment 
and its impact on transaction costs associated with PLS financing125. As was discussed 
earlier, the lack of a supportive institutional environment is recognised as one of the key 
factors for the low adoption of PLS financing contracts by Islamic banks (Iqbal et al., 
1998; Chapra, 2007). It can therefore be expected that banks are likely to have higher 
PLS-F levels in countries which provide an institutional network supporting Islamic 
banking and have adopted policies which are favourable for PLS over debt-based 
financing. The below summarises important differences between GCC countries, noting 
especially the factors which are systematically different in Bahrain and UAE compared 
to the other GCC nations, that are likely to have an impact on PLS levels.  
The Effect of Formal Institutions on Trust and Transaction Costs  
Institutions play an important economic role in reducing transaction costs (Dahlman, 
1979). In transactions where there is a principal/agent relationship, such that the agents’ 
actions are not costless to monitor and economic incentives do not suffice in aligning 
principal/agent interest, alternative relationships such as trust between parties is 
required to ensure that the agents do not cheat, even when it is the “rational economic 
behaviour” to do so (Arrow, 1968, p.538). By increasing confidence between 
transacting parties, trust reduces transaction costs as fewer resources are expended in 
monitoring the agent’s actions. It further makes drafting contracts easier and less costly 
125 Refer to section 3.6 for further details 
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since not all possible contingencies need to be specified at the outset, and as imperfect 
contracts are more effective in trusting relationships, disputes and therefore litigation is 
also less likely.  The “genetic predisposition to cooperate [however] is unlikely to vary 
across societies…variations in trust across societies must [therefore] be attributable to 
differences in the social, economic and legal environments” (Zak and Knack, 2001, 
p.299). 
One of the key determinants of trust in societies is the strength of formal126 institutions, 
established to protect contractual rights and restrain government expropriation of funds 
(Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). A measure of formal institutions 
therefore includes the strength of the judicial system including protection of property 
rights and more generally the efficacy of the state including levels of corruption (ibid; 
Herreros and Criado, 2008). According to the Global Competitiveness Report (2011-
2012) issued by the World Economic Forum (henceforth, GCR, 2012), Bahrain tops the 
GCC region for the strength of property rights. Strong property rights reduce risk 
associated with transactions as it guarantees that contractual rights will be upheld, and 
therefore has a positive impact on social trust (Zak and Knack, 2001; Herreros and 
Criado 2008). A strong judicial system which enforces contracts and punishes cheaters 
also limits the incentives for cheating (Zak and Knack, 2001). When moral hazard is 
low, equity contracts dominates debt (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). PLS financing is 
likely to be higher in such environments, especially as third-party enforcement agencies 
subsidise the costs of contract enforcement for the parties involved, including Islamic 
banks.  
Secondly, the impact institutions have on trust levels in a society is not automatic and 
depends on the credibility and legitimacy of the institutions as well as the state which 
creates them (Herreros and Criado, 2008). The state as an enforcement agency has to be 
legitimate in order to enhance trust between parties that do not share personal ties such 
126 As Zak and Knack (2001) note informal institutions also aid in constraining opportunism by agents 
through channels such as reputational effects, religious beliefs and moral norms. Anecdotal evidence 
confirms this, as Baele et al (2014) find default rate on Islamic banks loans to be lower than conventional 
banks even amongst the same borrowers. Informal institutions are also important as all economic 
transactions are embedded within a social context, which determines both the rewards associated with 
cooperation as well as punishments for deviation (Becker, 1974; Granovetter, 1985; Grief, 1989), and 
therefore have a bearing on the size of transaction costs associated with any financial arrangement 
(Williamson, 1985). This is especially evident from the success of PLS financing modes in early Islamic 
societies when equity (in particular the PLS arrangements) rather than debt financing was the norm 
(Udovitch, 1981 in Chapra 2007; Kuran 2005) 
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as family bonds. Confidence between parties in such cases stems from credibility of 
governance structures (Korczynski, 2000). For PLS financing especially, where banks 
enter into risk-sharing arrangements, this source of trust is extremely important to 
sustain a joint liability relationship. With regards to indicators of corruption, both UAE 
and Bahrain fare better than the other GCC countries. Bahrain ranks highest for the lack 
of diversion of public funds and UAE ranks highest for lack of irregular payments and 
bribes, whilst Kuwait is the lowest ranking GCC country for proxies of corruption and 
state efficacy127 (GCR, 2012). A high rank on indicators of low corruption is a positive 
sign of the government’s credibility and trust placed in the institutional environment. 
Where trust in governance structures is lacking, collateralised loans whether 
conventional or sharia-compliant alternatives e.g. murabahah are naturally preferred. 
Finally, where formal institutions are underwritten by a government’s strong 
commitment to support development of the financial sector, government policies reflect 
this. Bahrain tops the GCC region for transparency of government policy (GCR, 2012), 
which supports long term business planning and investment evaluations including the 
selection of production technologies which are optimal over the long-run. Such an 
environment is especially conducive for PLS financing, which is better suited to long 
term projects due to the time diversification effect of equity (Dar et al., 1999). 
The ‘Financial Centre’ Status  
One of the key distinctions between Bahrain, the UAE and other GCC countries is that 
the former two are regional finance hubs. Bahrain is in fact the “global centre for 
Islamic finance” (Baba, 2007,  p.384). In pursuit of diversifying the sources of national 
wealth away from oil reserves128, the Bahraini government worked towards establishing 
its country as the centre of finance in the Middle East, starting with the offshore 
banking sector in 1975 and fully embracing Islamic finance in the late 1970s (Baba, 
2007). The country is now the regional specialist in finance, with 406 financial 
institutions, 117 banking institutions (28 retail and 76 wholesale banks); 151 insurance 
companies and organisations; 61 investment business institutions and 2827 authorised 
127 These include diversion of public funds, irregular payments and bribes and transparency of 
government policymaking. 
128 Bahrain is the lowest ranked country in the GCC for oil reserves. In 2011, Bahrain as a share of the 
GCC held only 0.5% of the value of hydrocarbon reserves. Source: BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2013 (Global Finance Magazine, 2014) and BP Review of World Energy, QNB Capital Estimates 
(Zawya, 2012) 
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funds (Central Bank of Bahrain, 2014). After Bahrain, UAE is the second most 
concentrated financial centre of the region, with 366 financial institutions including 51 
commercial banks and 120 representative offices of foreign banks (Central Bank of 
UAE, 2014). In the last decade, UAE has moved towards becoming the regions’ finance 
hub through the establishment of an onshore capital market, the Dubai International 
Finance Centre (DIFC) in 2002 and has even advanced towards the establishment of 
Islamic-specific institutions (Baba, 2007). Bahrain nevertheless, remains the world 
leader in Islamic finance with Bahraini banks ranking highest for soundness in the GCC 
region129 (GCR, 2012).  
Moreover, as was highlighted in chapter 3, Bahrain has played a critical role in 
modernising the regulatory environment for Islamic banking by establishing standard-
setting and industry coordination bodies. As illustrated in table 4.11, more than half of 
the international Islamic infrastructure institutions, created to support the Islamic 
financial industry, are located in Bahrain. 
Table 4.11: Islamic Infrastructure Institutions 
                        
Sources: Iqbal and Molyneux (2005); Iqbal (2007) and Baba (2007) in Handbook of Islamic           
Banking (Hassan and Lewis, 2007). 
The presence of such institutions aimed specifically at supporting Islamic finance is 
likely to have a positive impact on banks’s propensity to engage in the ideal form of 
129 The Prudential Information and Regulations for Islamic Banks (PIRI) framework introduced by the 
Bahrain Monetary Agency in early 2002 covers liquidity management, asset quality and capital adequacy 
(Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005) whilst AAOIFI reporting standards work to establish greater market 
discipline through standardised accounting and auditing standard which increases transparency and 
therefore consumer and investor confidence in the banking sector. 
Institution and Year of Establishment Country 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI, 1991)
Bahrain
General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions 
(CIBAFI, 2001)
Bahrain
International Islamic Centre for Reconciliation and Commercial 
Arbitration for Islamic Finance Industry (IICRA, 2005)
United Arab 
Emirates
International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM, 2002) Bahrain
International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA, 2002) Bahrain
Islamic Development Bank Group (IDB, 1975) Saudi Arabia
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB, 2002) Malaysia
Liquidity Management Centre (LMC, 2002) Bahrain
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Islamic financing i.e. PLS. Moreover, with 5 of 8 Islamic infrastructure institutions 
being in Bahrain, the country undoubtedly benefits from institutional 
complementarity130, which is absent in the other GCC countries. For Islamic banks to 
undertake PLS financing, a supportive network of institutions is required which lowers 
costs associated with asymmetric information (Iqbal et al., 1998; Chapra, 2007).  In 
Bahrain, a cluster of supportive legal, accounting and advisory firms specialising in 
Islamic finance exist, in addition to the Islamic-finance-specific infrastructure 
institutions mentioned in table 4.11. In UAE as well, an Islamic-finance-specific 
arbitration avenue, the IICRA has been established to resolve financial and commercial 
disputes between Islamic banks, their clients and any third parties through 
reconciliation and arbitration according to the sharia (IICRA, 2013). While litigation on 
average costs 20% of the disputed amount, an out-of-court settlement costs 
approximately 17% (Iqbal, 2007). By lowering the costs associated with any disputes in 
PLS arrangements e.g. mudarabah, where the negligence of the entrepreneur needs to 
be proven so that full financial burden does not fall on Islamic banks, institutions such 
as IICRA are likely to increase confidence to undertake more complex forms of Islamic 
financing including PLS compared to the standardised debt-financing contracts131.  
Compared to these countries, Kuwait and Qatar do not host any major Islamic finance 
specific institution. Saudi Arabia, however does host the IDB, however as this 
institution is aimed specifically at promoting trade and development in the Muslim 
world, its remit does not focus precisely on supporting Islamic banking institutions 
(Warde, 2000). Therefore the impact of IDB on banks’ propensity to engage with PLS 
may not be as strong especially as Saudi Arabia, which is major oil producing state, has 
not focused on establishing an institutional network for the finance sector which would 
allow the country to benefit from institutional complementarity as is present in Bahrain 
and UAE, which hold the ‘financial centre’ status in the GCC region.  
130 Complementarity refers to the extent to which one institution “enhances the usefulness of another” 
(Kuran, 2009, p.601-2). 
131 Although IICRA operates internationally, the uptake of its services is likely to be higher in UAE, 
where it is headquartered due to the local presence, which is likely to support the provision of PLS 
financing by local UAE banks 
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Tax Policy   
Finally, one of the most influential government policies which directly impact the 
provision of PLS financing is the tax policy. Disadvantageous tax regimes, where 
profits are taxed but interest is exempted as a cost item, have been noted as an 
important reason for Islamic banks to avoid PLS (Baele et al., 2014). The impact of tax 
can be considerable, as evident from the case of mudarabah companies in Pakistan 
which grew considerably before the withdrawal of their tax-exempt status in 1992 (Dar 
et al., 1999). Such policies also intensify agency problems. Entrepreneurs have an 
incentive to underreport profits, not only from the desire to keep a bigger share, but also 
due to discriminatory tax treatment. In developing countries where tax evasion is a 
particularly serious problem, Islamic banks face the problem of receiving a share of 
profit, calculated using the entrepreneurs’ official financial accounts which are created 
for tax purposes (Kuran, 1995; Visser, 2009). Elimination of discriminatory tax regimes 
therefore reduces the competitive advantage debt holds over equity financing. It also 
reduces incentive to cheat by underreporting profits for tax purposes. As shown in table 
4.12, the only two countries in the GCC with a 0% corporate income tax rate are 
Bahrain and UAE, which is certainly more favourable towards PLS financing than the 
rates in other GCC countries. Even in countries e.g. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, where 
interest is not tax deductible, the rate at which interest is taxed is lower than equity, 
making debt financing more competitive132. 
132 Note, that a favourable tax regime alone is not sufficient to induce PLS financing as evident from the 
experience of Turkey (Kuran, 1995). Such policies work effectively only when embedded in an 
environment that is supportive of PLS arrangements and overcoming the problems of asymmetric 
information more broadly. This again highlights the importance that institutional complementarity holds 
for government policies to have the intended effect. 
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Table 4.12: Corporate Income Tax Rates in the GCC133 
Source: The 2012 Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, Ernst & Young (2012a). 
Given these differences amongst the GCC nations, which as discussed above may be 
important factors affecting bank’s choice to engage in PLS, it is deemed important to 
control for country level differences when investigating why some banks have higher 
PLS-F levels than others.  
4.6.2 Method: Econometric Modelling  
To investigate the variation in PLS-F levels between banks, the random effects model is 
used in this study134. In doing so, the approach proposed by Mundlak (1978) is applied, 
which extends the random effects model by including means of the individual time-
varying independent variables as regressors to avoid the bias introduced by the 
correlation between the independent variables and the unobserved effects. Mundlak’s 
approach is commonly used as a “compromise between the fixed and random effects 
models” (Greene, 2011, p.421). The fixed effects model, which cannot accommodate 
the estimation of time-invariant regressors, could not be used as several variables of 
interest in this study (e.g. bank type) are time-invariant. Previous Islamic banking 
studies which seek to include time-invariant regressors have also adopted the random 
effects model (see. e.g. Doumpos et al., 2017) and recent conventional banking studies 
(e.g. Mergaerts and Vennet, 2016) have specifically used the Mundlak’s approach, as it 
explores both the within and the between dimensions simultaneously. An additional 
benefit of using the Mundlak’s specification is that it provides an alternative approach 
for the Hausman test. The statistical significance of the estimated coefficients for the 
group means, can be used to test if the assumption made by the random-effects 
133 Oil and gas companies are subject to different tax rates  
134 Pooled OLS was also inititally run however the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test 
results (Prob>chi2 = 0.000) supported random effects specification.  
Country Corporate Income 
Tax Rate
Notes
Bahrain 0%
Kuwait 15%
Interest is tax deductible. Rent on leases is also tax 
deductible subject to supporting documents meeting 
Kuwait tax authority requirements.
Oman 12% Interest is tax deductible
Qatar 10% Interest payments are subject to 7% withholding tax
Saudi Arabia 20% Interest payments are subject to 5% withholding tax
United Arab Emirates 0%
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estimator (i.e. the observed variables are uncorrelated with the unobserved variables) 
holds for individual regressors (Greene, 2011; Perales, 2013; Bell and Jones, 2014; 
Mergaerts and Vennet, 2016).  
In practice, the following equation is estimated in this study: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾 +  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the PLS-F level (i.e. PLS financing as percentage of total financing) for 
bank i in country c in year t.  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′  contains variables capturing bank-specific 
characteristics, which have been identified from previous literature as potential 
determinants of PLS financing. These include: Age, measured as the number of years 
from incorporation of a bank till end of 2012 inclusive135; Size, proxied by the natural 
logarithm of banks’ total assets measured in 2010 constant US$ billion; Deposit ratio, 
which is measured as deposits as a percentage of total assets; Convert and CBIW which 
are dummy variables where Convert takes value 1 if a bank converted from 
conventional to Islamic banking and CBIW takes value 1 for conventional banks with 
Islamic window136. The term 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′  includes bank-specific averages of only the time-
varying variables over the sample period included in 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′  (i.e. size and deposit ratio). 
The within and between parameters for the time-varying variables, size and deposit 
ratio, are given by ?̂?𝛽 and (?̂?𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾�) respectively. As noted by Mergaerts and Vennet 
(2016), this model specification not only accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity and 
correlation between the explanatory variables (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
′ ) and the unobserved effects (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), 
but also exploits the cross-sectional dispersion in the data and therefore offers an 
intuitive interpretation: the within parameters reflect the impact of changes in banks 
over time while the between parameters reflect the impact of differences across banks.  
135 The year of incorporation is counted as a full year if the bank has been incorporated for full 6 months 
of that year; otherwise, the following year is taken as the first full year. For Islamic banks that have 
converted from conventional banking, the year when conversion began is used instead of the year of 
incorporation, as the latter refers to the establishment of the conventional bank and does not accurately 
represent the number of years the bank has been operating as an Islamic bank. For ARB, 1987 is used as 
the year of incorporation in accordance with the information provided in the bank’s annual report.      
136 Additional analysis was conducted to examine: 1) the relationship between Sharia Supervisory Board 
(SSB) members and PLS-F, to examine the influence of certain sharia scholars; and 2) if the geographical 
reach of a bank’s operations i.e. whether it operates mainly in the domestic or international market 
(another proxy for size) has an effect on PLS-F levels. No clear relationship was found in either case. 
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The model also includes, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 which captures differences in the institutional environment 
across countries, the importance of which has been discussed earlier. How favourable 
the institutional environment of a country is for PLS is difficult to measure empirically. 
Although numerical scores indicating the quality of individual institutions e.g. property 
rights, judicial independence etc. can be gained from sources such as the annual Global 
Competitiveness Report issued by the World Economic Forum, these reports do not 
measure the presence and quality of Islamic finance specific institutions created to 
support the industry. Moreover, the scores for individual institutions do not capture the 
‘complementarity’ effect (Kuran, 2009), which as was discussed in chapter 3 and 
above, has been recognised as a crucial component for promoting PLS. Furthermore, as 
institutions are slow to develop and change, there are unlikely to be significant changes 
in the institutional environment of a country within the four-year sample period 
considered in this study. The Global Competitiveness Reports demonstrate this as there 
is very little change in the scores issued to the GCC countries over the 2009 – 2012 
period137. Including country dummies in the model offers a pragmatic and parsimonious 
way of capturing differences in the institutional environment across countries including 
the effect of various (general and Islamic banking specific) institutions, their 
complementarity, the impact of government policies as well as other macroeconomic 
conditions138.  
Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the estimated model are presented in 
table 4.13 below. 
137 See for example Global Competitiveness Report (2012) for comparison between 2012 and 2011 and 
preceding years’ reports for comparison between earlier years. 
138 Year dummies are also included to control for any differences across the individual years 
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Table 4.13: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables by Bank type and Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conventional banks with Islamic windows are abbreviated as CBIW. 
 
As the figures show, Islamic banks on average have higher PLS-F than conventional 
banks with Islamic windows (CBIWs) however there is also greater variation in the 
former than the latter. Islamic banks are also younger but smaller in size and have lower 
deposit ratio than CBIWs. There is also a notable difference in PLS-F levels across 
countries. Bahrain has the highest average PLS-F (10.34%) while Kuwait’s average 
PLS-F is zero. Saudi banks are on average the oldest banks while Kuwaiti banks are the 
youngest. The average age for banks in the sample is 22 years however there is 
considerable variation as the youngest banks in the sample are 1 year old compared to 
the oldest which is 55 years. On average Bahraini and Kuwaiti banks are the smallest 
while Saudi banks are the largest and also have the highest average deposit ratio. The 
lowest variation in deposit ratio is amongst UAE banks and the greatest variation is 
amongst the Qatari banks. Only UAE and Saudi banks have higher than average deposit 
Mean St Dev Min Max Mean St Dev Min Max       
By Bank Type
Islamic 6.12 8.98 0.00 35.74 13 12.23 1 38
CBIW 1.14 2.24 0.00 10.11 33 11.74 2 55
All 3.94 7.31 0.00 35.74 22 15.55 1 55
By Country
Bahrain 10.34 10.35 0.00 35.74 15 11.88 1 34
Kuwait 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12 14.02 1 36
Qatar 2.16 3.81 0.00 14.99 23 15.92 1 49
Saudi Arabia 1.94 3.31 0.00 10.11 29 13.75 4 55
UAE 3.90 7.80 0.00 32.01 23 16.10 1 46
All 3.94 7.31 0.00 35.74 22 15.55 1 55
  PLS-F (%) Age    
            
By Bank Type
Islamic
CBIW
All
By Country
Bahrain
Kuwait
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
UAE
All
      
      Mean St Dev Min Max Mean St Dev Min Max
  
1.87 1.13 -0.85 4.23 62.28 19.99 0.33 83.33
3.32 0.76 0.75 4.57 66.86 8.82 38.16 79.31
2.52 1.22 -0.85 4.57 64.37 16.03 0.33 83.33
 
1.86 1.22 0.11 3.36 59.67 15.76 32.88 83.33
1.86 1.48 -0.85 3.92 56.62 17.92 10.76 74.12
2.44 1.12 -0.51 4.57 55.58 25.22 0.33 77.89
 3.04 0.80 1.54 4.23 72.20 13.87 8.65 83.09
2.65 1.26 -0.63 4.39 66.27 6.84 40.80 79.02
2.52 1.22 -0.85 4.57 64.37 16.03 0.33 83.33
Deposit Ratio (%) Ln (Total Assets) 
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ratios. Finally, as none of the Kuwaiti banks engage in PLS financing (PLS-F is zero for 
this country), Kuwait is selected as the reference case (excluded country) during the 
estimation. Results are presented and discussed below. 
4.6.3 Results from the Econometric Analysis 
Table 4.14 presents the regression results. Firstly, as the table shows, both coefficients 
for the group means (mean size and mean deposit ratio) are not statistically significant. 
Test of joint significance also yield consistent results (p = 0.1856). Recall from the 
preceding section, that the significance test for the estimated coefficients on the group 
means is an alternative to the Hausman test for the consistency of the random effects 
estimation (Greene, 2011; Perales, 2013; Bell and Jones, 2014). In this case, results 
confirm that the assumption made by the random-effects estimator hold for the 
individual regressors. 
As the table shows, there is no strong evidence in support of the ‘(controversial) means 
to an (Islamic) end’ argument, noted in prior literature (Ahmad, 1993; Khan, 1995; 
Usmani, 2004; Rehman, 2010; Warde, 2010). While the estimated coefficient on age is 
positive, suggesting that PLS-F increases with bank age, it is not statistically 
significant. The estimated coefficient for size however is negative and significant at the 
5% level. As explained earlier, the within and between parameters for the time-varying 
variables are given by ?̂?𝛽 and (?̂?𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾�) respectively. Therefore the within effect amounts 
to -5.61 while the between effect is smaller at -1.75. Nevertheless, as both are negative, 
results suggest that as the size of a bank increases, its PLS-F decreases and larger banks 
have lower PLS-F levels than smaller ones. This finding supports the proposition 
presented in earlier literature that there may be diseconomies of scale in the provision of 
PLS financing (see e.g. Čihak and Hesse, 2008; Visser, 2009). These results are also 
consistent with the findings of Aggarwal and Yousef (2000) who found in an 
international sample of Islamic banks, that the financing portfolio of larger banks is 
skewed more towards murabahah (non-PLS) than smaller banks. 
Table 4.14 also shows that there is a positive relationship between PLS-F and deposit 
ratio. The within parameter (0.25) is highly significant, indicating that an increase in 
deposit ratio within a bank leads to an increase in its PLS-F level. The impact of higher 
deposit ratio between banks is not as large, as the between parameter amounts to 0.12. 
Nevertheless, the impact on PLS-F is still positive. This finding is at odds with the  
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Table 4.14 Determinants of PLS-F: Results from Mundlak (1978) Estimation  
 
theoretical proposition put forth by Azmat et al. (2015), who postulate that a higher 
reliance on depositor funds will be associated with lower PLS financing due to 
depositors’ risk aversion and potential withdrawal risk faced by Islamic banks. 
Empirical evidence from this study however shows that once bank size, age, type and 
country effects have been controlled, there is a positive and significant relationship 
between a higher deposit ratio and PLS financing. This could simply be because 
depositors’ funds are a cheap source of finance for banks compared to genuine PLS 
(equity) capital, as banks pay no return on current accounts (Visser, 2009) and do not in 
practice follow a PLS arrangement with investment account holders (Warde, 2000; 
Zaher and Hassan, 2001; El-Hawary et al., 2007; Visser, 2009; Khan 2010). Given the 
higher risks associated with PLS financing, Islamic banks are expected to charge a 
Dependent Variable: PLS-F Coefficient Standard Error P Value
Age 0.11 0.073 0.125
Size (Ln Total Assets)    -5.61** 2.410 0.020
Deposit Ratio       0.25*** 0.067 0.000
Converted -6.23* 3.248 0.055
CBIW     -6.33*** 2.378 0.008
Bahrain     10.12*** 3.382 0.003
Qatar 2.52 3.487 0.469
Saudi 3.24 3.376 0.337
UAE   5.37* 3.198 0.093
Mean Size (Ln Total Assets ) 3.86 2.572 0.133
Mean Deposit Ratio -0.13 0.090 0.152
Constant -3.03 4.259 0.477
Observations 147
Number of Banks 41
Wald Chi sq. 53.3
Prob > chi sq. 0.000
R squared (within) 0.1352
R squared (between) 0.5343
R squared (overall) 0.4894
The model is estimated using  the Mundlak (1978) estimator Kuwait is the excluded 
country. Estimations use year dummies to control for any differences across the individual 
years. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the bank level. *, **, *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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premium on PLS financing contracts which, would suggest that the higher returns 
earned through PLS arrangements, would accrue (almost) entirely to the bank, 
encouraging them to undertake PLS financing contracts using depositors’ fund. 
Turning now to the control variables, as the results show, converted Islamic banks and 
conventional banks with Islamic windows, on average, have 6% lower PLS-F value 
than full-fledged Islamic banks. The relationship between conversion and PLS-F is 
therefore indicative of strategic behaviour whereby converting to Islamic banking 
appears to be a tactical decision on part of conventional banks in the GCC to enter the 
increasingly important Islamic banking market in their region. By relying on non-PLS 
financing, which mimic conventional loans, these converted banks have adopted an 
‘Islamic’ identity while keeping their operations fundamentally the same. Similarly, as 
conventional banks with Islamic windows have lower PLS-F levels, results also support 
Kuran (2004)’s position which contends that the provision of Islamic banking services 
has been a profit-motivated opportunity taken up by conventional banks to enter a 
growing market in their region, and therefore these banks, on average, favour low-risk 
non-PLS alternatives to PLS financing. 
Finally, as table 4.14 shows, country effects are highly significant. Relative to Kuwait 
(the reference country), banks in Bahrain have on average 10% higher PLS-F values 
while banks in UAE have 5% higher PLS-F. These are both statistically significant, the 
former at 1% and the latter at 10% level of significance. Although, the coefficients are 
positive for both Qatar and Saudi, these are not statistically significant. These findings 
therefore suggest that operating in Bahrain and UAE results in higher PLS-F levels than 
other countries. As discussed earlier, there are notable differences between these two 
countries especially Bahrain and the other GCC nations, in terms of their institutional 
environment being more favourable towards the finance sector in general and Islamic 
finance in particular. The significant and positive effect attached to Bahrain and UAE 
can therefore be attributed to the supportive institutional environment that these 
countries offer. In particular, Bahrain undoubtedly benefits from institutional 
complementarity, having created an environment conducive for Islamic financing, 
through hosting a cluster of Islamic infrastructure institutions geared to support the 
Islamic finance industry (noted earlier in table 4.11), and a nexus of legal, accounting 
and advisory firms specialising in Islamic finance, which are absent in the other GCC 
nations. Strong collective institutions create the environment for higher system trust 
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(Korczynski, 2000) which reduces agency problems and associated costs, making PLS a 
more competitive financing option relative to debt (Iqbal et al., 1998; Chapra, 2007). 
Given the well-developed financial infrastructure, supportive institutions and 
government policies e.g. non-discriminatory tax regimes, the transaction costs 
associated with PLS financing are likely to be lower in Bahrain and to some extent 
UAE. Of course, no single factor can explain the higher adoption of PLS financing in 
some countries or banks over others and variation in PLS-F is likely to be a 
consequence of a combination of external factors and bank-specific internal factors 
such as strategic choices. Nevertheless, to the extent that formal institutions including 
property rights and state efficacy foster trust and reduce costs associated with 
asymmetric information, cluster of specialised institutions generate complementarity 
and impartial tax policies reduce the competitive advantage debt holds over equity 
financing, these result suggest the institutional environment matters for PLS financing 
and thus helps in explaining the systematic differences in PLS-F levels across banks in 
the GCC countries. 
Finally, in evaluating the model, the overall r-squared suggests that the model performs 
fairly well (r-squared 0.50). The difference in the within and between r-squared 
however does indicate that the model performs relatively better in explaining 
differences in PLS-F between banks (r-squared 0.53) as opposed to within banks (r-
squared 0.16). This is somewhat expected as most of the regressors are time-invariant 
and the focus of this study is on identifying why PLS levels differ between banks, as 
opposed to a focus on within bank changes. It is also likely that differences in PLS-F 
levels arising within banks as well as between different banks operating within a single 
country are driven by strategic choices, which need further research to be studied 
thoroughly. Future research should therefore consider expanding the sample period to 
examine within-bank variation in PLS-F and consider primary sources of data e.g. 
interviews with bank management to gauge the impact of bank-specific strategies on the 
adoption of PLS financing.  
4.7 Conclusion  
The Islamic banking industry has been subject to serious criticism, to the extent that 
many academics have dismissed the entire industry as “indistinguishable” from 
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conventional banking (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Zaman and Movassaghi, 2002; 
Kuran, 2004; El-Gamal, 2006; Chong and Liu, 2009; Khan, 2010, p.805; Beck et al., 
2013). Lack of profit-and-loss-sharing (PLS) financing and the nature of non-PLS 
financial instruments which dominate the industry are at the core of this criticism. By 
dismissing the entire industry, the current literature implicitly implies that all Islamic 
banks are equally unIslamic and that the industry comprises of a homogeneous group of 
banks, with equally negligible levels of PLS financing. 
This chapter has investigated this issue in three parts. First, two measures of PLS have 
been used to assess and compare Islamic banks, Islamic windows and conventional 
banks. Using cross-sectional data initially, this chapter showed that there is significant 
heterogeneity in PLS levels existing within the Islamic banking industry. This chapter 
summarised this in form of a typology, identifying three broad but distinct groups of 
Islamic banks. In the second part, cluster analysis is applied to a pooled dataset 
covering 2009 – 2012 period, to validate the typology identified. As the results showed, 
the presence of three groups is verified and group membership is found to be extremely 
stable. As this chapter discussed, empirical evidence shows that Islamic banks follow 
different business models with regards to the PLS principle and therefore the industry 
can be seen as comprising of different strategic groups, where each group has adopted a 
distinct position on the adoption and implementation of the PLS principle. While some 
Islamic banks operate as quasi-conventional banks, focusing entirely on non-PLS 
financing contracts and only follow the PLS principle through holding PLS 
investments, others adopt a very different position. PLS-oriented banks for example 
hold substantial portions of their financing portfolio in the form of ‘ideal’ musharakah 
and mudarabah contracts, despite the higher transaction costs associated with PLS 
financing, while hybrid banks operate in between these two extremes.  
Thus, comparison of Islamic and conventional banks confirms that while some Islamic 
banks are genuinely indistinguishable from conventional counterparts and in some cases 
even less PLS-oriented, others are notably different. The highest ranking Islamic bank 
for example holds over 50% of its financing and investment assets in PLS form. As the 
chapter showed, the assumption that the Islamic banking industry comprises of a 
homogeneous group of banks that are all indistinguishable from conventional 
counterparts is empirically invalid. As some Islamic banks follow a more PLS oriented 
business model, these can indeed be considered more Islamic than others.  
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The final part of the chapter examined the question: why do some banks have higher 
levels of PLS financing than others? Mundlak (1978)’s approach was used to estimate 
the relationship between PLS financing and factors identified from the literature as its 
potential determinants. Results showed that there is some support to suggest that 
diseconomies of scale exist in the provision of PLS financing as the size of a bank and 
PLS financing levels are negatively related. Contrary to the proposition posed in prior 
literature, a positive relationship is found between deposit ratio and PLS financing. 
Most importantly, results from this study illustrate clear cross-country variation in PLS 
levels within the GCC region, suggesting that the institutional environment matters in 
enabling adherence to religious principles, by lowering transaction costs incurred in 
PLS financing.  
Given that PLS financing is considered to be the raison d’être of Islamic banking 
(Chapra, 2007), it is important that the industry moves closer to this equity-based model 
of financial intermediation. To increase levels of PLS financing in Islamic banks, 
reforms in Muslim counties need to “involve clusters of institutional changes” (Kuran, 
2009 p.602) in order to mitigate agency problems associated with PLS, as well as a 
change in attitude towards equity financing. Thus far, the partial reforms and general 
focus on creating markets for Islamic finance, e.g. secondary markets to trade Islamic 
financial instruments including and especially sukuk, as opposed to changing the 
underlying financial system in favour of equity rather than debt, has resulted in 
transaction costs associated with PLS remaining prohibitively high in most Muslim 
countries. This study confirms that where a supportive environment exists, PLS 
financing can be a viable option for at least some Islamic banks.  
Major institutional reforms however can take a long period to materialise. Therefore to 
increase the use of PLS financing, in the short run Islamic banks can use performance-
related profit-sharing ratios. A sliding scale mechanism, where the profit share is a 
function of the observed costs of the financed project, can help mitigate agency 
problems associated with PLS financing (see e.g. Burns et al., 1998). Under such a 
scheme, if entrepreneurs are able to choose from a published scale of cost-contingent-
profit-shares accruing to the bank, then efficient entrepreneurs will be able to choose a 
low cost projection and a low cost-contingent-profit-share for the bank, subject to the 
condition that failure to keep this low cost projection results in the profit share accruing 
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to the bank increasing up to 100%. By doing so, efficient entrepreneurs can signal their 
quality to the Islamic banks in the same way as signalling in the job market (Spence, 
1973) and the use of retained equity levels by owners in initial public offerings (Leland 
and Pyle, 1977) reducing the adverse selection problem. Such an arrangement also 
increases the incentive to keep costs under control and reduces moral hazard as gains 
from higher productive and allocative efficiency accrue to the entrepreneur through a 
higher share of the profit. 
Another interim solution to increasing PLS financing levels in for Islamic banks to 
adopt a full two-tier-mudarabah model through the Islamic window avenue. Given the 
incompatibility discussed earlier in chapter 3, a pure two-tier mudarabah model cannot 
fulfil the roles of commercial banks; however Islamic banks can within the existing 
banking model incorporate a pure PLS window which operates on the two-tier 
mudarabah basis, and thus benefit from the ability to hold a diversified portfolio, utilise 
the resource capital of the parent bank to reduce cost of PLS financing and possibly 
overcome the lack of a supportive environment.  
Finally, a notable observation from the balance sheet analysis conducted in this study is 
that while PLS financing exists on the asset side in some Islamic banks, evidence of 
actual PLS arrangements on the liability side do not exist. Investment accounts which in 
theory represent the risk-sharing liability side of the two-tier model in practice operate 
on fixed return basis. Lack of PLS on the liability side of the balance sheet suggests that 
Islamic banks consider PLS with depositors’ to be an even greater challenge than PLS 
financing on the asset side. This can be due to the regulatory system requiring 
guaranteed capital sums in all deposit accounts, pressure to provide fixed and stable 
competitive returns or simply due to Islamic banks underestimating depositor risk 
appetite. While a significant proportion of the population may only seek safekeeping 
and transaction services and prefer low risk fixed return, depositors with varying risk-
return preferences exist in all societies139. By offering the option to depositors between 
actual PLS-based investment accounts and fixed return accounts, Islamic banks can 
139 As stated earlier some banks report restricted investment accounts as off-balance-sheet activity. If 
these funds are managed purely on PLS basis (due to insufficient details in banks’ annual reports it 
cannot be unequivocally said that these are operating on risk-sharing basis), then there is certainly 
evidence to suggest that demand for PLS-based deposits exists. Through a PLS window operation, such 
funds can be reported on balance sheet which would lead to greater transparency in Islamic banks 
operations and management of PLS funds on the liability side. 
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benefit from matching the PLS asset and liability risk and maturity profiles on their PLS 
window operations and realise the stability and efficiency gains of PLS banking model 
advocated by Islamic economists (Siddiqui, 1983a,b; Chapra 1985; Khan 1995; Ahmed, 
2002; Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005), and operate closer to the spirit of sharia. Such hybrid 
banking structures which conform to both the conventional banking practices and PLS 
mechanisms are a requirement of the environment in which Islamic banks operate. As 
El-Gamal (1997, 1998) concludes in a heterogeneous environment with banks operating 
on PLS and interest basis, “a critical initial mass” (p.1) of banks providing debt and 
equity financing is necessary to ensure not only the survival of PLS institutions but also 
the efficiency of PLS mechanisms. 
For Islamic banks to move forward towards greater use PLS arrangements on both asset 
and liability side, in addition to significant institutional and regulatory changes, Islamic 
banks need to consider more innovate ways to mitigate the agency problems associated 
with PLS schemes, some of which are mentioned above. If however, the international 
Islamic banking industry continues down its current path of growth and development 
through sharia arbitrage, it will remain no more than an inefficient replication of the 
conventional banking system (El-Gamal, 2006) gaining legitimacy through a false 
Islamic identity as opposed to substantial differences in financial arrangements that 
operate according to the spirit of sharia.  
Limitations and Implications for Future Research  
This study has focused on the GCC region and used data over the 2009 – 2012 period to 
study variation in PLS levels between Islamic banks and conventional banks with and 
without Islamic windows. Two useful extensions to this work would be to, firstly, 
extend the sample period and consider changes in PLS levels in both Islamic and 
conventional banks over a longer period of time and secondly to extend the sample to 
include non-GCC countries.  
Additionally, this study focuses on the PLS principle which is a direct implication of 
the riba prohibition. Performance with regards to the other two prohibitions mentioned 
in chapter 2, i.e. gharar (excessive/avoidable risk and uncertainty) and haram 
(religiously prohibited) activities, such as financing of illicit industries has not been 
measured in this work, primarily due to the difficulty of operationalising these 
prohibitions and finding objective measures. Gharar for example refers to clarity in 
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contracts and also translates into the principle of materiality for financial transactions. 
Judging adherence to such principle requires access to internal documents of the banks 
which are not readily available. Furthermore, there exists no external audit to judge if 
Islamic banks comply with the ‘no haram activities’ principle (Khan 2010), therefore 
performance of Islamic banks on this issue is also difficult to assess. Consequently, this 
study only uses one, albeit a key principle of Islamic banking (PLS) which can be 
measured objectively through financial (quantitative) data that is widely available. 
However, this choice does admittedly limit the dimensions of sharia principles on 
which banks are assessed. Future studies may explore how to overcome the 
aforementioned problems in creating a multi-dimensional (quantifiable) measure to 
assess Islamic banks.  
Furthermore, future studies can build on this work by examining additional 
determinants of PLS financing and considering the use of qualitative data such as 
interviews with Islamic bank and windows managers to better understand the reasons 
for variation in PLS levels between and within banks over time. Although qualitative 
data is more resource and time consuming, which may limit sample size, it can provide 
additional insights into why variation in PLS-F levels exists between banks, 
complementing results from this work and possibly even reveal if bank managements’ 
religious preferences affects choice of financial instruments.  
Contributions 
Despite the above mentioned limitations, this study makes important contributions to 
the Islamic banking literature. This is the first study which uses two measures of PLS to 
investigate variation in PLS levels between Islamic banks. It is also the first study to 
measure PLS levels for conventional banks with and without Islamic windows and 
compare these with Islamic banks. Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge this is 
also the first study which has applied cluster analysis to identify if distinct (strategic) 
groups exist in the Islamic banking industry. By doing so, this study provides empirical 
evidence to demonstrate that the Islamic banking industry does not comprise of a 
homogeneous group of banks contrary to the implicit assumption made in the current 
literature. Furthermore, while the previous literature has focused on identifying the 
reasons for lack of PLS financing in Islamic banking industry, this is the first study 
which investigates and identifies what factors enable the provision of PLS financing 
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and illustrates the importance of institutional environment as an enabling factor to 
promote PLS financing. 
Chpater 5 will now consider the social aspect of Islamic banking and focus in particular 
on overcoming the challenges associated with comparing Islamic and conventional 
banks’ corporate social performance. 
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Chapter 5 
On Comparing the Corporate Social Performance 
of Islamic and Conventional Banks: Addressing 
the Methodological Issues    
5.1 Introduction 
Islamic banks are “expected to be more socially responsible than their conventional 
counterparts” (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007, p.101). This expectation stems from the 
industry’s claim of providing banking services in accordance with the sharia which, as 
explained in chapter 2, not only includes law but at its core is concerned with 
maintaining high ethical standards (Janin and Kahlmeyer, 2007, p.31). To be fully 
compliant with the sharia, Islamic banks need to not only abide by the rules regulating 
construction of financial arrangements (e.g. avoid riba) but also act in accordance with 
Islamic ethics as enshrined in the sharia140(Chapra, 1985). Prior studies have discussed 
the implications of Islamic ethics for business (Rice, 1999); accounting and social 
accountability (Baydoun and Willets, 2000; Lewis, 2001); environmental reporting 
(Kamla et al., 2006); marketing ethics (Saeed et al., 2001) and established consensus 
with international standards over the idea of socially responsible business141 (Abu-
Tapanjeh, 2009; Williams and  Zinkin, 2010). Broadly, prior literature confirms that 
Islamic ethics and the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is congruent (see 
Aribi and Arun, 2015 for a recent discussion).  
Despite this conclusion, as yet there has been no direct comparison of Islamic and 
conventional banks’ social performance to assess if the abovementioned expectation has 
been met in reality. This gap in the literature can be appreciated in light of the 
140 Discussion of the philosophical principles underlying the concept of Islamic business ethics is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Interested readers should consult Rice (1999) and Beekun and Badawi (2005) for 
a discussion.  
141 Williams and Zinkin (2010) for example have found consensus between the tenets of sharia and the 
Ten Principles of responsible business laid out in the UN Global Compact, whilst Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) 
found similar stakeholder focus between the corporate governance model based on Islamic teachings and 
the principles proposed by the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
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challenges that such a comparison presents. Firstly, a meaningful comparison between 
Islamic and conventional banks requires that a single research instrument is used to 
assess and compare the two industries. The current Islamic banking literature, despite 
acknowledging similarities between Islamic and secularly defined CSR, also asserts that 
a category of CSR is ‘particular’ to Islamic banks, required of them to demonstrate 
sharia compliance and fulfilment of sharia’s moral obligations (Belal et al., 2015). The 
presence of such a ‘particular’, religion-specific category essentially implies that CSR 
for Islamic and conventional banks are incommensurable142 and therefore 
incomparable. Given this, how can Islamic and conventional banks’ social performance 
be compared?   
Secondly, even if a valid comparison could be drawn, the challenge of measuring 
corporate social performance still remains. Corporate social performance (CSP) is a 
concept closely related to CSR (Orlitzky et al., 2011) as it refers to the ‘the outcomes 
and actions resulting from a firms’ socially responsible behaviour’ (Wood, 1991; van 
der Laan et al., 2008; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). In the conventional CSR literature, 
ethical ratings issued by rating agencies such as KLD143 are often used as a measure of 
an organisation’s CSP. For Islamic banks however, such third-party ethical ratings do 
not yet exist. Instead research on CSR in Islamic banking literature is largely normative 
and analytical as oppose to empirical (Farook et al., 2011). Importantly, the limited 
number of empirical studies which exist focus on measuring and analysing the volume, 
presence and/or type of social disclosure (e.g. positive/negative disclosure) in Islamic 
banks’ annual reports, often against a predetermined benchmark disclosure index, to 
understand  Islamic banks reporting behaviour, as opposed to examining and comparing 
social performance (see e.g. Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Aribi and 
Gao, 2011; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Aribi and Arun, 2015; Belal et al., 2015). A 
research instrument which measures and compares Islamic and conventional banks’ 
CSP therefore needs to be constructed.  
142 The term incommensurable refers to something that cannot be judged by the same standard or does not 
have common standard of measurement  
143 Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) is a leading ethical rating agency. It rates 
companies’ social performance using a rating criteria based on the company’s strengths and concerns 
against seven qualitative screens, each one focusing on a particular social indicator. These seven areas 
include: community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights and 
product quality and safety. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to construct a CSP Index which can be used to assess and 
compare the CSP of Islamic and conventional banks. In constructing this index, the first 
issue this chapter addresses is the assumption of religion-specific CSR being particular 
to Islamic banking. Section 5.2 first discusses the conceptualisation of CSR to illustrate 
that CSR is a concept embedded within a social context. It then presents the case, 
refuting the universal/particular categorisation propagated in the Islamic banking 
literature followed by the theoretical framework underpinning CSR. This section 
illustrates that the idea that CSR activities derived from religious norms of a society 
will be applicable only to a group of institutions (i.e. Islamic banks) but not others that 
also operate in the same environment, is inconsistent with both the conceptual and 
theoretical basis of CSR. This chapter therefore proposes that the assumed 
incommensurability problem can be overcome by selecting an appropriate context 
within which Islamic and conventional banks can be compared.  
Section 5.3 then looks at the issue of measuring CSP. It begins by providing an explicit 
definition of CSP and identifies a suitable analytical framework. It then reviews CSP 
measures used in prior literature and finally presents the approach adopted in this thesis 
to assess and measure CSP. Section 5.4 describes the data and explains how the CSP 
index is constructed using content analysis. This is followed by a brief description of 
the CSP index, which comprises of 6 dimensions and 25 social performance indicators 
(SPIs). Section 5.5 illustrates which SPIs are present and absent in Islamic and 
conventional banking industries and provides a brief explanation. This section provides 
further empirical evidence showing that the assumption of religion-specific CSR 
category being ‘particular’ to Islamic banks is invalid. It shows that it is not the entire 
category but a single SPI which can be considered specific to Islamic banking and 
draws parallel with PLS financing discussed in chapter 4. Finally, section 5.6 concludes 
the chapter.  
5.2 Addressing the Assumed Incommensurability Problem  
5.2.1 Understanding Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)  The 4-part model proposed by Carroll (1979) is one of the most widely cited and highly 
influential conceptualisations of CSR. It is also specifically relevant for the Islamic 
banking context as will be illustrated below. According to Carroll (1979, p.500) “the 
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social responsibility of business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and 
discretionary expectations that society has of organizations at a given point in time". This conceptualisation offers three important insights into CSR. Firstly, it highlights that the social responsibility of businesses extends beyond the economic and legal 
duties. For businesses, economic and social concerns cannot be considered separate 
domains, as they both form the different components of a business’ overall social 
responsibility. As all businesses recognise their economic duties to remain profitable as 
a key objective, and acknowledge the need to operate within the bounds of law, more 
recent definitions of CSR have built on Carroll’s 4-part model and focused on the 
ethical and discretionary responsibilities. Accordingly, CSR has been defined more 
specifically as corporate practices aimed at improving on the social and environmental 
standards required by law; such that a de facto adoption of these shifts the focus of 
corporate goals away from shareholder primacy towards satisfying a broader 
stakeholder base (see e.g. McWilliams and Siegel, 2006). 
Secondly and more importantly, Carroll’s conceptualisation indicates that it is societal 
expectations which define what constitutes as CSR. These expectations are 
understandably driven by societal norms and values which are affected by local culture 
including religious beliefs; differences in which can lead to variations in how CSR is 
actually constructed in different societies. As cross cultural differences can be 
significant, it is recognised that CSR does not always mean the same thing to everyone 
(van Marrewijk, 2003).  
Finally, Carroll’s conceptualisation also suggests that CSR is not static as it reflects the 
expectations society has at any given time. As societal values change so do the 
expectations held of businesses. There also exists the possibility that expectations may 
move from one category to another, e.g. over time ethical expectations can become 
legal expectations once codified in law (Carroll, 1979). From this conceptualisation, 
one can appreciate the basic notion underlying CSR is that society and business are not 
separate entities instead they are interwoven such that the former dictates what is 
considered appropriate business behaviour at any given time (Wood, 1991).  
Now, consider this definition within the context of Muslim countries, where Islam is the 
predominant religion and has significant influence on societal norms e.g. regarding 
community-based religious rituals and celebration of religious festivals. In such a 
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context, religion specific social activities may appear particular to outsiders however 
will be fully embraced by members of that society including corporations that do and do 
not claim an Islamic identity. Thus, the idea that religion-specific CSR activities will be 
addressed only by a particular group of organisations but not others does not conform to 
the conceptual basis of CSR. 
5.2.2 Refuting the Universal/Particular CSR Categorisation 
An important source defining the CSR expectations for present-day Islamic banks is the 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility Conduct and Disclosure for Islamic Financial 
Institutions’ (IFIs)144 Standard, (henceforth the CSR standard), issued by the 
international standard-setting body, the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). The CSR standard provides guidance on the 
nature of disclosure that Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) should provide regarding 
their CSR activities. Interestingly, the definition of CSR adopted by AAOIFI builds 
directly on Carroll (1979) as it reads, the “Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) for 
IFIs refers to all activities carried out by an IFI to fulfil its religious, economic, legal, 
ethical and discretionary responsibilities as financial intermediaries for individuals and 
institutions” (Governance Standard No.7, AAOIFI, 2010, p.71).  
This definition illustrates explicitly that the concept of CSR as broadly understood in 
the western/secular world and AAOIFI as a representative body of the Islamic finance 
industry is overlapping. Thus, for practical purposes of engaging in and reporting on 
CSR, it appears that there is consensus over the notion and categories of social 
responsibilities of Islamic banks and non-Islamic banking organisations, with the only 
difference relating to the addition of religious responsibilities applying to the former.  
Such a conclusion can also be drawn from the work of Belal et al. (2015), in which an 
ethical reporting index, comprising of 149 items is divided into ‘universal’ and 
‘particular’ categories. The former comprises of ethical reporting items related to 
144 The CSR Standard on ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Disclosure for Islamic Financial 
institutions’ (IFIs) was adopted by AAOIFI in April 2009 and made effective from 1st January 2010. This 
standard not only specifies the CSR expectations held of Islamic banks but also provides guidance on the 
nature of expected and recommended CSR disclosure to be made by IFIs. The standard classifies certain 
categories of CSR disclosure to be mandatory for all Islamic banks regardless of size and others to be 
recommended i.e. applicable only to those IFIs which have the capability to carry out the additional 
recommended social activities (Governance Standard No.7, AAOIFI). In line with recent CSR 
definitions, AAOIFI standard covers only the religious, ethical and discretionary categories i.e. does not 
include economic and legal categories.  
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community, customers, employees, environment and governance issues, as 
recommended by international CSR and governance initiatives. The latter comprises of 
“items that are specifically required from IFIs due to their moral obligations and 
shariah compliance requirements” (p.771). This includes reporting items related to 
zakah, Sharia Supervisory Board, qard hasan, policy to deal with insolvent clients and 
amount of unlawful income145, amongst others. Building on their categorisation, other 
studies such as Mallin et al. (2014) also divide their CSR index into universal and 
particular categories, with the latter “consisting of CSR items relating purely to 
Shari’ah principles” (p.25). Similarly, Platonova et al. (2016) state that of the six 
dimensions in their CSR disclosure index, the ‘zakah, charity and benevolent funds’ 
“dimension is specific to Islamic banking; however, the other five dimensions of social 
responsibility are also applicable to the conventional banking industry” (p.8).  
Although, it may appear reasonable at first, this universal/particular categorisation is 
based on two incorrect propositions: first, the assumption that all sharia-related issues 
are specifically required only of IFIs and second, that reporting items within the 
particular category are applicable to all IFIs. To understand this, consider Belal et al. 
(2015)’s particular category, which is the most diverse of the three studies cited above. 
This covers a variety of issues e.g. sharia laws (e.g. zakah) as well as industry-specific 
regulations/governance (e.g. Sharia Supervisory Boards (SSB)). Consider the issue of 
zakah. In Saudi Arabia, zakah reporting is mandated by state law, therefore all non-
Islamic banking organisations as well as Islamic banks report on and pay zakah (Kamla, 
2007). Second, note that SSBs do not exist in Iran as the central bank monitors and 
guarantees sharia compliance of the entire banking system (van Greuning and Iqbal, 
2008). Issues related to SSB’s are therefore not applicable to Iranian IFIs. Thus, neither 
are all issues in the particular category specific to IFIs nor are they applicable to all 
IFIs. Both these issues also apply to Mallin et al. (2014)’s CSR index.  
145 Islamic banks cannot earn through engaging in haram industries or transactions that are not sharia 
compliant. Where in the course of business while dealing with non-Islamic banks, arrangements that are 
not sharia compliant are made, any income arising from such arrangements are required to be given to 
charity as a way of purifying the income that will be disbursed to the shareholders. Islamic banks can also 
not use the income generated from charges put on late repayments (as that amounts to riba). To avoid 
moral hazard problems, banks have been permitted by sharia scholars to charge such a fixed fee, which is 
then given to charity.  
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Consider next, Platonova et al. (2016)’s dimension ‘zakah, charity and benevolent 
funds’. While it can be understood that zakah and benevolent funds (referring to qard 
hasan) are specifically derived from Islamic principles, charity is not a uniquely Islamic 
concept. Conventional institutions engage in charitable donations throughout the world. 
Simply referring to the concept of charity using the Arabic word ‘sadaqa’ does not 
make it specific to Islam or Islamic banking. Thus, the claim that this dimension is 
specific to Islamic banking is clearly erroneous.  
The primary problem with the universal/particular categorisation is that, by creating 
such a dichotomy, the abovementioned studies explicitly assume that all elements 
within the ‘particular’ categories are specific and thus applicable to all and only to IFIs, 
which as illustrated above is not valid in reality. Of course, certain individual items may 
be particular to Islamic banking. However to assert that an entire category of CSR is 
particular to Islamic banking presents a problem when Islamic and conventional banks 
are to be compared. Aribi and Gao (2010) is a case in point, that works on the premise 
of particular CSR category. Looking to compare the level and extent of social 
disclosure produced by Islamic and conventional banks in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), the authors compare the two industries only on the ‘universal’ subset of 
CSR issues. They do not investigate if conventional banks also provide any disclosure 
on the ‘particular’ CSR issues such as zakah, stating that “these disclosures merely 
relate to the religious practice and ensure that the IFIs discharge the Islamic concept of 
accountability; this has nothing to do with the business of CFIs [conventional financial 
institutions]” (p.85). In doing so, Aribi and Gao (2010) simply assume that religion-
specific CSR issues are irrelevant for conventional banks, despite the sample being 
limited to the GCC, which includes Saudi Arabia that has codified zakah in law. 
Contrast this with the findings from Kamla (2007) and Thibos and Gillespie (2011), 
which examine social reporting in companies from different sectors operating in the 
Arab Middle East. In addition to noting the zakah law in Saudi Arabia, Kamla (2007) 
finds that institutions from non-Islamic banking industry provided disclosure reflecting 
the influence of Islam on their activities e.g. a telecommunication company released 
special packages to assist the Hajj146 pilgrims. Thibos and Gillespie (2011) find that 
146 Hajj is the annual pilgrimage to Makkah that all Muslims are obligated to perform at least once in their 
lifetime, if their health permits and they can afford it.  
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conventional banks in the GCC support their employees for performing the umrah (the 
lesser voluntary pilgrimage to Makkah), while other an oil company provided free iftar 
(evening meals) to the local communities and workers during the fasting month of 
Ramadan. In explaining its findings, Kamla (2007) explains that Islam continues to 
have a “major impact on life and culture in Modern Middle East”. The voluntary 
disclosure on abiding by Islamic teachings and rules as well as incorporating Islamic 
values in business activities by companies which do not explicitly market themselves as 
Islamic is “a company’s way of portraying themselves as ‘good citizens’ in the Arab 
community, where religion and the teachings of Islam have a big influence on people’s 
everyday lives” (p.131).  
Although highly relevant, these findings have been overlooked by Belal et al. (2015) 
that propagate the universal/particular categorisation of CSR as well as Mallin et al. 
(2014) and Platonova et al. (2016) that follow Belal et al. (2015)’s classification. 
Furthermore, these studies have also overlooked implications drawn from the most 
pertinent CSR theories discussed below. 
5.2.3 Theoretical Framework 
Organisations may engage in CSR for a multitude of different reasons. Reflecting this, a 
variety of different CSR theories have been developed. The social-political theories of 
CSR however, in particular, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory have been known 
to provide the more insightful and interesting theoretical perspectives, and therefore 
have informed much of the penetrating analysis of CSR in the extant literature (Gray et 
a l., 1995a). In addition to these, institutional theory has also been increasingly applied 
to explain CSR behaviour in more recent studies particularly those studying cross-
national variations (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010; Brammer et al., 2012). Although 
separate in their own right, these three theories are interrelated as they have been 
developed from a similar philosophical basis and thus are considered complementary, 
each one providing slightly distinct insights into CSR behaviour. As Gray et al. (1995a) 
note, CSR is too complex a phenomenon to be explained through the lens of a single 
theory. Adopting a multi-theoretical approach is therefore beneficial, as compatible 
interpretations of evidence can be made from different theoretical perspectives, 
enabling a better understanding and explanation of corporate behaviour with regards to 
CSR (Gray et al., 1995a; Deegan, 2002; Islam and Deegan, 2008). Accordingly, all 
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three, legitimacy, stakeholder and institutional theory are integrated in the theoretical 
framework presented here. Importantly, from these theoretical perspectives business 
organisations are assumed to have an influence on and are influenced by the society 
within which they operate (Gray et al., 1996; Deegan, 2002; Islam and Deegan, 2008). 
This perspective can help understand why in certain societies such as the GCC, 
conventional banks can also be expected to undertake and report on CSR which is 
related specifically to the religion of Islam and therefore justify the use of a single 
research instrument to compare Islamic and conventional banks’ CSP as in this thesis.  
Essentially, political economy is “the social, political and economic framework within 
which human life takes place” (Gray et al., 1996, p.47). Central to the political 
economy and legitimacy theory is the idea that politics, society and economics are 
inseparable. The economic domain cannot be meaningfully studied and therefore should 
not be investigated in isolation from the social, political and institutional framework 
within which the economic transactions take place (Gray et al., 1995a).  
The legitimacy theory explains an organisation’s social responsibility by reference to 
the norms, values and attitudes of the wider society within which it operates (Deegan, 
2002; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). According to this theory, engaging in CSR is an 
organisation’s response to the various external social, political and economic pressures 
it faces. Organisations therefore engage in CSR to legitimise their corporate actions in 
order to achieve societal approval to ensure continual survival and growth. Indeed, as 
the legitimacy theory postulates, organisations do not have any inherent right to 
resources or even to exist. Organisations exist only when society considers them to be 
legitimate by conferring upon them the state of legitimacy (Deegan, 2002).  
Legitimacy theory relies on the idea that a social contract exists between organisations 
and society. Essentially, the social contract paradigm and legitimacy theory suggest that 
organisations seek to establish and communicate congruence between the social values 
implied by their activities and the values and norms of the society within which they 
operate to achieve a positive perception of their behaviour (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; 
Deegan, 2002; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). Organisational legitimacy is achieved 
when there is congruence between the two value systems and is threatened when 
disparity arises. Of course, societal norms and values are not fixed. As societal values 
change over time, organisations need to continually alter their behaviour to ensure that 
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they meet the changing expectations and operate within the bounds of their respective 
societies (Deegan, 2002).  
From the perspective of legitimacy theory, the perception of an organisation’s actions is 
crucial since legitimacy itself has been defined as: the perception that an organisation’s 
actions are desirable or appropriate within some socially constructed system of beliefs, 
norms and values (Suchman, 1995). Thus, if an organisation’s actions are perceived as 
breaching the social contract, its survival will be threatened as society will revoke its 
contract e.g. through eliminating demand for its products, supply of labour or financial 
capital, or lobbying for fines or laws to prohibit the actions which do not conform to 
society’s expectations. Organisations therefore need to not only ensure that their actions 
are congruent with societal values but also to communicate this effectively (Gray et al., 
1995a; Deegan, 2002). 
Communication is an important part of the legitimisation strategy147, the process 
through which an organisation can achieve the state of legitimacy. Lindblom (1994) 
identifies four strategies that organisations seeking legitimisation may use: first, inform 
the public about changes the organisation has made in response to a legitimacy gap; 
second, change public’s perceptions of the organisation without changing actual 
behaviour; third, manipulate public’s perceptions; and finally, change public’s 
expectations regarding their performance. In all of these cases, organisation can use 
voluntary CSR disclosure, with strategic disclosures being used for the second and third 
strategy. Since ‘legitimacy’ itself is a resource on which the survival of an organisation 
depends, legitimisation strategies are particularly used as a response when ‘threats’ to 
an organisations’ legitimacy are perceived and therefore CSR initiatives and related 
disclosures are likely to be higher after any such threatening events (Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995; Deegan, 2002; Branco and Rodrigues, 
2008).  
The stakeholder management theory148, while complementary to legitimacy theory, 
offers a different, narrower level of resolution. As Clarkson (1995) highlights, no 
147 The process of achieving legitimacy i.e. legitimisation and the state of legitimacy are not the same. 
Whilst legitimacy can be considered ‘status or condition’, legitimisation is the process through which 
organisations achieve such a state (Lindblom, 1994; Brown and Deegan, 1998, p. 23). 
148 There are two major branches of stakeholder theory, the ethical and the managerial. It is the 
managerial branch that overlaps with legitimacy theory (Islam and Deegan, 2008) and is discussed here. 
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business organisation can be made or be expected to deal with all social issues. 
Therefore before any responsibilities can be assigned and organisations can be held 
accountable, it is necessary to develop “a systematic method of determining what is and 
what is not a social issue for a corporation” (p.103). In this regard, the pioneering work 
of Freeman (1984) has been extremely influential. Freeman defined the abstract notion 
of ‘society’ for corporations by specifying the definition of a stakeholder, as “any group 
or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm's objectives" 
(Freeman, 1984, p.49). He pointed out that corporate management bears a fiduciary 
relationship to its stakeholders (Freeman, 1984).  
These stakeholders can be further divided into primary and secondary groups. A high 
level of interdependence exists between the corporation and its primary stakeholder 
group as it comprises of those “without whose continuing participation the corporation 
cannot survive as a going concern” (Clarkson, 1995, p.106). This primary stakeholder 
group consists of internals stakeholders such as shareholders, employees, customers as 
well as the public stakeholders including the government and communities that provide 
the market and infrastructure within which the corporations operate and to whom taxes 
and other obligations are due. Secondary stakeholders consist of groups that are not 
essential for the corporation’s survival and not directly involved in transacting e.g. 
interest groups and the media (Clarkson, 1995).  
Stakeholders which have the greatest control over resources required by the 
organisation are considered most powerful. To survive, organisations require support 
and approval of such stakeholders groups, and therefore seek to effectively manage 
their relationship with them in order to ensure access to resources to continue their 
operations. Communication is a key mechanism through which organisations can 
strategically manage such relationships. Organisations are therefore likely to produce 
voluntary disclosure on issues which concern its most powerful stakeholders, to gain 
and maintain their support (Ullman, 1985; Gray et al., 1995a; Islam and Deegan, 2008). 
The institutional theory is especially useful for understanding how and why different 
forms of CSR exist in different countries. According to this theory, to understand CSR 
holistically, requires an understanding of the institutional framework within which 
business is situated. This relates not only to formal institutions such as the legal 
framework but, more importantly to informal institutions which includes religious 
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norms. Since the ‘social’ in CSR relates to societal expectation, to the extent these 
differ across societies, so will the definition and nature of CSR produced (Brammer et 
al., 2012). Similar to the legitimacy theory, institutional theory views organisations as 
operating within a particular social framework of values and norms which define what 
constitutes as acceptable and appropriate behaviour. Organisations respond to pressures 
that arise from the institutional environment and in response adopt practices that are 
considered socially acceptable (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001). Therefore from this 
theoretical perspective as well, organisations operating in societies with certain 
religious norms are likely to honour them.  
Institutional theory also provides an additional analytical insight in explaining why 
organisations that operate within the same ‘organisational field’149 (e.g. banking sector) 
may develop homogenous characteristics. The process of homogenisation is referred to 
as isomorphism. As DiMaggio & Powell (1983, p.149) explain isomorphism is "a 
constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that 
face the same set of environmental conditions". Institutional isomorphism can be split 
into three processes i.e. coercive, mimetic and normative. Coercive isomorphism arises 
from external sources such as pressure from powerful stakeholders. It therefore relates 
to stakeholder management theory. In terms of CSR practices, it implies that powerful 
stakeholders can coerce organisations to adopt certain practices leading to uniformity 
within the sector (Deegan, 2009). Mimetic isomorphism involves organisations 
mimicking each other’s practices to gain competitive advantage. The motivation for this 
comes from a threat to their legitimacy. As Unerman and Bennett (2004) explain, 
organisations that fail to implement innovative practices adopted by other organisations 
within the same sector risk hurting and even losing their legitimacy. Finally, normative 
isomorphism relates to pressures that arise from common values that are a part of the 
accepted institutional practice within a sector. These can arise from formal or informal 
sources including culture (Deegan, 2009). Essentially, all of these three isomorphic 
processes lead to organisations adopting similar management practices (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001). 
149 Organisational field’ refers to organisations that, in aggregate, form a distinctly recognisable area by 
producing similar products and services e.g. the banking sector (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
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Finally, decoupling is another dimension of the institutional theory, which relates to the 
separation between the actual practices and external image of an organisation. This 
separation may be due to unintentional or intentional actions. When related to the latter, 
decoupling links directly with the second and third legitimisation strategies mentioned 
above, whereby an organisation may use CSR disclosures to construct a socially 
responsible image which may be very different to the organisation’s actual social 
performance (Deegan, 2009). 
Overall, given this theoretical framework, it can be expected that conventional banks 
operating in the GCC, a predominantly Muslim region, will also face and therefore 
respond to societal expectations that are derived from Islamic values. As such, 
conventional banks can be expected to undertake religion-specific CSR initiatives.  
5.2.4 Proposed Approach: Select an Appropriate Context 
In light of the above, the approach proposed in this study is to compare Islamic and 
conventional banks within a socio-political context where the religion of Islam and 
social expectations related to it are applicable and relevant for both Islamic and 
conventional banks. In this work, it is argued that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
is an ideal example of such a context. The six GCC countries are not only similar in 
terms of their macroeconomic environment but also their socio-political structure 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). More importantly, Islam is the dominant religion in the 
GCC and has been for more than a millennium. It has therefore shaped the cultural 
context within which societal norms, values and expectations have been established. By 
limiting the scope of this study to the GCC, where certain expectations related to the 
teachings of Islam are engraved in societal norms, a case can be made for the use of a 
single research instrument to compare Islamic and conventional banks’ CSP including 
an assessment on religion-specific CSR.  
5.3 Addressing the Measurement Problem 
This section examines the concept of CSP, provides an explicit definition, identifies a 
suitable analytical framework for assessing CSP and examines how it can be measured 
by reviewing the measures used in prior literature. The final part of this section makes 
the case for how and why analysis of social reporting can provide the means for 
comparing Islamic and conventional banks’ CSP. 
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5.3.1 Defining Corporate Social Performance (CSP) and Identifying a 
Suitable Analytical Framework 
Defining the concept of CSP has a long history. In fact the definition of CSR offered by 
Carroll (1979) is a part of his conceptual model of CSP which comprised of three parts; 
defining CSR, identifying the social issues faced by organisations and the mode of 
organisations’ social responsiveness. Building on this work, a revised framework of 
CSP was proposed by Wartich and Cochran (1985), who defined CSP as "the 
underlying interaction among the principles of social responsibility, the process of 
social responsiveness, and the policies developed to address social issues" (1985, 
p.758). Both Carroll’s (1979) and Wartich and Cochran’s (1985) CSP models 
fundamentally consist of three parts; CSR (the principles), social responsiveness 
(processes) and management of social issues (performance) (Erden and Bodur, 2012). 
Wood (1991) however criticised the definition proposed by Wartich and Cochran 
(1985) arguing that “the term performance speaks of actions and outcomes, not of 
interaction or integration” (1991, p.692). She further argued that the presence of a 
formal policy does not imply social performance as these policies may not be reflected 
in actual corporate behaviour, whilst behaviour that rates highly on social performance 
may exist even without any formal policy. Relying on the presence of policies to infer 
social performance is therefore risky. Consequently, Wood (1991) built on Wartich and 
Cochran (1985) and redefined CSP as “a business organization's configuration of 
principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, 
programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal relationships” 
(p.693). To assess a company’s CSP, researchers need to examine each of these three 
domains, however, as Wood explains “social outcomes, is the only portion [of the CSP 
model] that is actually observable and open to assessment … [and] the only place in the 
CSP model where any real performance exist” 150 (p.711). Thus, in line with prior 
studies (Wood, 1991; van der Laan et al., 2008; Ioannou and Serafeim 2012) , for the 
150 The three domains to be examined consist of “the degree to which principles of social responsibility 
motivate actions taken on behalf of the company, the degree to which the firm makes use of socially 
responsive processes, the existence and nature of policies and programs designed to manage the firm's 
societal relationships, and the social impacts (i.e., observable outcomes) of the firm's actions, programs, 
and policies” (Wood, 1991, p. 693). However as Wood explained, “Motivations are not observable, and 
processes are observable only by inference” therefore overall CSP of a company can and will be judged 
by its stakeholders on the basis of the visible outcomes (Wood 1991, p.711)     
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purposes of this thesis, CSP is defined more specifically as ‘the outcomes and actions 
resulting from a firms’ socially responsible behaviour’.  
An important aspect of this definition, derived from Wood (1991), is that it allows CSP 
to be seen as “a construct for evaluating business output” rather than something that is 
inherently good (p.693). It allows one to acknowledge that the level and nature of CSP 
may differ across organisations based on their individual capabilities, including 
business strategies, competitive advantages as well as the expectations and pressures 
faced, which ultimately dictates the nature of social outputs produced. Indeed from the 
social contract, legitimacy and stakeholder theory perspectives, corporations invest 
resources in social programs, either one-time ventures or longer-term institutionalised 
projects considered to be socially desirable, to meet their stakeholder’s expectations and 
achieve legitimacy (Wood, 1991; Erden and Bodur, 2012). Therefore the actual 
outcomes and actions undertaken by corporations that form their CSP will reflect the 
nature of responsibilities expected of them by society. 
As Clarkson (1995) emphasises defining the appropriate level of analysis is vital. Wood 
(1991) presents three levels of analysis of the principles of CSR (institutional, 
organisational and the individual level). Using the same levels of analysis, Clarkson 
(1995) offers a different framework which is grounded in the data of corporate case 
studies. He illustrates using several examples how confusion arises when terms from 
one level of analysis are applied to another. Clarkson argues that discussions of 
corporate social responsibility and responsiveness relate to the business and society 
relationship and are appropriately analysed at the institutional level. Corporate social 
performance on the other hand relates to the corporation and its stakeholder groups and 
therefore is appropriately analysed and evaluated at the organisational level. Finally at 
individual level, manager’s performance can be evaluated with regards to their 
management of stakeholder issues and relationships. As this thesis aims to analyse and 
compare the CSP of Islamic and conventional banks, the organisational level is the 
appropriate level of analysis (which relates to the corporations and their stakeholder 
groups).  
193 
 
` 
5.3.2 Measures of Corporate Social Performance (CSP) in Prior 
Literature 
The aim of this chapter is to develop a CSP index, a research instrument which can be 
used to assess and compare the CSP of Islamic and conventional banks. The difficulty 
of assessing CSP is well documented in the current literature. Assessing levels of CSP 
for a company is a complex exercise as it requires an objective and standard measure 
(Aupperle et al., 1985). Despite extensive research, consensus is yet to be reached over 
the optimal measure for CSP (van Beurden and Gössling, 2008; Soana, 2011). 
Essentially, the problem lies with the multidimensionality of this construct, comprising 
of corporate practices across a range of: 1) inputs e.g. sourcing renewable energy, 2) 
processes e.g. labour practices and 3) outputs e.g. community initiatives (Waddock and 
Graves, 1997). Despite the challenge, a variety of CSP proxies have been proposed in 
the extant literature151. These include questionnaires, forced-choice surveys (Aupperle 
et al., 1985); reputational indices e.g. Moskowitz, 1972 (Cochran and Wood, 1984) or 
Corporate Reputational Index by Fortune magazine (Brown and Perry, 1994; Preston 
and O’Bannon, 1997); one-dimensional indicators such as pollution indices (Spicer,      
1978; Chen and Metcalf, 1980) or corporate philanthropy (Seifert et al., 2004); ethical 
ratings based on a multidimensional indices constructed by specialised agencies (Soana, 
2011) including EIRIS (Cuesta-González et al., 2006) or MSCI KLD which has been 
widely used in academic literature (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Ruf et al., 1998; van 
der Laan et al., 2008; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Mahoney et al., 2012); inclusion in 
ethical/social market indices (Baird et al., 2011) and content analysis of social 
disclosures made in corporate reports (Bowman and Haire, 1975; Ingram 1978; 
Anderson and Frankle, 1980; Wiseman, 1982; Patten, 1990; Tsang, 1998; Ameer and 
Othman, 2011). Industry-specific measures have also been used in banking studies, 
such as the Community Reinvestment Act ratings for US banks (Simpson and Kohers, 
2002).  
Each approach has its benefits but also presents certain limitations. For example, the 
one-dimensional indicators fail to account for the multidimensionality of CSP, with the 
151 See Orlitzky et al. (2003) and Soana (2011) for overview of the literature on CSP proxies and relation 
between CSP and corporate financial performance (CFP) 
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chosen indicator not necessarily reflecting overall social performance152 (Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; Chen et al., 2008).   Questionnaires reflect managers’ and directors’ own 
perception of CSR (Soana, 20 11). Ethical ratings, although increasingly popular, are 
found to be subjective measures as the procedures and components for ratings differ 
between agencies, with little transparency on such issues153 (Scholtens, 2009; see 
Soana, 2011 for inconsistency of ethical ratings awarded to the same banks from 
different rating agencies). Additionally, reputational measures e.g. by Fortune magazine 
have been found to be affected by the previous financial performance of firms (Brown 
and Perry, 1994); whilst analysis of social disclosure assumes that self-reporting is a 
good proxy for actual performance which may not be always the case (Wiseman, 1982; 
Cochran and Wood, 1984; Cho and Patten, 2007). 
Unlike the long tradition existing in the conventional literature, CSR analysis of Islamic 
banks is still relatively new. Additionally, identifying a CSP proxy for Islamic banks 
presents somewhat greater challenges since a number of the abovementioned 
approaches cannot be used for Islamic banks. For example, ethical ratings such as KLD 
and the Fortune magazine reputational index do not cover the scope of Islamic banks. 
Third party independent CSP ratings for Islamic banks do not yet exist. A pragmatic 
approach to examine the CSP of Islamic banks is to analyse the social disclosure 
produced by the banks in their annual reports. Indeed, banks’ annual reports are widely 
available for both Islamic and conventional banks allowing for the possibility of 
comparison; however there is an important challenge which needs to be overcome.  
5.3.3 The Challenge of Using Social Reporting to Assess CSP:  The Issue 
of Corporate Identity Management  
Social reporting, i.e. voluntary disclosure of a corporation’s social and environmental 
impact is considered a key mechanism through which companies may discharge their 
accountability duties and communicate their social performance (Gray et al., 1996; 
Unerman, 2000; Bouten et al., 2011; Belal et al., 2015).  
152 For example, taking philanthropic giving as the sole measure of CSP has been found to be 
inappropriate. Empirical evidence supports the existence of a negative relationship between corporate 
giving and performance in other social areas such as environmental care and product safety. Firms 
performing poorly in other social aspects are more likely to make charitable donations and their extent of 
giving is higher than better performing firms (Chen et al., 2008). 
153 For this reason, some authors, such as Scholtens (2009) propose their own indices that are similar to 
the ethical rating agencies, but more transparent.  
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Previous Islamic banking studies have focused on assessing the level of social 
disclosures made by Islamic banks in their annual reports against a disclosure index 
using content analysis (e.g. Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Aribi and 
Gao, 2010, 2011; Farook et al., 2011; Aribi and Arun, 2015; Belal et al., 2015154). A 
disclosure index is an extensive list of pre-selected items deemed important by 
researchers (or a reporting standard, if followed to design the index), to be disclosed by 
the entity under review. The use of this method allows researchers to measure the extent 
of information disclosed by a particular entity through a particular disclosure vehicle 
e.g. the annual report relative to the benchmark index (Marston and Shrives, 1991; 
Hassan and Marston, 2010).  
Disclosure indexes have been extensively used in the general social reporting literature, 
popularised since Cerf (1961) and are considered a valid research tool given the 
selection of items is based on prior literature or international benchmarks and standards 
(Hooks and van Staden, 2011) such as the Global Reporting Initiative155 (GRI) or 
AAOIFI for Islamic financial institutions. However, as evident from prior literature, 
construction of such benchmark disclosure indexes varies greatly across studies with no 
consensus over the size or individual items to be included156. In Islamic banking studies 
for example, some have considered broad theme-based categories (between 5 and 8) 
(Aribi and Gao, 2010; 2011) whilst others have included disclosure items ranging from 
26-149 (Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Aribi and Arun, 2015; Belal et 
al., 2015). Nevertheless, similar conclusions are drawn across the studies; Islamic banks 
disclose on far fewer CSR issues than expected and avoid controversial matters that 
may affect their Islamic image negatively (Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2007; Aribi and Arun, 2015). Evidence indicates that a strong element of identity 
154 In the case of Aribi and Arun (2015) and Belal et al. (2015), interviews with bank management have 
also been conducted to understand the perception of CSR held in Islamic banking industry 
155 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) produces sustainability reporting standards which provide 
guidance to corporations on how to disclosure on their economic, social and environmental performance. 
These guidelines are designed for universal use, regardless of company size, location, or sector, although 
industry-specific guidelines exist. Through these guidelines, GRI aims to provide a credible and trusted 
framework, increasing the use and comparability of sustainability reporting worldwide. Since its 
formation in 1997, GRI has constantly reviewed, and refined its guidelines using a consensus-seeking 
consultation process with experts from all stakeholders groups e.g. business, NGOs, investors etc. More 
information available at https://www.globalreporting.org/Pages/default.aspx  
156 The use of AAOIFI reporting standards have been considered in designing the index in almost all 
Islamic banking studies, with some specifically including compliance with AAIOFI standards as an item 
of disclosure (Hassan and Harahap, 2010). 
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management exists in Islamic banks as “social disclosures are used by the banks to 
construct a positive Islamic image” (Maali et al., 2006 p.286).  
Islamic banks however are not the only institutions which use social disclosure for 
corporate identity management. Corporate identity is widely acknowledged as a 
strategic instrument. Effective management of this enables organisations to achieve 
differentiation, an important source of competitive advantage (Downey, 1987; Schmidt, 
1995; van Riel and Balmer, 1997; Melewar and Karaosmanoglu 2006;  Balmer 2008; 
Bolton et al., 2011) especially in the services industry such as banking where the 
intangible nature of products and services offered, makes differentiation ex ante 
difficult to communicate (Wilkinson and Balmer, 1996; Haniffa and Hudaib 2007; 
Sánchez and Sotorrío, 2007; Bravo et al., 2012). 
CSR is recognised as one of the direct routes to establishing an ethical corporate 
identity (Balmer et al., 2007; Bravo et al., 2012), building reputational capital which 
reduces risk of regulation and legal action from stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; 
Robertson and Nicholson, 1996; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Halme and Laurila, 2009; 
Brønn and Vidaver-Cohen 2009; Spiller, 2009; Mahoney et al., 2012), whilst increasing 
customer and staff loyalty (Spiller, 2009). Effective communication is essential for 
materialising potential CSR benefits157 (Spiller, 2000; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; 
Parguel et al., 2011; Bolton et al., 2011; Schreck, 2011; Bravo et al., 2012) since the 
organisation must be perceived by its stakeholder as socially responsible (Arvidsson, 
2010; Bravo et al., 2012). In managing stakeholder perceptions, generating a positive 
corporate image, and in legitimising corporate behaviour, communication (including 
voluntary CSR reporting) plays an important strategic role (Ullmann, 1985; Guthrie & 
Parker,1989; Neimark, 1992; Gray et al., 1995a; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Neu et al., 
1998; Spiller, 2000; Cornelissen and Harris, 2001; Deegan, 2002; Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006; Coupland, 2006; Melewar and Karaosmanoglu, 2006; Cho and Patten, 
2007; Chen et al., 2008; Jamali, 2008; Brønn and Vidaver-Cohen, 2009; Reverte, 2009; 
Arvidsson, 2010; Bolton et al., 2011; Bouten et al., 2011; Parguel et al., 2011; Bravo et 
al., 2012; Pérez and d el Bosque, 2012). For external stakeholders especially, corporate 
communication is a key proxy to gauge an organisations’ social performance. However, 
157 Voluntary disclosure reduces informational asymmetry between the firm and its stakeholders lowering 
perceived risk and thereby the cost of capital (El Ghoul et al., 2011) 
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informational asymmetry, arising from un-observability of actual corporate actions, 
creates scope for greenwashing and symbolic CSR (Neu et al., 1998; Parguel et al., 
2011; Perez-batres et al., 2012). Through communication and corporate identity 
management, organisations can achieve legitimacy even without changing actual 
behaviour (Neu et al., 1998). It has been long established that "it is often easier to 
manage one's image  through communication than through changing one's output, 
goals and  methods of operations" (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975, p. 127). Thus, companies 
are able to materialise the economic benefits of CSR through mere communication 
(Berrone et al., 2007). Evidence shows that applied ethics i.e. “firm’s behaviour –
actions and policies” improve stakeholder satisfaction, while revealed ethics i.e. 
“communication of a firm’s ethical attitudes” are sufficient to enhance shareholder 
value (p.36). Thus, there exists an incentive to disclose information on CSR even if it is 
symbolic which can lead to  potential dissonance between the communicated (what the 
organisation says about its self) and the actual corporate identity (what the organisation 
actually does) (Balmer and Soenen, 1999).  
In light of this, prior studies measuring CSR disclosure in Islamic banks annual reports 
although make valid conclusions regarding volume and extent of disclosure against 
benchmark indexes and identify disclosure patterns, do not provide sufficient 
information to enable readers to determine the extent to which Islamic banks undertake 
actual CSR activities. Recent studies have stated explicitly that their aim is to 
“understand the extent to which IFIs follow in practice the ethical and social objectives 
implied by Shari’ah” (Aribi and Arun, 2015, p.2 emphasis added) and to undertake an 
“examination of ethical and developmental performance” of Islamic banks (Belal et 
al., 2015, p.1, emphasis added). However, in light of the strategic nature of CSR 
reporting, results from these studies cannot be deemed a measure of CSP since any type 
of disclosure even declarative statements which reveal the bank’s ethical attitude as 
opposed to communicate the result of actual CSR initiatives suffices for a score against 
the disclosure index. By looking at the overall index score from such studies, one 
cannot determine which banks have provided evidence of actually putting CSR 
initiatives into practice and which simply provide greater amount of qualitative 
narrative comprising of social and ethical claims. Thus, social performance of Islamic 
banks in terms of outcomes and actions remains to be measured.  
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5.3.4 Can CSP be Assessed Using Social Reporting? The Case for 
Evidence-Based Disclosure 
Social reporting faces an important challenge in light of the legitimising role of CSR 
disclosure and the potential dissonance between declared and actual social performance. 
However, an important consideration in the disclosure-performance nexus is the type of 
disclosure. The doubt over reliability of CSR disclosure largely pertains to the narrative 
and qualitative nature of CSR information produced (Wiseman, 1982; Al- Tuwaijri et 
al., 2004; Beck et al., 2010; Hooks and van Staden, 2011). Corporate rhetoric without 
evidence of actual actions and outcomes is relatively uninformative of a firm’s actual 
CSP (Robertson and Nicholson, 1996; Scholtens, 2009).  
For social reporting to be a useful proxy for CSP, disclosure and actual performance 
need to be congruent (Ingram and Frazier, 19 80). To close the gap between disclosure 
and performance, comprehensive reporting has been advocated in the social reporting 
literature (Hooks and van Staden, 2011, Bouten et al., 2011) where comprehensiveness 
relates to full disclosure, i.e. disclosure on 1) corporate vision/aims, 2) management’s 
approach/specific actions, and 3) performance indicators i.e. reporting on outcomes and 
results from CSR initiatives (Robertson and Nicholson, 1996;  Vuontisjärvi, 2006; 
Bouten et al., 2011). It is argued that such comprehensive reporting enables 
stakeholders to gain a better understanding of a firm’s actual social performance (Hooks 
and van Staden, 2011). Since it is easier to produce declarative statements than the 
results from actual implementation (Spiller, 2009), it is argued that organisations with 
poor CSP will produce greater amount of narrative comprising of qualitative disclosure 
(Ingram and Frazier, 1980) to symbolise their CSR commitment (de Villiers and van 
Staden, 20 06). On the other hand, organisations with superior CSP would find it easier 
and less costly  to produce evidence-laden and quantifiable CSR information (Mahoney 
et al., 2012), and therefore would voluntarily produce the type of  disclosure which is 
difficult to mimic for poor performing organisations (Clarkson et al., 2008). Only 
organisations with actual commitment to fulfilling their CSR would proactively 
measure and therefore report on current and future impact of their decisions. Thus, a 
distinction between companies can be made based on the basis of the quality of 
reporting. Empirical evidence supports this such that comprehensiveness of reporting 
including quantifiable disclosure is higher in companies which actively embed CSR in 
their operations (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Scholtens, 2009; Mahoney et al., 2012).  
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5.3.5 Proposed Approach: Evidence-based Disclosure as a proxy for 
CSP 
The above discussion indicates that if social disclosure is scrutinised to seek evidence 
of actions as oppose to mere declarative statements, a better view of CSP can be 
achieved. The importance of examining the type of disclosure has been long recognised 
in the CSR literature. For example Guthrie and Mathews (1985) review of the literature 
suggested that the type of ‘evidence’ disclosed by companies needs to be assessed, 
since one can gauge the quality of ‘evidence’ from  whether the statement made are 
declarative or quantitative (Gray et al., 1995a). 
To warranty the use of social reporting to assess CSP in this thesis, the established link 
between comprehensive reporting and performance is used (see e.g. Robertson and 
Nicholson, 1996; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Vuontisjärvi, 2006; Cuesta-González et al., 
2006; Clarkson et al., 2008; Scholtens, 2009; Hooks and van Staden, 2011, Bouten et 
al., 2011; Mahoney et al., 2012). Distinction is made between declarative and evidence-
based disclosure as recommended (Wiseman, 1982; Guthrie and Mathews, 1985; Gray 
et al., 1995b; Neu et al., 1998) to better gauge actual performance. Below, the terms 
‘declarative’ and ‘evidence-based disclosure’ are explicitly defined in light of previous 
literature and GRI guidelines. 
Defining Declarative and Evidence-based Disclosure  
Declarative disclosure is defined as corporate rhetoric that is not backed by any 
evidence of actual action, but instead expresses awareness or commitment to the CSR 
causes. This category covers the first two types158 of information disclosure required by 
the GRI guidelines (2011, 2011a); Robertson and Nicholson, (1996); Vuontisjärvi, 
(2006); Beck et al. (2010) and Bouten et al. (2011). Therefore disclosure on aims, 
vision and goals of the company as well as statements on how the bank is addressing 
CSR concerns, i.e. simple description of any actions taken, are considered part of this 
disclosure type159. Therefore if a bank discloses it has a policy on any CSR issue, it will 
be considered a declarative statement, since the assertion that a policy exists does not 
158 The GRI guidelines requires reporting on firm strategy and profile; management approach and 
performance indicators. The categories defined in Bouten et al. (2011) are congruent with GRI; 
Robertson and Nicholson (1996) and Vuontisjärvi (2006).  
159 The latter is included on the basis that description of an action is not as informative or easy to verify 
unless results from that action are mentioned (Clarkson et al., 2008; Bouten et al., 2011). 
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necessarily mean it is implemented (Wood, 1991; Robertson and Nicholson, 1996; 
Bouten et al., 2011). This approach is in line with the previous literature (Wiseman, 
1982; Gray et al., 1995b; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Bouten et al., 2011). 
Evidence based disclosure is defined as disclosure of objective measures, performance 
indicators and specific outcomes from CSR initiatives. This corresponds with the third 
type of information disclosure required by GRI; Robertson and Nicholson, (1996); 
Vuontisjärvi, (2006); Beck et al. (2010)160 and Bouten et al. (2011). Only disclosure 
that meets the following criteria is considered evidence-based : 1) Quantitative 
disclosure (monetary or non-monetary quantitative – for example, amount donated in 
charity); 2) specific qualitative disclosure (for matters where quantitative disclosure is 
not applicable for example, adoption of voluntary CSR-related international initiatives 
such as the Equator Principles; to be counted as evidence-based, specific mention of the 
initiative/standard is required) and 3) outcome/result from a CSR initiative (for 
example, reporting on amount of paper recycled, through adopting a recycling policy). 
5.4 Method: Constructing the CSP Index to Assess and Compare 
Islamic and Conventional Banks 
5.4.1 Data  
This study analyses Islamic and conventional banks located in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). The scope of this study is limited to the GCC region as these countries 
are considered relatively homogenous in terms of their culture and socio-political 
structures (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). Culture plays a major role in accounting 
especially social reporting practices across different countries (Lopes and Rodrigues, 
2007). Limiting the scope of analysis to a homogenous region assists in reducing the 
impact of external influences and makes comparative analysis more appropriate 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Aribi and Gao, 2010; 2011). 
Only commercial banks are analysed in this study. Consolidated annual reports were 
collected from banks’ websites. As these reports include the performance of the 
banking group’s subsidiaries, any subsidiaries of local Islamic or conventional banks 
160 The evidence based disclosure category captures disclosure types 3,4 and 5 specified in in Beck et al. 
(2010) 
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were also excluded from the sample. Consequently, Islamic windows have been 
considered as part of the parent conventional banks as opposed to separate Islamic 
banks. As it is reasonable to assume that decision-making authority regarding policies 
on CSR exist at the bank’s parent-level rather than the subsidiary or branch level, it is 
deemed fairer to confine the Islamic category to full-fledged Islamic banks only.  
Banks are analysed for three consecutive years, in line with Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) 
and Aribi and Arun (2015) to examine both the level and change in CSP within 
individual banks and the complete sample over time. The three years post the onset of 
the financial crisis i.e. 2009-2011were selected. To ensure that every bank is 
represented for each year of analysis, any bank for which 2009-2011 annual reports 
could not be collected were excluded. The sample is also limited to banks which 
produced annual reports in English therefore banks with reports in Arabic were 
excluded. Finally, any bank which produced only the mandatory financial statements as 
opposed to a complete annual report (with voluntary CSR disclosure) could not be 
included in the study. The final sample consists of 47 banks; 12 full-fledged Islamic and 
35 conventional banks. A balanced panel over the 2009-2011 period results in 141 
bank-year observations. Table 5.1 presents breakdown of sample banks per country. 
Table 5.1: Number of Banks per country and type 
 
Disclosure medium: Annual Report  
In keeping with prior literature, this study analyses social disclosure provided in banks’ 
annual reports. Annual reports have been acknowledged as an appropriate and useful 
medium to assess social disclosure and have been extensively used in social reporting 
literature (Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Neimark, 1992; Gray et al., 1995b; Neu et al., 
Country Number of Observations
Islamic Conventional Total 2009-2011
Bahrain 4 6 10 30
Kuwait 2 4 6 18
Oman 0 4 4 12
Qatar 2 4 6 18
Saudi Arabia 3 5 8 24
UAE 1 12 13 39
Total 12 35 47 141
Observations per 
Type of Bank 36 105
Number of Banks
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1998; Tsang, 1998; Maali et al., 2006; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; de Villiers and van 
Staden, 2006;  Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Aribi and Gao, 2010, 2011; Beck et al., 2010; 
Bouten et al., 2011; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Belal et al., 2015). The popularity of 
these reports lies in their practicality for research purposes as they are widely available 
in the public domain (Deegan and Rankin, 1997; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2007; Bouten et al., 2011). More importantly, annual reports provide 
valuable insight into a company at a particular point in time as they are not only 
produced regularly but also at uniform intervals. These reports also present one of the 
key channels used by companies to communicate their operations to a wide variety of 
stakeholders and have been recognised as central to the construction of an 
organisation’s external social image (Neimark, 1992; Gray et al., 1995b).  
It is recognised that annual reports are not the sole medium of corporate communication 
on CSR (Maali et al., 2006), with advertising, PR publications and specially company 
websites and separate CSR reports becoming increasingly popular mediums (Bravo et 
al., 2012).  Evidence of examining such alternative mediums exists in prior literature 
(see e.g. Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990; Coupland, 2006; Bravo et al., 2012; Kamla and 
Rammal, 2013). However, as Gray et al., (1995b) note, to capture the entirety of an 
organisation’s CSP using social disclosure requires identification and examination of all 
communication mediums used by the organization to disseminate information on CSR. 
Such an ambitious task, however, proves practically impossible to undertake. Thus for 
pragmatic reasons, prior CSR literature has primarily focused on annual reports as the 
sole medium of communication to examine (Gray et al., 1995b).  
For the purpose of this study, annual reports are considered the most appropriate 
information source based on five important factors. Firstly, relative to the sample period 
analysed, use of stand-alone CSR reports has only begun very recently in the GCC 
banks with some publishing their first reports in 2011, resulting in insufficient 
observations for analysis and comparison. Secondly, there is evidence that the most 
important information found in stand-alone CSR reports is often repeated, either 
literally or somewhat concisely, in annual reports (Beck et al., 2010; Hooks and van 
Staden, 2011). Thirdly, in line with the CSP definition adopted here, the exercise of 
CSR will result in either production of CSR outputs or use of CSR resources 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Since annual reports provide an overview of a firm’s 
operations including resource usage during the year to a large stakeholder base 
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(Neimark, 1992), it is argued that in cases where banks undertake actual CSR, the 
related resource use/output will be reported in annual reports. Fourthly, it has also been 
argued that social reporting in annual reports, “possess a degree of credibility not 
associated with other forms of advertisement” (Neu et al., 1998, p. 269) and is “not 
subject to the risk of journalistic interpretations and distortions possible through press 
reporting” as management has complete editorial control over its content (Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989, p. 344), thus annual reports represent a relatively reliable source of 
information on banks’ CSR activities. Finally, despite rising popularity, studies which 
examine CSR disclosure on company websites acknowledge problems with this 
communication medium. Most notably, the ever-changing nature of websites means that 
there is potential for the content on webpages to be altered, moved or even removed 
during the data collection period and whilst this problem exists in cross-sectional 
studies, it is even more acute in longitudinal studies, where the constant updating and 
relocation of content makes returning to the same position on the website extremely 
problematic over time (Coupland, 2006). As this study examines social reporting over 3 
years, and based on the reasons stated above, limiting the scope of analysis to annual 
reports is considered appropriate.   
5.4.2 Content Analysis: Choosing the Appropriate Approach  
To analyse the narrative in annual reports, content analysis is used. Content analysis has 
been defined as “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from 
texts (or other meaningful matter) to the context of their use” (Krippendorff, 2003 p. 
18).  This technique enables a body of text to be analysed in a systematic, objective, 
reliable and replicable manner (Krippendorf, 2003; Gutherie and Parker, 1990; Gray et 
al., 1995b). Content analysis has been extensively used in the social reporting literature 
(Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Guthrie and Mathews, 1985; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 
Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990; Gray et al., 1995b; Tsang, 1998; Unerman, 2000; Al Tuwaijri 
et al., 2004; Maali et al., 2006; Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; Vuontisjärvi, 2006; de 
Villiers and van Staden, 2006; Cho and Patten, 2007; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; 
Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Clarkson et al., 2008; Aribi and Gao, 2010, 2011; Beck et 
al., 2010; Bouten et al., 2011; Hooks and van Staden, 2011; Bravo et al., 2012; Pérez 
and del Bosque, 2012, Kamla and Rammal, 2013), giving it “validity as an empirical 
research tool” in this field (Hooks and van Staden, 2011, p.201). Nevertheless, an 
important criticism of the extant content analysis studies is that many do not provide 
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sufficient detail to assist others in understanding how the content analysis is conducted 
(Bouten et al., 2011). Therefore this section explains in detail the choices made and the 
content analysis process undertaken in this work.  
There are broadly two approaches adopted in content analysis studies. Quantitative 
content analysis (mechanistic approach) captures frequency/volume of disclosure e.g. 
word/sentence count, whereas qualitative content analysis (interpretative approach) 
focuses on capturing meanings in information disclosed (Beck et al., 2010). The aim of 
qualitative content analysis (QCA) is to identify the presence of themes/categories 
within a body of content which illustrate “the range of the meanings of the 
phenomenon” under study  as understood by the producers of that text (Zhang and 
Wildemuth, 2009, p.2). 
As stated earlier, it is well-established in the CSR literature that corporate rhetoric 
without evidence of actions and outcomes is often symbolic, used as a legitimising tool 
and therefore reliance on measuring volume of disclosure produces misleading results 
with regards to actual CSP (Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Robertson and Nicholson, 1996; 
de Villiers and van Staden 2006; Cho and Patten, 2007; Scholtens, 2009; Hooks and 
van Staden, 2011). Therefore in this study, qualitative content analysis (QCA) method 
is used, which allows detailed examination of social narrative, allowing differentiation 
between declarative and evidence-based disclosure. Under QCA, the unit of analysis i.e. 
the “unit of text to be classified during content analysis” is the individual theme which 
can be conveyed in a word, sentence or paragraph, therefore one looks for the 
expression of an idea during the coding process (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009, p.3). 
Consequently, texts of varying lengths were coded161 as long as they represented 
themes associated with CSR and met the criteria of evidence-based disclosure. 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007), the full annual reports 
were read.  
161 Annual reports were loaded into the NVivo software and narrative in annual reports was coded into 
different nodes representing the CSP categories and subcategories, allowing for a copy of the text 
(evidence-based disclosure) to be kept for future reference. Using these extracts, subcategory definitions 
were amended to reflect the nature of initiatives communicated under evidence-based disclosure in 
banks’ annual reports. 
205 
 
                                                 
` 
5.4.3 Development of the CSP Index: Confirming Instrument Validity  
The first step in content analysis is to define a classification system for the different 
elements of social narrative found in the annual reports. Although QCA is primarily 
inductive in nature as it involves designing a process to “condense raw data into 
categories or themes based on valid inference and interpretation”, it need not be purely 
inductive (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009, p.2). Deductive reasoning is especially useful 
in generating concepts from prior literature at the inception of the data collection and 
analysis process providing a suitable and helpful starting point. In terms of the three 
approaches to QCA summarised by Hsieh and Shannon (2005), this study adopts the 
‘directed content analysis’ approach in which coding of text starts with relevant 
research findings i.e. CSR categories derived from prior literature, followed by several 
rounds of iterations to reflect the themes emerging from the data. Developing categories 
in the initial stage from extant literature ensures that the research instrument is validated 
i.e. the categories of analysis are derived by reference to ‘shared meanings’  which 
recreate the same referents in all associated researchers as is required for appropriate 
content analysis (Krippendorf, 2003, Gray et al., 1995a, p.85; Hammond and Miles, 
2004; Bouten et al., 2011) ensuring that the eventual CSP Index consists of 
transferrable, dependable and credible categories making this study’s findings 
generalizable (Kamla and Rammal, 2013, p.922).  
Employing shared meaning has two important implications for the process of content 
analysis. First it requires that the categories of CSR are defined in a way which is 
compatible with prior CSR literature and secondly it requires that different 
coders/researchers agree in identifying what constitutes as a particular type of 
disclosure (Hammond and Miles, 2004). The first results in achieving instrument 
validity (discussed here) whilst the latter results in coder reliability (discussed later). 
To achieve instrument validity key CSR themes applicable to both Islamic and 
conventional banks needed to be identified. For this, it was important to identify 
sources which define CSR in the global context and acknowledge the peculiarities of 
Islamic banking industry including the influence of religion. For Islamic banks, the 
AAOIFI CSR Standard (2010) is a natural starting point. The AAOIFI Standard is a 
credible source to identify the relevant CSR issues and expectations held of Islamic 
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banks, as it is published by the internationally acknowledged institution, AAOIFI162, 
which represents the views/expectations of Islamic banking’s major stakeholders 
including sharia scholars, Islamic banks and academics, and has been a reference source 
in prior Islamic banking literature (see e.g. Maali et al., 2006; Mallin et al., 2014). To 
further ensure that all relevant CSR issues for conventional banking have also been 
identified, the internationally recognised and widely cited KLD criteria, used by 
numerous conventional CSR studies as a measure of CSP was also consulted (see e.g. 
Waddock and Graves, 1997; Ruf et al., 1998; Van der Laan et al 2008; El Ghoul et al., 
2011; Mahoney et al., 2012). Keeping in mind the industry-specific nature of CSR 
(Simpson and Kohers, 2002; Reverte, 2009; Baird et al., 2011), prior CSR studies with 
a focus on Islamic and conventional banking were also examined. Given that each 
industry has a different stakeholder portfolio, expectations of social responsibility vary 
across industries impacting the type of CSP produced (Baird et al., 2011). For example, 
firms in manufacturing industries face greater pressure for health and safety related 
issues than the banking sector. Additionally environmental issues are found to be less 
relevant to banking given the industry’s low impact on environment while social 
aspects are found to be more relevant (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; Reverte, 2009). 
Thus, it was deemed important to consult banking-specific CSR studies. These studies 
included: Branco and Rodrigues (2006); Coupland, (2006); Cuesta-González et al. 
(2006); Maali et al. (2006); Haniffa and Hudaib (2007); McDonald and Rundle-Thiele 
(2008); Scholtens (2009); Aribi and Gao (2010, 2011); Bravo et al. (2012) and Kamla 
and Rammal (2013).  
The most common CSR categories identified from the aforementioned sources and 
which have been widely acknowledged in mainstream CSR literature are Community, 
Customers, Employees, and the Environment (Gray et al., 1995b). Robertson and 
Nicholsan (1996) point out that these represent the four stakeholders which account for 
162 It is recognised that recommendations of the AAOIFI CSR standard target disclosure practices by 
Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) and are aimed at enhancing transparency and improving reporting 
practices in IFIs. However since the objective of this study is to gauge  social performance (CSP) rather 
than compliance with a particular reporting standard, AAOIFI recommendations are used only as a source 
to identify the broad areas of CSR deemed relevant to Islamic banks and not to construct a list of 
disclosure items expected from Islamic banks. This approach is particularly useful since that there is no 
uniform method for an organisation to fulfil its social responsibility therefore banks may undertake 
different CSR initiatives focusing on areas congruent with their business capabilities, which are not 
necessarily included in the AAOIFI recommendation. 
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the majority of the focus163 in the broad CSR literature. However, as correctly pointed 
out by Gray et al., (1995b), these four categories are not exhaustive, suggesting the need 
for an ‘other’ CSR category to capture ‘new’ meanings of CSR emerging from the data. 
Close study of the Islamic banking literature and the AAOIFI CSR Standard indicated 
what this ‘other’ category could be at an early stage of the CSP index development, 
suggesting the addition of two further CSR categories. The first refers to ‘Socio-
economic Development’ (SED); and the second to ‘Religion-specific Initiatives’ (RSI). 
Issues related to the SED are also applicable to conventional banks and have been 
included in several conventional studies (e.g. Coupland, 2006; Branco and Rodrigues, 
2006; Cuesta-González et al., 2006; McDonald and Rundle-Thiele, 2008; Scholtens, 
2009; Bravo et al., 2012) although not always under this label. Nevertheless, given the 
importance attached to the role of Islamic banks in promoting socioeconomic 
development of their respective countries as advocated by Islamic economists and 
sharia scholars (Maali et al., 20006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Kamla and Rammal, 
2013), a separate category for SED was included in the CSP index, to determine if 
Islamic banks have met such expectations and how they compare with conventional 
banks on this particular category. The final category, RSI includes CSR issues such as 
payment of zakah, and provision of qard hasan which are rooted in Islamic values, and 
considered particular to Islamic banks in the current literature (Belal et al., 2015). 
Under these six categories, a comprehensive but not exhaustive list of CSR issues was 
identified to construct the initial CSP index. 
5.4.4 The Process of Content Analysis: Ensuring Coding Reliability  
Following the initial compilation of the 6 CSR categories and their constituent 
subcategories, a pilot study was undertaken. Coding a sample text provides the best way 
to establish clarity in category definitions and test coding consistency (Zhang and 
Wildemuth, 2009). To ensure reliability of results from content analysis it is essential 
that the coding process is objective (i.e. different coders code the text in the same way) 
(Weber, 1990; Krippendorff , 2003). Unlike, the quantitative content analysis 
(mechanistic approach), the scope for subjectivity is greater in QCA, as the researcher 
is required to make judgement on the meaning of the text analysed in order to codify it. 
163Robertson and Nicholsan (1996) acknowledge that whilst the environment is not strictly a stakeholder, 
its inclusion in CSR categories is warranted since all corporations including banks have an impact on the 
environment e.g. through their lending/investment decisions (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006).  
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This highlights the importance of a well-written and clear coding scheme i.e. guidelines 
that specify how the text should be coded. In addition to producing specific definitions 
on what constitutes as evidence-based disclosure prior to data collection a detailed 
coding manual was also created at this stage, following the recommendations of Weber 
(1990), which included the category and subcategory names, definitions164 and 
summary of evidence-based disclosures indicating the type of text to be coded per 
subcategory. As the aim of QCA is to develop categories to represent as close as 
possible the material under study (Mayring, 2000), the coding manual was iteratively 
improved during and after the pilot study stage, with the subcategory definitions 
amended until they accurately represented the evidence-based disclosure found in banks 
annual reports165. Where banks provided evidence-based disclosure for a CSR activity 
not found in prior literature or AAOIFI/KLD, the description of the activity was noted 
and added to the relevant subcategory. Therefore, as required new subcategories166 were 
added and existing ones rephrased or merged. Any subcategories on which no bank 
provided evidence-based disclosure were deleted.  
A further important step in the process of conducting a QCA study is to reassess coding 
consistency (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009). This requires rechecking the coding 
consistency after the full dataset has been analysed because as newer material is coded, 
new themes emerging from the data are added to the coding manual and with greater 
exposure to similar material, the coders’ understanding of the underlying phenomenon, 
the categories and coding rules can change leading to inconsistency in coding over a 
period of time (Weber, 1990). Thus, as recommended in Weber (1990), after the initial 
coding of the complete dataset, all 141 annual reports were recoded using the finalised 
coding manual (see Appendix 5.A). This ensured that any additional coding rules 
established using newer material (reports coded later in the data collection process) 
were also applied to narrative from reports coded at the earlier stage when the coding 
164 Thus, the subcategory definitions in CSP index reflect the nature of activities indicated by evidence-
based disclosures in banks annual reports and are unique to this study. 
165 As Weber (1990) states, the process of gradually coding the complete dataset, revising the coding 
rules and checking for coding consistency is an iterative process, which needs to be continued until 
sufficient coding consistency has been achieved. 
166 E.g. it was identified that new subcategories e.g. ‘avenue for donations’ and ‘healthcare campaign’ 
were required under the Community category in addition to charitable donations to highlight that banks 
not only established avenues for customers to make donations but also undertook a variety of initiatives 
to raise awareness of health issues in their respective countries, in addition to donating money to 
healthcare causes. 
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manual was still in its developmental stage. Additionally, it guaranteed that all narrative 
was allocated to the relevant subcategories and that the finalised coding rules 
represented the nature of evidence-based disclosure found in the full body of data. 
Furthermore, as the entire data collection (from compilation of initial CSR categories 
from literature, to conducting pilot studies and coding the entire dataset whilst 
iteratively improving the coding manual) took approximately 6 months, the full sample 
was recoded at the end of the six-month period, which added an intra-coder reliability 
check to the process i.e. ensuring that the same coder codes the data in a similar manner 
over time, which addressed the potential for inconsistency over time highlighted above. 
5.4.5 CSP Index 
The CSP Index constructed from content analysis of banks’ annual reports is presented 
in table 5.2. It comprises of six CSP dimensions and 25 social performance indicators 
(SPIs). For details on each of the SPI including the definition and coding criteria, refer 
to appendix 5.A. References mapping each of the SPIs to AAOIFI, KLD and prior 
literature are presented in appendix 5.B (this confirms instrument validity). A brief 
description of each dimension is presented here. 
The Community dimension comprises of 4 SPIs: Charitable Donations, Avenue for 
Donations, Healthcare Campaigns and Culture. The Customers dimension is one of the 
smallest, such that it comprises of only 3 SPIs: Quality of Service, Customer Service 
Skills and Customer Engagement. The Employees dimension is the largest, comprising  
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Table 5.2: CSP Dimensions and Indicators  
 
Community
1. Charitable Donations
2. Avenue for Donations
3. Healthcare Campaign
4. Culture
Customers
5. Quality of Service
6. Customer Service Skills
7. Customer Engagement
Employees
8. Diversity and Inclusion
9. Training and Education
10. Career Progression
11. Incentive Schemes
12. Healthcare Benefits
13. Occupational Health and Safety
Environment
14. Environmental Impact
15. Green Products and services
16. Energy Conservation
17. Raising Environmental Awareness
18. Environmental Funding Conditions
Socio-Economic Development (SED)
19. Support for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
20. Infrastructure Development
21. Development of Human Capital
22. Financial Inclusion
Religion-Specific Initiatives (RSI)
23. Zakah
24. Facilitating Religious Duties 
25. Qard Hasan
CSP Dimensions and Indicators
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6 SPIs: Diversity and Inclusion, Training and Education, Career Progression, Incentive 
Schemes, Healthcare Benefits and Occupational Health and Safety. Environment is the 
second largest dimension comprising of 5 SPIs: Environmental Impact, Green Products 
and services, Energy Conservation, Raising Environmental Awareness and 
Environmental Funding Conditions. The Socio-Economic Development (SED) 
dimension comprises of 4 SPIs: Support for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), 
Infrastructure Development, Development of Human Capital and Financial Inclusion. 
Finally, the Religion-Specific Initiatives (RSI) dimension, also one of the smallest, 
comprises of 3 SPIs: Zakah, Facilitating Religious Duties and Qard Hasan. The next 
section discusses the issue of religion specific CSR initiatives being particular to 
Islamic banks, in light of the content analysis conducted in this work. 
5.5 Is Religion-Specific CSR Unique to Islamic Banks? 
Table 5.3 illustrates which social performance indicators (SPIs) are present and absent 
in Islamic and conventional banking industries. As table 5.3 shows, conventional banks 
provide evidence-based disclosure on 2 of the 3 religion-specific initiatives. Thus, 
empirical evidence invalidates the assumption that religion-specific CSR is an entire 
category that is particular to Islamic banks. As this study shows, it is not the entire 
category, but rather a single SPI which is unique to Islamic banks. 
Results from content analysis revealed that conventional banks provided evidence-
based disclosure on engaging with zakah and facilitation of religious duties. On the 
latter SPI, prominent initiatives were related to the month of Ramadan. These findings 
are in line with Kamla, (2007) and Thibos and Gillespie (2011). The month of Ramadan 
is one of the most prestigious months in the Islamic calendar, where not only are forms 
of worship including fasting and prayers but also acts of kindness and especially charity 
are highly promoted in Islamic societies. Many individuals arrange the payment of their 
zakah during Ramadan as the rewards for good deeds are considered higher during this 
month. Within the broader cultural context of the GCC, it is therefore unsurprising that 
conventional banks also undertake specific CSR initiatives aimed at Islamic festivals 
and facilitate the fulfilment of religious duties through their CSR programmes, despite 
only Islamic banks portraying a religious identity. To sustain continued operations, 
banks not only need to manage stakeholder expectations but also the perception held of 
them more broadly by operating within the accepted norms of society. 
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Table 5.3: Social Performance Indicators in Islamic and Conventional Banks 
These results are based on Islamic/conventional banks providing evidence-based disclosure for each 
social performance indicator at least once during the 3 year period (2009 to 2011). 
  
CSP Dimensions and Indicators Islamic Conventional
Community
1. Charitable Donations ✓ ✓
2. Avenue for Donations ✓ ✓
3. Healthcare Campaign ✓ ✓
4. Culture ✓ ✓
Customers
5. Quality of Service ✓ ✓
6. Customer Service Skills ✓ ✓
7. Customer Engagement ✓ ✓
Employees
8. Diversity and Inclusion ✓ ✓
9. Training and Education ✓ ✓
10. Career Progression ✓ ✓
11. Incentive Schemes ✓ ✓
12. Healthcare Benefits ✓ ✓
13. Occupational Health and Safety ✓ ✓
Environment
14. Environmental Impact ✓ ✓
15. Green Products and services ✓ ✓
16. Energy Conservation ✓ ✓
17. Raising Environmental Awareness ✓ ✓
18. Environmental Funding Conditions ✓ ✓
Socio-Economic Development (SED)
19. Support for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) ✓ ✓
20. Infrastructure Development ✓ ✓
21. Development of Human Capital ✓ ✓
22. Financial Inclusion ✓ ✓
Religion-Specific Initiatives (RSI)
23. Zakah ✓ ✓
24. Facilitating Religious Duties ✓ ✓
25. Qard Hasan ✓ ✕
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In this regard, the legitimacy, stakeholder and institutional theory help understand the 
behaviour of conventional banks. These theories are nevertheless, limited insofar as 
they do not explain why conventional banks engage in only 2 of the 3 SPIs. To 
understand this, insights into the religion of Islam are required. What is different about 
the 2 SPIs conventional banks engage in i.e. ‘zakah’, ‘facilitating religious duties’ and 
‘qard hasan’?  
The difference lies in their status within the religion of Islam. Payment of zakah and 
initiatives undertaken for ‘facilitating religious duties’ relate to obligatory forms of 
worship. These relate directly with the five pillars of Islam, which are an essential 
matter of belief for all Muslims. In contrast qard hasan is a voluntary act that is 
recommended in Islam and is not a religious obligation. Thus, it appears that 
conventional banks which are also owned and run by Muslims in the GCC, engage in 
religious CSR that relates directly to obligatory but not voluntary acts of worship.  
The payment and reporting on zakah is a case in point in this regards. A thorough 
examination of the conventional banks annual reports on all CSR issues considered in 
this study revealed that conventional banks not only report on due zakah and deduct it 
from dividends prior to distribution in Saudi Arabia where payment of zakah is 
mandated by state law, but also that several conventional banks willingly do the same 
or pay zakah by charging it to the income statement in other GCC counties. Even in 
cases, where banks are not permitted by their Articles of Association to pay on behalf of 
their shareholders, several banks choose to use their resources to calculate the amount 
of the zakah due per share and communicate this in their annual reports thereby easing 
the fulfilment of this religious obligation for their shareholders, assisting them in paying 
the correct amount of zakah owed. Thus, contrary to the particularity suggested by 
Belal et al. (2015), zakah is not an Islamic banking specific but rather a culture-specific-
issue, applicable to all organisations operating in the GCC including Islamic and 
conventional banks. The assumption that religion-specific CSR is particular to Islamic 
banks, as in Mallin et al. (2014), Belal et al (2015) and Platonova et al., (2016), neglects 
this reality.  
By assuming that all religion specific CSR initiatives are particular to Islamic banking, 
the current Islamic banking literature fails to capture the ‘religious’ aspect of CSR in 
the GCC. This is primarily due to a failure to appreciate the operating environment, a 
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narrow focus i.e. analysing Islamic banking reports only and more broadly a 
decontextualized approach towards CSR. Future studies should therefore consider a 
contextualised view of CSR and examine empirical evidence for new possibilities prior 
to making broad-brush generalisations. 
A final interesting insight from this chapter’s analysis worth noting is that qard hasan is 
identified as the single differentiating feature of Islamic banks’ CSP. A parallel can be 
drawn between qard hasan and PLS financing which, recall from chapter 4, is the only 
feature that meaningfully differentiates Islamic banks’ balance sheet from that of its 
conventional counterpart. What is interestingly common between PLS financing and 
qard hasan, as was highlighted in chapter 2, is that these are both alternatives to riba-
based lending, the former is the ‘for profit’ alternative, whilst the latter is the ‘not for 
profit’ alternative and as such these are considered to be “the most ‘Islamic’” forms of 
financing by many Islamic scholars (Pollard and Samers, 2007, p.315). Thus it appears 
that for both its financial and social aspects, it is riba which drives the practical 
distinguishing features of Islamic banking relative to its conventional counterpart. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter details how the CSP index designed to assess and compare the corporate 
social performance (CSP) of Islamic and conventional banks is developed. In 
constructing this index, this chapter first addressed the issue of incommensurability 
between Islamic and conventional banks CSR by challenging the assumption that 
religion-specific CSR initiatives are a category particular to Islamic banks, as 
propagated in the current literature. By explaining the concept of CSR using Carroll 
(1979)’s widely-cited definition and delineating perspectives from legitimacy, 
stakeholder, and institutional theory, this chapter explained why this assumption is 
inconsistent with the conceptual and theoretical basis of CSR, which by definition is a 
concept embedded within a social context.  
The chapter then looked at the challenge of measuring CSP. From its review of the 
extant literature, this chapter has adopted a specific definition of CSP derived from 
Wood (1991) and analytical framework to assess CSP based on Clarkson (1995)’s 
recommendation. As there are no third-party independent ratings for Islamic banks’ 
CSP, and content analysis of banks’ annual reports is widely used in the current 
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literature, this chapter offers an improvement on the current methodology, by making a 
case for evidence-based disclosure to be used as a more objective means to assess CSP 
from social reporting. In doing so, this chapter builds on the established link between 
comprehensive reporting and performance and explicitly defined the terms ‘declarative’ 
and ‘evidence-based disclosure’ using GRI guidelines and prior literature.  
By applying the evidence-based disclosure criteria, in-depth content analysis of 47 
banks’ annual reports for the years 2009-2011 is conducted. From this, the CSP index is 
constructed which comprises of 25 social performance indicators that fall under 6 
dimensions namely: Community, Customers, Employees, Environment, Socio-
economic Development and Religious-specific Initiatives. As this index is grounded in 
actual corporate data as opposed to representing a theoretical benchmark, it arguably 
provides better insight into the nature of CSP in Islamic and conventional banks 
allowing for a better comparison, which can aid in identifying areas of improvement 
and thus policy making for both industries. Application of this index to conduct a 
thorough comparison between Islamic and conventional banks’ CSP should therefore be 
the next step forward, especially as a limited comparison in this chapter, seeking the 
presence of SPIs in both industries, has already provided important insights.  
By comparing which social performance indicators are absent in Islamic/conventional 
banks, this chapter has identified that conventional banks provide evidence of engaging 
in 2 of the 3 religion-specific CSR initiatives, namely zakah and facilitating religious 
duties, both of which are related to the obligatory forms of worship in Islam. This 
chapter therefore, in addition to providing a conceptual and theoretical argument, also 
provides empirical evidence which invalidates the assumption that religion-specific 
CSR is a category particular to Islamic banking. The only religiously inspired initiative 
identified as unique to Islamic banking is qard hasan. This work therefore finds that it is 
not an entire category of religious CSR but rather a specific social performance 
indicator that differentiates the composition of CSP between Islamic and conventional 
banks.  
Drawing a parallel with PLS financing, the only financial asset that differentiates 
Islamic from conventional banks’ balance sheet, leads to a profound insight. The only 
features which differentiate both the financial and social aspects of Islamic banking 
from its conventional counterpart in practice are the Islamic alternatives to riba-based 
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lending. Thus, riba which has received considerable attention in theoretical literature 
holds practical significance to this date.  
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research   
As with any research, this study also has its limitations. In constructing the CSP index, 
this study looks only at GCC banks over a three-year period. A useful extension to this 
work would be to increase the sample size, both in terms of the number of banks and 
number of years analysed. It would also be interesting to examine what CSP comprises 
of in other Muslim regions for example Southeast Asia and how this differs from the 
GCC. Additional sources of data, beyond annual reports, can also be helpful. 
Researchers should therefore consider analysing stand-alone CSR reports where 
available. Primary data analysis, for example interviews with bank management can 
also complement this work in gaining insights into the nature of CSP in Islamic and 
conventional banks. 
Contributions 
Despite its limitations, this chapter has made important contributions to the Islamic 
banking literature. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to construct a 
corporate social performance (CSP) index, which is based on the criteria of evidence-
based disclosure and grounded in actual corporate data to assess and compare the CSP 
of Islamic and conventional banks. Furthermore, this is the first study to challenge and 
invalidate an important assumption in Islamic banking literature, i.e. the assumption of 
religion-specific CSR being ‘particular’ to Islamic banking, on conceptual, theoretical 
and empirical basis. In doing so, this study has opened up new avenues of research by 
showing that a meaningful comparison between Islamic and conventional banks’ CSP 
can be possible in an appropriate context.  
It is hoped that future researchers will be able to benefit from the detailed methodology 
presented in this chapter to either construct their own indices using the evidence-based 
disclosure criteria for a better assessment of corporate social performance or adapt and 
modify the CSP index offered in this work for an improved evaluation of Islamic banks’ 
CSP and comparison with conventional banks. As this index is constructed using 
content analysis of banks’ annual reports, which are widely available, both the 
methodology and the application of this index can be generalised to contexts beyond the 
GCC Islamic banking industry.  
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Chapter 6 will now use the index developed in this chapter to conduct a thorough 
comparison of Islamic and conventional banks’ CSP. 
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Appendix 5.A 
CSP Dimensions 
and Indicators 
Definitions of Social Performance 
Indicators (SPIs) 
Coding Rule: Evidence-based disclosures provided for each social 
performance indicator (SPI) 
Scoring Rule: Score 1 if at least one of the disclosure items listed is present 
for each social performance indicator (SPI); 0 otherwise 
Community 
Charitable 
Donations 
Donations made to charitable 
organisations or causes.  
 
- Amount of donation 
- Names of charities and/or causes supported locally and/or internationally 
- Name / details of specific CSR program / charitable trust set up by the bank 
Avenue for 
Donations 
Avenues created for depositors, 
shareholders, clients, employees 
and/or general public to make 
donations for charitable purposes  
- Initiatives such as ‘donations through ATMs’  
- Donating a percentage of amount used by customers on bank cards 
- Participating or organising fund-raising events (details of initiatives provided 
e.g. cause, collaborators or amount raised) 
- Internal initiatives e.g. donation opt-in for employees to contribute towards 
the bank’s total charity amount   
Healthcare 
Campaign  
Initiatives aimed at supporting and 
raising awareness of health issues  
- Campaigning and/or volunteering programs arranged to support / raise 
awareness of health issues in general public (details of initiatives given) 
Culture  Promoting national culture including 
arts, literature and sports events   
- Sponsoring cultural events including arts, literature, traditions, national days 
and/or sports (details of event supported given e.g. name and actions taken) 
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167 ISO9001 is an international standard related to quality management systems by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). One of its eight management 
principles focuses on customers’ satisfaction by ensuring that customers’ needs are identified and met. ISO 9001 certification therefore implies that customer engagement and 
feedback mechanisms will be in place and actions will be undertaken to improve performance accordingly. More information on: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/management-standards/iso_9000.htm 
Customers 
Quality of Service Evidence of quality customer service 
through  proficient handling of 
complaints and third party awards   
- Resolution to customer complaints –percentage satisfied or time within 
which complaints resolved  mentioned   
- Evidence of high quality customer service e.g. award received for customer 
service by independent third party (which must be named). 
Customer Service 
Skills 
Measures taken to develop and 
enhance customer service skills  
including training and audit of service 
skills 
 
- Initiatives /training programs specifically designed to improve customer 
service skills – evidence of training program required e.g. number of 
employees trained through the program 
- Audit of customer service skills undertaken for employees – specific details 
of method of assessing customer service skills must be given e.g. through 
mystery shopping exercises  
Customer  
Engagement 
Managing relations through customer 
engagement initiatives and/or 
measures undertaken to gain insight 
into customer satisfaction 
- Details of any customer engagement initiatives and/or  
- Results from customer satisfaction surveys undertaken by bank itself 
- Certification of ISO9001167 
220 
 
                                                 
` 
168 This does not include female members of the Royal families on board of directors. 
Employees 
Diversity and 
Inclusion 
Employment/ leadership opportunities 
for women, disabled, minority ethnic 
and/or individuals from other 
disadvantaged groups  
- Women present on board of directors and/or in senior management 
positions168 
- Employment opportunities provided for the disabled, special needs, ethnic 
minorities and/or other disadvantaged members of society (evidence provided 
e.g. number of recruits from such groups). 
Training and 
Education 
Continual training, skills development 
and education of employees 
- Number/percentage of employees attending training programs in the year 
- Number of training days/ hours provided / training events held (internal and 
external to the bank, details of training programs given e.g. the topics of 
training covered)  
- Specific training units/departments or academies established within the bank 
to support staff training requirements 
- Budget allocated /costs incurred related to training needs specified 
Career 
Progression 
Training programs or initiatives 
specifically for career advancement of 
current employees  
- Leadership/ career development/ management programs in place (details 
given e.g. number of employees enrolled on such programs)  
- Sponsorship of higher education/ training and professional certifications for 
employees to enable career advancement (details given) 
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169 This does not include bonus/ shares/incentives for board of directors 
Incentive 
Schemes 
Performance related incentive 
schemes for employees e.g. 
bonus/share plans, award schemes or 
other incentives 
- Bonus plan in place (details of bonus plans and/or amount of bonuses paid 
given)169  
- Share plan available for employees (details of share plans specified) 
-Award schemes for employees to recognise good performance   
- Provision of loans for employees with favourable terms 
 
Healthcare 
Benefits 
Healthcare benefits for employees 
including medical/health insurance 
and/or initiatives taken by bank aimed 
at improving employees physical 
well-being 
- Medical / health insurance in place for employees  
- Initiatives undertaken by bank specifically aimed at improving employees 
physical well-being (details, including aim and scope of initiatives / number of 
employees affected mentioned) 
Occupational 
Health and Safety  
Initiatives taken to ensure health and 
safety at work  
 
- Health and safety certification e.g. premises meeting national health and 
safety requirements 
- Specific training on health & safety for employees (scope of training e.g. 
first aid / fire safety training mentioned) 
- Reports on health and safety inspections including fire drills 
- Number of incidents/accidents on premises and details of response taken 
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Environment 
Environmental 
Impact 
Initiatives taken to neutralise banks 
environmental impact  
- Details of environmentally friendly initiatives taken e.g.  
- Recycling 
- Planting trees 
- Environmentally friendly waste management programs in place  
Green Products 
and Services 
Environmentally friendly products 
and services provided 
- Banking products and/or services linked with environmental concerns e.g. 
- E-statements  
- Donating percentage of amount spent on credit cards to green causes 
Energy 
Conservation 
Reducing use of non-renewable 
sources of energy and/or minimising 
energy consumption 
- Energy saving initiatives e.g. switch off equipment at end of day/ energy 
saving lights / bulbs in use 
- Use of renewable sources of energy 
- Eco-friendly building specification 
- Reporting on reduction of energy/utility usage 
Raising 
Environmental 
Awareness 
Organising / participating at events or 
sponsoring organisations that raise 
awareness of environmental issues  
- Sponsoring organisations / participating at or organising events aimed at 
raising awareness of environmental issues (for external events, details such as 
cause supported and/or amount donated given; for internal events, details such 
as number of employees attending and/or frequency of events held mentioned) 
Environmental 
Funding 
Conditions 
Environmental considerations in 
lending and/or investment portfolios.  
- Membership of Equator Principles  
- Evidence of environmentally friendly projects financed 
- Preferential rates or terms offered to environmentally friendly companies 
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Socio-Economic Development (SED) 
Support for Small 
and Medium 
Enterprises 
(SMEs) 
Support for small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) 
- Financial products/services tailored to the needs of SMEs  
- Amount financed specifically to SMEs and/or the number of SMEs helped 
- Specific SME programs in place offering support to SMEs and local, small 
scale entrepreneurs, either initiated or in partnership with government schemes  
- Evidence of favourable financing terms offered to SMEs 
Infrastructure 
Development 
Investment in development of 
country’s infrastructure.  
- Investment/ funding of infrastructure project e.g. utilities (electricity, water, 
gas) / transport / education (public schools/universities) / hospitals / affordable 
housing projects and/or government buildings 
- Support for trade infrastructure between countries  
(for all of the above, details of projects financed given e.g. name/ cause/ 
amount spent; includes private and public joint ventures) 
Development of 
Human Capital 
Contributing to the development of 
human capital through training and 
opportunities provided to youth in 
order to assist them in finding and 
securing employment 
 
- Training and recruitment opportunities for graduates including: 
- Internships offered at the bank to students (details of internship program 
given, including number of interns)  
- Collaboration with universities / government initiatives to guide/train 
graduates in securing jobs in banking sector 
- Participation at and selection of graduates from career fairs (number 
recruited given) 
- Sponsoring higher education for graduates /courses to help youth get jobs  
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170 Iftar is the meal eaten at sunset for breaking one’s fast during Ramadan  
Financial 
Inclusion 
Provision of finance for the socially 
and economically disadvantaged 
members of society and/or women 
empowerment schemes 
- Specific financial products aimed at women and/or special needs customers 
- Extension of branches to rural communities 
- Microfinance schemes offered by the bank  
- Women empowerment schemes (e.g. sponsoring skills training courses) 
Religion-Specific Initiatives (RSI) 
Zakah Paying zakah on behalf of 
shareholders where permitted or 
specifying the amount of zakah due 
where not permitted  
-  For banks permitted to pay zakah on behalf of shareholders: amount of 
zakah paid / Zakah deducted from dividends before being paid to shareholders  
- For banks not permitted to pay zakah on behalf of shareholders: amount of 
zakah due per share given (to ease the calculation of zakah for the individual)  
Facilitating 
Religious Duties  
Providing facilities to ease fulfilment 
of religious duties (does not include 
payment of zakah by the bank) 
- Making fulfilment of religious duties easier e.g. 
- Providing savings account for Hajj and/or umrah (pilgrimage) 
- Funding hajj/umrah for employees/customers or members of general public 
- Providing payment avenue for customers to pay zakah  
- Taking special initiatives for Ramadan e.g. providing free iftars170    
- Taking special initiatives and/or donations made on the Eid festivals (nature 
of initiatives / beneficiaries mentioned) 
Qard Hasan Provision of qard hasan  - Amount of qard hasan given during the year  
- Specific qard hasan fund in place 
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Appendix 5.B 
Corporate Social Performance (CSP) Index 
CSP 
Dimensions & 
Indicators 
AAOIFI 
Reference 
Islamic Studies 
References 
Conventional Studies 
References 
Community 
Charitable 
Donations 
5/3/6a,f  
(para 32) 
Maali et al., 2006; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2007; Aribi and Gao, 
2010, 2011; Kamla and 
Rammal, 2013 
KLD; Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006; 
Coupland, 2006; Cuesta-
González et al., 2006; 
Scholtens, 2009 
Avenue for 
Donations 
5/3/6b,c 
(para 32) 
    
Healthcare 
Campaign  
5/3/3d  
(para 26) 
Haniffa and Hudaib,  
2007; Aribi and Gao, 
2010, 2011 
KLD; Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006; Cuesta-
González et al., 2006; 
Scholtens, 2009 Bravo et 
al., 2012 
Culture  5/3/3g  
(para 26) 
Haniffa and Hudaib,  
2007 
Branco and Rodrigues, 
2006; Cuesta-González et 
al., 2006;  Bravo et al., 
2012 
Customers 
Quality of 
Service 
5/3/4  
(para 30) 
and 6/2/2c  
(para 46) 
Aribi and Gao 2010, 
2011 
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Customer 
Service Skills 
5/3/4b  
(para 30) 
and 6/2/2b  
(para 46) 
  
Customer 
Engagement 
5/3/4c  
(para 30) 
Aribi and Gao 2010, 
2011 
Branco and Rodrigues 
2006;  Cuesta-González et 
al., 2006;  Bravo et al., 
2012 
Employees  
Diversity and 
Inclusion 
5/2/4a,g  
(para 18) 
Maali et al., 2006; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2007; Aribi and Gao, 
2010, 2011 
KLD; Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006;  
Coupland 2006; Cuesta-
González et al., 2006; 
McDonald and Rundle-
Thiele, 2008; Scholtens, 
2009  
Training and 
Education 
5/2/4c  
(para 18) 
Chapra, 1992; Maali et 
al., 2006; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2007; Aribi 
and Gao, 2010, 2011 
Branco and Rodrigues, 
2006; Cuesta-González et 
al., 2006;  Scholtens, 2009  
Career 
Progression 
5/2/4b  
(para 18) 
   
Incentive 
Schemes 
5/2/4c  
(para 18) 
Chapra, 1992; Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2007; 
Aribi and Gao, 2010, 
2011 
KLD; Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006; 
McDonald and Rundle-
Thiele, 2008; Bravo et al., 
2012 
Healthcare 
Benefits 
5/2/4l  
(para 18)1  
Chapra, 1992; Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2007; 
Aribi and Gao, 2010, 
2011 
KLD; Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006; Bravo et 
al., 2012 
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Occupational 
Health and 
Safety  
5/2/4l  
(para 18)1  
Maali et al., 2006 KLD; Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006; 
Coupland, 2006; 
McDonald and Rundle-
Thiele, 2008; Bravo et al., 
2012 
Environment 
Environmental 
Impact 
5/3/2c  
(para 23) 
Maali et al., 20063 KLD; Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006; Cuesta-
González et al., 2006; 
McDonald and Rundle-
Thiele, 2008; Scholtens, 
2009; Bravo et al., 2012 
Green Products 
and Services 
5/3/2c  
(para 23) 
Maali et al., 20063 KLD; McDonald and 
Rundle-Thiele, 2008; 
Bravo et al., 2012 
Energy 
Conservation 
5/3/2a,d 
(para 23) 
Maali et al., 20063 KLD; Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006; Cuesta-
González et al., 2006; 
Coupland, 2006; 
McDonald and Rundle-
Thiele, 2008 
Raising 
Environmental 
Awareness 
5/3/2b  
(para 23) 
Maali et al., 20063   
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Environmental 
Funding 
Conditions 
5/3/3  
(para 28)2 
 
 
Branco and Rodrigues, 
2006; Cuesta-González et 
al., 2006; Coupland, 2006; 
Scholtens, 2009; Bravo et 
al., 2012 
Socio-Economic Development (SED) 
Support for 
Small and 
Medium 
Enterprises 
(SMEs) 
 
5/3/3c  
(para 27)2 
Chapra,1992, 2008; 
Aggarwal and Yousef, 
2000 
Cuesta-González et al., 
2006; Bravo et al., 2012 
Infrastructure 
Development 
5/3/3b  
(para 27)2 
Chapra, 2008; Maali et 
al., 20064; Aribi and 
Gao, 2010, 2011; 
Kamla and Rammal, 
2013 
Cuesta-González et al., 
2006 
Development of 
Human Capital 
5/3/3e  
(para 26)2 
Chapra, 1992, 2008; 
Maali et al., 2006; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2007; Aribi and Gao, 
2010, 2011 
 
KLD; Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2006; Cuesta-
González et al., 2006; 
Bravo et al., 2012 
Financial 
Inclusion 
5/3/3a, c, f 
(para 26)2 
Chapra, 1992, 2008; 
Kamla and Rammal, 
2013 
KLD; Coupland, 2006; 
Branco and Rodrigues, 
2006; Cuesta-González et 
al., 2006;  McDonald and 
Rundle-Thiele, 2008; 
Scholtens, 2009; Bravo et 
al., 2012 
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Religion-Specific Initiatives (RSI) 
Zakah 5/2/5  
(para 17)  
Maali et al., 2006; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2007; Aribi and Gao, 
2010, 2011; Kamla and 
Rammal, 2013 
n/a 
Facilitating 
Religious Duties  
5/3/3g  
(para 26)2 
Haniffa and Hudaib,  
2007 
n/a 
Qard Hasan 5/3/1  
(para 21) 
Maali et al., 2006; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2007; Aribi and Gao 
2010, 2011; Kamla and 
Rammal, 2013 
n/a 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
Some examples where the AAOIFI CSR Standard and CSR indices have been broadly 
interpreted to be used as supporting references in this study  
1. AAOIFI Recommendation 5/2/4l on occupational health and safety measures has been 
referenced here in order to separate banks that may have health and safety certification and/or 
training but do not provide additional health benefits for employees and vice versa. 
2. AAOIFI recommendation 5/3/3 “Policy for social development and environment based 
investment quotas”: The recommended actions under 5/3/3 of the AAOIFI CSR standard have 
been interpreted broadly for referencing here. This AAOIFI recommendation is limited to 
investment quotas however; the CSP index above appreciates and includes any action that has a 
positive social, environmental and/or development impact that is undertaken by the bank either 
as part of an investment quota or otherwise. 
3. Maali et al. (2006, p.279) includes in their index, two items “The amount and nature of any 
donations or activities undertaken to protect the environment” and “The projects financed by the 
bank that may lead to harming the environment” which have been broadly interpreted as 
supporting references here 
4. Maali et al. (2006, p.279) includes an item “The bank’s role in economic development” in 
their index. This item has been interpreted as a supporting reference here. 
  
230 
 
` 
Chapter 6 
Comparing the Corporate Social Performance of 
Islamic and Conventional Banks  
6.1 Introduction 
A comparison of Islamic and conventional banks’ corporate social performance (CSP) 
has eluded the literature thus far. As explained in chapter 5, this gap primarily exists 
because of two key methodological issues, the assumed incommensurability problem 
and the measurement problem. Having addressed both these issues in chapter 5, a 
comparison can now be made between the two industries.  
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the CSP of GCC-based Islamic and 
conventional banks over the 2009 – 2011 period. To achieve this aim, this chapter is 
divided in three parts. In part 1, Islamic and conventional banks are assessed against the 
CSP Index developed in chapter 5. CSP scores for each bank are generated using the 
widely used dichotomous scoring method, where banks are allocated a score of 1 for 
each of the 25 social performance indicators (SPIs) they provide evidence-based 
disclosure on and 0 otherwise, with the overall CSP score being the sum of these. Using 
this CSP score, this chapter first answers the question: do Islamic banks, on average, 
have higher CSP scores than conventional banks? Then by comparing individual banks’ 
CSP scores, this chapter examines the level of intra-industry variation followed by a 
comparison of year-on-year CSP scores to investigate how CSP scores have changed 
across and within the two industries over the 2009-2011 period.  
In part 2, this chapter investigates how the composition of CSP differs between Islamic 
and conventional banks and answers the question: are the most and least popular CSP 
dimensions and SPIs the same across the two industries? To achieve this, the six CSP 
dimensions are ranked in order of popularity for both industries and compared. The 
rank is determined by the average percentage of Islamic and conventional banks that 
have provided at least one evidence-based disclosure per dimension over the 2009-2011 
period. Next, the most and least popular SPIs are identified and compared across the 
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industries. SPIs disclosed by more than 50% banks on average are classified as the most 
popular while SPIs disclosed by less than 5% banks on average are classified as least 
popular. This is followed by a comparison of the percentage of Islamic and 
conventional banks providing evidence-based disclosure per dimension and SPI to 
identify and discuss where differences between the two industries are statistically and 
practically significant. The difference over the 2009-2011 period is also examined to 
identify: firstly, if and how the composition of CSP has changed within both industries 
and secondly, how the changes compare across the two industries. 
Finally, in part 3, a more in-depth analysis is conducted where Islamic and conventional 
banks are evaluated and compared using three social performance quantitative 
indicators (SPQIs), which provide a quantitative measure of banks’ performance on 
selected SPIs for which monetary and/or impact data could be collected. These SPQIs 
assess the extent to which a bank engages in a particular CSR activity, allowing for 
greater differentiation between individual banks and a more comprehensive comparison 
between the Islamic and conventional banking industries.  
The remaining chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 identifies what results can 
be expected with regards to the comparison of Islamic and conventional banks’ CSP 
scores and composition in light of previous literature and theoretical framework 
presented in chapter 5. Section 6.3 describes the method and data. This includes a 
description of how the CSR scores are generated and details on how the three SPQIs are 
constructed. Section 6.4 presents the results and discussion. Finally, section 6.5 
concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Comparing the Corporate Social Performance (CSP) of Islamic 
and Conventional Banks: What Can We Expect?  
6.2.1 Comparing CSP Scores 
Islamic banking “is not just riba-free but also social-welfare oriented” (Chapra, 1985, 
p.174). This view has been long advocated by Islamic economists who argue that the 
‘Islamic’ prefix necessitates ethical behaviour and social goals since the objective of 
sharia itself is to promote human welfare. From this basis, advocates argue that Islamic 
banking offers an ethical alternative to conventional banking as it is shaped by the 
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teachings of Islam. The Islamic banking literature has thus been dominated by the idea 
that Islamic banks are not just financial but also social institutions. CSR has therefore 
been declared as an essential, inseparable feature of Islamic banking, a requirement for 
Islamic banks to follow the principles of Islam in their entirety.  Thus, according to this 
view, Islamic banks  “are expected to be more socially responsible than their 
conventional counterparts (Maali et al., 2006; Kamla et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2007, p.101; Dusuki, 2008; Warde, 2010; Farook et al., 2011; Aribi and Arun, 2015; 
Platonova et al., 2016).   
Critics however argue that Islamic banks seek profits as aggressively as their 
conventional counterparts and are only interested in ‘big business’ (Kuran, 2004; 
Pollard and Samers, 2007; Warde, 2010; Belal et al., 2015). Only in theoretical models 
do Islamic banks operate in accordance with sharia’s ethical teachings. In practice, 
ethical and social goals seem to have very little impact on these banks behaviour. These 
institutions operate on sharia arbitrage basis and are “guilty of exploiting the pious” by 
selling products that do not comply with the letter or spirit of the sharia law (El-Gamal, 
2006; Khan, 2010, p. 817). It is therefore unrealistic to expect Islamic banks, which do 
not even meet the law, to be more socially responsible than their conventional 
counterparts (Kuran, 2004; Kamla and Rammal, 2013).  
Which of these two views is empirically supported remains to be tested. 
Change in CSP Scores 
The 2007 – 08 financial crisis is a prime example of a legitimacy threatening event. In 
the years immediately following the onset of the crisis (i.e. 2009-2011, analysed in this 
work), the international banking industry faced a significant loss of credibility, 
heightened customer dissatisfaction and increased pressure  to demonstrate a socially 
responsible business profile (Bravo et al., 2012; Jizi et al., 2013). Although the crisis 
began in the West, the GCC banking industry was no exception to this international 
pressure. In such circumstances, the need to improve public image and defend 
operational legitimacy is of utmost importance. From the perspective of legitimacy 
theory, under such circumstances, CSR initiatives and related disclosures are likely to 
be higher as a response (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995; 
Deegan, 2002; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). Therefore, one can expect a positive 
change in CSP scores over the 2009-2011 period in both Islamic and conventional 
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banks. It is a priori ambiguous however, whether Islamic or conventional banks should 
have greater improvement. 
6.2.2 Comparing CSP Dimensions and Social Performance Indicators 
According to the institutional theory, organisations such as Islamic and conventional 
banks, which operate within the same ‘organisational field’, develop homogenous 
characteristics (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). From this theoretical perspective, 
differences in the composition of CSP between Islamic and conventional banks are 
unlikely to be significant. Furthermore, isomorphic processes, whether coercive, 
mimetic or normative, lead to organisations adopting similar management practices 
over time. This suggests that over time Islamic and conventional banks’ CSP 
composition will become uniform (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Carpenter & Feroz, 
2001).  
One key difference nevertheless, can be expected. The Islamic banking industry derives 
its legitimacy from its religious identity. Providing sharia compliant financial services is 
the raison d'être of the industry. As Farook et al., (2011) notes, Islamic banks rely on 
the Muslim public’s support and therefore need to demonstrate compliance with 
religious values. Chapra and Ahmed (2002) found that over 80% of Islamic banks 
depositors would withdraw their deposits if they found their banks failed to comply 
with sharia. Therefore to maintain their operational legitimacy and to portray an Islamic 
identity, it is reasonable to expect ‘Religion-specific Initiatives (RSI)’ to be the most 
popular CSP dimension in Islamic banks. While conventional banks in the GCC also 
face the pressure to conform to religious norms and to appear as good corporate citizens 
in the Muslim community (Kamla, 2007), conventional banks’ stakeholders do not 
expect the same level of dedication as do Islamic banks’ (Haniffa, and Hudaib, 2007).  
‘Socio-economic Development’ (SED) is another CSP dimension that, according to the 
Islamic banking literature, should be higher in Islamic banks. Islamic economists have 
long advocated that Islamic banks are to play a social and developmental role in their 
societies, assist in economic regeneration, support small businesses and widen the 
access to credit through financial inclusion schemes. Islamic banks are therefore 
expected to be involved in such initiatives more than their conventional counterparts 
(Chapra 1985; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Belal et al., 
2015). Critics however disagree as Islamic banks are found to focus largely on trade 
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and short term financing, rather than long-term projects (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; 
Khan, 2010). It is a priori ambiguous whether Islamic banks would prioritise SED over 
conventional banks. 
According to the stakeholder management theory, banks prioritise their relationships 
with the most powerful stakeholders, those with the greatest control over resources 
required by the organisation (Gray et al., 1995a; Islam and Deegan, 2008). Banks are 
therefore likely to produce voluntary disclosure on issues which concern such 
stakeholder groups, to gain and maintain their support (Ullman, 1985; Gray et al., 
1995a; Islam and Deegan, 2008). Employees are amongst the most important resource 
for banks and have been identified as one of the most important stakeholder group in 
the banking sector (Beekun and Badawi, 2005; Cuesta-Gonzales et al., 2006; Aribi and 
Arun, 2015). Prior studies e.g. Zeghal and Ahmed (1990) find that banks prioritise the 
employees dimension relative to other industries. In the specific context of the GCC, 
Kamla (2007) found the most common disclosure relates to the employee dimension, 
within which training and education is the most disclosed indicator. Aribi and Gao 
(2010) also find similar results. Accordingly, ‘Employees’ can be expected to be one of 
the top CSP dimensions in both Islamic and conventional banks. The relative priority 
attached to this dimension in either industry, however, cannot be a priori determined. 
After Employees, Kamla (2007) finds the second-highest disclosure by Arab companies 
is on Customer relations category, within which the vast majority of disclosures relate 
to improving customer care. Few companies however provided any disclosure 
concerning satisfaction surveys or the feedback mechanisms to communicate with 
customers. Majority of the disclosures identified are of qualitative nature and general 
i.e. without specific evidence. Similar focus on qualitative disclosure is found in Aribi 
and Gao (2010) who finds customer service to be the most predominant disclosure issue 
in the GCC. In the non-GCC banking context as well, customers is one of the most 
prominent stakeholder groups (Cuesta-Gonzales et al., 2008). In the Spanish banking 
industry for example, Bravo et al., (2012) find customers to be the top ranking 
dimension followed by community. Nevertheless, as the previous studies have found 
majority of the disclosure on this dimension is qualitative (declarative) in the GCC, it is 
unclear how this will rank relative to other dimensions, especially as the CSP index in 
this work examines the presence of evidence-based disclosure. It is also unclear how the 
prioritisation of this dimension will differ across Islamic and conventional banks. 
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Related to customers, is the Community dimension. Clarke and Gibson-Sweet (1999) 
conclude that in highly visible industries such as banking, community-related CSR 
initiatives and their disclosure are especially prominent. These initiatives are aimed at 
both the local community and customers. With the branches on the high street, a 
positive reputation in the local communities is important for their continuous legitimacy 
and as part of stakeholder management (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). These initiatives 
are also used to attract new consumers since the general public includes banks’ present 
and future customers. Thus, both Islamic and conventional banks are expected to 
engage in community initiatives. The exact composition and priority cannot be a priori 
determined. However, it is noted in prior literature that a notable aspect of community 
initiatives is charitable donations. Maali et al., (2006) finds that Islamic banks 
accentuate their charitable donations. Charitable donations may therefore be higher in 
Islamic banks than conventional counterparts, relative to other types of community 
initiatives.  
Finally, as banking is a less environmentally-sensitive industry relative to others (e.g. 
mining), the Environment dimension tends to be one of the least prioritised (Branco and 
Rodriguez, 2008; Maalin et al., 2014). Repeatedly banking studies in the extant 
literature have found disclosures on the environment to be relatively low and in case of 
Islamic banks, even absent. It is therefore reasonable to expect that Environment may 
be one of the least prioritised dimension by banks and that the proportion of Islamic 
banks engaged in environmental CSR is lower than conventional banks (Maali et al., 
2006; Kamla 2007; Mallin et al., 2014; Aribi and Arun, 2015; Platonova et al., 2016). 
6.3 Method and Data 
This chapter continues the analysis from chapter 5. The same dataset is therefore used, 
comprising of 47 GCC commercial banks, 12 full-fledged Islamic and 35 conventional 
banks, analysed over the 2009-2011 period.  
6.3.1 Generating CSP Scores 
To measure and compare the CSP of Islamic and conventional banks, this chapter uses 
the CSP Index developed in chapter 5. CSP is a multidimensional construct (Waddock 
and Graves, 1997). The CSP index captures this multidimensionality by assessing banks 
236 
 
` 
performance on 25 social performance indicators (SPI) under six CSP dimensions171: 
Community (4), Customers (3), Employees (6), Environment (5), Socio-economic 
Development (4) and Religion-specific Initiatives (3).  
To calculate the CSP scores, a dichotomous scoring method is used in line with prior 
literature (see e.g. Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Bravo et al., 
2012; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Aribi and Arun, 2015; Belal et al., 2015; Platonova et  
al., 2016). Banks are allocated a score of 1 for each SPI they provided evidence-based-
disclosure on and 0 otherwise. The scoring approach is also additive, therefore  the total 
CSP score per bank represents the number of SPIs a bank provided evidence-based-
disclosure on and ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 25 (24) for Islamic 
(conventional)172 banks. When interpreting such scores, it is important to note that these 
numerical scores do not measure the intensity of the social initiatives, an evaluation of 
which requires impact and monetary data, neither of which are readily available nor 
possible to collect in many cases (Abbott and Monsen, 1979). Instead, the numerical 
CSP scores reflect the variety of different SPIs that a bank has provided evidence of 
engaging in thorough its annual report.  
6.3.2 Constructing Social Performance Quantitative Indicators (SPQIs) 
To further extend the literature on Islamic and conventional banks’ CSP comparison, 
this thesis also complements the dichotomous CSP score method with quantitative 
measures of selected SPIs, for which monetary or impact data could be collected from 
banks’ annual reports. Termed as Social Performance Quantitative Indicators (SPQIs), 
these assess the extent to which a bank engages in a particular CSR activity, allowing 
for greater differentiation between individual banks and a more comprehensive 
comparison between the Islamic and conventional banking industries. By adding further 
quantitative detail through the SPQIs, this chapter also contributes methodologically to 
the existing Islamic banking literature where this approach, of using both the 
dichotomous scoring method and quantitative measures, is currently absent.  
To construct the SPQIs, the entire list of 25 SPIs constituting the CSP index was 
examined for presence of monetary and non-monetary quantitative disclosure. Content 
171 The number of SPIs per dimension is given in the parenthesis. 
172 Recall, from chapter 5, no conventional bank provided evidence of qard hasan thus the maximum 
score for conventional banks is 24.  
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analysis conducted in chapter 5 revealed that banks did provide some type of 
quantitative disclosure for majority of the 25 SPIs (see appendix 5.A for the complete 
list of SPIs and details on the nature of quantitative disclosure per SPI). The key 
challenge in constructing SPQIs however related not to the presence of quantitative 
disclosure but more importantly to the comparability of such disclosures across banks. 
This comparability problem arises due to the nature of disclosures banks have made. As 
CSR reporting is voluntary in the GCC banking industry and there is no sector-wide 
consensus shared by the Islamic and conventional banking industries on which 
performance metrics to use, banks have used different metrics to measure and report the 
intensity or impact of their social activities relating to each of the SPIs.  
Take for example the SPI ‘training and education’ from the Employees dimension. A 
wide variety of quantitative disclosures have been provided by banks on this SPI. Banks 
making disclosure on the provision of training courses have measured it as either 1) the 
number of training courses or events held during the year, 2) the number of training 
days provided or 3) the number of training man-hours undertaken. Other banks have 
made disclosures on employee participation at such events, measured either as 1) the 
number of employees or 2) the percentage of employees attending training programs 
during the year. Finally, banks making monetary disclosures have either provided 1) the 
allocated training budget or 2) the costs associated with staff training and education 
incurred during the year. In each case, banks have clearly made quantitative disclosures. 
However drawing comparisons between individual banks and especially between the 
Islamic and conventional banking industries is difficult as numerous banks within and 
across the two industries over the 3-year sample period have not used the same 
performance metric. Furthermore, as some banks have provided different performance 
metrics year on year, it is also difficult to make comparisons for the same bank over 
time in some instances.  
Similar comparability issues exist with other SPIs as well. For example, for the 
‘customer engagement’ SPI from the Customers dimensions, results of customer 
satisfaction surveys have been presented as either 1) the percentage of customers 
satisfied or 2) the percentage improvement in year-on year customer satisfaction level. 
While both quantitative disclosures relate to customer satisfaction, disclosure 1 refers to 
the percentage of satisfied customers recorded for the year whereas disclosure 2 refers 
to the change in percentage of satisfied customers over the preceding year and thus the 
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two figures are not directly comparable. Popularity of the dichotomous scoring method 
that overcomes such comparability issues, by generating a single CSP score for each 
bank which takes into account the multidimensionality of CSP and enables comparisons 
to be made across banks, is thus understandable.  
Nevertheless, for 3 SPIs comparable quantitative disclosures could be identified. These 
are Charitable Donations, Diversity and Inclusion and Qard Hasan. From these, the 
following 3 SPQIs are constructed: %Charitable Donations, %Women Representation 
in Leadership Roles (this relates to the ‘diversity and inclusion’ SPI173) and %Qard 
Hasan. Details of how the 3 SPQIs are defined and their significance is discussed 
below. 
% Charitable Donations 
To define a measure for ‘%Charitable Donations’, the 2012 report issued by the 
National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy (NCRP, 2012), which is the only 
independent watchdog investigating institutional philanthropic spending in the United 
States (Goldberg, 2013) was consulted. In its 2012 report, the NCRP investigates 
philanthropic practices of four US megabanks, namely Bank of America, Wells Fargo, 
Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase. The report defines ‘cash giving as a percentage 
of total revenue’ as the “best metric” to measure banks’ philanthropic giving (NCRP, 
2012, p.5) and highlights three key points taken into consideration when devising this 
metric. First, the report calls for philanthropic giving to include only cash donations, 
and therefore excludes non-cash i.e. in-kind donations. Amongst other points mentioned 
in the report, this approach overcomes incomparability problems across banks as well 
as the issues of double counting e.g. the monetary value of in-kind donations may 
already be included in the total donation value stated. Secondly, the report calls for cash 
donations to be measured as a proportion of revenue rather than profit or pre-tax profit, 
arguing that creative accounting practices can more easily manipulate the profit value 
than revenue, that revenue is a more stable measure of performance over time than 
173 Recall from appendix 5.A, the ‘diversity and inclusion’ SPI includes evidence-based disclosure on 
leadership opportunities for women as well as employment opportunities for the disabled, special needs, 
ethnic minorities and/or other disadvantaged members of society. The %Women Representation SPQI 
only examines banks’ performance relating to leadership opportunities for women because although some 
banks have made disclosures specifically on employment opportunities for the latter disadvantaged 
groups, there aren’t sufficient number of banks making such disclosures to allow comparisons to be 
drawn across the Islamic and conventional banking industries specifically on these issues. 
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profit, and finally that measuring donations as a proportion of revenue shows “a bank’s 
true, long-term commitment to philanthropy regardless of fluctuations in profit” 
(NCRP, 2012, p.5). The NCRP report also highlights that measuring corporate giving as 
a percentage of revenue is in line with the approach adopted by the Committee 
Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy (CECP), the international CEO-led coalition of 
over 200 of the world’s largest companies, which works to design the corporate social 
strategy adopted by its members. Each year, the CECP produces the largest, 
internationally recognised industry-led research on corporate social investment. In 
evaluating the performance of multi-billion dollar companies from across the globe, the 
CECP also measures corporate giving as a percentage of revenue, thus supporting the 
NCRP metric. Finally, the NCRP report also emphasises the importance of looking at 
the average value of philanthropic giving over time, i.e. over the sample period 
examined, as the average over time overcomes yearly anomalies.   
In line with the NCRP recommendations, %Charitable Donations is therefore defined 
here as ‘cash donations as a percentage of total revenue’.  
%Charitable Donations = (Cash Donations / Total Revenue) x 100 
Evaluating banks using this SPQI offers new insights on the relative performance of 
Islamic and conventional banks’ level of charitable giving in the post financial crisis, 
2009-2011, period. As noted earlier, prior literature finds that Islamic banks accentuate 
their charitable giving, relating this act to their religious identity (Maali et al., 2006). 
However, as there has been no comparison of the relative amount donated by banks in 
both industries thus far, it is a priori unknown whether Islamic banks do indeed donate a 
higher percentage of their revenue to charitable causes than their conventional 
counterparts. Comparing Islamic and conventional banks using this SPQI will therefore 
shed light on whether Islamic banks’ accentuated claims of charitable giving is mere 
marketing or reflection of genuine philanthropic behaviour. 
% Women Representation in Leadership Roles 
To evaluate banks’ performance on the second SPQI, ‘%Women Representation in 
Leadership Roles’, three measures are used. The first measure, %Board of Directors 
(henceforth %BoD) is defined as ‘the percentage of women on the board of directors’. 
This measure is calculated by dividing the number of female directors on each bank's 
board by the total number of directors and is reported in percentage terms.  
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1) %BoD (% Board of Directors) = Number of women on BoD  x100 
            Total BoD Members 
The second measure % Senior Management Position (henceforth %SMP) is defined as 
‘the percentage of women in senior management positions, excluding the board of 
directors’. This measure is calculated by dividing the number of women in senior 
management position (SMP) in each bank by the total number of SMP members, and is 
reported in percentage terms. 
2) %SMP (%Senior Management Position) = Number of women in SMP  x100 
                     Total SMP Members  
Finally, the third composite measure %BoD&SMP is defined as ‘the percentage of 
women holding position on the board of directors and/or in senior management’. This 
measure is computed as: the number of women on BoD plus the number of women in 
SMP for each bank divided by the total number of BoD and SMP members, and is 
reported in percentage terms.  
3) % BoD&SMP = Number of women on BoD and/or in SMP  x100       
          Total BoD and SMP Members 
As the current Islamic banking CSR literature has not measured the extent of women 
representation in leadership roles, guidance in defining these measures was sought from 
the broader literature on business ethics, management and leadership particularly 
studies with a focus on gender diversity issues. The most common measure of gender 
diversity used in the extant literature is percentage of female directors (see e.g. 
Williams, 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Isidro & Sobral, 
2015), which is represented by the first measure, %BoD, in this work. While these 
aforementioned studies only focus on the presence of female directors, others such as 
Terjesen and Singh (2008) and Jurkus et al. (2011) also look at women representation in 
senior management positions. Industry analysts such as the MSCI ESG Research 
LLC174, which analyses and provides ratings for companies’ environmental, social and 
174 Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) is an international investment research firm which 
provides research-based indexes and analysis tools to institutional investors. MSCI ESG Research LLC 
provides research, analysis and ratings of company’s environmental, social and governance-related 
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governance-related practices, also uses two separate measures: the  percentage of 
women on the board and the percentage of women in senior management position to 
assess a company’s workforce gender diversity (for details see MSCI, 2018).  
As Jurkus et al. (2011) highlight it is important to use a broader measure of gender 
diversity by including women in senior management position in addition to the board of 
directors because firstly not many companies have female directors which leads to 
insufficient data and secondly because many companies without female directors may 
still have women in position of leadership such as higher management. Thus, focusing 
purely on %BoD may not be an accurate reflection of women representation in 
leadership roles for a particular company. Furthermore, as Terjesen and Singh (2008) 
explain, members of the senior management constitute the population from which new 
board members are commonly appointed. Thus, for women to be represented at the 
board level and move into the highest decision making position requires them to have 
some level of representation in position of senior management first. For FTSE 100 
companies, Singh et al. (2007) found that of the newly appointed female directors, 
almost half held senior positions in financial institutions, a third in the public sector and 
a quarter in the charity sector. The lack of such higher management experience has been 
long noted as a key reason for low number of female directors (Burke, 1997; Oakley, 
2000). Evaluating women representation in senior management therefore reflects the 
extent to which a company supports’ women empowerment at work, particularly their 
career prospects and progression.  
Taking these points into account, this thesis also looks at women representation in 
senior management by using the second measure %SMP. Finally, in line with Jurkus et 
al. (2011)’s broader measure of gender diversity, the third composite measure 
%BoD&SMP takes into account women representation on both the board of directors 
and in senior management positions and thus provides an overall measure of women 
representation in leadership roles for each bank.  
Although there has been no comparison of how well women are represented in 
leadership roles between Islamic and conventional banks in the GCC thus far, this is an 
important comparison which deserves investigation. Gender diversity and particularly 
practices. The ESG ratings are used to construct the MSCI ESG Indexes (for further details on MSCI 
gender diversity methodology, see MSCI, 2018) 
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women empowerment within the workplace has become an important topic of debate 
globally. While this subject is undergoing intense scrutiny and has received 
considerable attention in the Western world, both in research and the media, interest in 
this topic is growing in non-western contexts. In the GCC, the debate on the role of 
women in society and more specifically in the workplace has gained significant 
prominence in recent years. Many academics and social activists have noted that the 
GCC has amongst the highest female literacy rates in the world, with female 
educational attainment being higher than male counterparts in all 6 GCC countries. Yet 
for decades, women representation in the labour force has been marginal (Krause, 2009; 
Young, 2016). The 2014 Global Gender Gap report by the World Economic Forum 
illustrates this paradox, as w omen in the GCC are well-educated relative to 
international standards but lag behind in economic participation. In the traditionally 
patriarchal GCC society, where gender segregation is an established norm, there are 
considerable social, cultural and institutional barriers which hinder women’s economic 
participation (Kelly, 2009; Randeree, 2012; Young, 2016).  
Despite the challenges, trends have been changing over the last two decades, as women 
participation rates have been rising in all GCC states. This is partly driven by social 
pressures and partly by economic conditions and government policy. Over the last two 
decades, the GCC states have not only undergone liberalisation of cultural and social 
norms but are also evolving into knowledge-based economies, with member states 
actively trying to reduce dependence on oil and gas as the primary source of revenue 
and, more importantly, on foreign labour. As a result, GCC governments have actively 
encouraged companies to recruit locally and have focused on integration of women into 
the labour force, in recognition of their importance as an underused resource for the 
country (Kelly, 2009; Krause, 2009; Randeree, 2012; Young, 2016). Since the mid-
2000s especially, state leaders, including notable monarchs, have vigorously 
encouraged women empowerment schemes (Kelly, 2009; Krause, 2009; Randeree, 
2012), promoting women as the “next generation of GCC working professionals” 
(Buttorff, 2018, p.2) and a sign of “GCC’s modernity” (ibid, p.5). Even in Saudi Arabia, 
known to be the most conservative of the 6 GCC nations, women empowerment is part 
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of the ‘Saudi 2030 Vision’175, whereby increasing women participation in the private 
sector specifically is deemed an important developmental goal (Young, 2016). 
Empowering women and encouraging participation in the workforce is now also 
considered an important part of companies’ CSR. Many are addressing this CSR issue 
through ‘nationalisation of the workforce’ schemes, which target employment and 
career progression opportunities towards national citizens. These schemes have been a 
key driver increasing women participation in the workforce, opening up employment 
opportunities for national women as companies aggressively recruit to meet set quotas. 
Nevertheless, it is notable that despite the rise in women participation rates, at present 
few women are found in senior management and executive roles (Kelly, 2009; Young, 
2016). 
Given this context, it can be expected that only a minority of banks would have women 
in leadership positions. However, with changing trends and increased social pressure, 
both the stakeholder and institutional theory (particularly mimetic and normative 
isomorphism), suggest that the change in %women representation is likely to be 
positive. The difference between Islamic and conventional banks however is more 
difficult to predict a priori, as both operate in the same social and cultural environment 
and thus face the same challenges. It is therefore important to look at both the 
percentage of banks from each industry that have women represented in leadership 
positions as well as the percentage of senior management & executives that are female 
in order to compare the two industries. This will be achieved using the three measures 
defined above.  
%Qard Hasan 
To define a measure for the third and final SPQI, %Qard Hasan, prior Islamic banking 
literature was consulted. At present, Islamic banking CSR studies use the dichotomous 
scoring method to evaluate banks on the provision of qard hasan, i.e. allocating a score 
of 1 if a bank provides qard hasan and 0 otherwise (see e.g. Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2007; Aribi and Gao 2010; 2011; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Mallin et al., 
175 Saudi Vision 2030 refers to the plan Saudi Arabia has drawn up to express the country’s long-term 
goals. These include a move towards reducing the country’s dependence on oil, diversification of its 
economy, development of public sector services (including education, health, infrastructure etc.) as well 
as addressing notable social issues. The vision explicitly mentions “to increase women’s participation in 
the workforce” as part of its vision (for further details, see www.vision2030.gov.sa/en) 
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2014; Aribi and Arun, 2015; Platonova et al., 2016). To define a quantitative measure 
for qard hasan, this thesis therefore takes into consideration the parallel drawn between 
qard hasan and PLS financing, which was highlighted in chapters 2 and 5 as well as by 
Pollard and Samers (2007). As noted earlier in this thesis, both qard hasan and PLS 
financing are considered to be “the most ‘Islamic’” forms of financing by many Islamic 
scholars, the former is the ‘not-for profit’ while the latter is the ‘for profit’ alternative to 
interest-bearing loans (Pollard and Samers, 2007, p.315). As discussed in chapter 
4,‘PLS financing as a percentage of total financing’ is the most common measure used 
in prior literature to examine the extent to which Islamic banks provide the ideal ‘for-
profit’  alternative to interest-bearing loans (see e.g. Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; 
Chong and Liu, 2009). Similar metric for qard hasan can also be devised to evaluate the 
extent to which Islamic banks provide the ‘not-for-profit’ alternative to interest-bearing 
loans. Accordingly, %Qard Hasan, is defined in this work as ‘qard hasan as a 
percentage of total financing’. It is calculated by dividing the amount of qard hasan 
provided by a bank by its total financing value and is reported in percentage terms.  
%Qard Hasan = (Qard Hasan / Total Financing) x 100 
While the dichotomous scoring method will illustrate how many Islamic banks provide 
qard hasan, the %qard hasan SPQI will allow further differentiation between individual 
Islamic banks based on the percentage of their financing portfolio which is in the form 
of qard hasan. As chapter 4 showed, there is considerable intra-industry variation in the 
level of PLS financing provided by individual Islamic banks. Similar variation could 
also exist in the level of qard hasan within the industry. As the abovementioned Islamic 
banking CSR studies have not evaluated what percentage of Islamic banks is in qard 
hasan form and how it compares across banks, it is apriori unclear the how much 
variation exists in the industry. By comparing %qard hasan levels between Islamic 
banks, this chapter will therefore offer additional insights contributing to the existing 
Islamic banking literature. 
Before results for the three SPQIs are discussed, the next section will first discuss 
results from the dichotomous CSP scoring method. 
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6.4 Results and Discussion  
6.4.1 Comparing CSP Scores between Islamic and Conventional Banks 
Using the dichotomous scoring method, CSP scores are calculated for each Islamic and 
conventional bank. Results are presented in Table 6.1. Columns headed: ‘2009 – 2011’ 
list each bank’s yearly CSP score; ‘3 yr. Average’ lists each banks’ average score over 
the sample period; ‘3 yr. Cumulative’ score is the number of different SPIs each bank 
provided evidence-based disclosure on, at least once during the sample period and 
‘Change’ is calculated as the 2011 CSP score minus the 2009 score. The range and 
average CSP score as well as the standard deviation for each industry are also 
presented.  
As results from table 6.1 show, the average CSP scores for Islamic and conventional 
banks is extremely similar. There is no difference between Islamic and conventional 
banks’ average CSP score for 2009, only one point difference for 2010, the 3 yr. 
average and cumulative scores and two point difference for 2011. Given these scores, as 
one would expect, the t-test results confirm that for all categories, the difference 
between average CSP scores for Islamic and conventional banks is not statistically 
significant. As the CSP scores for Islamic (conventional) banks for the years 2010 and 
2011 (2009 and 2010) are skewed, the Mann-Whitney U test176 was also conducted, 
which produced similar results177. Thus, empirical evidence does not support the 
expectation that Islamic banking is more socially responsible, as advocated in the 
literature.  
 
176 The Shapiro-Wilk normality test was used. Results indicated that the null was rejected at 5% level of 
significance for Islamic (conventional) banks’ CSP scores for the years 2010 and 2011 (2009 and 2010). 
As there are 12 Islamic banks in the sample (the sample size is relatively small), the Mann-Whitney U 
test was also conducted to test for difference between the groups. 
177 Difference in CSP scores between conventional banks with and without Islamic windows was also 
tested. No significant difference was identified. As mentioned earlier in chapter 5, it is expected that 
decisions related to CSR activities are made at the parent conventional bank rather than at the Islamic 
window level (subsidiary or branch) level, thus it is unsurprising that the presence of an Islamic window 
operation has no clear impact on the CSP of conventional banks. 
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Table 6.1: CSP Scores for Islamic and Conventional Banks 
 
 
Banks 2009 2010 2011 3 yr. 
Average
3 yr. 
Cumulative 
Change
AB 2 2 6 3 6 4
ABG 4 5 6 5 8 2
ADIB 10 3 17 10 20 7
ARB 5 5 7 6 10 2
ASB 9 8 6 8 11 -3
BAJ 4 4 6 5 7 2
BISB 7 4 9 7 9 2
BYB 3 3 5 4 6 2
KCB 4 4 4 4 5 0
KFH 3 3 7 4 8 4
QIB 6 11 17 11 18 11
QIIB 1 2 2 2 3 1
Min. 1 2 2 2 3 -3
Max. 10 11 17 11 20 11
Mean 5 5 8 6 9 3
St. Dev 3 3 5 3 5 4
ABC 1 3 2 2 3 1
ADCB 12 18 11 14 22 -1
AKB 5 7 9 7 11 4
ANB 5 4 4 4 5 -1
AUB 2 4 7 4 8 5
BB 13 3 10 9 13 -3
BBK 1 5 7 4 7 6
BM 9 7 11 9 12 2
BMIB 5 6 9 7 10 4
BOS 1 1 3 2 3 2
BS 5 9 7 7 11 2
BSF 6 8 8 7 12 2
CBD 6 8 4 6 9 -2
CBI 2 3 3 3 5 1
CBK 4 7 5 5 8 1
CBQ 10 8 12 10 15 2
DB 10 10 8 9 14 -2
ENBD 5 9 6 7 10 1
cont.
Islamic Banks: CSP Scores
Conventional Banks: CSP Scores
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Table 6.1: CSP Scores for Islamic and Conventional Banks 
 
It is important, however, to look beyond industry averages especially in light of chapter 
4 results. Similar to PLS levels, here too, results indicate considerable intra-industry 
variation in both the Islamic and conventional banking industries. Over the 3 years, 
CSP scores range from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 17 in Islamic banks and 0 to 
18 in conventional banks. There are several Islamic banks which have higher CSP score 
than conventional banks and vice versa. The 3 yr. average CSP score, for example, is 
higher in 42% (40%) of Islamic (conventional) banks than the 3 yr. industry average for 
conventional (Islamic) banks. Unlike PLS financing levels however, no range of CSP 
scores systematically differentiates Islamic from conventional banks. Thus, the notable 
difference in CSP scores exists at the bank rather than the industry level. 
Comparing the cumulative with the yearly CSP scores for each bank reveals interesting 
insights. Take ABG’s CSP scores for example, which are 4(2009), 5(2010) and 
Banks 2009 2010 2011
3 yr. 
Average
3 yr. 
Cumulative Change
FB 2 3 3 3 4 1
FGB 2 3 2 2 5 0
GB 2 2 4 3 4 2
MB 1 0 0 0 1 -1
NBAD 3 3 4 3 5 1
NBB 8 10 9 9 11 1
NBK 8 10 10 9 12 2
NBO 4 10 7 7 12 3
NBQ 1 2 2 2 2 1
NCB 6 6 5 6 9 -1
OAB 3 3 3 3 4 0
QNB 7 5 5 6 10 -2
RAK 1 1 1 1 1 0
RB 8 8 9 8 10 1
SHB 4 5 4 4 6 0
UAB 4 4 2 3 5 -2
UNB 2 2 7 4 7 5
Min. 1 0 0 0 1 -3
Max. 13 18 12 14 22 6
Mean 5 6 6 5 8 1
St. Dev 3 4 3 3 5 2
Change is calculated as 2011 CSP score minus the 2009 score
Conventional Banks: CSP Scores
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6(2011). Its cumulative score however, indicates that over the three years the bank 
actually provided evidence-based disclosure on 8 different SPIs. This pattern i.e. higher 
cumulative than yearly CSP score is found in almost 75% of the sample banks and is 
reflected at the industry level. As the industry cumulative score demonstrates, Islamic 
banks provided evidence-based disclosure on 9 and conventional banks on 8 different 
SPIs respectively, amounting to a third of the of the SPIs in the CSP Index. These 
patterns signify that banks are covering a greater variety of SPIs over the three-year 
period than the yearly CSP scores suggest.  
Two important and interesting inferences can be drawn from this finding. Firstly, the 
difference between yearly and cumulative scores indicates that banks are substituting 
between different types of CSR initiatives, choosing to undertake new initiatives in 
some years whilst ceasing to continue others. Take ABG as the example. To have added 
4 different SPIs to its 2009 score, whilst the yearly scores demonstrate the addition of 1 
per year implies that the bank must have replaced 2 of its existing SPIs from either 2009 
or 2010 with two alternative ones by 2011. Substituting between SPIs seems to be a 
pragmatic strategy adopted by GCC banks to cover a variety of CSR initiatives, 
appealing to a wider stakeholder base whilst spreading the cost across different years.  
Secondly, the discrepancy between the cumulative and the yearly CSP score also 
suggests that banks may be choosing to undertake only a certain number of CSR 
initiatives each year, perhaps to keep the expense on social responsibility at a certain 
(manageable) level. The two banks with the highest cumulative score of 20 (ADIB) and 
22 (ADCB) provided evidence of no more than 17 and 18 SPIs in a single year 
respectively. Interestingly, both these banks with the highest cumulative score are from 
the same country i.e. UAE. Closer inspection, however, does reveal that there is no 
significant country-level difference in CSP scores. Instead, there is notable variation in 
CSP scores within individual countries. Any institutional differences across the six 
GCC countries therefore do not appear to have the defining influence on banks’ overall 
CSP score, unlike the case for PLS financing.  
Next, consider the change in CSP scores. Over the 2009-2011 period, CSP scores have, 
on average, increased in both Islamic and conventional banking industries by 3 and 1 
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point respectively. T-tests confirm that the increase in both industries is statistically 
significant at 5% level, although the difference between the two industries is not178.  
Analysing year-on-year changes shows interesting comparison between the two 
industries. In the Islamic (conventional) banking industry, over the 2009-2010 period, 
CSP scores increased for 25% (54%), remained unchanged for 50% (29%) and 
decreased for 25% (17%) banks. Over the 2010-2011 however, CSP scores increased 
for 75% (24%), remained unchanged for 17% (29%) and decreased for 8% (37%) of 
Islamic (conventional) banks. Thus, the increase in Islamic banks’ CSP over the three-
year period is driven largely by the rise over the 2010-2011 period in contrast to 
conventional banks, which experienced a more notable improvement during the 2009 - 
2010 period.  
The impact of the global financial crisis is one possible explanation for these differing 
patterns of increase in CSP scores between Islamic and conventional bank. As Hasan 
and Dridi (2010) find, the 2007-08 crisis affected Islamic and conventional banks 
differently. Initially in 2008, the impact on conventional banks was much greater than 
Islamic banks. However in 2009 this changed. As the impact of the financial crisis 
moved into the real economy, Islamic banks, which have a much higher concentration 
in real estate than conventional counterparts, suffered much larger decline in 
profitability. This was exacerbated by the risk management practices in some banks. 
While conventional banks begun their recovery process in 2009, the decline in Islamic 
banks profitability only began to stabilise in 2010 (Ernst & Young, 2011). 
Notice, how for both Islamic and conventional banks, the largest increase in CSP scores 
has appeared 1 year after the most impactful crisis year, i.e. for conventional  (Islamic) 
banks, the greatest impact of the crisis is in 2008 (2009) and the rise in CSP scores is 
most notable in 2010 (2011). To understand this fully, note that there are likely to be 
two forces at play: economic well-being and legitimacy. By reducing or maintaining 
their social activities, banks have understandably focused on their economic well-being 
following the crisis. Once secured, as part of the recovery strategy, there has been much 
greater emphasis on reducing the legitimacy gap. What is also interesting is that a 
higher percentage of conventional banks have reduced their CSP scores in 2011 relative 
178 The p values are: 0.02 for Islamic banking and 0.01 for conventional banking. The data on Change in 
CSP scores did not fail the Shapiro-Wilk normality test, therefore only the t-test results are reported. 
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to 2010. This is also in line with legitimacy theory which postulates that when a threat 
such as the financial crisis arises, organisations increase their efforts towards social 
initiatives to address any legitimacy gaps, reducing them as the perceived threat lessens 
over time179. Overall, it appears that, as in other industries, Islamic and conventional 
banks in the GCC also engage in CSR initiatives to attain organisational legitimacy 
particularly after a threat event (see e.g. Cho and Patten, 2007; Branco and Rodrigues, 
2008; Du et al., 2012; Bravo et al., 2012).  
Finally, the considerable intra-bank variation that is evident in table 6.1 is another 
notable finding from this analysis. As table 6.1 shows, the change in CSP scores in 
some banks has been quite dramatic. QIB for example increased its CSP scores by 11 
points, whilst others such as ASB and BB have reduced by 3 points in the three-year 
period180. Comparing banks’ year-on-year CSP scores also indicates that some banks 
have relatively stable CSP whilst others portray a more volatile CSP trend. AKB for 
example, has shown a gradual improvement in CSP, with its score increasing from 
5(2009), 7(2010) to 9(2011) compared to ADIB which records a significant reduction in 
CSP scores from 10 (2009) to 3 (2010) followed by a rise to 17 (2011). Of course the 
impact of the crisis, the importance attached to CSP and associated strategies are likely 
to differ between individual banks based on their idiosyncratic characteristics. Thus, the 
level of intra-bank variation, illustrated in table 6.1, is understandable. These results are 
also consistent with prior literature, which finds that CSR disclosure levels vary year-
on-year within the same organisation both in the (Islamic) banking and non-banking 
industries, even outside of a legitimacy-threatening event (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; 
Branco and Rodrigues, 2008; Patten and Zhao, 2014; Aribi and Arun, 2015; Platonova 
et al., 2 016). Overall, results show that there is considerable variation in CSP scores 
within banks as well as between banks in both industries. Ironically, the only point of 
similarity is in the average CSP scores of the two industries. Whether such similarity 
exists at the dimension and SPI level is investigated next.  
179 It must be noted, that the general trend of course does not represent each individual bank, as the effect 
of the financial crisis differs in each institutions based on its idiosyncratic characteristics. 
180 Only five banks have the same CSP score in 2011 as 2009. However, even in these banks, two 
experienced an increase in their CSP scores in 2010, going back to the original score of 2009 in 2011. 
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6.4.2 Decomposing CSP: Comparing CSP Dimensions and Social 
Performance Indicators 
In this section, the most and least popular CSP dimensions and SPIs are examined. 
Table 6.2 lists the six CSP dimensions in rank order, from the most to the least popular, 
in both Islamic and conventional banks. As table 6.2 shows there is clear difference in 
the top ranking dimensions in both industries. Religion-specific initiatives (RSI) is the 
most popular dimension in Islamic banks, while Employees, the most popular 
dimension in conventional banks, is second most popular in Islamic banks. These 
results are consistent with both the legitimacy and stakeholder management theory as 
was described in section 6.2.1. While employees are considered the most powerful 
stakeholders for banks (Beekun and Badawi, 2005; Cuesta-Gonzales et al., 2006; Aribi 
and Arun, 2015), Islamic banks’ operational legitimacy relies on their religious identity 
and thus it is understandable why RSI is given most prominence.  
Table 6.2: Most/Least Popular CSP Dimensions 
 
The least popular dimensions, customers and environment are the same in both Islamic 
and conventional banks. The finding that environment is the least popular dimension in 
both Islamic and conventional banks is in line with prior literature, as it is a reflection 
of how pertinent the industry considers the issue of environment relative to other 
stakeholder issues (Maali et al., 2006; Kamla 2007; Mallin et al., 2014; Aribi and Arun, 
2015; Platonova et al., 2016). However, it is notable that customers, one of the 
important stakeholder groups, is the second least popular dimension. One possible 
reason for this may be the nature of disclosure provided by banks. As noted in Kamla 
(2007) and Aribi and Gao (2010), Islamic and conventional banks in the GCC in 
general provide largely qualitative (declarative) disclosure on customer relations in their 
Rank Islamic Conventional
1 Religion-specific Initiatives (RSI) Employees
2 Employees Socio-Economic Development (SED)
3 Community Community
4 Socio-Economic Development (SED) Religion-specific Initiatives (RSI)
5 Customers Customers
6 Environment Environment
Ranking is based on the average percentage of banks providing at least one evidence-based disclosure per CSP 
dimension over the 2009-2011 period. These are listed in order of popularity (from most to least popular).
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annual reports. As the CSP index used in this work specifically looks at evidence-based 
disclosure, this low ranking may be a reflection of the nature of disclosure provided. 
The declarative disclosure itself is reflective of a lack of initiatives in this dimension. 
As Kamla (2007) points out few Arab companies engage in satisfaction surveys or 
feedback mechanisms to communicate with customers, thus customer engagement 
initiatives are lacking in the GCC. Thus, there is a need for both an increase in greater 
customer related initiatives and improvement in disclosure practices.  
Notice, community is the third ranking dimension in both Islamic and conventional 
banks. As highly visible institutions, community-related CSR initiatives are important 
for the public image of both Islamic and conventional banks (Clarke and Gibson-Sweet, 
1999; Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). What is notable however is the ranking of socio-
economic development (SED). Contrary to the expectations expressed in the literature 
regarding Islamic banks and their role in socio-economic development (Chapra 1985; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Belal et al., 2015), results show 
that in practice, conventional banks on average prioritise SED dimension more than 
Islamic banks. 
The most popular SPIs as table 6.3 shows are identical in both Islamic and conventional 
banks, with the addition of zakah in Islamic banks. These are training and education, 
development of human capital and charitable donations. These results are consistent 
with prior literature (Maali et al., 2006; Kamla, 2007; Aribi and Gao, 2010). All four of 
the least popular SPIs in Islamic banks are from the environment dimension, which is 
consistent with the findings at the dimension level. In contrast conventional banks have 
two from the environment dimension, one from the employee dimension namely 
occupational health and safety and qard hasan which, as indicated in chapter 5, is absent 
in conventional banks. Although, conventional banks prioritise employee dimension the 
most, they clearly differentiate between individual SPIs as occupational health and 
safety is one of the least popular. This highlights the importance of looking not only at 
the CSP dimension level but also at the composition of each dimension to identify 
priorities within and between the Islamic and conventional banking industries.  
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Table 6.3: Most/Least Popular Social Performance Indicators 
 
To take a more in-depth look at the results, table 6.4 presents the percentage of banks 
providing evidence-based disclosure for each of the CSP dimensions and individual 
social performance indicators. As table 6.4 shows, there are only a few cases where the 
difference between Islamic and conventional banks is statistically significant. Thus in 
general, the composition of CSP does not differ too much between Islamic and 
conventional banks. This finding is in line with the institutional theory which postulates 
that organisations operating within an organisational field develop homogenous 
characteristics (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This significant differences exist in 1/6 
CSP dimensions (religion specific initiatives) and 5/25 SPIs, of which the difference is 
statistically significant in each year only for 2 SPIs, whilst for the other 3 SPIs the 
difference is not significant in all three years. Looking at the average percentage of 
banks, the difference between Islamic and conventional banks is statistically significant 
for 4/25 SPIs, of which 3 belong to the religion specific initiatives (RSI) dimension. 
Thus, the difference between Islamic and conventional banks is largely driven by the 
RSI dimension. Given earlier discussions, this result is unsurprising, as Islamic banks’ 
operational legitimacy relies on their religious identity whereas for conventional banks 
this is not the case.  
Islamic Conventional
Training and Education Training and Education
Development of Human Capital Development of Human Capital
Charitable Donations Charitable Donations
Zakah
Green Products Green Products
Environment Funding Conditions Environment Funding Conditions
Energy Conservation Occupational Health and Safety 
Environment Awareness Qard Hasan
Most Popular Social Performance Indicators (On Average > 50% Banks)
Least Popular Social Performance Indicators (On Average < 5% Banks)
The social performance indicators (SPIs) are not listed in rank order. Instead, to make it easy for the readers 
to see similarities and differences, SPIs common in both industries' most and least popular categories are 
presented next to each other. 
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Table 6.4: Percentage of Banks Providing Evidence-based Disclosure per CSP Dimension and Social Performance Indicator 
  
CSP Dimensions & Indicators
Islamic Conventional Islamic Conventional Islamic Conventional Islamic Conventional Islamic Conventional
Community 75% 63% 58% 60% 83% 63% 72% 62% 8% 0%
Customers 8% 23% 25% 31% 42% 26% 25% 27%      34%***      3%***
Employees 75% 80% 75% 89% 75% 89% 75% 86% 0% 9%
Environment 25% 20% 8% 29% 8% 31% 14% 27% -17% 11%
Socio-Economic Development (SED) 58% 66% 50% 77% 92% 83% 67% 75% 34% 17%
Religion-specific Initiatives (RSI)      92%***      37%***      92%***      37%***      92%***      31%***      92%***      35%*** 0% -6%
Community
Charitable Donations 67% 60% 58% 57% 75% 51% 67% 56% 8% -9%
Avenue for Donations 0% 11% 0% 14% 25% 14% 8% 13%     25%**      3%**
Healthcare Campaigns     0%**     34%**      0%***      43%*** 25% 40%    8%**     39%** 25% 6%
Culture 17% 29% 17% 34% 25% 40% 20% 34% 8% 11%
Customers
Quality of Service 8% 6% 8% 14% 25% 17% 14% 12% 17% 11%
Customer Service Skills 0% 14% 17% 14% 17% 6% 11% 11% 17% -8%
Customer Engagement 8% 3% 0% 11% 17% 11% 8% 8% 9% 8%
Employees
Diversity and Inclusion 8% 26% 25% 34% 33% 40% 22% 33% 25% 14%
Training and Education 67% 80% 58% 77% 58% 77% 61% 78% -9% -3%
Career Progression 8% 20% 17% 29% 17% 40% 14% 30% 9% 20%
Incentive Schemes 17% 9% 17% 20% 17% 23% 17% 17% 0% 14%
Occupational Health and Safety 0% 3% 8% 6% 17% 3% 8% 4%    17%**     0%**
Healthcare Benefits 8% 9% 8% 6% 17% 6% 11% 7% 9% -3%
cont.
Percentage of Banks Providing At Least One Evidence-based Disclosure per CSP Dimension
2009 2010 2011 3 yr. Average Difference over Period 
Percentage of Banks Providing Evidence-based Disclosure per CSP Indicator
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Table 6.4 Percentage of Banks Providing Evidence-based Disclosure per CSP Dimension and Social Performance Indicator 
 
 
Islamic Conventional Islamic Conventional Islamic Conventional Islamic Conventional Islamic Conventional
Environment
Environmental Impact 8% 11% 8% 20% 8% 14% 8% 15% 0% 3%
Green Products 0% 6% 0% 6% 8% 3% 3% 5% 8% -3%
Energy Conservation 8% 6% 0% 9% 8% 6% 5% 7% 0% 0%
Environment Awareness 8% 20% 8% 17% 0% 20% 5% 19% -8% 0%
Environment Funding Conditions 8% 3% 0% 3% 0% 9% 3% 5% -8% 6%
Socio-Economic Development (SED)
Support for Small and Medium Enterprises 8% 11% 17% 20% 58% 29% 28% 20%    50%**a 18%**
Infrastructure Development 25% 9% 8% 11%    42%**    11%** 25% 10% 17% 2%
Development of Human Capital 50% 60% 42% 66% 75% 66% 56% 64% 25% 6%
Financial Inclusion 17% 11% 8% 11% 33% 20% 19% 14% 16% 9%
Religion-specific Initiatives (RSI)
Zakah      92%***      31%***      92%***      31%***      92%***      29%***      92%***      30%*** 0% -2%
Facilitating Religious Duties    33%**     9%** 17% 9%     50%***      6%***    33%**     8%** 17% -3%
Qard Hasan      25%***      0%***      25%***      0%***      25%***      0%***      25%***      0%*** 0% 0%
CSP Dimensions & Indicators
2009 2010
***, ** denote significance at the 1%, and 5% levels respectively. Following the literature, 5% level of significance has been used as the cut-off point. To test if there is a statistically significant difference in 
the proportion of Islamic and conventional banks, the Boschloo Exact Test has been used. The most common test used for this purpose is Chi squared test. However it is not appropriate given the small sample 
size and with frequencies for several SPIs being less than five and even 0 in some cases. A possible alternative is the Fisher Exact Test. The Fisher Test however computes the p value, assuming the margins 
of the 2x2 table are fixed (both columns and rows). This assumption is not appropriate for this work as only the total number of banks is fixed, while the number of banks disclosing per CSP dimension and SPI 
are not prefixed. The alternative to Fisher’s Test when only one margin is fixed is the Barnard Test. Boschloo Test is a type of Barnard test, which uses Fisher’s p value to calculate the ‘as or more extreme’ 
tables; it is uniformly more powerful than Fisher (see Lydersen et al., 2009 for details). 
a To test if the change in proportion of Islamic/conventional banks disclosing between 2009 and 2011 is statistically significant, the McNemar Test has been used. Support for Small and Medium Enterprises is 
the only instance where results indicate statistical significance.
4B: Percentage of Banks Providing Evidence-based Disclosure per CSP Indicator
2011 3 yr. Average Difference over Period
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Looking at the individual SPIs, it is clear that zakah is driving the difference between 
Islamic and conventional banks at the RSI dimension level. It is also notable that within 
RSI, the difference between Islamic and conventional banks is not statistically 
significant for ‘facilitating religious duties’ in all three years. This is also the only SPI 
in the RSI dimension for which the percentage of Islamic banks change during the 
sample years as there is no change in the percentage of banks disclosing on zakah and 
qard hasan. Overall, excluding RSI (zakah and qard hasan), there is no statistically 
significant difference in the percentage of Islamic and conventional banks providing 
evidence-based disclosure for the CSP dimensions and SPIs which is systematic 
throughout all 3 years.   
Although not statistically significant, the differences between Islamic and conventional 
banks do nevertheless hold practical significance and therefore are discussed here. The 
focus of the discussion is on identifying which dimensions and SPIs are higher/lower in 
Islamic banks relative to conventional counterparts, as that’s an indication of their 
priority. As table 6.4 shows, the percentage of Islamic banks is higher than conventional 
banks in each year for RSI and its three constituent SPIs, namely zakah, facilitating 
religious duties and qard hasan as well as for charitable donations. The latter is in line 
with Maali et al (2006)’s finding that Islamic banks put emphasis on charitable 
donations.  
The percentage of Islamic banks is lower than conventional banks in each year for the 
Employees dimension and the following SPIs: healthcare campaigns, culture, diversity 
and inclusion, training and education, career progression, environmental impact and 
environmental awareness. On average, of the six CSP dimensions, Islamic banks are 
higher in community and RSI and lower in the other four. In the environment 
dimension, on average, Islamic banks are lower for all its constituent SPIs. This is in 
line with prior literature which finds that Islamic banks do not tend to show much 
concern for the environment and at times make no disclosures on this dimension in their 
annual reports (Maali et al., 2006; Kamla 2007; Mallin et al., 2014; Aribi and Arun, 
2015; Platonova et al., 2016). Results are mixed for the other four dimensions excluding 
RSI for which Islamic banks are higher on average.  
Looking at the individual years, it is notable that in 2010, the percentage of Islamic 
relative to conventional banks is lower for 5 of the 6 dimensions and for all SPIs in the 
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environment and socio-economic development (SED) dimension. These are largely 
driven by an increase in the percentage of conventional banks, rather than a decrease in 
Islamic banks (which is the case with 3/4 SPIs in the SED dimension). In 2011, the 
results for Islamic banks improve as they become higher for 4 of the 6 dimensions, with 
a remarkable turnaround for SED, going from lower to higher for all its constituent 
SPIs. In the customers dimension as well, Islamic banks turn from being lower in 2 to 
higher in all 3 SPIs. Performance improves in the environment and community 
dimensions as well, with a higher percentage of Islamic banks in 2/5 and 2/4 SPIs 
respectively. These changes are driven primarily by a rise in the percentage of Islamic 
banks. Although conventional banks have also seen an increase in most SPIs over the 
2010-2011 period, this increase is modest relative to Islamic banks for which the 
change is much more pronounced, increasing in some cases by 17% – 42% points with 
the largest rise in SED’s SPIs (25% – 41% points). These results are not only consistent 
with findings discussed in section 6.4.1, where it was noted that the improvement in 
CSP scores in conventional (Islamic) banks was primarily in 2010 (2011), due to the 
differing effects of the financial crisis, but are also complimentary providing further 
insights into how the composition of CSP changed during those years. 
Looking at the overall change now (2009 – 2011), it is notable that the difference 
between Islamic and conventional banks is statistically significant only for the 
customers dimension. While conventional banks have seen a modest increase of 3% 
points, Islamic banks have increased by 34% points. The percentage of Islamic banks 
have increased by the same amount in SED as well, however, for this dimension, the 
increase in conventional banks is also notable (17% points) and thus the difference 
between the two is not statistically significant. For the individual SPIs, there is a 
statistically significant difference for: avenue for donations, occupational health and 
safety and support for SMEs. The significant result regarding the first two indicates that 
Islamic banks have made considerable effort to adopt SPIs present in the conventional 
banking industry. In addition to avenue for donations and occupational health and 
safety, Islamic banks have also adopted the following SPIs over the course of the three 
years: healthcare campaigns, customer service skills, and green products. Particularly in 
the case of healthcare campaign, the difference in Islamic and conventional banks has 
gone from being highly significant in 2009 to not significant in 2011. These results are 
indicative of mimetic isomorphism. It is notable however that, contrary to the views of 
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its proponents, Islamic banking industry appears to follow, rather than lead the CSR 
movement in the GCC banking industry. 
The largest increase in any SPI is in support for SMEs (50%). This is the only SPI for 
which the change in the proportion of Islamic banks between 2009 and 2011 is 
statistically significant. Given these results, naturally two questions arise: what is 
driving the increase in Customers and SED in Islamic banks and particularly support for 
SMEs which has increased by 50% points in 3 years.  
 Although not obvious to those outside of the industry, however both the customers 
dimension and support for SMEs share one common factor: these are delineated as 
areas of growth opportunities for Islamic banks during the 2010-2012 period by 
industry analysts. The World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report, produced with 
Ernst & Young (henceforth the Report), provides yearly overview of the global Islamic 
banking industry, indicating areas of growth and concern and makes recommendations 
on the direction the industry should follow. The main message in its 2011 Report was 
that a “customer centric operating model” is required “to drive future (sustainable) 
growth” in this industry (p.4), as Islamic banks now compete for customers who are 
open to both Islamic and conventional banking. It further emphasised ‘SME banking’ as 
a key growth opportunity for the industry. Moreover, it also encouraged Islamic banks 
to get involved in infrastructure projects as many GCC governments, as a response to 
the financial crisis, have committed to spending on large infrastructure projects (Ernst 
& Young, 2011). Results for 2011 reflect Islamic banks acting on this, as the difference 
in the percentage of Islamic and conventional banks engaging in ‘infrastructure 
development’ has become statistically significant in 2011, while it was not in the 
previous two years.  
Given the above, it is quite obvious that Islamic banks CSP especially areas the industry 
is concentrating and growing on is driven by profit and market share concerns, and not 
altruistic objectives as many in the Islamic banking CSR literature suggest. 
6.4.3 Evaluating and Comparing Banks on the Social Performance 
Quantitative Indicators (SPQIs)  
To complement the above analysis with a more in-depth comparison, this section 
evaluates Islamic and conventional banks’ performance using the three SPQIs defined 
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in section 6.3.2. First, the relative performance of Islamic and conventional banks is 
examined on %charitable donations, followed by the three measures designed to assess 
%women representation in leadership roles and finally, Islamic banks are evaluated on 
the level of %qard hasan they provide. Results for each SPQI are discussed sequentially 
below.   
%Charitable Donations 
As the earlier analysis and discussion in section 6.4.2 highlighted, the percentage of 
Islamic banks providing evidence-based disclosure on the SPI ‘Charitable Donations’ is 
higher than conventional banks for each of the three years analysed. By comparing the 
%charitable donations made by Islamic and conventional banks, this section 
investigates whether the level of charitable donations i.e. the percentage of revenue a 
bank has donated to charitable causes, is also higher in Islamic banks. As the definition 
of %charitable donations includes only cash donations, any banks which made 
disclosures of in-kind donations but did not provide a monetary value of their donations 
could not be included in this analysis. Thus due to data limitations, only a subset of the 
sample banks are assessed using this SPQI.  
Results for each year, the three-year average and change in %charitable donations are 
presented in table 6.5. As the figures show, the three-year average for Islamic and 
conventional banking industries is almost identical at 0.68% and 0.63% respectively. 
There is a diference in the annual average %charitable donation levels, which is higher 
in Islamic banks for both 2009 and 2010 however the difference is not statistically 
significant. Although the literature finds that Islamic banks accentuate their charitable 
giving (Maali et al., 2006), results from this study show that on average Islamic banks 
do not show evidence of donating a higher percentage of their revenue to charitable 
causes compared to their conventional counterparts.  
While the average donation levels are relatively similar, there are differences between 
the industries. As the 3-year standard deviation shows, there is greater variation within 
the conventional banking industry (0.73%) compared to Islamic banking (0.22%). The 
maximum and minimum also reflect this as the range for the 3-year average 
%charitable donations ranges from 0.40% to 0.92% in Islamic banks compared to 
0.11% to 2.11% in conventional banks. Yearly standard deviations also show that 
variation is consistently higher for conventional banks relative to Islamic  
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Table 6.5: Percentage Charitable Donations by Islamic and Conventional Banks 
  
Banks 2009 2010 2011 3 yr. Average Change
ABG 1.66% 0.76% 0.35% 0.92% -1.30%
ASBa - 0.92% 0.42% 0.67% -0.50%
BAJ 1.04% 0.54% 0.60% 0.73% -0.44%
BISB - - 0.76% - -
KFH - - 0.57% - -
QIBb 0.25% 0.55% - 0.40% 0.30%
Min. 0.25% 0.54% 0.35% 0.40% -1.30%
Max. 1.66% 0.92% 0.76% 0.92% 0.30%
Median 1.04% 0.66% 0.57% 0.70% -0.47%
Mean 0.98% 0.69% 0.54% 0.68% -0.48%
St. Dev 0.70% 0.18% 0.16% 0.22% 0.66%
ANB 0.12% 0.15% 0.06% 0.11% -0.07%
AUB 0.14% 0.14% 0.12% 0.13% -0.02%
BBK 1.94% 1.56% 1.42% 1.64% -0.53%
BMIB 0.10% 0.14% 0.37% 0.20% 0.27%
BOS 0.33% 0.36% 0.37% 0.36% 0.04%
DB - 0.01% - - -
NBAD 0.40% 0.48% 0.64% 0.51% 0.24%
NBB 1.94% 1.25% 3.14% 2.11% 1.20%
NBO 0.12% 0.13% 0.18% 0.15% 0.06%
NCB 0.44% 0.58% 0.44% 0.49% 0.01%
Min. 0.10% 0.01% 0.06% 0.11% -0.53%
Max. 1.94% 1.56% 3.14% 2.11% 1.20%
Median 0.33% 0.26% 0.37% 0.36% 0.04%
Mean 0.62% 0.48% 0.75% 0.63% 0.13%
St. Dev 0.76% 0.52% 0.98% 0.73% 0.46%
a Change is calculated as %charitable donations made in 2011 minus %charitable donations made in 
2010 ; b Change is calculated as %charitable donations made in 2010 minus %charitable donations 
made in 2009 
Islamic Banks
Conventional Banks
% Charitable Donations
 '-' denote missing values i.e. where banks did not provide either evidence-based disclosure on 
charitable donations or only mentioned in-kind donations without stating a monetary value in their 
annual reports. 
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counterparts in each year, and while the variation in %charitable donations within the 
Islamic banking industry has reduced, from standard deviation of 0.70% in 2009 to 
0.16% in 2011, for conventional banks it has increased from 0.76% to 0.98%. Change 
in the average %charitable donations over the 2009-2011 also differs between the 
industries as it is negative for Islamic banks (-0.48%) but positive (0.13%) for 
conventional banks. Moreover, as the difference in the mean and median values 
indicates, the distribution for conventional banks is skewed to the left, in contrast to 
Islamic banks which is skewed to the right (except for 2010).  
Differences between banks within each industry are also noticeable. Two banks from 
each industry particularly stand out, namely, ABG and BAJ in the Islamic and BBK and 
NBB in the conventional banking industry as these banks have made donations 
exceeding 1% of their revenue in at least one year during the sample period. While 3 of 
these 4 banks have showed a reduction in %charitable donations over the sample 
period, the most notable of which is in ABG (-1.30%), NBB has shown an increase of 
1.20%, leading to its donation level exceeding 3% of its revenue. In contrast, there are 
also banks such as ANB and NBO where %charitable donation is below 0.20% of their 
revenue. Thus, as table 6.5 shows there is considerable heterogeneity in the level of 
%charitable donations and change in this over the sample period between individual 
banks, within and across the two industries.  
Finally, it is also notable that there is no clear correlation between the level of 
%charitable donation and the overall CSP score for a bank (refer to table 6.1 for CSP 
scores). Thus, banks that engage in greater variety of CSR initiatives do not necessarily 
donate a higher percentage of their revenue to charitable causes. Similarly, banks that 
donate a higher percentage of their revenue to charitable causes do not shy away from 
undertaking a variety of other CSR initiatives. In line with previous literature (see e.g. 
Waddock and Graves, 1997; Chen et al., 2008) this study’s findings also confirm the 
value of using a multidimensional instrument (such as the CSP index) over a single 
indicator (e.g. %donation) as the latter does not reflect a firm’s overall social 
performance.  
% Women Representation in Leadership Roles 
This subsection evaluates Islamic and conventional banks’ performance on the issue of 
women representation in leadership roles, using the three measures, %BoD, %SMP and 
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%BoD&SMP defined in section 6.3.2. Data for these three %Women Representation 
measures has been collected from banks’ annual reports. Where banks did not provide 
details of their board of directors and/or senior management, relevant data to calculate 
these measures could not be collected, leading to some missing observations.  
Table 6.6 presents the percentage of Islamic and conventional banks which have 
women represented on their board of directors (BoD) and/or in senior management 
positions (SMP). As the figures show, the percentage of banks where women are 
represented in higher management has increased over the 2009-2011 period in both the 
Islamic and conventional banking industries. The only exception is the percentage of 
conventional banks with women in SMP which increased in 2010 but fell back to its 
2009 level in 2011. Nevertheless, the general trend is positive as the percentage of 
banks where women hold positions on the BoD and/or SMP has increased. This finding 
is in line with the stakeholder and institutional theory (particularly mimetic and 
normative isomorphism) which, as discussed earlier, suggest that %women 
representation will expectedly increase given the context of changing attitudes towards 
women in the workplace, rising social pressure and significance of women 
empowerment initiatives in the GCC countries (Kelly, 2009; Krause, 2009; Randeree, 
2012; Young, 2016).  
Table 6.6: Percentage of Banks with Women Representation in Leadership Roles 
 
The overall improvement in women representation is notably greater in the Islamic 
banking industry as the percentage of Islamic banks where women are represented on 
the BoD and/or in SMP roles has increased by 17% points, compared to the 
conventional banking industry where the percentage has increased by 11% points 
(column 3). Nevertheless, as the figures in table 6.6 show, the actual percentage of 
Islamic banks with women representation is consistently lower than the percentage of 
conventional banks for all three measures and throughout the three years analysed. 
Year
Islamic Conventional Islamic Conventional Islamic Conventional
2009 0% 6% 8% 20% 8% 26%
2010 0% 11% 17% 23% 17% 31%
2011 8% 17% 17% 20% 25% 37%
Change 8% 11% 8% 0% 17% 11%
Change is calculated as the percentage of banks with women representation in leadership roles in 2011 minus the 2009 value
Percentage of Banks with Women Representation in Leadership Roles
Board of Directors (BoD) Senior Management BoD and/or Senior Management
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Therefore, while the Islamic banking industry has shown a greater improvement 
overall, when the two industries are compared on the percentage of banks that have 
women represented in leadership positions, the conventional banking industry clearly 
outperforms its Islamic counterpart.  
Results from table 6.6 (column 1 and 2) also show that in both the Islamic and 
conventional banking industries, the percentage of banks with female directors is lower 
than the percentage of banks where women hold senior management positions. This 
finding is also consistent with the global trend as prior research has shown that most 
companies do not have female directors, although  many such companies do have 
female representation in other senior management roles (Terjesen and Singh,  2008; 
Jurkus et al., 2011; MSCI, 2018). Moreover, as table 6.6 shows, relative to the Islamic 
banking industry, which has progressed from having no banks with female directors in 
2009 to 8% in 2011, the percentage of conventional banks with female directors has 
almost trebled over the sample period (from 6% to 17%). Thus, results show that 
although the overall improvement is greater in the Islamic banking industry (as shown 
in column 3), conventional banks have made greater progress on the issue of 
representing women at the highest decision making position (BoD). These findings 
provide support for the approach adopted in this study, that is, to evaluate gender 
diversity within and across industries through multiple (composite and specific) 
measures, as advocated in prior literature and by industry analysts (Terjesen and Singh,  
2008; Jurkus et al., 2011; MSCI, 2018), since the different measures not only provide 
greater insight but also lead to different conclusions181. 
Table 6.7 shows the percentage of the BoD and/or senior management teams that are 
female, in banks where women are represented in higher management. As the lower 
panel of the table shows, on average, over the 2009-2011 period, 10-12% of the BoD 
and 8-11% of senior management teams comprise of female members in GCC banks. 
There is almost no difference in the mean and median percentages for the BoD however 
the median percentage of women members is slightly lower than the mean for senior  
181 As mentioned earlier, when the two industries are compared using the composite measure i.e. the 
percentage of banks where women are represented on the BoD and/or in SMP, the Islamic banking shows 
a greater improvement, however, when the industries are compared using the single measure i.e. the 
percentage of banks where women are represented on the BoD specifically, conventional banking 
outperforms its Islamic counterpart.   
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Table 6.7: Percentage Women Representation in Leadership Roles: Board of Directors (BoD) and/or in Senior Management Position 
 
 
Banks
2009 2010 2011 Change    2009 2010 2011 Change    2009 2010 2011 Change    
ADIB 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 6% 6% -1% 5% 4% 4% -1%
BYB 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 11% 11% 0% 6% 6% 6%
KFH 0% 0% 10% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 6%
BB 0% - 0% 0% 13% - 27% 14% 6% - 17% 11%
BBKa - 0% 9% 9% - 0% 0% 0% - 0% 4% 4%
BM 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 4% 8% 4% 3% 3% 6% 3%
BMIb 0% 0% 0% 0% - 8% 11% 3% - 5% 7% 2%
BS 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 13% 14% 1% 7% 7% 8% 1%
CBD 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 3% 3% 0% 3% 2% 2% -1%
CBI 0% 0% 11% 11% - - 0% - - - 6% -
CBK 0% 17% 13% 13% - - - - - - - -
DB 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 4% 0% -4% 3% 3% 0% -3%
FB 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 9% 8% 0% 5% 5% 5% 0%
NBK 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 17% 9% -24% 14% 7% 5% -9%
NBO 9% 9% 9% 0% 0% 3% 0% 0% 3% 5% 5% 2%
OAB 0% 13% 13% 13% - - - - - - - -
SHB 10% 10% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 4% 4% 0%
cont.
Islamic Banks
Conventional Banks
Board of Directors 
% Women Representation  in Leadership Roles: Board of Directors (BoD) and/or in Senior Management Position
Senior Management BoD and/or Senior Management
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Table 6.7: Percentage Women Representation in Leadership Roles: Board of Directors (BoD) and/or in Senior Management Position 
 
 
2009 2010 2011 Change    2009 2010 2011 Change    2009 2010 2011 Change    
Islamic Banks
Min. 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% 0% 0% 4% -1%
Max. 0% 0% 10% 10% 7% 13% 11% 11% 5% 6% 6% 6%
Conventional Banks
Min. 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -24% 3% 0% 0% -9%
Max. 10% 17% 13% 13% 33% 17% 27% 14% 14% 7% 17% 11%
Min. 9% 9% 9% 9% 3% 3% 3% -24% 3% 2% 2% -9%
Max. 10% 17% 13% 13% 33% 17% 27% 14% 14% 7% 17% 11%
Median 10% 11% 10% 11% 7% 7% 9% 1% 4% 5% 5% 2%
Mean 10% 12% 11% 11% 11% 8% 11% 0% 5% 5% 6% 2%
St. Dev 1% 3% 1% 2% 10% 5% 7% 11% 3% 1% 3% 5%
No' of Banks 2 4 7 5 8 10 9 9 10 11 14 13
% of Sampled 4% 9% 15% 11% 17% 21% 19% 19% 21% 23% 30% 28%
BoD and/or Senior Management
Banks with Positive %Women Representationc
GCC Banking Industry Level (includes Islamic and Conventional Banks)
a Change is calculated as  2011 value for all three measures minus 2010 value. b Change is calculated as 2011 value minus 2010 value for %SMP and %BoD&SMP. c These are calculated using only the banks 
which have positive %women representation ratios (includes both Islamic and conventional banks). d This percentage is calculated using the total sample figure (i.e. 47 GCC banks) which includes Islamic and 
convnentional banks 
 '- ' denote missing values i.e. where data on board of directors and/or senior management is unavailable from banks' annual reports. Only banks which have positive women representation on the board of 
directors and/or in senior management position for at least one year during the 2009-2011 period are listed here, therefore banks which have 0% women representation ratios for all 3 sample years are not listed on 
this table. Banks are listed in alphabetical order.
% Women Representation  in Leadership Roles: Board of Directors (BoD) and/or in Senior Management Position
Board of Directors Senior Management
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management. There is also greater variation in senior management teams as the 
standard deviation ranges between 5-10%, compared to BoD which has a standard 
deviation of 1-3%. Column 3 shows that women comprise almost 5% of the higher 
management teams, i.e. including BoD and senior management, in GCC banks and that 
the mean and median are almost identical.  
Comparing the two industries shows that in banks where women hold position on the 
BoD and/or SMP, the percentage of women on these teams, for most banks, is similar to 
the industry average. There are however notable exceptions especially in the 
conventional banking industry, that have notably higher  percentage of their BoD  
and/or senior management comprising of female members. In BB, for example, women 
constitute 17% of higher management compared to the industry average of 6% in 2011 
(column 3) and the percentage is even higher, 27%, for senior management position. 
Similarly, CBK has had 17% female directors in 2010, which although reduced to 13% 
in 2011, is still higher than the industry average. The percentage of women in Islamic 
banks’ higher management however, is largely on par with the industry average. 
Results also show that in all banks with female directors, the proportion of women on 
BoD has either remained the same or there has been an increase. In senior management 
teams however, there has been both positive and negative change over the sample 
period in different banks. The most notable is NBK where the percentage of females in 
SMP has reduced from 33% (2009) to 9% (2011). Such a significant change has not 
been observed in the Islamic banking industry.  
Overall, comparison of %women representation measures between Islamic and 
conventional banking industries show that, not only are there fewer Islamic banks 
where women hold position in higher management but the proportion of women in 
these teams tends to be lower as well compared to conventional banks. Empirical 
evidence therefore suggests that the conventional banking industry outperforms its 
Islamic counterpart in terms of representing women in higher management positions. 
While both Islamic and conventional banks face the same social pressures, it is notable 
that the Islamic banking industry lags behind its conventional counterpart since the 
absolute percentage of banks with women representation is lower in the Islamic banking 
industry. The proportion of female members in higher management teams is also lower 
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than several conventional banks. Is this poorer performance an Islamic banking specific 
issue? Prior research indicates that it is not.  Malaysian Islamic financial institutions for 
example, not only boast several women executives but also several female sharia 
scholars. The country has also had a female central bank governor working to promote 
Islamic finance and appointed its second female scholar on the country’s Shariah 
Advisory Council in 2011. Indonesia also has six women on the country’s National 
Shariah Council. In contrast, no Islamic bank in the GCC has a female member on the 
Sharia Supervisory Board and none of the women in higher management hold the top 
chief executive position. The difference between countries may primarily be driven by 
cultural differences as the GCC is known to be more conservative than Malaysia (Omar 
and Permatasari, 2011). This conservatism may be reflected more strongly in Islamic 
banks than conventional counterparts in the region and the possibility that the presence 
of a male-only Sharia Supervisory Board in Islamic banks may have an influence 
remains to be investigated. More research is required in this area, which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
%Qard Hasan 
This section evaluates Islamic banks on the final SPQI, %qard hasan. As the amount of 
qard hasan a bank provides is recorded in the notes to their financial statements even 
Islamic banks that did not publish voluntary CSR reporting can be assessed against this 
SPQI. Thus, the entire sample of 23 Islamic banks analysed earlier in the thesis (in 
chapter 4) were examined182. Only 5 provided evidence of offering qard hasan. Of these 
5 banks, %qard hasan could not be calculated for ASB, as the figure reported in the 
banks’ annual report did not provide a breakdown to determine the value of qard hasan 
relating to each individual year. Results for the remaining 4 banks are presented in table 
6.8. 
182 Recall from chapter 5 (section 5.4.1), banks which produced only the mandatory financial statements 
as opposed to a complete annual report (with voluntary CSR disclosure) could not be included in the CSP 
study. This resulted in 12 of the 23 Islamic banks being included in the analysis for chapter 5 and 6. 
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Table 6.8: Percentage Qard Hasan by Islamic Banks 
 
As table 6.8 shows, there is considerable difference in %qard hasan between SIB and 
the other 3 banks. Over the 2009-2011 period, %qard hasan ranges from 3% to over 
10% in SIB, compared to 0% to 0.22% in the other banks. Both BISB and DIB have 
extremely similar levels of %qard hasan, on average 0.02% and 0.01% respectively and 
while ABG does have higher %qard hasan with an average of 0.18%, all are negligibly 
low compared to SIB which has an average of 6.93%. The change in %qard hasan over 
2009-2011 period also shows similar variation between banks. While SIB has increased 
its %qard hasan by more than 7% points, in ABG %qard hasan has reduced by 0.06% 
points while BISB has almost maintained its level, increasing by only 0.01% points and 
DIB has reduced by 0.02% points to reach 0% qard hasan in 2011. Thus, for each year, 
the 3-yr average and the change over sample period, SIB clearly stands out as an outlier 
with noticeably higher level of %qard hasan. The impact of SIB on the industry average 
is also clear. With SIB included, the industry average %qard hasan ranges from 0.86% 
in 2009 to 2.68% in 2011, with a 3-year average of 1.78%. Excluding SIB, the yearly 
and 3-year industry average %qard hasan does not even amount to 0.1%, similar to the 
median. The industry 3-year average falls from 1.78% to 0.07% with the standard 
deviation ranging around 0.1% throughout the 3 years.  
Closer study of these banks’ annual reports reveals the possible reason for the relatively 
higher level of %qard hasan in SIB. What is noticeably different between SIB and the 
Banks 2009 2010 2011 3 yr. Average Change
ABG 0.22% 0.15% 0.16% 0.18% -0.06%
BISB 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.01%
DIB 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% -0.02%
SIB 3.19% 7.05% 10.55% 6.93% 7.36%
Min. 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% -0.06%
Max. 3.19% 7.05% 10.55% 6.93% 7.36%
Median 0.12% 0.09% 0.09% 0.10% 0.00%
Mean 0.86% 1.81% 2.68% 1.78% 1.82%
St dev. 1.55% 3.49% 5.24% 3.43% 3.69%
Excluding SIB
Mean 0.08% 0.06% 0.06% 0.07% -0.02%
St dev. 0.11% 0.08% 0.08% 0.09% 0.04%
% Qard Hasan
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other banks is how qard hasan is offered by the bank. BISB (and ASB) specifically 
highlight qard hasan as a mechanism through which the bank discharges its social 
responsibility and therefore considers qard hasan to be an activity similar to making 
charitable donations. ABG and DIB treat qard hasan as peripheral to their core 
financing activity, recording it as part of ‘other assets’ on their balance sheet. SIB 
however offers qard hasan as one of the main financing options to its customers, similar 
to how murabahah and other financing contracts are offered. Unsurprisingly, it 
therefore holds a much higher percentage of its financing portfolio in qard hasan form 
compared to other Islamic banks. To understand why SIB alone offers qard hasan as 
one of its main financing options while other banks do not requires further research. 
Future studies should therefore consider conducting a case study investigation into SIB 
and its choice of financing contracts, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Finally, it must be noted that the above results show the benefit of evaluating banks’ 
CSP using quantitative measures (i.e. the SPQIs developed in this thesis). While the 
dichotomous scoring method puts all Islamic banks that provide qard hasan in the same 
category, %qard hasan allows further differentiation between individual banks and 
illustrates the considerable amount of intra-industry variation that exists, which requires 
further investigation. Future studies should therefore complement the popular 
dichotomous scoring method with additional quantitative measures where possible as 
these not only provide new insights buts also open up avenues for further research.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to compare the corporate social performance (CSP) of 
GCC-based Islamic and conventional banks over the 2009 – 2011 period. To achieve 
this aim, this chapter was divided in three parts. In part 1, Islamic and conventional 
banks were assessed against the CSP Index developed in chapter 5, using a 
dichotomous scoring method to generate CSP scores. Using these CSP scores, this 
chapter first answered the question: do Islamic banks, on average, have higher CSP 
scores than conventional banks? By comparing banks’ CSP scores, this chapter also 
examined the level of intra-industry variation and changes in year-on-year CSP scores 
to investigate how CSP scores have changed across and within the two industries over 
the 2009-2011 period. In part 2, this chapter investigated how the composition of CSP 
differs between Islamic and conventional banks to answer the question: are the most 
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and least popular CSP dimensions and SPIs the same across the two industries? Finally, 
in part 3, a more in-depth analysis was conducted where banks were assessed and 
compared using three social performance quantitative indicators (SPQIs) constructed in 
this chapter to provide a quantitative measure of banks’ performance on selected SPIs 
for which monetary and/or impact data could be collected.  
As this chapter showed, on average, there is no difference between Islamic and 
conventional banks’ CSP scores. Therefore, contrary to the expectations and the claims 
made by the industry, Islamic banks do not present an ethical alternative to their 
conventional counterparts. Instead there is considerable variation within the Islamic and 
conventional banking industries, with CSP scores varying between banks and within 
individual banks over time. At the CSP dimensions level, results showed that the 
difference between Islamic and conventional banks is only significant for religion-
specific initiatives. This result is driven by zakah, which is due to the regulatory 
environment, as 75% of Islamic banks are required to report on or pay zakah either by 
industry regulation or state law.  
Furthermore, this study found that on average, the most and least popular SPIs are 
almost identical in both industries. However, year on year comparisons showed a 
complex picture, highlighting that CSP is not only multidimensional but also dynamic. 
The biggest changes in Islamic banks’ CSP are increases in the customers dimension 
and in support for SMEs. In both cases, the increase appears to be driven by profit and 
market share motives.  
Comparison using the three SPQI’s indicated that on average, the percentage of 
charitable donations made by Islamic and conventional banks does not differ 
significantly, and while Islamic banks have made greater improvement in representing 
women in leadership positions, conventional banks tend to generally outperform their 
Islamic counterparts on this issue. Finally comparison of %qard hasan between Islamic 
banks further illustrated the considerable amount of intra-industry variation that exists, 
which requires further research. 
Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
This study compares the CSP of 12 Islamic and 35 conventional banks located in the 
GCC for the years 2009-2011. To extend this work, three suggestions are made based 
on the limitations of this work. First, increasing the sample size should be considered. 
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Second, increasing the number of years analysed would also be helpful in assessing the 
changes in CSP more broadly. Third, this chapter does not investigate what are the 
determinants CSP. Future studies should therefore examine what factors can explain 
why CSP scores are higher in some banks than others. 
Contributions 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to compare the CSP of Islamic and 
conventional banks. It shows that Islamic banks in practice do not offer an ethical 
alternative to conventional counterparts. Furthermore, by decomposing CSP at its 
dimension and individual SPI level, this chapter also highlights that differences between 
Islamic and conventional banks are more subtle than broad generalisations suggest. 
Finally, this chapter also contributes to the literature by constructing and using three 
SPQI’s to compare Islamic and conventional banks’ CSP, complementing the 
dichotomous scoring method commonly used in the CSR literature to further 
differentiate between individual banks. In doing so, this is also the first study, to the 
best of my knowledge, which compares how the percentage of donations made by 
banks and women representation in leadership roles differs between the Islamic and 
conventional banking industries. 
Finally, the next chapter concludes this thesis.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion    
7.1 Introduction 
There were four questions posed at the beginning of this thesis. These questions are 
reproduced below followed by a summary of the each of chapters, explaining how these 
questions were answered in this thesis  
7.2 Research Questions 
1. How and why has the Islamic banking industry diverged from its PLS-oriented 
theory towards non-PLS oriented practices?  
2. Are some Islamic banks operating closer to the principle of PLS than others, and 
therefore can be considered more Islamic? If so, what factors enable some banks 
to provide more PLS financing than others? 
3. Can a single research instrument be used to compare the corporate social 
performance of Islamic and conventional banks?  
4. How does the corporate social performance (CSP) of Islamic and conventional 
banks differ?  
7.3 Summary of Chapters 
Chapter 2 introduced the central concepts including the three key prohibitions of 
Islamic law which are directly relevant for the financial aspect of Islamic banking. The 
meaning and scope of sharia and the prohibition of riba were explained in detail due to 
their importance and relevance for the discussions presented in chapter 3 and 4. The 
prohibitions of gharar and haram industries were covered more concisely and 
implications of all three prohibitions for Islamic banking were explicitly stated. By 
addressing the common misconceptions held about these concepts, the chapter provided 
a sound foundation to build further discussions on. 
Chapter 3 presented a detailed account of the development of Islamic banking and 
explained how and why the industry deviated from its PLS-oriented theory to non-PLS 
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oriented practices. The chapter presented the historical context and provided a 
description of the theoretical model of Islamic banking. This was followed by an in-
depth account of the three different phases Islamic banking underwent in its transition 
from theory and to reality. Controversies related to Islamic banking products as well as 
the sharia certification process were also discussed at length. Finally a four-part 
analysis explained why the divergence between theory and practice of Islamic banking 
was inevitable, by discussing: transaction costs, impact of the institutional environment, 
incompatibility between the theoretical model of Islamic banking and the roles of a 
commercial bank and finally the inconsistency between principles of commercial 
banking and Islamic finance. The chapter concluded that no present-day Islamic 
commercial bank can be fully consistent with Islamic principles and raised the question 
whether some banks could be considered more Islamic than others, setting the 
motivation for the question addressed in chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 used two measures of PLS to assess and compare Islamic and conventional 
banks on the PLS criteria. Contrary to the implicit assumption made in the literature, the 
chapter showed that there is considerable variation in PLS levels between individual 
Islamic banks, both in PLS financing levels and PLS-MEA levels. The chapter 
identified a typology of Islamic banks with three distinct groups initially using a single 
year’s (2012) data. Using cluster analysis and multiple years of data (2009 – 2012), the 
chapter validated the presence of heterogeneous (strategic) groups in the Islamic 
banking industry, following distinct, quasi-conventional, hybrid, and PLS-oriented 
business models. The final part of the chapter examined the question: why do some 
banks have higher levels of PLS financing than others? Mundlak (1978)’s approach was 
used to estimate the relationship between PLS financing and factors identified from the 
literature as its potential determinants. Results showed that there is some support to 
suggest that diseconomies of scale exist in the provision of PLS financing as the size of 
a bank and PLS financing levels are negatively related. Contrary to the proposition 
posed in prior literature, a positive relationship is found between deposit ratio and PLS 
financing. Most importantly, results from this study illustrate clear cross-country 
variation in PLS levels within the GCC region, suggesting that the institutional 
environment matters in enabling adherence to religious principles, by reducing 
transaction costs associated with PLS financing. 
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Chapter 5 addressed the question of whether a single research instrument can be used to 
assess and compare the CSP of Islamic and conventional banks. The chapter discussed 
the concept of CSR based on Carroll (1979)’s widely-cited definition and presented the 
theoretical framework based on legitimacy, stakeholder, and institutional theory. In 
light of these, the chapter explained why the assumption that religious-CSR is category 
particular to Islamic banking, as asserted in the current literature (Belal et al., 2015),  is 
inconsistent with the conceptual and theoretical basis of CSR. It then addressed the 
challenge of measuring CSP. By reviewing previous literature and building on the 
established link between comprehensive reporting and performance, this chapter made 
the case for evidence-based disclosure to be used as a more objective means to assess 
CSP from social reporting. Using this evidence-based disclosure criterion, the chapter 
undertook in-depth content analysis of 47 banks’ annual reports for the years 2009-2011 
and from this, the CSP index was constructed. The multidimensional CSP index covers 
25 social performance indicators within 6 dimensions namely: Community, Customers, 
Employees, Environment, Socio-economic Development and Religious-specific 
Initiatives. By comparing which social performance indicators are absent in 
Islamic/conventional banks, this chapter also provided empirical evidence which 
invalidates the assumption that religious CSR is a category particular to Islamic 
banking. Finally, it identified qard hasan as the only religiously inspired initiative 
unique to Islamic banking and drew parallel between PLS financing and qard hasan. 
Chapter 6 used the CSP index constructed in chapter 5 to compare the level and 
composition of CSP between Islamic and conventional banks. In drawing comparisons, 
the chapter asked two questions. First, do Islamic banks, on average, have higher CSP 
scores than conventional banks? Second, how does the composition of CSP differ 
between Islamic and conventional banks? E.g. are the most/least popular CSP 
dimensions and social performance indicators the same? For these questions, the 
difference over the 2009-2011 period was also examined to identify: firstly, if and how 
the level and composition of CSP has changed within both industries and secondly, how 
the changes compare across the two industries. To further extend the literature on 
Islamic and conventional banks’ CSP comparison, the chapter also complemented the 
dichotomous CSP score method with quantitative measures of selected social 
performance indicators developed in chapter 5, for which monetary or impact data 
could be collected from banks’ annual reports. Termed as Social Performance 
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Quantitative Indicators (SPQIs), these assessed the extent to which a bank engages in a 
particular CSR activity, allowing for greater differentiation between individual banks 
and a more comprehensive comparison between the Islamic and conventional banking 
industries. The chapter made the following conclusions. On average, there is no 
difference between Islamic and conventional banks’ CSP scores. Thus contrary to the 
expectations and the claims made by the industry, Islamic banks do not present an 
ethical alternative to their conventional counterparts. Rather, there is considerable 
variation within the Islamic and conventional banking industries, with CSP scores 
varying between banks, and within individual banks over time. At the CSP dimensions 
level, the difference between Islamic and conventional banks is only significant for 
religion-specific initiatives, a result that is driven by zakah. On average, the most and 
least popular SPIs are almost identical in both industries. However, year on year 
comparisons show a complex picture, highlighting that CSP is not only 
multidimensional but also dynamic. The biggest changes in Islamic banks’ CSP are 
increases in the customers dimension and in support for SMEs. In both cases, the 
increase is driven by profit and market share motives. Finally, comparison made using 
the three SPQI’s indicated that on average, the percentage of charitable donations made 
by Islamic and conventional banks does not differ significantly, and while Islamic 
banks have made greater improvement in representing women in leadership positions, 
conventional banks tend to generally outperform their Islamic counterparts on this 
issue. Comparison of %qard hasan between Islamic banks further illustrated the 
considerable amount of intra-industry variation that exists between banks, which 
requires further research. 
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